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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Making decisions in the business environment is arguably the most challenging aspect 
of managers‘ yet also the easiest to fail in. Unlike individual decisions managers as agents for 
their organizations make decisions amidst high levels of ambiguity, incomplete information and 
mostly under time pressure. These are the very conditions that make managers vulnerable to the 
volition-undermining potential of decision-generated affect precisely when they are feeling 
over-extended to deal with such demands. Effective managerial decision making (MDM) 
involves more than applying a set of individual abilities. Managers face numerous obstacles, 
failures, and setbacks that often carry perturbing self-evaluative implications as well as social 
consequences that undermine their self-evaluations in ways that impair good use of their 
decision making skills (Bandura, 1997).  
Given the absence of a coherent theoretical framework in the literature the conceptual 
model of relations put forward attempts to organize and simplify how managers make decisions 
as agents of their organizations. Most conceptualizations apply oversimplified models that 
focus attention on one or a few variables,  neglect the joint constellations of individual variable 
factors and the influence of individual self-generated influences as a contributing factor in 
MDM. As an ex post facto explanatory-predictive study the present research offers evidence of 
these links among the theoretically relevant constructs in order to formulate an account of their 
relations in a parsimonious framework that could guide future insights to explain and predict 
the intentions and direction of managerial decision behaviour.  
Conceptual research has outpaced empirical research in decision making of managers in 
organizations. A number of mini-theories exists that focus on a few variables using linear, 
antecedent-consequence relations with manipulations in laboratory environments that deal with 
decisions in contexts that are very different to those faced by managers. There is limited 
research on managers as research participants and empirical findings based on non-managerial 
samples and students may not generalize to managers in real life decision making. The present 
research used a non-probability, purposive sample (N = 196) of experienced managers in the 
Western Cape region of South Africa, all employed in private and public organizations (mean 
age 38.9 years,  SD of 7.49, ethnic black managers constituted 15.8% of the sample). 
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As part of the study it was necessary to construct and validate custom indicator 
measures in an independent pilot study from the same population. The pilot study determined 
the factor structures of the dimensionality and internal consistency of the custom-designed 
measures by way of both convergent, as well as, discriminative validity.  The exploratory factor 
(EFA) and internal reliability analyses succeeded to provide both a comprehensive and 
empirical grasp on the constructs as was defined. Further, analyses of both standardized and 
custom-designed also revealed no significant difference between black and other managers 
across the pilot samples which provided confidence of the substantive relations of interest (i.e., 
the associations among the variables).  
Structural equation modeling (SEM) was chosen as the data analysis strategy of choice 
and a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) demonstrated that the operational measures by and 
large succeeded in providing both a comprehensive and empirical grasp on the constructs as 
defined. The inter-construct relations were also consistent with expectations. Evidence for 
convergent validity however proved that the indicator measures for the allocation of attentional 
resources were less than adequate in order to provide an uncontaminated measure as a latent 
variable. 
The structural model was subjected to further scrutiny by way of a spectrum of 
goodness-of-fit statistics. The analyses revealed that the model was not adequate and the null 
hypothesis that the model fitted the population data was subsequently, rejected. It was also 
sensible to assess the degree of lack of fit of the model with reference to RMSEA which 
revealed a value of .08, that suggested a reasonable model fit.  The poor structural model fit 
could however be attributed to the failure of the measured indicators used to provide an 
acceptable grasp of the allocation of attentional resources as a latent variable. The inherent 
structural flaws in the model could however not be unequivocally be ruled out as an additional 
possibility of poor fit. One conclusion is the possibility of an expanded model that requires 
additional indicator measures and additional paths. Notwithstanding these limitations, the 
present research provided support for social cognitive theory that underlies the model. In 
accordance with the literature and empirical findings the present research demonstrated 
mangers‘ decision making is much more than reason-based behaviour.  
The present research demonstrates the interdependencies and cumulative effects among 
individual factors, self-efficacy beliefs and temporal volitional processes, as psychological 
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mechanisms through which social-structural factors are linked to the quality of MDM 
processes. The present research also presents an argument for the independent contributions of 
self-efficacy beliefs as causal influences on ‗hot temporal processes‗ that promote accuracy in 
decision making. Although present research demonstrates that the estimates were greater for 
cognitive ability than for both self-efficacy beliefs and social self-confidence it does not 
suggest that personality traits and self-efficacy beliefs have no utility. The present research 
demonstrates that cognitive ability combines with personality traits, self-efficacy beliefs and 
temporal processes (decision-generated affect and the allocation of attentional resources) in a 
complex manner through multiple pathways.  
 
 
Key Words: Self-efficacy beliefs, managerial decision making, decision-generated affect, 
attentional resources  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
CONTEXT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
The burden of decision making is vividly depicted in movies, magazines, novels, great 
victories and tragedies. Hamlet‘s dilemma was not about what decisions he should take, but 
rather whether he would be able to make any decision at all. Dante was paralysed by indecision 
and starved to death when confronted with two equally appealing foods. Napoleon lost his 
army and empire in his ill-fated Russian campaign of 1812, despite being informed that the 
chances of failure were high. 
In her book The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and 
Deviance at NASA, Diane Vaughan (1996) illustrates how deviance from the norm became 
institutionalized to result in an incremental descent into poor decision making which led of the 
ill-fated Challenger launch disaster. Brigadier General Matthew Broderick, chief of the 
Homeland Security Operations Centre, who was responsible for alerting President Bush and 
other senior government officials of Hurricane Katrina went home despite multiple reports of 
the imminent disaster. Virtually everyone in the USA‘s Bush administration believed in the 
existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq despite a complete lack of confirming 
evidence. The decision to go to war in Iraq was tipped by anger for some people and by fear for 
others. Evidence also shows that corporate acquisitions are often financially harmful for the 
shareholders of acquiring firms (Malmendier & Tate, 2002). The 2008 global financial crises 
visibly underscores how beliefs in exercising control over events that are uncontrollable tend to 
make decision makers take undue risk, which increase the possibility of financial losses 
(Collins, 2009).  
Many decision failures emanate from intelligent, responsible managers and executives 
with the best information and intentions; yet they make decisions that are clearly wrong. It is 
disconcerting that as flawed human beings, managers reside in positions to decide the fate of 
their organizations where injudicious commitment associated with their humanness are 
enormous. The daunting reality is that important decisions made by intelligent, responsible 
people with the best information and intentions are sometimes hopelessly flawed (Campbell, 
Whitehead & Finkelstein, 2009).  
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The next subsection reviews major historical paradigms in decision theory as a general 
framework of decision behaviour. Rational theories of choice are shown to be an inadequate 
paradigm to either describe how individuals make decisions or to evaluate the quality of their 
decisions. This is followed by an overview of descriptive and behavioural process-models of 
decision making.  
 
History of Decision Theory 
 
Over the past several decades, researchers investigating the psychology of decision 
making have offered counterintuitive findings, profound insights, and practical prescriptions 
regarding the means by which individuals make decisions. Understanding how people make 
decisions is however spread across many disciplines. The decision making paradigm, as it has 
developed, is the product of a marriage between cognitive psychology and economics. The 
unique association of decision theory with economics has resulted in the problem of decision 
making behaviour being approached from normative principles of rationality (see, for example, 
Koehler & Harvey, 2007; Pham, 2007). The assumption derived from this premise is that 
individuals are inherently rational and all have the same goal: to maximize expected utility 
(Schneider & Barnes, 2003). With this resultant emphasis on cognition and rationality, theories 
of decision making assume that individuals will conform to normative standards once they are 
informed about them. In fact, Shafir and LeBoeuf (2002, p. 492) note that; ―the rationality 
assumption has come to constitute perhaps the most common and pivotal assumption 
underlying theoretical accounts of human behavior in various disciplines.‖  
From economics, decision theory inherited, or was socialized into, the language of 
utility maximization that provides a unitary perspective for understanding all behaviour. From 
cognitive psychology, decision theory inherited its descriptive focus, concern with process, and 
many specific theoretical insights. Koehler and Harvey (2007) however note that the focus on 
economics may have led decision research to underutilize the insights and methods of 
psychology (Weber & Johnson, 2009).  
Despite the dominant stronghold of rationality, the history of decision making has not 
marched steadily toward rationalism (Buchanan & O'Connell, 2006; Certo, Connelly, & 
Tihanyi, 2008; Hirshleifer & Shumway, 2003; Kisfalvi & Pitcher, 2003; Wong, Kwong, & Ng, 
2008). There has been a growing concern that the progress of decision making research may be 
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limited by focusing heavily on traditional schools of thought (e.g., approaches emphasizing 
deviations from rationality and utility theory). At the same time, there has been accumulating 
evidence to show that numerous unexplored factors are likely to impact judgment and choice 
(see, for instance, Schneider & Shanteau, 2003). 
In real life situations, individuals perform poorly because they make do with only good-
enough decisions (e.g., Buchanan & O'Connell, 2006; Schmidt & Calantone, 2002).  Such 
deviations from the criteria of rational judgment and choice ―can be attributed to nonsystematic 
performance errors ‖ (Stanovich & West, 1998, p. 164) and these deviations are far too 
systematic, both within and across individuals, to be considered randomly distributed (Shafir & 
LeBoeuf, 2002; Stanovich & West, 2000).   
Incremental adjustments to economic models, in their accumulation over the past 50 
years, have added up to and converge on a more psychological theory of decision making. The 
recognition of these systematic irrationalities in decision making has emphasized the need to 
supplement normative principles of rationality in decision making with descriptive findings that 
delineate the systematic ways in which decision makers deviate from rationality (e.g., 
Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000; Elbanna & Child, 2007; Hough & White, 2003; 
Papadakis, 2006; Wong, Kwong, & Ng, 2008). There has been a growing interest in a 
descriptive perspective in decision making that attempts to clarify the reasons why individuals 
are often not disposed to or are incapable of conforming to normative theories. The dominant 
feature of descriptive theories is that individuals rely on simplifying strategies or cognitive 
heuristics in their decision making (e.g., Chen & Sun, 2003; Hodgkinson & Healey, 2008; 
Payne, & Bettman, 2007).  Although the traditional influences of philosophy, economics, and 
mathematics are evident, psychology is clearly playing a greater role in decision making theory 
(e.g., Beach & Connolly, 2005; Forgas, Kipling, & Laham, 2004; Luce, Payne & Bettman, 
2001). The field is becoming more behavioural-descriptive and more psychological in its 
approach. In fact, Weber and Johnson (2009) stated that the adjustments to economic models 
over the past 50 years have converged on a more psychological theory of decision making.  
The next subsection introduces decision making as a psychological process. 
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Decision-Making is a Psychological Process 
 
Decision making is a volitional  and reflective choice in response to perceived needs 
(Kleindorfer, Kunreuther, & Schoemaker, 1993).  Individuals make decisions to satify goals 
that are far richer than what can be captured in utility-maximizing models (Schneider & 
Barnes, 2003) and understanding psychological process frameworks provide for a possibly 
better causal understanding of decision making and choice phenomena (Weber & Johnson, 
2009).  It is often difficult to pinpoint how process affects the outcomes of complex decisions.  
John F. Kennedy remarked that the essence of ultimate decisions remains impenetrable to the 
observer and often to the decider himself  (Sorensen, 1963). Good decisions result from sound 
process:  ―in man as much as in organisations, everything is a matter of decision processes and 
problem solving‖ (Simon, 1945, p. 38). 
In this regard, Chia (1994) points out that the attempts to replace decision by other 
terms, for example, action and change, ignore the ontological status of the decision making 
process. He argues that a decision is better understood as a series of interlocking pre-definitive 
acts of punctuating the flow of human experiences in order to facilitate sense-making. This 
means that one should study the behaviour in decision making processing, rather than the 
processes of decision making. Final outcomes do not just depend on the inputs. To use an 
analogy, in cooking it is not sufficient to have all the right ingredients (inputs) and just mix 
them in a bowl to produce an edible cake. The order of operations matters (add mix, break 
eggs, then stir, etc.) and feedback over time is important (via the ubiquitous teaspoon or finger). 
No matter how superb the ingredients, without a sound process, few of the cakes will come out 
right (Kleindorfer et al., 1993).  
A process focus means being especially sensitive to timing, sequence, and dynamics 
that account for the stream of behaviour that integrates context, multiple goals, and individual 
variables in the service of goals.  Understanding of the decision process is useful because it 
considers a series of psychological processes and intermediate states that precede decisions, 
make predictions of the temporal order of these states and, consequently, contain more 
variables and multiple constraints (Weber & Johnson, 2009). Such a process framework aids 
decision making research with an implicit or explicit concern with the ways in which decisions 
might be improved with practical and applied settings in mind. 
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Context of the Research Problem 
 
In the midst of the last century Chester Barnard imported the term "decision making" 
from the lexicon of public administration into the business world. The introduction of this 
phrase changed how managers thought about what they did and spurred a new crispness of 
action and desire for conclusiveness (Buchanan & O'Connell, 2006). Barnard and others 
(Kotter, March, Mintzberg, and Simon) laid the foundation for the study of managerial decision 
making (MDM). An explicit commitment to devote resources to a course of action over a 
period of time makes decision making not just an incidental part, but a critical aspect of 
management work. Drucker (2004, p. 61) writes, ―making good decisions is a crucial skill at 
every level‖ that significantly shapes much of what occurs in organisations (Mintzberg, 1973; 
Zaccaro, 2001). In fact, Buchanan and O‘Connell (2006, p. 33) state that '''decision making 
implies the end of deliberation and the beginning of action‖. Decision making is arguably the 
most important job of  a manager and one of the easiest to get wrong (Garvin & Roberto, 2001) 
and is thus a key aspect of organizational life and a critical prerequisite for organizational 
success (Forgas & George, 2001).   
Managers however make decisions in a context very different from individual decision 
making or as studied in laboratory experiments. Environmental uncertainty and hostility, 
industry characteristics and competitiveness, company performance and national culture 
represent external factors that impact on MDM (e.g., Elbanna & Child, 2007; Papadakis 2006).  
Managers have to meet long-term outcomes using ambiguous means-ends pathways and deal 
with implicit or explicit conflicts between their own and organizational goals.  Even when 
managers make individual decisions,  they often face social pressure to justify their decisions to  
multiple interest groups that pursue local and own goals rather than organizational goals, and 
yet also bear personal responsibility for the consequences of their decisions and actions. The 
institutional and social contexts surrounding MDM, consequently, pose unique challenges to a 
manager as an agent for decision making of their organization. This requires them to use a 
comprehensive decision process which calls for the application of cognitive abilities, as well as 
a blend of direct and covert social persuasion in order to balance a myriad of social and 
political expectations and divergent interests in a manner that promotes accuracy in decisions 
that serve the interests of the organization. 
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Motivation for the Study 
 
All research may be considered in terms of two objectives: the quest for fundamental 
understanding and considerations of practical use (Stokes, 1997).  Although academic 
psychology has flourished in generating and eliminating alternative hypotheses and isolating 
causation with its mastery of the hypothesis–experiment model of science, the  discovery of 
functional relations that apply to the real world and have generality are as important. Such 
findings have been the basis for theoretical advances in other natural sciences (Rozin, 2009).  
Observations by the researcher as a private practioner in a managerial assessment 
practice and a review of relevant research suggest that MDM does not only depend on 
experience, the level of cognitive ability, complexity and environmental uncertainties 
surrounding a decision, but also on self-efficacy beliefs. The literature and empirical 
generalizations suggest that demographic attributes, cognitive and social abilities, as predictors 
of actual decision making ability should be tempered by considerable caution because they may 
be confounded with interacting, self-regulatory, affective and volitional-undermining factors. 
Managers may thus often fail to perform optimally in MDM even though they possess the 
requisite skills and experienced managers with the same set of abilities and traits may perform 
at a mediocre, adequate or a notable level, depending on fluctuations in the nature and strength 
of these non-ability contributors (Bandura, 1997). 
Authoritative viewpoints and a search for a plausible explanation of how the 
constellations or potential associations of individual variable factors and self-beliefs in efficacy 
combine in a time-ordered structure in MDM revealed an absence of a coherent 
conceptualization as well as no extant research on managers as research participants.  In 
addition, in spite of the centrality of self-beliefs in efficacy in general work performance there 
has been surprisingly few efforts to determine the unique or incremental validity of self-
efficacy beliefs in MDM. Further, although a number of conceptualizations of decision making 
are present, these conceptualizations apply oversimplified models. Most models focus attention 
on one or a few variables in single trial, controlled and laboratory environments. Absent from 
these conceptualizations, however, is the influence of individual self-generated influences as a 
contributing factor since relatively little attention is paid to motivation and volitional processes 
that account for individual differences in decision making. These models are also designed to 
deal with decisions in contexts that are very different to those faced by managers. Although  
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these models reflect some commonality with managers as agents of decision making in 
organizations they remain ambiguous on how to improve decision making of managers.  
The present study is envisaged to have a heuristic, applied and theoretical utility to 
address the concerns which Cascio and Aguinis (2008, p. 1074) voice:  
Although there will always be a need for basic research that addresses important 
questions that may not be relevant to practioners immediately…or research that 
is stimulated by the simple desire to understand the psychology of people at 
work…it will not produce a substantial body of research that will inform HR 
practitioners, senior managers, or outside stakeholders…If the published 
research is seen as relevant and useful, then there is a higher likelihood that 
practitioners will read it and that the research findings will affect their practices.  
 
The motivation for this research is the development of a parsimonious model of 
relations of MDM in order to organize, simplify and explain how managers make decisions in 
organizations.  The present research permits the isolation of the temporal influences, 
interdependencies and cumulative effects among individual factors, self-efficacy beliefs and 
temporal volitional processes, as  psychological mechanisms through which social-structural 
factors are linked to the quality of MDM processes. The present researcher argues that such an 
integrative model indeed meets current gaps in the knowledge of MDM and that a coherent 
theoretical framework is envisaged to have both heuristic and applied utility.  
In an age where managers face greater demands for greater accountability for their 
decisions, this study can make a timely contribution to a fuller understanding of MDM.  The 
work of managers is becoming more global and requires them to adjust to greater challenges. 
Findings can be used for the  assessments of better performing managers. Further, the ability to 
regulate behaviour and attention represents a set of abilities that is relatively untapped. As self-
efficacy beliefs  is configurally equivalent across countries (Sadri, 1996; Scholz, Dona, Sud, & 
Schwarzer, 2002; Schwarzer, 2002) they can provide confidence to use them as universal and 
relevant to MDM. Moreover, measures of self-efficacy beliefs can help practitioners predict 
pretraining motivation, tailor specific coaching or training programmes in order to help 
managers to manage their affect and subsequent temporal processes that impact on the quality 
of MDM.  
8 
In the next subsection the research aim is outlined.  
 
Research Aims 
 
The central thesis in this research argues that managers make decisions in the service of 
both individual and organizational goals. Based on a priori selection, determining conditions 
and ordering of the theoretically relevant constructs, the present researcher proposes a 
structural model of relations in which distal individual variables and self-efficacy beliefs 
combine to mediate temporal processes (indexed by decision-generated affect and the 
allocation of attentional resources) that predict the quality of MDM processes. In this model 
MDM is impacted by a causal chain of variables that take time to exert their influence to 
impact on the  quality of decision processes. The overall aim is to establish the postulated 
ordering of a causal path linking individual variables (distal influences), self-efficacy beliefs 
(as proximal influences) and temporal processes as a whole, which bear on the construct of 
MDM. 
An additional aim of the present research is the question concerning the relative 
contribution of self-beliefs in efficacy, cognitive ability and personality traits as predictors of 
the quality of MDM processes. Also, given the centrality of self-beliefs in efficacy in the 
literature, the present researcher aims to determine the unique or incremental validity of self- 
beliefs in efficacy in MDM.  
 
Chapter Outline of the Research  
 
Mouton (2001) lists four concepts as the logic of research viz.: (1) the research problem, 
(2) the research design, (3) evidence, and (4) conclusions. The conceptual underpinnings, 
theoretical rationale of the theoretically relevant constructs in MDM are presented  in Chapter 
Two. Authoritative viewpoints of  researchers are used to provide for a reasoned assertion to 
put forward an integrative model of relations as a plausible explanation of how individual 
variable factors and self-efficacy beliefs account for the quality of MDM processes. Chapter 
Three presents an empirical review of previous research findings. These empirical 
generalizations afford the present researcher an opportunity to select and extract empirical links 
in order to support the plausible constellations and associations of individual variables and self-
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efficacy beliefs, together with their time-ordered influences, and their cumulative effects they 
bring to bear on the prediction of decision-generated affect, volitional allocation of attentional 
resources and subsequent quality of decision processes.  
In Chapter Four the research question is formulated in terms of whether the 
hypothesized model provides a plausible explanation for the decision making behaviour of 
managers.  Chapter Five is dedicated to the operationalization and psychometric evaluation of 
measures pertaining to the study. The chapter presents information on existing,standardized 
measures used. The present research furthermore required the development, design and 
psychometric evaluation of custom measures in an independent pilot study from the same 
population. The external construct validity by way of both convergent, as well as, 
discriminative validity of measures is also presented. Finally, univariate normality of the 
measures is outlined and presented. 
Chapter Six outlines the primary aim, the research questions and the methodological 
evidence in support of the aim. The present research is an ex post facto explanatory-predictive 
research study.  The chapter outlines the sampling design, the procedures followed, the ethical 
considerations implemented and the data analysis and data techniques.  The choice of data 
analysis techniques is based on the research question posed by the present study. A two stage 
analytic procedure is presented. First, a measurement model is presented to test the validity of 
the measures using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) procedures. Other than testing the 
validity of the measures, the second stage of the analytic procedure presents evidence to reveal 
whether the theoretical model and thus the research hypotheses, are supported.  Structural 
equation modeling (SEM) was adopted as the data analysis strategy of choice in order to 
evaluate the entire system of direct and mediated relations in the model instead of just the 
contribution of isolated variables.  Finally, a description of the variables,  and substantive and 
statistical hypotheses are presented.  
The results are presented in Chapter Seven. The evaluation of the measurement part of 
the model precedes the detailed evaluation of the structural part of the model. CFA results are 
presented first as a test of the validity of the indicator variables. The findings on multivariate 
normality are followed by the results of the goodness-of-fit for the measurement model and 
specific evidence of construct validity. Moreover, this evaluation also provides reliability data 
and independence of the variables in the proposed model. This is followed by the results of the 
10 
statistical analyses as evidence in order to compare how well the proposed model fits the data 
and, in doing so, evaluate the plausibility of the proposed model. This is followed by the results 
of the substantive linkages between the various individual variables and self-efficacy beliefs in 
order to determine their incremental contribution to the quality of MDM processes.  
Chapter Eight presents a discussion that derives from the results obtained from the 
present research. This is done by connecting the results with the original aims as well as the 
theory and research used to support the arguments of the present research.  
Chapter Nine discusses the theoretical and practical contributions of the present 
research as well as practical prescriptions that would aid practitioners and managers in decision 
making. The research‘s methodological limitations are noted and recommendations for future 
research are presented to answer questions about the principal relationships with regard to the 
theory as well as to provide insight into alternative formulations of the model that could be 
supported. 
Chapter Two and Three that follow form the theoretical unit that provides the 
conceptual framework of  the theoretically relevant constructs and conceptual relations in 
MDM based on social cognitive theory. 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
Understanding how individuals make decisions is an enterprise of such importance that 
its study is spread across many disciplines with most judgment and decision making research 
conducted outside psychology (Koehler & Harvey, 2007). The study of decision making is thus 
interdisciplinary, employing concepts and models from anthropology, economics, political 
science, sociology, psychology and statistics (Payne, 1997). Consequently, the theory on 
decision making is vast, ill bound, heterogeneous and somewhat disorganized (Buchanan & 
O'Connell, 2006; Connolly & Ordonez, 2003). This lack of integration in the decision making 
literature has slowed theoretical progress (Dougherty, Gronlund, & Gettys, 2003). 
Certo et al. (2008) noted that summarizing what is known about decision making is a 
daunting challenge, indeed a view shared by the researcher. Decision making is differentially 
understood across the variety of disciplines that make up decision theory and the fundamental 
obstacle the present researcher faced in this study is the absence of a coherent and adequate 
theoretical framework in which to organize and simplify the relevant constructs in order to 
describe managerial decision making (MDM) in a parsimonious manner. Clearly defined 
constructs are the building blocks of good theory (Klein & Zedeck, 2004) but in decision 
making there is no clear universal agreement on the definitions and constructs of decision 
making (Yates, Veinott, & Patalano, 2003). In addition, the need for practical knowledge about 
decision making has resulted in a number of specific theories that focus on particular aspects of 
decision making. Although there is a reasonable commonality within MDM, these models 
describe different kinds of decisions in contexts that are very different to those faced by 
managers (Beach & Connolly, 2005; Leaptrott & McDonald, 2008). Given the current status of 
decision making theory it was deemed wise to structure the chapter in the following three 
sections: (1) a theoretical overview of MDM, (2) relevant constructs in MDM, and (3) a 
formulation of a theoretical framework for MDM.   
The first section of this chapter provides a specification of the theoretically relevant 
constructs in MDM. In this regard Klein and Zedeck (2004, p. 932) stated that ―clearly defined 
constructs are the building blocks of good theory …thorough and thoughtful propositions 
linking the constructs — explaining what construct leads to what, when, how, and why — 
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provide the mortar‖.  The real world of MDM is over-determined in that many variables 
account for MDM. It is argued that undertanding how managers make decisions requires an 
understanding of how the time-ordered influences and cumulative effects among environmental 
constraints, individual factors, concomitant affect and fatigue, combine to impact the quality of 
decisional processes.   
Despite its practical appeal, the reality in MDM does not permit a strict sequential 
phasing of information search, evaluation, choice, and implementation activities as proposed by 
many conceptualizations. MDM is introduced as a dual, multifaceted process, that is, a 
cognitive problem of attempting to find the best solution (mostly under pressure of time) and 
making decisions against a background of divergent political interests. Further, most 
conceptualizations neglect the impact of self-referent motivational and affective influences on 
managers‘ information search, deliberation and decision making process. It is argued that social 
cognitive theory offers a conceptual framework to clarify how individual cognitions and other 
individual difference factors, decision processes, and the environment account for the quality of 
MDM processes and outcomes. In keeping with social cognitive theorizing, individuals are able 
to exercise control over their effort and affect and this control is influenced by an individual‘s 
self-efficacy beliefs. The discussion presents conceptual evidence of these links among the 
relevant constructs in order to formulate a coherent account of their relations in a parsimonious 
framework.  
MDM, by its very context-specific nature, does not lend itself to simple analysis in 
actual organizational settings [see, for instance, Bandura and Jourden (1991); Critchfield and 
Kollins (2001); Leaptrott and McDonald (2008)]. While experimental research provides useful 
evidence regarding the nature and the significance of hypothesized variables that tend to 
enhance or inhibit the quality of MDM these settings are likely to limit generalizability of 
experimental results. Continued experimental research is clearly important for the further 
refinement of MDM, but non-experimental field research helps to understand how 
consequential decisions are actually made and how better decisions could be made in 
organizational settings, challenges not faced by experimental research. 
The processes governing decision making are influenced by a multiplicity of interacting 
factors that take time to exert their influence on individual-factor variables and decision making 
in specific environmental contexts.  Moreover, it is easy to overlook the implications of the 
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manager as a decision making agent for the organization. Managers do not make decisions in 
isolation, and social and institutional contexts influence decision processes and alter the goals 
held by managers (Beach & Connolly, 2005; Elbanna, 2006). Hambrick (2007) notes that 
relatively few researchers display an interest in this area because it requires access to large 
numbers of managers who are notoriously unwilling to submit themselves to scholarly 
investigation. These aspects contribute to limitations in the theory building of MDM. 
The second section of this chapter outlines MDM as a process and provides conceptual 
evidence of the links between the theoretically relevant constructs of decision making within 
organizations.  In addition, the utility of social cognitive theory is presented as a plausible 
framework to understand both affect and MDM processes as a function of individual-factor 
variables of the manager as decision maker, given constraints in their operative environments in 
organizations. 
The last section of this chapter provides an integrative model of MDM that incorporates 
the multiple constellations of individual variable factors and self-efficacy beliefs in their 
relation to the quality of MDM processes and outcomes. The present researcher proposes that 
such a social cognitive framework could lead to modifications and refinements of the extant 
theory in order to advance insights into the multiplicity of antecedents and consequences in 
MDM.  
 
THEORETICAL OVERVIEW OF MDM 
 
Decision making is an ordered sequence of interrelated processes (e.g., Bazerman, 
2006; Bonabeau, 2003; Brousseau, Driver, Hourihan, & Larsson, 2006; Driver, Brousseau, & 
Hunsaker, 1998; Koehler & Harvey, 2007) and a commitment to a course of action that is 
intended to produce a satisfying state of affairs (Yates et al., 2003). Good decision-making 
processes tend (on average) to lead to more desirable outcomes than do poor decision-making 
processes (e.g., Dean & Sharfman, 1996; De Dreu, Beersmaa, Stroebea, & Euwemab, 2006; 
Frisch & Clemen, 1994; Payne & Bettman, 2007). 
The conceptual research suggests that the process of making a decision contains an 
initiating activity (i.e., looking for and selecting situations requiring decisions) and a design 
phase (i.e., seeking alternatives and evaluation), which precede a choice phase (i.e., dealing 
with choosing and accepting one alternative from the available alternatives). For instance, Janis 
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and Mann‘s (1977) proposed a process consisting of: appraising the challenge, surveying 
alternatives, weighing alternatives, deliberating about commitment, and adhering despite 
negative feedback and opposition. Similarly, Wood, Atkins, and Tabernero (2000) describe 
decision processes in terms of two related but distinct subtasks, that is, exploratory search 
(seeking information) and deliberative processing (the degree to which individuals attend to 
and consciously process information acquired during exploratory search). The latter authors 
refer to a systematic-comprehensive process that includes attempts to gather information about 
criteria for a range of alternatives and to process the acquired information in a systematic 
manner.  
The process of decision making may unfold over weeks, months, or even years, replete 
with personal nuances and institutional politics (e.g., Brousseau et al., 2006; Garvin & Roberto, 
2001). Although an intimate relationship between the different stages in the process of decision 
making exists, long temporal disparities may emerge, as managers may seek solutions or 
evaluate possible alternatives even before they have collected all the necessary information 
(e.g., Bandura & Jourden, 1991; Wood, Bandura, & Bailey, 1990). Consequently, decisions 
made at one point in time influence the options and effects of later decisions, which requires 
managers to frequently recycle between different decisional operations in MDM (Bandura, 
1997). Moreover, MDM represents an amalgam of a systematic-comprehensive and an 
emergent incremental-political process (e.g., Elbanna, 2006) and this dual explanation of MDM 
signifies the temporal and evolving nature of how decisions are made in organizations.   
This dynamic nature of decision making underscores the time-ordered effects and 
multiplicity of constituent variables that impact on MDM and subsequent choices (see 
Brousseau et al., 2006; Hough & White, 2003; Papadakis & Barwise, 2002; Schneider & 
Barnes, 2003; Wood, Atkins, & Tabenero, 2000). MDM contains many antecedent and/or 
consequential distal or far-removed variables (e.g., political context, individual-factor 
variables) that are likely to be transmitted through additional links in a causal chain, and 
affected by other competing causes and random factors (i.e., distal mediation processes [see, 
for instance, Critchfield and Kollins (2001) and Shrout and Bolger (2002)].   
Bandura (1991) argued that social cognitive theory offers advantages over other models 
of MDM since this theory is not constrained by the assumption of sequential phases of search, 
evaluation, and choice in making decisions as they evolve in organizations. Briefly, social 
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cognitive theory explains human functioning in terms of reciprocal causation among three 
categories of determinants: the individual‘s cognitions and other individual difference factors, 
behaviour, and the environment (Bandura, 2006). Such a framework implies that MDM is an 
interactive process that is regulated extensively by a multiplicity of interacting factors that 
create reciprocal influences among individual factors, decisional actions, and environmental 
effects.  Moreover, social cognitive theory acknowledges self-regulatory factors as a 
contributing influence in the application of individual capabilities in MDM. The utility of social 
cognitive theory is that it provides a succinct conceptual framework that allows for the isolation 
of temporal influences in order to examine the interdependencies and cumulative effects among 
individual factors, decisional processes, and environmental constraints in MDM.  
A number of authors have, in fact, adopted social cognitive process theories in decision 
making to specify how antecedent conditions mediate decision processes. The 
conceptualizations of Janis and Mann‘ Conflict Model (1977), Forgas‘ (1995) Affect Infusion 
Model, and Payne, Bettman, and Johnson‘s (1993) Adaptive Decision Maker  are examples of 
decision-process theories which illustrate that individuals have a repertoire of decision 
strategies that are contingent on task, context, and individual difference factors. The 
fundamental assumption of these models is that individuals decide how to decide by 
considering a number of goals and that the contingent use of decision strategies represents an 
adaptive response to decision demands. Moreover, the basic hypothesis of these models is that 
decision making represents an adaptive balancing of goals while conserving limited attentional 
resources.  
The social-cognitive perspective adopted for the purposes of this study views MDM as 
an integrated and interactive process that is regulated extensively by the organizational 
environment (i.e., task and context demands) and individual variable factors of the decision 
maker, as multiple and reciprocal determining factors (Bandura 1991). Figure 2.1 provides a 
specification of the theoretically relevant constructs and conceptual relations that reflect MDM 
as a stream of behaviour that integrates context, multiple goals, individual variables and the 
selection of decision making processes.  
The discussion that follows firstly defines MDM as a psychological process. The 
manner in which managers construe the decision making context orients them toward a 
commitment to devote attentional resources to a course of action in order to satisfy multiple 
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goals in MDM. Individual factors, in turn, influence the engagement and allocation of 
attentional resources to give rise to the volitional selection of cognitively effortful decision 
strategies that account for the quality of MDM processes and outcomes. 
The discussion introduces self-efficacy beliefs as a proximal and contextually situated 
individual factor that influences managers‘ interpretative biases that reflect estimates about 
how effort and ability will combine and the type of affect a manager will experience in 
response decision demands. Finally, MDM is presented as inherently conditional on the 
independent and interactive influence of self-efficacy beliefs (via its regulation of effort and 
affect) in the application of individual capabilities,  concomitant decision-generated affect and 
fatigue to account for MDM decision processes and outcomes.  
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Figure 2.1 A Social Cognitive Framework of MDM 
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Figure 2.1 illustrates that the specific threats or benefits which arise from managers‘ 
ongoing interaction with their decision context orient them toward particular goals, and how 
these selected goals are mediated by the managers‘ subjective appraisals of their abilities.  
Consequently adaptive and maladaptive volitional action patterns follow directly from the 
selection of different goals selected and the type of goals individuals pursue, in turn, mediates 
the relationship between self-efficacy beliefs and performance (e.g., Locke & Latham, 1990a; 
Phillips & Gully, 1997; Thomas & Mathieu, 1994). Self-efficacy beliefs and goals are thus 
important proximal mediators and represent "the motivational hub," or "where the action is" 
(Locke, 1991, p. 296) in their relationships of distal individual differences (both cognitive 
ability and social self-confidence) and affect in MDM. Goals thus influence performance 
primarily through the application of directed, concentrated, and persistent attentional effort, 
whereas self-efficacy influences performance both through attentional effort and through the 
self-regulation of affect (Bandura, 1997; Bandura & Locke, 2003; Locke & Latham, 1990, 
2001, 2002).  
 
The Organizational Context and Goals 
 
In the absence of a clear definition within the literature of managers as an agent for 
decision making in an organizational context, MDM as a context-dependent and 
multidimensional process is defined for the purposes of this study as the intentional and explicit 
commitment to devote attentional resources to a course of action in order to satisfy multiple 
goals in response to the subjective appraisals of the environment. In this subsection of the 
chapter, the organizational context is shown to feature prominently in MDM. The discussion 
elaborates how decision making is influenced by information overload, time deadlines and 
competing goals, all conditions that make great demands on managers. This is followed by a 
discussion which illustrates how the context influences the goals managers pursue.   
Decisions and choices are not created in a vacuum (Beach & Connolly, 2005). MDM 
can be affected by a host of contextual factors that can profoundly shape choices (Bandura, 
1997; Haleblian, Markoczy, & McNamara, 2004; Krantz & Kunreuther, 2007; Lerner & 
Tetlock, 2003). Unlike most laboratory studies of individual decision making, MDM is 
sensitive to company size, conflicts about goals and the salience of incentives as internal 
aspects of context (Hough & White, 2003; McNamara & Bromiley, 1997; Shapira, 1997; 
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Sutcliffe & McNamara, 2001). Environmental uncertainty and hostility, industry characteristics 
and competitiveness, company performance and national culture, all represent additional 
external factors that impact on MDM (see, for instance, Elbanna & Child, 2007; Papadakis, 
2006). One consequence of context is that there are rarely bounds on what information is 
potentially important and what is not for MDM (Hambrick, Finkelstein, & Mooney, 2005b). In 
addition, it is not the sheer volume or pace of information that matters, but the considerable 
ambiguity in MDM (Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Hambrick, Finkelstein, & Mooney, 2005a).  In 
this regard, Mintzberg (1973, p. 191) noted that:  ―it is not the decision making under 
uncertainty risk or even uncertainty that a manager faces, but decision making under 
ambiguity‖. This subjective experience of missing or inadequate information contributes 
greatly to complexity in MDM (see, for example, Gottfredson, 2002; Hough & White, 2003). 
In addition, ill-defined and ambiguous means-ends pathways that link short-term goals to more 
long-term outcomes (i.e., distal organizational objectives) provide managers with great latitude 
of actions that contribute to the complexity in the relationship between managers‘ and 
organizational goals (Bandura, 1997; Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). Managers, consequently, 
need to seek explanations and answers to multiple expectations and are forced to decipher how 
others see things rather than merely understanding objective structures or systems. Weick 
(1995, p. 4) argued that this absence of a clear and accurate understanding of role expectations 
means that the assumptions necessary for rational decision making are absent and that this 
process of ―sensemaking‖ literally ―means the making of sense‖ when faced with uncertainty or 
ambiguity as a means to return a sense of stability to the organizational life world. 
Fundamentally, the decision context forces managers to deal with two accountability 
problems: a cognitive problem of attempting to find the best solution (mostly under time 
pressure), and the decision between mutually exclusive goals (i.e., the problem of resolving 
divergent interests) (Butler, Davies, Pike, & Sharp, 1991; Dean & Sharfman, 1993b; Elbanna & 
Child, 2007; Ferris, Perrewé, & Douglas, 2002; Papadakis, 2006). This dual explanation of 
MDM refers to two types of processes that describe how decisions are made in organizations, 
that is, a systematic-comprehensive and an incremental-political process (e.g., Elbanna, 2006; 
see Figure 2.1 in this regard). The most fundamental feature of the systematic-comprehensive 
process is the emphasis placed on being rational in making decisions (i.e., a process focus), 
whereas the second process assumes that decisions emerge from an incremental context-
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dependent process that reflects an amalgam of preferences of those who hold most power rather 
than on what is good for an organization. MDM can consequently be rational but not political, 
political but not rational, both rational and political, or neither (Dean & Sharfman, 1996). 
Managers are rewarded when they demonstrate rationality in line with economic 
arguments of cost or risk in order to maximize the accuracy of their decisions (i.e., conformity 
to a rational decision). As individuals, however, managers are finite, flawed human beings, who 
reside in positions where the consequences associated with their humanness are significant. In 
this regard, Hambrick et al. (2005a, p. 478) note:   
Under high job demands, managers have so much performance pressure, so many 
decisions to make, in the face of so much information, they simply cannot 
afford…to be comprehensive in their analyses or search for 
solutions…Importantly, it is not that executives facing high job demands 
purposely become less comprehensive. The pressures of the job may actually 
encourage them to try to be more comprehensive, but they cannot achieve that 
ideal.  
 
Experimental research usually assesses decision making in an environment where 
contact with other individuals during the decision process is eliminated and such research 
assumes that the process is completely unaffected by interactions with one or more other 
individuals. Managers do not make decisions in isolation since organizations are made up of 
multiple interest groups that pursue local and own goals rather than organizational goals (Beach 
& Connolly, 2005; Garvin & Roberto, 2001). Consequently, decisions are embedded in 
institutional practices (McNamara & Bromiley, 1997; Sutcliffe, & McNamara, 2001) and 
enmeshed in webs of interdependent relationships that require managers to defend their 
conclusions and reasoning to peers, subordinates, or superiors. This requires an endeavour of 
informal dependence on others instead of just formal control or power over others (Kotter, 
1999).  In this regard, Levinson (1994) observes that such institutional contexts foster 
continuous political ‗machination‘ (p. 432) as individuals try to maximize their individual gains 
and vie for political position. This compels managers to exercise influence in order to obtain 
cooperation, information, and other resources in their management of power conflicts and 
building coalitions (Bandura, 1997). Managers, consequently, make decisions against the 
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background of these divergent political interests which act as constraints in MDM (Elbanna & 
Child, 2007; Lerner & Tetlock, 2003). Such politicization exerts influence on MDM and 
decisions often emerge from a process in which decision makers are less likely to be informed 
about what is feasible given environmental constraints since their attention is focused inside the 
organization around self-interest (Dean & Sharfam, 1996; Elbanna, 2006; Padadakis, 2006). 
This inherent political nature of MDM makes it more difficult for managers to make 
decisions independently (Bandura, 2001; Beach & Connolly, 2005; Kotter, 1999; Shapira, 
1997; Zaccaro, 2001). To make managerial decisions requires levels of persuasion, social 
coercion and what Pfeffer (1996, p. 295) referred to as ―political savvy‖. In addition, mutually 
exclusive demands (i.e., when compliance with one constituency‘s demands makes compliance 
with another constituency‘s impossible or extremely difficult) contribute to considerable 
ambiguity in MDM. This requires managers to know their constituents‘ expectations, gain this 
information explicitly, and to actively produce actions congruent with those demands and/or to 
take steps to change constituent expectations (Tsui & Ashford, 1994).  
Accountability is a universal feature of everyday management decision-making 
environments, and it represents an implicit or explicit constraint on virtually everything a 
manager does, yet it has been overlooked by theories of decision making in organizations 
(Lerner & Tetlock, 2003). The social pressure to justify one‘s views to others refers to 
accountability and is defined as "an implicit or explicit expectation that one's decisions or 
actions will be subject to evaluation by some salient audience(s) with the belief that there exists 
the potential for one to receive either rewards or sanctions based on this expected evaluation" 
(Hall, et al., 2003, p. 33). Qualitative differences in terms of the nature of the audience and the 
context of accountability may result in distinct social and cognitive coping strategies in 
decision making (Lerner & Tetlock, 2003).  Consequently, accountability qualifies as an 
enhancement-constraining context (Sedikides & Herbst, 2002; Sedikides, Herbst, Hardin, & 
Dardis, 2002).  
Ambiguity and decision-making difficulty can be both objective and subjective 
parameters of the decision context. Differential appraisals provide a convenient summary of 
specific threats or benefits that arise in an individual‘s ongoing interaction with the decision 
context and thus may moderate managers‘ subjective experiences of complexity, ambiguity and 
conflict in their attempts to make a good decision. It is argued that managers who view MDM 
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as taxing do so primarily because they perceive their choices to be subjectively more difficult 
and are thus more likely to acquiesce to environmental dictates (see, for instance, Bandura, 
1997). This is discussed in the following subsection.  
 
Appraisals of the Decision Context 
 
Appraisals refer to a cognized view about something in a certain context (Stajkovic, 
2006). Individuals‘ beliefs in their decisional efficacy affect their appraisal orientations which 
exerts an effect on judgment and choice (Cavanaugh, Bettman, Luce, & Payne, (2007; Lerner 
& Keltner, 2000). Such appraisals reflect an internal, subjective cognitive process that may not 
necessarily be linked to objective factors and task and context demands (Brown, Ferris, Heller, 
& Keeping, 2007). Beach and Mitchell (1978) suggest that selection of a decision strategy is a 
subjective process that depends on the type of problem, the surrounding environment, and the 
individual attributes of the decision maker. Ganster (2005) states that subjective appraisals play 
a significant role in transforming perceptions of decisions into cognitive appraisals of 
difficulty.  Thus, managers‘ subjective interpretation of their context may be evoked for 
reasons other than objective decision parameters and these interpretive biases affect the 
selection of decision strategies and processes.  
Consequently, the subjective demands in MDM are not a fixed property of situational 
events but represent a relational property concerning the match between perceived coping 
capabilities and the potentially aversive aspects of the environment (see, for instance, Bandura, 
1991; Hu, Huhmann & Hyman, 2007). Appraisals are determined by simultaneously perceiving 
environmental demands and personal resources (Han, Lerner, & Keltner, 2007; Loewenstein, 
Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Roseman & Evdokas, 2004). These subjective interpretations 
provide a convenient summary of specific harms or benefits that arise in the individual‘s 
ongoing interaction with the social environment and accompany action tendencies to reduce 
uncertainties (Raghunathan & Pham, 1999). Appraisal tendencies are thus goal-directed 
perceptual processes through which affect colours the interpretation of stimuli which exerts 
effects on decision making until the affect-eliciting problem is resolved (Lerner & Keltner, 
2000). Control perceptions capture an individual's appraisal of an objective situation (Ganster, 
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1989), whereas self-efficacy beliefs are specific appraisals of one's capacity to execute actions 
to exercise that control (Bandura, 1997; Shapira, 1995). 
Control beliefs reflect and determine self-efficacy beliefs (Armitage & Conner, 1999; 
McCarthy & Newcomb, 1992) and beliefs in controllability are a means of creating managerial 
self-efficacy beliefs (Bandura & Wood, 1989; Wood & Bandura, 1989a). Consequently, 
managers‘ beliefs in their decisional efficacy affect their appraisal orientations. For example, 
individual differences in appraisal have measurable effects on individuals‘ responses in 
handling the pressure of justifying their views to influence others (Green, Visser, & Tetlock, 
2000; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999, 2003). Thus, ease of justification is best viewed as a subjective 
interpretation (i.e., felt accountability), rather than an objective condition (i.e., formal 
accountability mechanisms). This explains why individuals, occupying comparable work 
environments with equivalent demands and expectations, report levels of felt accountability 
that are inconsistent and even contradictory (Hochwarter et al., 2007). 
Bandura (1999) argues that most environmental events exert their effects through 
cognitive processing rather than directly. Consequently, appraisals refer to a cognized view 
about something in a certain context (Stajkovic, 2006). Although related, Campbell (1988) 
argues that it is useful to distinguish between the objective and the subjective complexity that is 
experienced by an individual engaged in the task since these complexities are not necessarily 
identical. Subjective task complexity uniquely affects task performance independent of 
objective task complexity (Ganster, 2005; Maynard & Hakel, 1997). Thus, Beach and Mitchell 
(1978, p. 444) state:  
While it is not possible to entirely disentangle task characteristics and decision 
maker characteristics, it is possible to separate them conceptually by defining task 
characteristics as the decision maker's interpretations of the demands and 
constraints of the specific task at hand.   
 
The perceptions of objective task demands, consequently, are typically more important 
than the actual demands (Fisher & Noble, 2004; Lucas, Alexander, Firestone, & Baltes, 2006). 
In this regard, Bandura (1997) argues that the environment does not come into being until it is 
selected and activated by appropriate action. Although managers may not have much control 
over the presence of their imposed operative socio-structural environment, the social and 
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institutional environment constitutes a potentiality that can be actualized by appropriate action, 
for example, social skill activation (Hochwarter et al., 2006). Consequently, managers‘ 
appraisals of their objective situation and what parts of the environment and events come into 
play as the ‗actual‘ environment depend on how they construe (Mangos & Steele-Johnson, 
2001) and act on the demands imposed by it (Sonnentag & Frese, 2003).  
Individuals thus elicit reactions from the imposed operative environment that affect 
their conceptions of themselves and others in ways that either strengthen or reduce the 
environmental bias (Bandura, 2008). MDM demands can thus be both a subjective and an 
objective parameter of decision difficulty, and this difficulty may depend in part on individual 
differences in self-efficacy beliefs (Bandura & Jourden, 1991). Consequently, managers with 
less confidence in their ability to maximize their chances of demonstrating high ability are 
more likely to be taxed by the erroneous influence of subjective difficulty in MDM (Bandura, 
1997). In essence, then, self-efficacy beliefs provide for moderation, via social cognition, that 
helps define decisions as difficult or not (Mangos & Steele-Johnson, 2001).  Hambrick et al. 
(2005b, p. 507), in this regard, note: 
Executives who are intensely prepared—by virtue of their prior experiences, 
training, and readiness for difficult conditions—are less likely to feel the same 
degree of pressure from a set of task stimuli than are other executives who always 
seem to be catching up. The intensely prepared executive is able to attend to his or 
her task and performance challenges and is unlikely to feel overwhelmed or 
stressed, compared to a less prepared executive.  
 
Individuals‘ goal orientation creates the framework within which they interpret and 
react to their environment (Dweck, 2006). Nicholls (1984) argues that choice, and therefore 
action, is a rational attempt to attain goals or incentives efficiently or economically (i.e., 
maximize gains and minimize losses). Individuals make decisions because they want to move 
towards satisfying goals that are far richer than what can be captured in utility-maximizing 
models (Schneider & Barnes, 2003). It can be argued that a major meta-goal for decision 
making is aimed at mastering one‘s environment (via competence) because individuals 
perceive that, through repetition of action, they can master their ability to successfully interact 
with their environment. In a seminal work White (1959) proposed that the urge to have an 
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effect on and master one‘s environment is sought for the pleasure of the feelings of efficacy 
that accompany effective interaction with the environment.   
In the next subsection, goals are shown to figure prominently in MDM and, unlike 
individual decision making models that assume that all decision makers have one goal, that is, 
to maximize expected utility, managers use decision making to meet multiple goals (see Figure 
2.1). 
 
Goals Managers Pursue 
 
Most of human behaviour is the result of an individual‘s consciously chosen goals and 
intentions (Mitchell & Daniels, 2003). In making decisions, individuals make choices in order 
to accomplish varied goals. Locke and Latham (2002) state that goals, as a theory of 
motivation, influence performance through a directive function, that is, they direct attention 
cognitively and behaviourally toward goal-relevant activities and away from goal-irrelevant 
activities. In addition, goals have an energizing function in that high goals lead to greater effort 
and affect persistence. Finally, goals affect action indirectly by leading to the arousal, 
discovery, and/or use of task-relevant knowledge and strategies. 
Goals are context dependent (Beach & Connolly, 2005; Kanfer & Ackerman, 2005; 
Krantz & Kunreuther, 2007). Situational and temporal contexts can thus contribute to the 
ambiguity of goals to pursue in MDM, that is, to find the best solution and to meet political 
expectations. Moreover, the longitudinal nature of MDM requires managers to consider 
multiple goals (i.e., personal and long-term economic goals). For instance, success in short-
term goals may contribute to feelings of success but may not necessarily produce expected 
gains in long-term organizational performance as the cumulative effects of good or faulty 
decisions are often delayed. In many cases, short-run gains may often have to be sacrificed for 
desired distal attainments (Bandura, 1997). In addition, ignorance of the order of importance of 
goals (i.e., the temporal nature of goals) creates a distorted view in which the importance of 
goals can be easily lost, thus limiting MDM‘s fundamentally dynamic character (Schneider & 
Barnes, 2003).   
Most managerial decision theories assume that decision makers pursue the same goal 
(i.e., utility maximization involving economic goals). However, economic goals do not 
adequately capture the wide range of goals that individuals actually seek (Schneider & Barnes, 
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2003). Theoretical attention to goals is therefore a prerequisite for a meaningful understanding 
of MDM since goals elucidate why managers make certain decisions, what kinds of decision 
strategies they adopt and what constraints they experience throughout the decision making 
process. The next subsection outlines the multiple goals individuals have and how they decide 
to resolve conflicts between their own and others‘ goals in order to conserve limited cognitive 
(i.e., finite attentional) resources.  
 
Temporal goals  
 
It is often difficult to determine progress toward a distal goal (Schunk, 1995) and it has 
been noted that the further away a goal is temporally, the less impact it has on individuals‘ 
motivation (Latham & Brown, 2006; Seijts, Latham, Tasa, & Latham, 2004). In this regard, 
Locke and Latham (2002) maintain that individuals sometimes spontaneously generate 
proximal goals (i.e., present-directed intentions) when assigned distal goals. Converting distal 
goals into reality operates as its own reward in the service of self-satisfaction from personal 
accomplishments (i.e., interim progress and mastery) (Bandura, 1991). Goals embodying such 
self-engaging properties (i.e., discrete, short-term goals that reflect matters of personal 
importance and value) can bolster motivation and serve as powerful motivators of action 
because their attainment is an early indication of accomplishment (Bandura, 1997). These 
proximal outcome goals appear to be particularly beneficial with tasks that individuals 
experience as complex because of their ambiguity (Latham & Seijts, 1999).  
This line of reasoning argues that proximal, short-term goals are achieved more quickly 
and result in higher motivation and better self-regulation than more temporally distant, long-
term goals (Bandura, 2001). Short-term proximal goals focus and sustain attentional effort on 
task-relevant strategies or context-specific objectives thereby ensuring goal-directed actions 
(see, for example, Kanfer &  Ackerman, 2005; Krantz & Kunreuther, 2007). Such tangible self-
motivators (Bandura, 1986) contribute a continuing source of self-motivation because they 
provide individuals with additional specific information about performance that is not present 
when only a distal goal is set. As individuals experience these ‗small wins‘, they increase their 
belief that they can attain distal goals (Latham & Brown, 2006).  By making self-satisfaction 
conditional on performances that match a personal index of merit, individuals are able to apply 
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the effort necessary to accomplish what they value (Bandura & Cervone, 1983; Bandura & 
Jourden, 1991).  
In constructing or selecting plans to achieve multiple goals in their decision making, 
individuals structure how to decide by considering how to balance a number of goals while 
conserving limited cognitive (i.e., finite attentional) resources (Luce, 2005; Luce, Bettman, & 
Payne, 1997; Luce et al., 2001). Svenson (2003) argues that decision making, by and large, is 
the art in resolving such conflicts as those between inner goals, between one‘s own and others‘ 
goals, and between conflicts concerning how to evaluate alternatives in relation to competing 
goals.  
 
Multiple Goals Managers Pursue 
 
When individuals establish goals, they devote a portion of their total available 
attentional resources to construct or select plans to achieve multiple goals in their decision 
making. This dedication of attentional resources differentiates goals from wishes and intentions 
(Kanfer, 1990). In a world of limited time and attentional resources, managers are faced with 
repeated choices over time concerning where to focus their attention and how to revise these 
decisions in response to changes in the environment (Bandura, 1997).  The relevant question in 
MDM is thus rarely which course of action to follow but rather how to best allocate attentional 
resources and switch between tasks to efficiently accomplish these multiple goals (DeShon & 
Gillespie, 2005).   
Bettman, Luce, and Payne (1998) present a useful theoretical framework for 
understanding how managers make choices in order to accomplish their goals. These authors 
identify four important meta-goals in decision making as: (a) minimizing the cognitive effort 
(i.e., attentional resources) required to make the choice, (b) maximizing the accuracy of the 
choice, (c) maximizing the ease of justifying the decision, and (d) minimizing the experience of 
negative affect when making the choice. These choices in order to achieve goals in MDM are 
expanded on in the discussion that follows. 
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Minimizing cognitive effort 
 
Cognitive effort represents the proportion of total attentional resources and the extent to 
which these resources toward a task are maintained over time (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989, 
1996).  Building on Kahneman's (1973) model of attentional capacity, Kanfer (1990) suggested 
that when individuals establish a goal, they devote effort (a portion of their total available 
attentional resources to goal accomplishment). Theorists such as Kuhl (1987) and Corno (1993) 
have argued for the distinction between motivation and volition, with motivation guiding 
intentions about engaging in particular activities, and volition guiding the actions used to attain 
a goal. Whereas goals guide decisions about engaging in effort (Austin & Klein, 1996; Locke, 
1991; Locke & Latharn, 2002), volition determines whether or not an intention to act is 
fulfilled. Individuals first decide whether to allocate attentional resources toward goal 
attainment (engagement of effort) and then decide how much of the attentional resources 
should be devoted to a task.  With regards to the latter the attentional allure of off-task concerns 
or affective events can present great challenges to individuals‘ ability to regulate task-focused 
attention (Weiss, Ashkanasy, & Beal, 2005).  
Attentional effort is a dynamic construct that changes within individuals in response to 
individual and environmental factors (Beal, Weiss, Barros, & MacDermid, 2005; Kanfer & 
Ackerman, 1996; Payne & Bettman, 2007; Schmeichel & Baumeister, 2004; Yeo & Neal, 
2004, 2008). Bandura and Locke (2003) noted that individuals mobilize their effort and 
personal resources based on their anticipatory estimation of what it would take to fulfill those 
standards. Attentional effort is thus a covariate of perceived difficulty and individuals increase 
their allocation of attentional resources toward on-task activities when tasks become more 
difficult (see, for example, Foo, Uy, & Baron, 2009; Yeo & Neal, 2004, 2008) because of a 
discrepancy between current and desired levels of performance (Carver & Scheier, 2005; 
Vancouver,  More, & Yoder, 2008).   
A focal issue in MDM is to make a good decision (i.e., conformity to a normative 
solution) and is cognitively often more effortful (Connolly & Ordonez, 2003). Consequently, 
making accurate decisions can be highly costly in terms of the attentional resources required. In 
this regard, Payne and Bettman (2007, p. 113) note: 
An increase in the cognitive (or emotional) cost of processing an item of 
information, like the cost of acquiring an item of information, will lead to greater 
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use of simplification mechanisms that minimize information processing. The cost 
of acquiring and processing an item of information may also affect the order in 
which information is processed, as well as whether or not an item is processed at 
all.  
 
Exerting attentional effort directed at finding, identifying and using information and 
arriving at the most accurate alternatives can lead an individual to adopt an aversive stance to 
making a decision (Anderson, 2003). Expending a large amount of attentional resources might 
be affectively unpleasant (Fisher & Noble, 2004) and/or taken as indicative of low ability 
(Bandura, 1991; Dweck, 2006; Dweck & Molden, 2005). Fisher and Noble (2004) noted in this 
regard that the perceived difficulty of a task is a function of how much effort an individual 
believes is necessary for success, and that task difficulty is analogous to how much effort is 
necessary for success. Perceived difficulty is a covariate of attentional effort (Yeo & Neal, 
2004). Thus, individuals would allocate attentional effort to compensate for perceived ability if 
they thought effort mattered and there is a great deal of volition that permits individuals to exert 
more or less effort despite how difficult they perceive the task to be (e.g., Lucas et al., 2006; 
Smillie, Yeo, Furnham, &  Jackson, 2006). 
The conservation of attentional resources may in fact be both intelligent and adaptive in 
order to save attentional resources (Ganster, 2005; Payne & Bettman, 2007).  Individuals may 
adopt decision processes that represent the best trade-off between a goal of achieving an 
accurate decision and saving attentional effort. When faced with information that is too 
voluminous or complex under time stress individuals employ simplifying strategies, or 
heuristics (i.e., simple and fast rules of thumb) and engage in filtration (i.e., focus on a subset 
of the available information) (Payne & Bettman, 2007; Plous, 1993). Further, managers are 
forced to balance an accuracy goal (i.e., conformity with rationality) with opportunity-cost time 
(Payne, Bettman, & Luce, 1996; Pelham & Neter, 1995). Under such conditions, adopting a 
comprehensive decision strategy may come at a cost in terms of time (Brousseau et al., 2006; 
Payne et al., 1996) and present lost opportunities where a delay can result "in failure as 
windows of opportunity close" (Eisenhardt, 1993, p. 121).   
 This tendency to make judgments without complete information may lead to decisions 
that can contribute to failure, or may alternatively even be the reason why some entrepreneurs 
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are successful (Le Roux, Pretorius, & Millard, 2006). Heuristics enable individuals to inject 
their personalized interpretations and their experience to search for and interpret information, 
what they find familiar or what they are comfortable with, in order to select among options that 
enable them to make up their minds quickly and easily in decision making (Geletkanycz & 
Black, 2001; Hambrick et al., 2005a, 2005b).  
Managers as agents for decisions in organizations bring available attentional resources 
to bear on their decision making and they are required to direct these resources toward making 
accurate decisions that serve the interests of the organization. Although the advantage of 
heuristics is that it simplifies the decision task and reduces the time and attentional effort 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), it leads to what Keren (1996) referred to as motivated mistakes. 
However, it might actually allow managers to make the best decisions possible under difficult 
circumstances (Ganster, 2005).  Consequently, it can provide relatively high levels of decision 
accuracy with substantial savings in the allocation of attentional resources (i.e., effort) and in 
minimizing the experience of negative affect. 
 
Maximizing the accuracy of choice 
 
Trying to solve the decision problem effectively increases the weight given to a goal of 
maximizing accuracy. Decision strategies with high cognitive effort are thus more likely to be 
used when decision accuracy is prioritised over saving cognitive effort (attentional resources) 
(see, for example, Bettman et al., 1998; Foo et al., 2009). Such a motivation to perform 
accurately is often associated with a more rational, systematic-comprehensive decision process 
to meet the best interests of the organization.  
Pursuing an accuracy goal leads to better performance when there is no time pressure 
(Payne et al., 1996). In fact, Pelham and Neter (1995) argue that pursuing an accuracy goal 
leads to increased performance in environments that did not involve opportunity-cost time 
pressure. Consequently, decision makers who are more motivated to be accurate can sometimes 
make decisions in ways that are not adaptive when deciding in high-velocity environments. 
Situational factors such as need for accuracy, degree of external control, and social 
norms and expectations also motivate a goal to be accurate in decision making. Managers are 
rewarded when they demonstrate rationality in line with economic arguments of cost or risk in 
order to maximize accuracy of decisions (i.e., conformity to a rational decision). For example, 
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accountability to others is a contextual determinant of accuracy in decision making (Green et 
al., 2000; Lerner & Tetlock, 2003).  
 
Maximizing the ease of social influence and justifying the decision 
 
Accountability conditions require an effortful decision process (i.e., an increased level 
of effort to meet accuracy goals). Meeting conflicting goals of diverse interest groups can lead 
managers to weigh ease of justification more heavily than effort considerations (i.e., a heuristic 
search for good reasons to use as justifications) in order to minimize negative affect (Bettman 
& Payne, 2007; Luce et al., 2001). This is especially the case when a constituent‘s views are 
unknown, or when a constituent‘s views are reasonably well-informed, or when constituents 
value accuracy, and when constituents have a legitimate reason for inquiring into the reasons 
behind the manager‘s judgments or choices (Lerner & Tetlock, 2003; Sedikides & Herbst, 
2002). Consequently, managers prepare themselves by engaging in an effortful and self-critical 
search for reasons to justify their decisions in anticipation of how it will be evaluated by others 
(Brousseau et al., 2006; Green et al., 2000). This accountability-political influence relationship 
can lead to aversive negative affect (Perrewé et al., 2004).  
Maximizing ease of justification may involve the use of heuristics in social influence 
situations based on social goals individuals employ (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Janssen, 
Fennis, Pruyn, & Vohs, 2008). Motivated by social goals to get along (Hogan & Shelton, 
1998), impression-motivated managers may base decisions on the low-effort acceptability, 
consensus or relational heuristics (Bettman et al., 1998; Chen, Shechter, & Chaiken, 1996; De 
Dreu & Van Kleef, 2003). that lead individuals to shift their decisions toward that of their 
audience and choosing compromise options.  Meeting conflicting goals of diverse interest 
groups can thus lead managers to craft impression-motivated compromises in order ‗to go 
along to get along‘ with divergent interest groups. Individuals may thus weigh the ease of 
social goals more heavily than effort considerations (i.e., an accuracy goal) as a way to 
minimize negative affect that emanates from potential interpersonal conflict (Bettman & Payne, 
2007; Luce et al., 2001). Alternatively, managers may also avoid decisions in order to minimize 
aversive affect (Anderson, 2003, 2007).  
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Minimizing decision-generated affect 
 
Affect is a function of goals individuals pursue and their reaction to subsequent 
outcomes (Locke & Latham, 2002). Forty years ago Simon (1967) reasoned that the experience 
of affect calls for a reprioritization of goals in order to induce individuals to interrupt their 
behaviour (i.e., action goals) and substitute present goals with higher priority goals.  Goals are 
deeply connected to the self and affect arises whenever there is a significant change in the 
likelihood of reaching one‘s goals. Carver and Scheier (2005) argue that goals are 
hierarchically structured and that higher-level goals specify the purpose (i.e., the ‗why‘ or distal 
desired states) of action, whereas lower-level goals direct increasingly more specific actions 
(i.e., the ‗how‘ or the means) to obtain the higher-level goals. These authors argue that goals 
placed higher in the hierarchy are fundamental to physical and mental health and that, when 
discrepancies in these fundamental goals are large, not much else matters to an individual. 
Forgas and Laham (2005, p. 182) note in this regard that ―arguably, one of the most common 
and important goals people have in everyday life is the maintenance of a reasonably positive, 
optimistic affective balance despite the manifold challenges they face‖.  
Consequently, one salient goal in decision making is coping with or minimizing 
decision-generated negative affect (Luce, Bettman, & Payne, 1997; Luce, 2005). Individuals 
seldom come close to a state of detached affect when making decisions that implicate their own 
interests and produce conflict (Luce, 2005; Svenson, 2003). It is noteworthy that managers‘ 
considerations regarding negative affect become more pronounced in situations that involve 
higher-stakes decision outcomes (Luce et al., 2001). In fact, many managers describe affect-
laden decisions as difficult even if the relevant information is easy to comprehend.   
Decisions, thus, may depend on minimizing unpleasant affective experiences, rather 
than maximizing the expected utility of the chosen outcomes (see, for example, Mellers, 
Schwartz, & Ritov, 1999; Mellers, Schwartz and Cooke, 1998). In fact, Baumeister, Vohs, 
DeWall, and Zhang (2007) argue that minimizing affect is a prime factor in most behavioural 
choices. Decision makers, thus, adapt to negative affect by simply adopting easier decisions 
(Payne & Bettman, 2007) or even avoid making decisions (see Anderson, 2003, 2007; Ferrari, 
1991a, 1991d; Ferrari & Pychyl, 2007; Green et al., 2000; Luce,  2005). Such shifts in goals in 
order to reduce negative affect are motivated by a concern to ‗repair‘ one‘s affect through 
taking action either to reduce or to change the intensity of affect (Forgas & Ciarrochi, 2002; 
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Forgas & Laham 2005; Gohm, 2003; Larsen & Prizmic, 2004).  The various decision options 
adopted to minimize affect are discussed later in this chapter.  
The discussion thus far has highlighted how properties of the decision environment 
influence goals and the selection of decision process strategies. Decision-task variables such as 
information load and time constraints were shown to have an impact on the relative effort to 
acquire and use information in order to meet the criteria to make a good decision (i.e., accuracy 
of the choice). Moreover, it was shown that MDM is embedded in a political/social context that 
contributes to considerable ambiguity. This requires managers to actively produce actions 
congruent with constituent demands and/or to take steps to change their expectations.  It has 
been pointed out that making a decision in organizations requires managers to apply a 
systematic-comprehensive decision process which calls for the application of cognitive 
abilities, as well as social self-confidence (as prerequisites for information acquisition and the 
political problem of resolving divergent interests) in order to facilitate decision implementation.  
MDM is thus nearly always multidimensional in nature, involving several ability and 
skill dimensions. These individual variables, illustrated in Figure 2.1, are presented in the next 
subsection.   
 
Individual Variable Factors 
 
Payne and Bettman (2007) argue that decision making is best understood from the 
determinants of attentional resources as a function of task, context, and characteristics of the 
decision maker. The discussion thus far has argued that MDM is an effortful process (Connolly 
& Ordonez, 2003) and costly in terms of the attentional resources required (Payne & Bettman, 
2007). Effort in the context of this thesis is conceptualized as the amount of attentional 
resources devoted to a task and provides for a theoretical linkage between distal individual 
factors and proximal volitional/motivational processes on individual ability/motivation-
performance relations (see, for example, Kanfer & Ackerman, 2000a, 2000b; Kanfer, 
Ackerman, & Heggestad, 1996). Kanfer and Ackerman (1989, 1996) and Kanfer and 
Heggestad (1997) proposed a distinction between distal influences on action, in the form of 
relatively stable attributes, and proximal influences on performance associated with individual 
differences in self-regulation. This approach permits a conceptualization of attentional resource 
allocation approach that permits a distinction between a motivational process that affects an 
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individual‘s decisions to exert effort (distal), and the volitional processes by which intentions 
are translated into performance (proximal). Such proximal motivational processes determine 
the distribution of attentional effort across on-task and off-task activities during performance.  
The influence of distal domain-independent individual variable factors (i.e., cognitive 
ability and social self-confidence) is indirect in their relationship to decision making processes 
in that they reflect individual differences in the total attentional capacity that can be devoted to 
tasks (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1996).  The capacity of available attentional resources does not 
univocally determine performance in tasks since individual differences in self-regulatory or 
motivational processes, as a proximal influence on performance, impact on the extent to which 
intentions are translated into performance.   
Thirty five years of motivation research demonstrates that attention drives effort (Locke 
& Latham, 2002). Motivation reflects the direction and proportion of total attentional effort 
directed to the task (see, for example, Kanfer & Ackerman, 2005) and strengthens the 
allocation of attentional resources in contexts that require sustained effort (i.e., persistence) 
(see, for example, DeShon, Brown, & Greenis, 1996; Yeo & Neal, 2008). Self-regulation 
reflects the exercise of effortful attention and affective reactivity (Eisenberg, Smith, Sadovsky, 
& Spinrad 2004) to direct attentional effort and the ability to regulate affect (Peterson & 
Seligman, 2004; Weiss et al., 2005). Further, self-efficacy beliefs are central to the self-
regulation of effort allocation intentions and the regulation of affect (see, for instance, Bandura, 
1997) and are thus construed as proximal (i.e., task-specific and associated with a particular 
situational context) and a more direct influence on performance. Several researchers propose 
that self-efficacy beliefs mediate between distal individual differences and are essential in order 
to permit individuals to effectively adjust their attentional resource allocations as task demands 
change (see, for example, Beal et al., 2005; Kanfer & Ackerman, 1996; Weiss et al., 2005).   
The operating environment of managers requires individuals to deal with information-
processing demands and social complexity (Zaccaro, 2001). Earlier in this chapter it was shown 
that MDM is a dual process that combines a rational, comprehensive process (Hough & White, 
2003) with a context-specific political and accountability process (Elbanna & Child, 2007; 
Lerner & Tetlock, 2003; Papadakis, 2006). With regards to the former, MDM represents a 
rational, systematic-comprehensive process of acquiring and deliberating with information in 
order to make decisions (Elbanna, 2006;  Hough & White, 2003; Wood et al., 2000).  In 
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addition, MDM is also a political/social process (Beach & Connolly, 2005; Brousseau et al., 
2006; Elbanna & Child, 2007; Kolodinsky, Treadway, & Ferris 2007). Gaining compliance 
requires that the political interests of others must be obtained in a manner that promotes 
accuracy in decisions (even in cases where opposition is likely to be high). This process may 
bias the collection and use of information, deliberation and decisions about alternatives in order 
to gain the favour of those individuals managers feel accountable to (see, for example, Green et 
al., 2000; Lerner & Tetlock, 2003). This requires managers to exercise social (i.e., persuasion, 
negotiation) and rational modes of social influence in their management of power conflicts and 
building supportive coalitions (see, for example, Ferris et al., 2007; Hochwarter et al., 2007; 
Sullivan, O'Connor, & Burris, 2003).  
Consequently, this dual process of MDM implies that individual differences in 
cognitive ability and personality/social traits, independently and in combination, account for 
individual differences in the quality of MDM processes and outcomes.  Moreover, although 
cognitive ability and personality traits are empirically and conceptually distinct (Ferris et al., 
2002), they are related in a temporal order in MDM. In fact, Russell (2001) demonstrated in a 
longitudinal study that cognitive predictors accounted for short-term business execution and 
personality-related predictors predicted longer term performance trends amongst executives. 
Further, Motowidlo, Borman and Schmit (1997) provide a useful taxonomy to conceptualize 
the unique contribution of cognitive ability and personality traits in work performance. Their 
theory divides job performance into two groups of dimensions, namely task (substantive) and 
contextual performance, with the former aligning with cognitive ability and the latter 
accounting for personality traits. These authors also argue that, although the strongest effects of 
cognitive ability are on task performance, it is possible that cognitive ability also contributes to 
contextual performance through its effects on individual characteristic adaptations. Similarly, 
although the strongest effects of personality traits are on contextual performance, some 
personality traits also have some effect on task performance. Despite these ‗crossover‘ effects, 
personality traits are more strongly associated with the contextual performance domain and 
cognitive ability with the task performance domain. In the next subsection the influence of 
cognitive ability and social self-confidence as distal domain-independent individual variable 
factors are discussed.  
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Cognitive Abilities 
 
Cognitive abilities are hypothetical attributes of individuals that are manifest when 
individuals perform tasks that involve the active manipulation of information (Murphy, 1996). 
Regardless of the occupation or job under consideration, cognitive ability predicts overall job 
performance (Ones, Viswesvaran, & Dilchert, 2005a; Schmidt, 2002). Gottfredson (2002, p. 
30) conceptualizes cognitive ability as a generic ―all purpose tool‖ to process any sort of 
information in order to solve any kind of problem. In this regard, Chen, Casper, and Cortina 
(2001) suggest that individuals with higher cognitive ability may be more likely to accomplish 
complex tasks. Cognitive ability is, consequently, a significant determinant of individual 
differences in information-processing tasks (e.g., Chen, Casper, & Cortina, 2001; Finucane & 
Lees, 2005; Hu et al., 2007; Kanfer & Ackerman, 2005). For example, verbal ability (see, for 
example, Parker & Fischhoff, 2005; Zaccaro, 2001) and numerical ability are required for 
decision tasks such as analyzing, interpreting and understanding relevant information, creating, 
conceptualizing and integrating information, and reasoning about it (see, for example, Peter & 
Levin, 2008; Peters et al., 2006). 
A large and consistent distinction among jobs is the complexity of their information- 
processing demands. Tasks high in their information processing demands correlate most highly 
with job complexity (Gottfredson, 2002; Jaques, 1996; Wood et al., 2002) and display a high 
validity for predicting task performance by occupational group (for example, upper 
management jobs that represent greater information processing complexity) (Bertua, Anderson, 
& Salgado, 2005; Schmidt & Hunter, 2004). Various authors also indicate that cognitive ability 
is important for decision making (Bartram, 2005; Conway, 2000; Schmidt, Shaffer, & Oh, 
2008; Stanovich & West, 2000; Weekley & Ployhart, 2005). In fact, cognitive limitations may 
restrict decision making performance (e.g., Parker & Fischhoff, 2005). Individuals with higher 
levels of cognitive ability have a larger pool of attentional resources than their counterparts and 
require a smaller proportion to achieve the same performance outcome. When high ability 
individuals perceive an increase in difficulty, the corresponding increase in attentional effort is 
proportionately smaller than that in their counterparts. Consequently, lower cognitive ability 
individuals need to make larger proportional attentional resource adjustments to achieve the 
same outcome as their counterparts (Yeo & Neal, 2008). 
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Cognitive ability also contributes to contextual performance (Motowidlo et al., 1997). 
For example, in one of the first empirical studies in the organizational sciences to investigate 
the joint contribution of cognitive ability and social influence Ferris, Witt, and Hochwarter 
(2001, p. 1081) demonstrated that the possession of higher levels of cognitive ability provided 
individuals with high levels of social influence a "boost" necessary to increase performance. 
Conversely, an increased display of social influence in conjunction with low cognitive ability 
led to lower performance. Schmidt et al. (2008) suggest the possibility that individuals use their 
cognitive ability to control the expression of their personality dispositions in their behaviour. 
For example, extraversion incorporates individual traits associated with sociability and general 
activity level (talkative, active, assertive) and managers could use their cognitive ability to 
learn to display such extraverted behaviours, even though such behaviour is not their natural or 
spontaneous inclination.  
The following subsection describes social self-confidence as an intra-individual trait of 
ascendancy, as a proxy to influence others. Social self-confidence as a behavioural response is 
a relatively stable and enduring trait that is mediated by a trait-relevant context that mediates 
social influence. The subsection will first highlight the importance of social traits in MDM, 
followed by an outline of how traits relate to social skill. The discussion is followed by a 
description of confidence as an additional individual variable. Finally, self-confidence as a 
composite trait is defined for the purposes of this study.  
 
Social Self-Confidence 
  
The social and political contexts of organizations often yield little clear information 
about decision parameters and problem boundaries and, accordingly, it is difficult if not 
impossible for managers to achieve their goals either independently or through persuasion and 
formal authority alone. Consequently, MDM requires managers to use a blend of direct and 
covert persuasion and social coercion to balance a myriad of social and political expectations 
and interests in order to influence decisions (Bandura, 1997; Beach & Connolly, 2005).  In fact, 
an unwillingness to take the social and political aspects of organizational life seriously is a 
common reason why managers fail (Hogan, 1994). Consequently, interpersonal or social 
effectiveness constructs are important in the prediction of management performance (see, for 
example, Semadar, Robins, & Ferris, 2006; Wayne, Liden, Graf, & Ferris, 1997).  In spite of 
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their importance, Zaccaro (2001) notes that personality and social traits have been subsumed by 
cognitive ability and are infrequently referred to in MDM since some theorists and conceptual 
researchers have considered them to be proportionately less important that cognitive ability 
factors.  
Although there has been a resurgence of interest in social skills in organizations, little 
conceptual and empirical research has attempted to distinguish between the proliferation of 
social skills constructs in order to aid a more informed and parsimonious understanding of 
social effectiveness. In this regard, Ferris et al. (2002, p. 50) conclude that social effectiveness 
is ―a rather broad, higher-order, umbrella term which encapsulates a number of moderately-
related, yet conceptually-distinctive, manifestations of social understanding and competence‖. 
It is therefore necessary to conceptualize social self-confidence traits as an important construct 
for the purpose of this study. 
 
Personality traits 
 
Personality traits are intra-individually consistent and inter-individually distinct 
propensities to behave in some identifiable way (i.e., as expressing a given trait) and, as 
propensities, traits are latent constructs (Tett & Guterman, 2000). Allport (1924) considered 
traits to imply ranges of behavioural possibilities that are activated according to situational 
demands. For example, Allport states that extraversion serves as a salient proxy for social skill 
only when coupled with extensive experience, learning, and interaction with evaluative cues. 
Traits-as-dispositions are thus best understood when both individual and environmental 
determinants are simultaneously considered. In this regard, Tett and Guterman (2000) argue 
that trait-relevant behavioural intentions are strong in situations that provide appropriate cues 
for trait expression, an idea that has roots in Murray‘s (1938) notion of ‗situational press‘. It 
was pointed out earlier that individuals‘ subjective appraisals of difficulty in a task produce 
different affective reactions depending on how it is appraised (Bandura, 1997; Mangos & 
Steele-Johnson, 2001). Stemmler (1997, p. 214) argues that affect is a potent indicator of 
selective personality trait activation and utilization: 
Emotions signal actual, adaptationally significant features of context and 
environment...If environmental demands change, the pattern of elicited emotions 
might also change and with it the best fitting person characteristic. However, 
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instead of changing environmental demands, one could also attempt to vary just 
their intensity dimension. Therefore, specific temperament traits will be more 
likely activated under high than medium or low intense emotion inductions.  
 
Similarly, Hochwarter et al. (2006) state that trait activation is dependent on contextual 
cues and with practice and effort individuals develop a sense of when it is necessary to use 
social skill. Consequently, situational cues evoke the expression of trait-relevant behaviours 
(Lievens, Chasteen, Day, & Christiansen, 2006; Tett & Burnett, 2003). Further, unambiguous 
behavioural situations result in few differences in how individuals respond to a situation, 
whereas ambiguous situations (characterized by more unclear expectations) evoke greater 
variability in behavioural responses (Hough, Ones, & Viswesvaran, 1998). Hogan and Shelton 
(1998) argue for a socio-analytic approach to personality as a promising theoretical framework 
to understand how personality traits relate to social skill. These authors note that two 
motivational constructs are particularly relevant mediators for personality trait effects in work 
settings.  Hogan and Shelton further argue that the two primary motives that drive behaviour 
are the desire to ‗get along‘ and the desire to ‗get ahead‘ and some individuals are thus more 
motivated to get along, whereas others are more motivated to get ahead. Different individuals 
use different behavioural strategies as attempts to achieve one or both of these goals (see, for 
example, Joyce Hogan, & Holland, 2003).  Consequently, a clear, interpretable pattern of 
relations emerges regarding the motive to get along with others (e.g., empathy and 
agreeableness) versus the motive to get ahead (e.g., potency measures) and it stands to reason 
that successful managers display socio-political trait-dispositions to get ahead rather than those 
necessary to get along.   
Extraversion and ambition are components of a larger construct of surgency (the degree 
of impact), arousal levels and the availability of attentional resources (energy) that are manifest 
potency behaviours related to resourcefulness, decisiveness, dominance, independence, and 
social presence (Conway, 2000; Craik et al., 2002). Although extraversion combines aspects of 
interacting with others on the one hand and dominance or potency on the other (Hough et al., 
1998), it is the dominance and potency facet of extraversion that relates to leading/deciding and 
interacting/presenting competencies (Bartram, 2005).  Extraversion is related to arousal levels 
and H. J. Eysenck (1967) has long held that extraverts are likely to experience more positive 
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affect. Moreover, M. Eysenck (1987) suggested that extraversion represents susceptibility to 
positive affect (see, also, H. J. Eysenck and M. Eysenck, 1985) and consequently the 
availability of attentional resources (Austin & Klein, 1996).  
In this regard, Kanfer and Ackerman (2005) refer to a ‗social trait complex‘ that appears 
to include social potency, social self-confidence, forcefulness, ambition and energy to enable 
managers to take charge, overcome obstacles and act decisively, all of which are facilitative or 
impeding of the acquisition of social influence-specific knowledge and skills (see, for example,  
Hogan, 2005; Hogan & Hogan, 1995, 2002; Holland, Hogan, & Van Landuyt, 2002).   These 
arguments, thus, support the value of compound personality traits as more useful than global, 
decontextualized traits in the prediction of performance (see, for instance, Ones, Viswesvaran, 
& Dilchert, 2005b). 
 
Social skills 
 
Social skills is a broad, higher-order construct that reflects a number of distinctive 
manifestations of social understanding and competence which account for performance in 
occupations where a significant portion of the job involves interacting with others, particularly 
when that interaction is focused on influencing others and obtaining status and power (Bartram, 
2005; Hogan, Kaiser, & DeVries, 2005; Schwarzwald, Koslowsky, & Ochana-Levin, 2004; 
Semadar et al., 2006; Wayne et al., 1997). Political and negotiation skills, for example, are not 
based on single traits or skills, but are a characteristic manner of expression and ability to 
influence others to act in ways to enhance one‘s personal and/or organizational objectives 
(Ferris et al., 2005; Ferris, et al., 2007; Sullivan et al., 2003).  
 
Confidence 
 
Confidence represents another major variable in individual differences related to 
decision making (Ferrari, 2001; Ferrari & Dovidio, 2001; Papadakis, 2006; Russell, 2001; 
Zaccaro, 2001). Confidence is a relatively stable individual disposition to meet challenging task 
demands in a wide variety of situations and is distinct from the malleable, task-specific self-
efficacy belief of individuals (Bandura, 1997). Confidence, thus, basically reflects generalized 
self-efficacy beliefs (see, for example, Chen, Gully, & Eden, 2004; Chen, Gully, Whiteman, & 
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Kilcullen, 2000). Confidence relates to individuals‘ willingness to take risk. Individuals accept 
risk more often when they perceive themselves to be competent than when they do not 
(Haleblian et al., 2004). Thus, social skills deficits may not merely reflect deficient knowledge 
(i.e., a capacity).  
Hill (1989) observes that dysfunctional cognitions affect the willingness to display 
social skills. Treadway, Hochwarter, Kacmar, and Ferris (2005) argue that personal volition 
(i.e., allocation of attentional resources) explains the enactment of social behaviour. In this 
regard, Bandura (1997, p. 2) explains that ―people's level of motivation, affective states, and 
actions are based more on what they believe than on what is objectively true". Social 
interaction and influence to initiate and maintain interpersonal relationships are closely related 
to self-efficacy beliefs (see, for example, Ferris et al., 1999; Smith & Betz, 2000; Xie, 2007) 
and individuals may not wish to influence others (i.e., an unwillingness to do so) in spite of 
knowing what is required to influence decisions. Self-efficacy beliefs moderate the effect of 
situational social influence variables (i.e., accountability to others) and susceptibility to social 
influence. Socially efficacious individuals are less likely to yield to the influence of others (e.g., 
Lucas et al., 2006), whereas individuals with insufficient confidence in their social efficacy 
tend to shy away from assuming responsibilities that entail decision making (e.g., Mirels, 
Greblo, & Dean, 2002). Such dysfunctional cognitions consequently inhibit social behavioural 
responses (e.g., cognitive withdrawal and unwillingness to deploy their attentional resources) 
(Stevens & Gist, 1997) and thus prevent the demonstration of social skills irrespective of social 
skills knowledge.  
In this regard, Forgas and Laham (2005) observe that individuals with less confidence 
view risky interpersonal endeavours (for example, requests and negotiation) as potential threats 
to be approached in such a way as to maximize compliance without risking giving offense. 
Managers who are self-confident, conversely, select more rational modes of influence (Wayne 
et al., 1997). Overconfidence, on the other hand, is a common and relatively robust 
phenomenon in decision making (Hiller & Hambrick, 2005) and refers to the failure to know 
the limits of one‘s knowledge or ability (Simon, Houghton, & Aquino, 1999). Overconfidence 
in one's own abilities is a form of cognitive conceit according to Dawes (1976) which implies a 
withdrawal of cognitive effort (i.e., minimization of effort) (Stone, 1994; Vancouver, 
Thompson, Tischner, & Putka, 2002). Individuals with unwarranted confidence may undertake 
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tasks beyond their abilities, underutilize available assistance, and neglect signs that decisions 
are going awry (see, for example, Malmendier & Tate, 2002; Moore, 2007; Tasa & Whyte, 
2005; Vecchio, 2002; Wong, 2005)  
There is an array of personality variables that account for overconfidence in the 
correctness of one's decisions and Wolfe and Grosch (1990) list individual-differences in affect 
(including optimism), social cognition (i.e., need for cognition, self-monitoring, self-efficacy), 
and cognitive ability.  The combination of these factors makes managers believe they possess 
valuable personal insights or an understanding of their situations and available alternatives, 
such that they do not feel the need to exhaustively gather, analyze, and discuss data (Hayward 
& Hambrick, 1997).   
Individuals who believe they are better than average are more likely to be overconfident 
in their assessments of ability (Larrick, Burson, & Soll, 2007). This may lead them to engage in 
tasks for which they are ill equipped or to persist in strategies that are no longer effective 
(Audia, Locke, & Smith, 2000; Bandura & Locke, 2003). Such unwarranted confidence may 
lead individuals to overestimate their ability to produce success and, consequently, neglect 
signs that decisions are likely to fail (Kroll et al., 2000; Malmendier & Tate, 2002; Schmidt & 
Calantone, 2002; Wong, 2005; Wong, Yik, & Kwong, 2006). In addition, overconfident 
managers tend to inflate positive outcomes and pay attention to positive feedback but ignore 
negative feedback. This cognitive bias (e.g., Simon et al., 1999; Vecchio, 2002) in combination 
with organizational pressures leads managers to make overly optimistic forecasts in analyzing 
proposals for major investments (see, for example,  McNamara & Bromiley, 1997; Sutcliffe & 
McNamara, 2001). By exaggerating the likely benefits of a decision and ignoring the potential 
pitfalls, managers lead their organizations into initiatives that are doomed to fall well short of 
expectations. For example, Bond, Carlson, Meloy, Russo, and Tanner (2007) observe that 
individuals form an initial assessment of favourability toward a choice option and then bias 
their evaluation of subsequent information to cohere with their initial disposition when faced 
with a single option (i.e., a systematic and non-normative misinterpretation of new 
information).  Consequently, commitments to a losing course of action are mediated by 
overconfidence. Overconfident individuals perceive less risk in their decisions by 
overestimating their ability to produce successes that contribute to escalation and entrapments 
in major decisions.   
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When such overconfidence leads to failure, it is colloquially referred to as ‗hubris‘ 
(Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Hiller & Hambrick, 2005). Confident that they could succeed 
where others had failed potentially distorts individuals‘ estimation of the problems associated 
with their decisions. The familiar prototypical examples of leaders who rose from humble 
origins to great power and ultimate ruin because of their hubris are Napoleon and Hitler. In 
these and other instances (Certo et al., 2008; Lovallo & Kahneman, 2003) overarching self-
confidence led to a series of early successes, but eventually led to a disregard of warning signs 
of impending failure (Kroll, Toombs, & Wright, 2000).  It is axiomatic to say that one major 
function of social influence interpersonal interactions is to achieve social influence  (Vohs & 
Ciarocco, 2004). Analyses of influence attempts show that influence tactics can be split into 
two different types:  alpha attempts (which involve boosting approach forces) and omega 
attempts (which involve reducing opposition). Omega strategies suggest that self-regulation 
may be involved in combating other's attempts to influence. One line of research demonstrates 
that self regulation as guided by the self-regulatory resource model, is a central determinant of 
an individual‘s ability to defend against others‘ attempts to persuade. 
For the purposes of this thesis, social self-confidence is conceptualized as intra-
individual consistent propensities to behave in some identifiable way (i.e., as expressing a 
given trait) (Tett & Guterman, 2000) as an expression of personality in a socially adaptive 
fashion (Mayer, 2005).  Social self-confidence is related to arousal levels, the availability of 
attentional resources (Austin & Klein, 1996), and positive affectivity (see, for example, H. J. 
Eysenck, 1967 and M. Eysenck, 1987; H. J. Eysenck & M. Eysenck, 1985).  Further, 
operationalized as the level of surgency (the degree of impact and forcefulness) and the 
availability of attentional resources (energy) this  trait cluster gives rise to both intra-individual 
variations in affective states and inter-individual differences in emotionality that represents a 
"preparedness to respond" (Tellegen, 1985, p. 697). The trait cluster is manifested in 
resourcefulness, decisiveness, dominance, independence, social presence and energy to act 
decisively and influence others. This positive emotionality promotes more behavioural 
responsiveness to positive affective states (Judge, Scott, & Illies, 2006; Tett & Burnett, 2003). 
Successful performance is often as much a matter of perceived efficacy as of 
capabilities and any skill is only as good as its execution. Confidence, effort, and persistence 
are often more potent than innate ability (Dweck, 2000) and individuals therefore may perform 
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poorly, adequately, or highly with the same set of skills depending on the beliefs they hold 
about their capabilities in given situations (Bandura, 1997). Beliefs in self-efficacy are 
accorded a prominent role in the present thesis since they account for the allocation of the 
shareable attentional resources to serve on-task decision strategies in MDM and the regulation 
of affective reactions. The functional relationship between distal individual variable factors and 
the quality of MDM processes and outcomes may thus vary depending on the relative 
magnitude of beliefs in efficacy as a main determinant of attentional resources allocation and 
intentions. Space does not permit an exhaustive review of the literature on self-efficacy beliefs 
and an abbreviated summary of the major theoretical issues central to this thesis is provided in 
the section that follows. 
 
Self-Efficacy Beliefs 
Definition  
 
In colloquial terms, self-efficacy beliefs are frequently referred to as the ‗self-
confidence‘ to perform a specific task at a certain level of competence. Although conceptually 
similar to self-efficacy beliefs, Bandura (1997) states that self-confidence (as a trait) is a 
nondescript term that refers to the strength of a belief but does not necessarily specify what the 
certainty is about. As a term, self-confidence is not a construct embedded in a theoretical 
system that specifies its determinants, mediating processes, and multiple effects. Another 
surrogate term for self-efficacy beliefs is self-esteem. Self-esteem usually is considered to be a 
global affective trait that reflects an individual's characteristic affective evaluation of the self 
(e.g., feelings of self-worth or self-liking) across a wide variety of situations (Chen, Gully, & 
Eden, 2004; Judge, Erez, Bono, & Thoresen, 2002; Judge, Locke, & Durham, 1997). 
By contrast, self-efficacy beliefs are judgments about task or domain-specific 
capabilities that are not inherently evaluative (Gist & Mitchell, 1992). Self-efficacy beliefs 
represent individuals‘ momentary belief in their capabilities to perform a specific task at a 
specific level of performance, that is a judgment about the likelihood of successful performance 
measured immediately before any effort is expended on a task (Bandura, 1997). Consequently, 
self-efficacy beliefs are narrow in scope and much more variable than more enduring 
personality traits (Gardner & Pierce, 1998). To conclude, the essential distinction between self-
efficacy beliefs and similar constructs lies in the fact that self-efficacy beliefs imply an internal 
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attribution, they are  prospective, that is referring to future behaviours, and they are an 
operative construct which means that this cognition is quite proximal to critical behaviour and 
thus a good predictor of that actual behaviour. 
Defined as ―beliefs in one's capabilities to organize and execute the courses of action 
required to produce given attainments‖ (Bandura, 1997, p. 3), self-efficacy beliefs represent an 
individual-in-context appraisal. This appraisal constitutes a comprehensive state-based 
judgment of individual and context-specific capabilities (Bandura, 1997; Cervone, Mor, Orom, 
Shadel, & Scott, 2004; Stajkovic, 2006). Bandura‘s definition of self-efficacy includes 
"organize and execute courses of action," which represents the theory's more specific and 
situational view of perceived competence in terms of including the behavioural actions or 
cognitive skills that are necessary for competent performance (Bandura, 1997; Cervone, 2000, 
2005; Moritz, Feltz, Fahrbach, & Mack, 2000; Shea & Howell; 2000; Stajkovic, 2006; 
Weigand & Stockham, 2000).  
The underlying premise of self-efficacy beliefs is the self-regulation of behaviour 
through four efficacy-activated processes that include cognitive, affective, motivational and 
selective processes (Bandura, 1997).  These beliefs influence how a challenge is cognitively 
evaluated and determine how much effort individuals will expend and how long they will 
persevere when confronting obstacles. In addition, self-efficacy beliefs influence individuals‘ 
thought patterns and emotional reactions and determine how resilient they will be in the face 
of adverse situations. The illustration in Figure 2.2 outlines the multidimensionality and the 
mediating processes of self-efficacy beliefs. 
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                                            Mediating processes  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Self-Efficacy Beliefs and Mediating Processes 
 
Beliefs in efficacy affect individuals and their performance in two ways: one is through 
its influence on motivation (i.e., effort and goals); the other is through its influence on affect 
(Bandura, 1997). It was pointed out that goals are a theory of ability and are, consequently, 
deeply connected to the self (Carver & Scheier, 2005). Self-efficacy beliefs and personal goals 
enhance motivation that lead individuals to expend greater effort and to persist longer in the 
face of failure (e.g., Khan & Nauta, 2001; Nel, 2007) to attain their goals (Bandura & Locke, 
2003). A perceived lack of ability therefore mitigates the effects of goals on individual 
performance (Latham & Brown, 2006; Locke & Latham, 2002). Beliefs in personal efficacy are 
thus important to the extent that they may lead to an ―efficacy-difficulty effect‖ (Lucas et al., 
2006, p. 62) and act as a threshold variable that determines whether an individual chooses to 
engage (i.e., deploy attentional resources) in a task (Kanfer & Ackerman, 2005).  
Consequently, self-beliefs in efficacy motivate individuals by influencing the challenges they 
choose to undertake (Bandura, 2004, 2006; Bandura & Locke, 2003; Brown, Jones, & Leigh, 
2005; Cervone et al., 2004). Bandura (1997) notes in this regard that individuals tend to avoid 
tasks and situations they believe exceed their capabilities, but they take on tasks and activities 
that they believe they can handle (see, for example, Hu et al., 2007).  
Goals affect motivation in part through self-evaluative feedback in order to assess 
personal competence (e.g., Bandura & Jourden, 1991; Bandura & Locke, 2003; Cervone, 
Jiwani, & Wood, 1991; Latham & Brown, 2006; Locke & Latham, 2002). Affect is thus a 
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function of one‘s actions and the subsequent outcomes (Locke & Latham, 2002) and the goals 
individuals pursue create the framework within which they interpret and react to events. From 
this line of reasoning, individuals' implicit theories of ability influence the goals they pursue 
which, in turn, differentially influence the manner in which they interpret and respond to task 
difficulty and failure.  
Self-efficacy beliefs also play a pivotal role in the self-regulation of affective states and 
are powerful determinants of the type and intensity of affect (Bandura, 1997). Beliefs in one‘s 
competence can create attentional biases in how events are construed that can transform the 
environment in ways that alter its affective potential. A useful analogy is to view such beliefs in 
self-efficacy as affective currency. Just as affluent individuals are better able to process 
information about a very expensive product they desire, individuals with a resilient level of 
self-efficacy beliefs may feel less intimidated at the prospect of processing negative self-
relevant information (Raghunathan & Trope, 2002). 
Earlier in the chapter it was pointed out that affect reflects differences in managers‘ 
active appraisals in MDM. In summary, managers with low self-efficacy beliefs tend to 
appraise MDM demands as more formidable than they really are, focus more on personal 
deficiencies and possible adverse decision outcomes and, consequently, suffer frequent and 
debilitating self-doubt about capabilities they possess. This perceived lack of control leads to 
affective arousal and intrusive thinking that diverts attentional resources away from how best to 
proceed, to concerns over personal deficiencies and possible adverse outcomes. Managers with 
a firm belief in their self-efficacy shift their attention to task-relevant problem-focused 
strategies (i.e., they figure out ways of exercising some measure of control in their 
environments), and through ingenuity and perseverance, such managers realize experiences of 
success which, in turn, provide behavioural validation of personal efficacy and environmental 
controllability (Bandura, 1991).  
MDM makes heavy attentional demands that generate affective outcomes as by-
products of the decisional process. The presence of such coexisting affect represents an 
additional element to consider that competes with attentional resource allocation. The next 
section of the chapter points out that the presence of decision-generated affect can undermine 
persistence to stay focused on the relevant information to facilitate MDM processes and 
outcomes.   
48 
 
 
Decision-Generated Affect  
 
The unique demands of information overload, experienced time constraints and meeting 
the interests of divergent interest groups are the very conditions that make managers vulnerable 
to the volition-undermining potential of decision-generated affect precisely when they are 
feeling over-extended to deal with such demands (Ganster, 2005; Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick et 
al., 2005a, 2005b). Effective MDM involves more than applying a set of individual abilities to 
generate desired solutions and is not a dispassionate process. As agents of decisions managers 
face numerous obstacles, failures, and setbacks that often carry perturbing self-evaluative 
implications as well as social consequences that undermine their self-evaluations in ways that 
impair good use of their decision making skills (Bandura, 1997). 
The existence and ubiquitous nature of decision-generated affect is of considerable 
interest in its own right for any comprehensive understanding of MDM (see Lord & Kanfer, 
2002, for a review). The role of affect as a source of information has been largely ignored since 
economists as well as psychologists have mainly focused on cognitive constraints while 
neglecting to integrate the growing body of research on emotion which indicates that reason 
and emotion are interconnected (Hanoch, 2002). This subsection of the chapter outlines a 
general overview of decision-generated affect in MDM (as illustrated in Figure 2.1). Several 
authors use different definitions to refer to the constructs of emotions, feelings, mood and 
affect. These constructs are clarified for the purpose of this thesis. The informational value and 
functions of affect in MDM are subsequently presented and reference is also made to the 
attentional-resource-demanding aspects of affect.  
 
Definition of Terms 
 
―All manner of distinctions have been made in an attempt to bring order to the 
‗conceptual and definitional chaos‖ (Buck, 1990, p. 330) that characterizes affect research. 
Even then there is little general agreement about how to best define terms such as emotions, 
feelings, mood and affect (Baumeister, DeWall, & Zhang 2007; Beal et al., 2005; Forgas, 2003; 
Gasper & Isbell, 2007; Izard, 2009; Pfister & Böhm, 2008; Winkielman & Truijillo, 2007).  
Discrete emotions and mood, as prototypical affective constructs, are experiential states 
or outcomes that vary meaningfully within individuals (Baumeister et al., 2007; Brief & Weiss, 
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2002; Forgas & Laham, 2005). Mayer, Roberts, and Barsade (2008) define emotions as an 
integrated affective state involving physiological changes, motor-preparedness, cognitions 
about action, and inner experiences that emerge as outcomes from an appraisal of the self or 
situation. Bandura (1997, p. 22) asserts that there are three forms of positive affect as 
outcomes: a physical form such as ―pleasant sensory experiences and physical pleasures‖, a 
social form such as ―social recognition, monetary, and conferral of status and power‖, and a 
self-evaluative form such as ―self-satisfaction and a sense of pride and self-worth‖. Clore and 
Huntsinger (2007) argue that affect reflects representations of personal value (i.e., the goodness 
or badness of things) and that such representations can be neurological, physiological, 
experiential, cognitive, expressive and behavioural, among others. 
Decision-generated affect is defined by Luce (2005) as affect elicited by the perception 
that there is a meaningful decision to be made. For the purposes of this thesis, the term 
‗decision-generated affect‘ is adopted to refer to a broad construct that encompasses subjective 
emotions, moods, and evaluations when individuals are required to resolve multiple, viable, 
competing options that require them to prioritize some goal(s) over another (others). Earlier it 
was noted that individuals‘ ongoing appraisal-generated cognitive representations give rise to 
positive or negative affect in situations that matter to them (Raghunathan & Pham, 1999). 
Simply put, decision-generated affect calculates the nature of decisional outcomes where 
positive affect represents positive outcomes and negative affect signifies negative outcomes 
(Baumeister et al., 2007).  
The affective outcomes generated by decisions are proposed by several authors to be 
multidimensional in nature (Baumeister et al.,  2007; Han et al., 2007; Loewenstein & Lerner, 
2003; Pham, 2007). Affective arousal ranges from rapid, simple positive or negative evaluative 
reactions toward external situational demands (i.e., they operate in the foreground where they 
attract attention), to slow, transitory, mild, and diffuse positive or negative affective states that 
are not directed at a specific target. Whilst somewhat arbitrary, the former refers to emotions, 
that is, intense, short-lived and usually having a definite cause and clear cognitive content 
whilst the latter refers to moods, that is, low-intensity and relatively enduring affective states 
with no immediately salient antecedent cause with little cognitive content (Forgas, 1991, 
2000a).  
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Decision-generated affect is conceptualized as both (1) an immediate, rapid and 
automatic (i.e., proximal) affective outcome experienced at the time of decision making, and 
(2) as an anticipated (i.e., distal) affect that consists of predictions or forecasts about the 
affective consequences of decision outcomes (see, for instance,  Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). 
Moreover, Loewenstein and Lerner construe affect temporally according to when it occurs in 
the decision process, beginning with the deliberation phase that leads to a decision, 
implementing the decision, and, eventually, experiencing the outcomes. Although interrelated 
and coordinated, immediate and anticipated affect operate in different ways because they serve 
different functions (see, for instance, Baumeister et al., 2007). The dual outcomes of affect are 
presented in Table 2.1 and are described in the subsections that follow. 
Table 2.1 Dual Outcomes of Decision-Generated Affect 
 Immediate affect Anticipated affect 
Definition Affect experienced during 
decision making 
Predictions about how one will 
feel if certain decision outcomes 
occur 
Time when affect occurs Present at time of decision  Future: when decision outcomes 
are experienced 
Potential benefits associated  
with incorporating affect 
Prioritizing information 
processing and introducing 
important, but intangible 
considerations 
Determination of optimal course 
of action to maximize long-term 
well-being 
Potential pitfalls associated  
with incorporating affect  
Can propel behaviour in 
directions that are counter to  
self-interest 
When expectations are biased 
(e.g., forecasting errors), decision 
making will be commensurately 
biased 
 
Note: Adapted from G. Loewenstein and J. S, Lerner,  (2003) in R. Davidson, K. Sherer and H. Goldsmith (Eds.), 
Handbook of affective science, (p. 634). NY: Oxford University Press.  
 
Immediate affect 
Affect serves as embodied information about an individual‘s immediate concerns and 
provides important inputs into decision making that are fast enough to guide behaviour 
immediately (Schwarz & Clore, 2003, 2006) in order to make choices to increase the likelihood 
of experiencing positive affect (Baumeister et al., 2007). Such immediate affect carries specific 
‗action‘ tendencies (i.e., affect-relieving actions) that shift individual priorities toward 
immediate improvement in positively valued affect and that save attentional resources (Luce, 
1998, 2005, Luce et al., 2001). 
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There is no simple answer to the question of whether immediate negative or positive 
affect is helpful or harmful for decision making. Affective reactions are not all equal because 
individuals experiencing them will draw different inferences from their affective experiences 
(Bhattacharjee & Moreno, 2002; Raghunathan, Pham, & Corfman, 2006; Seo & Barrett, 2007).  
For example, negative affect may relate positively to effort, but if the negative affect persists, it 
may signal that things will not improve despite greater efforts and evoke intentions to 
disengage from actions (see, for example, Foo et al., 2009). How affect is construed may also 
cause decrements in decision making that force shifts in attentional resource allocations to an 
off-task focus and dilute the comprehensiveness of decision processes (Payne & Bettman, 
2007) or function as an incentive to allocate attentional resources in order to pursue an 
accuracy goal rather than to minimize the effort (Arenas, Tabernero, & Briones, 2006; Maule, 
Hockey, & Bdzola, 2000).   
For the purpose of this study, immediate affect is conceptualized as the immediate 
proximal affective arousal experienced at the time of decision making in response to making 
decisions. Immediate affect operates as an important source of information that disrupts on-task 
effort allocation and redirects attentional resources from the decision process to the affective 
experience.  How these affective traces (inclusive of subjective experience and physiological 
arousal) are construed may lead managers to approach decision making with anxiety and the 
experience of such disruptive arousal lowers managers‘ self-beliefs in their ability to perform 
skillfully (Bandura, 1997).  
 
Anticipated affect  
 
Anticipated affect reflects cognitive forecasts about anticipated affective consequences 
of decisions. Anticipated affect impacts on the content of thoughts that come to mind rather 
than the immediate experience of affect (Schwarz & Clore, 2006) and influences the 
assessment of decision alternatives (i.e., it serves a directional role) (Baumeister, Vohs, 
DeWall, & Zhang, 2007). Anticipated affect thus serves as a cue to weigh up the pros and cons 
of various decision alternatives and to form an affective ‗shortcut‘ or ‗affect heuristic‘, 
especially when the decision is ambiguous, complex or attentional resources are limited 
(Finucane, Peters, & Slovic, 2003). Moreover, Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, and Johnson (2000) 
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point out that using an overall, readily available affective impression can be far easier and more 
efficient than comprehensive deliberation (i.e., an accuracy goal) under time pressure. 
Actions are pre-shaped in thought and individuals anticipate either optimistic or 
pessimistic scenarios in line with their level of self-efficacy beliefs according to Ajzen (2002). 
It is thus partly on the basis of anticipated affect in succeeding (i.e., based on efficacy beliefs) 
that individuals choose which goal challenges to undertake, how much effort to invest and how 
long they persevere in the face of difficulties (Bandura, 1997). Anticipated affect, 
consequently, prepares individuals for the future (Mellers et al., 1999).   
A major source of human motivation is cognitively generated and individuals anticipate 
likely outcomes of prospective actions in order to guide and motivate their efforts (Bandura, 
2004). Frisch and Clemen (1994) argue that a component of a good decision is that one should 
try to accurately anticipate the different possible consequences of one's actions. To anticipate 
the consequences of one's actions accurately, one must predict both what consequences will (or 
might) occur and how one will experience the different possible consequences. This ability to 
bring anticipated outcomes to bear on current activities promotes purposeful and foresightful 
behaviour and, when projected over a long time on matters of value, a forethoughtful 
perspective provides direction, coherence, and meaning to one's life (Bandura, 2006). 
Individuals, consequently, pursue courses of action that produce positive self-reactions 
and affect (Baumeister et al., 2007). For example, individuals tend to choose situations in 
which they anticipate high personal control but avoid situations in which they anticipate low 
control (Wood & Bandura, 1989b). In addition, when thinking about what actions to take, 
managers anticipate the results of their actions through predictive forethought and evaluate the 
adequacy of their actions by analyzing the effects of their actions (Wood et al., 1990). Self-
beliefs in efficacy, goals, and expectations are consequently all reflections of individuals 
pursuing affect. The beneficial value of anticipated affect on goal pursuit motivates individuals 
to try harder to pursue such goals and these motivated efforts, in turn, facilitate reaching one‘s 
goals. Janis and Mann (1977) propose that anticipated affect accounts for greater vigilance and 
information gathering (i.e., systematic-comprehensive decision processes) that lead to better 
choices.   
Some factors, however, limit the efficacy of decision making based on expected affect. 
Individuals systematically mis-predict their own affective reactions to outcomes of their own 
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decisions (Carstensen & Hartel, 2007). Although individuals are generally accurate in making 
predictions about the valence of future affective experiences, they are not always accurate at 
predicting the intensity and duration of the actual affective experience. Individuals may 
consequently be systematically biased when it comes to predicting affective outcomes and they 
may overestimate the enduring effect that future events will have on their wellbeing. In regard 
to this, Loewenstein and Lerner (2003, p. 626) note:   
Such mis-predictions may constitute a major source of sub-optimality in decision 
making ... Many, if not most, of the consequences of decisions occur in the future, 
when the emotions an individual experiences may be different from those that 
prevailed when the decision was made. 
 
Consequently, the degree of latitude in how individuals interpret future outcomes makes 
anticipated affect a treacherous guide (S. L. Williams, 1995). Moreover, anticipated affect is 
especially noteworthy in the escalation of commitment to prior decisions. For example, 
managers are unwilling to incur loss (i.e., they avoid the feelings of failure), so much so that 
they often make irrational decisions based on a small probability that they could avoid such 
loss (Schmidt & Calantone, 2002; Wong, 2005; Wong et al., 2006). 
A review by Anderson (2003) concludes that a great deal of inaction stems from 
anticipated or feared affective outcomes. Anticipated affect can motivate decision-avoidant 
behaviours such as refusing to make any decision (Anderson, 2003), status quo bias (Luce, 
1998), or allowing others to make the decision (i.e., minimizing justification). Avoidance or 
deferral of decisions, consequently, serves as an attempt to circumvent the anticipated affective 
consequence of potential failure, as long as individuals believe that avoidance makes them feel 
better (see Baumeister et al., 2007; Schwarz & Clore, 2006).   
Anticipated affect is especially relevant in social comparison. The negative 
consequences of managerial decisions are not easily avoidable in a competitively structured 
business world because of the prevalence of forced social comparisons (e.g., industry 
performance, board reviews). Organizations promote competition due to their focus on, and 
rewarding of, individual accomplishments that encourage social comparisons. Consequently, 
managers are continually confronted with comparative appraisals whether they seek them or 
not (Bandura & Jourden, 1991). How managers are perceived and evaluated by their superiors 
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and peers has considerable consequences in terms of their reputation (Tsui & Ashford, 1994) 
and the potential effects of a loss of peer acceptance or a reduction in self-esteem tend to invite 
strong self-evaluative reactions. As a result, managers may pursue choices that minimize the 
demoralizing effects of adverse social comparison (Bandura, 1997). Anticipated affect for the 
purpose of this study is regarded as attempts to regulate future affective outcomes rather than 
the immediate experience of affect itself.  In this study, anticipated affect is represented by self-
evaluative and social comparative concerns about personal competence, vulnerability and 
control over decision outcomes. 
Earlier it was pointed out that the decision context forces managers to deal with two 
problems: the cognitive problem of making a good decision under pressure of time and 
ambiguity; and achieving this against a background of divergent political interests (i.e., to 
maximize the ease in obtaining information, resources and influencing others). Moreover, 
managers will devote more effort (i.e., allocate attentional resources) to exploring and 
deliberating during their decision processes when they believe it will help them attain their 
individual and organizational goals. These decision processes are however modified by affect 
minimization concerns that can disrupt attentional resource allocation in the prediction of the 
quality of MDM processes and outcomes.   
In conclusion, considerations regarding decision-generated affect are critical in MDM 
by virtue of their informational and motivational value. Affect in fact serves as a ‗common 
currency‘  in making decisions to allow individuals to compare the affective outcomes 
associated with different options (Peters, Västfjäll, Garling, & Slovic, 2006). Using disparate 
types of affective rewards in a kind of internal common affective scale enables individuals to 
utilize positive and negative affect rather than opting for less deliberation and effort in order to 
avoid decisions. Moreover, in many decisions affect may indeed be the most useful and only 
information individuals have (Raghunathan & Pham, 1999).  Managers with a strong ability to 
regulate affective influence are able to modulate their affective response tendencies by effortful 
or controlled processes (via self-efficacy beliefs) and are thus able to balance affective 
information processing with deliberative analysis in MDM.  
Any theory of MDM cannot be based on making decisions alone but also needs to take 
into account the decision not to act as well. The decision not to act has largely been ignored in 
MDM research, though aspects of not choosing constitute a useful contribution towards 
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understanding the decision making of managers. The next subsection deals with the volitional 
transformation of decision-generated affect into decision behaviours.  
 
Allocation of Attentional Resources      
 
Escapist thoughts, as a form of cognitive interference, redirect attentional resources 
(cognitive effort) from the decision process task to the affective experience and, consequently, 
keep individuals away from investing more effort and persistence which leads to premature 
disengagement from tasks (Carver & Scheier, 2005; Foo et al., 2009). Such thought and 
emotional interference disrupts on-task attentional effort allocations that compete with 
available and limited attentional resources (Beal et al., 2005; DeShon et al., 1996; Kanfer & 
Ackerman, 1996; Weiss et al., 2005).  
Schwarzer (1996) sees self-doubts as unfavorable thought intrusions that refer to 
personal deficits that direct attention to negative outcomes that limit constructive attempts to 
find the best possible choice. Instead of seeking a choice an individual chooses not to choose 
because of the difficulty in committing to the choice (Anderson, 2003). Intrusive and 
interfering thoughts interfere with the allocation of sufficient attention to the task and a lack of 
effortful attention leads to volitional inaction and disengagement from intentions. Cognitive 
interference thus has a volitional effect that induces individuals to avoid the opportunity-
affording features of a decision and makes individuals less likely to approach the decision, as 
well as more likely to favour the maximization of positive affect with avoidance of decisions 
(Baumeister et al., 2007).  
 
Decisional procrastination 
 
Several authors express the opinion that avoidant and decisional procrastination is a 
result of proximal motivational-affective self-regulation (see Ferrari & Pychyl, 2007; Renn, 
Allen, Fedor, & Davis, 2005; Steel, 2007; van Eerde, 2000). Volitional inaction is a type of 
psychological inertia that provides an affective incentive to circumvent the affective 
consequence of failure. Consequently, the allure of inaction attracts individuals away from the 
aversive nature of the consequences of decisions because the anticipated affective outcome 
holds promise of feeling better (Baumeister et al., 2007; Schwarz & Clore, 2003). It has been 
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pointed out that managers make strong external attributions to subjectively experienced 
decision difficulty and that hesitation to act on intentions about conflicting alternatives creates 
a situation in which they never have to put their abilities to the test. Individuals‘ cognitive 
evaluations of themselves (i.e., implicit theory of ability) is an underlying disposition which 
influences their affective responses to situations. Such cognitive frameworks determine self-
conceptions of ability (Dweck, 2006; Dweck & Molden, 2005; Elliot & Dweck, 2005). 
Individuals with a fixed ability and performance validation goal produce a bias in the 
evaluations of performance in order to demonstrate and validate this competence by proving 
performance (i.e., a preference to demonstrate and validate one's competence by seeking 
favourable judgments). Such a fixed self-conception of ability evokes a performance-avoidance 
goal-orientation (i.e., a preference to avoid negative judgments about one's ability from others). 
Performance-oriented individuals are more susceptible to the effects of negative affect, prefer 
normative standards to evaluate their level of task mastery and are consequently less 
efficacious in adapting to novel challenges (Bandura, 1997; Bandura & Jourden, 1991; 
Gerhardt & Brown, 2006). Such a perceived lack of ability therefore lessens the effects of goals 
on individual performance (Latham & Brown, 2006; Locke, & Latham, 2002) and as such 
individuals tend to avoid tasks and situations they believe exceed their capabilities and take on 
tasks and activities that they believe they can handle (Bandura, 1997; Hu et al., 2007). 
Shifting responsibility, buck-passing and bolstering behaviours are of specific interest 
within MDM as examples of individuals‘ avoidance and attempts to limit information gathering 
by getting others to make choices and take responsibility for decision consequences on their 
behalf (see, for example, Green et al., 2000; Lerner & Tetlock, 2003). For example, escape 
occurs when an individual leaves the decision context entirely. Luce (1998) noted that trade-off 
choices generated negative affect that caused individuals to try to escape from the dilemma, 
often by means of premature closure and ending the decision process before all the relevant 
information had been examined (Cheng 2003). Eisenhardt (1989) introduced the term quick 
closure as an impulsive, hasty or simplified choice that is based on a failure to differentiate 
between information that is relevant or irrelevant, reliable or unreliable, supportive or non-
supportive to the interests of both individual and organizational goals. Janis and Mann (1977) 
illustrated that hypervigilance (quick closure) occurred as a result of individuals‘ overreacting 
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to impending threat by taking impulsive, ill-considered action when in conditions characterized 
by informational overload and lack of time to search and deliberate. 
Persistence is a feature of situational purposive behaviour (Meier & Albrecht, 2003) and 
is defined as the voluntary and enduring continuation of a goal-directed action in spite of 
obstacles, difficulties, or discouragement (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). To accomplish their 
goals individuals need continued engagement with goals (Carver & Scheier, 2005) and 
individuals who judge that they can solve problems persist because it is worth expending time 
and energy on solvable problems (Bandura, 1995, 1997; Bandura & Locke, 2003; Khan & 
Nauta, 2001; Lucas et al., 2006; Nel, 2007; O'Connor & Arnold, 2001). Persistence in the face 
of failure is relatively difficult and individuals are often inclined to give up and turn their 
attention elsewhere. Moreover, individuals who distrust their capabilities reduce their efforts 
(attentional resources) or abort their attempts prematurely irrespective of their actual ability 
(see, for example, Phillips & Gully, 1997) and give up quickly because there is no point in 
persisting on tasks that are judged to be beyond their capability (Cervone & Peake, 1986). 
Volitional persistence parallels effort (attentional resources allocation) as well as how long 
managers sustain this effort when confronted with ambiguity, opposition and obstacles in 
MDM in the service of their goals and interests of the organization. 
Intentional inactivity, consequently, reflects a desire to distance oneself from 
challenging tasks and independence in decision making that serves as a protective response in 
order to prevent disclosure of perceived inabilities and incompetence (Cheng 2003; Mirels et 
al., 2002).  Such avoidance of challenges (especially in the face of failure) and the tendency to 
seek tasks on which success is likely reflect emotion-focused coping in order to induce positive 
feelings (see, for example, Brown, Westbrook, & Challagalla, 2005; Carver, 2004) and regulate 
attentional resources (DeShon & Gillespie, 2005; Finkel, et al., 2006; Tice, Baumeister, 
Shmueli, & Muraven, 2007; Vohs & Baumeister, 2004; Vohs, et al., 2008). 
In this regard, Luce (2005) argues that making decisions can be thought of as 
confronting conflict (i.e., seeking choices) or as avoiding conflict (i.e., choice averse) in 
decision making (see also Svenson, 2003). Making decisions, thus, can be conceptualized as 
cognitive and behavioural efforts to cope with specific external and/or internal demands that 
are appraised as taxing or exceeding the resources of individuals (see, for example, Hu et al., 
2007). Effective coping enables individuals to resolve problems, relieve emotional distress, and 
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stay on track toward achieving their goals (i.e., achieving a satisfying state of affairs) (Brown et 
al., 2005). Thus, individuals may either choose to engage in adaptive behavioural patterns, such 
as selecting challenging tasks, setting difficult goals, and persisting when obstacles are 
encountered or, conversely, they might choose to avoid challenging tasks, set low goals, and 
choose to engage in self-handicapping behaviour when difficulties are encountered (DeShon & 
Gillespie, 2005). Individual attempts to cope with decision conflicts can thus either be adaptive 
or non-adaptive, as suggested by Janis and Mann‘s (1977) conflict model of decision making. 
Consequently, coping responses can range from dealing with problems directly (task-
orientation or problem-focused) to avoiding them altogether (i.e., emotion-focused) (Bettman, 
Luce, & Payne, 1998). 
Emotion-focused coping to minimize affect (Luce, 1998) also serves as a protective 
strategy in order to avoid negative comparison from others. Consequently, individuals avoid 
task performance in order to preserve the status quo of social approval and to avoid being 
negatively judged by others (Skaalvik, 1997). Minimizing affect is especially relevant in the 
competitively structured business world because of the prevalence of accomplishments that 
encourage social comparisons. How managers are perceived and evaluated by their superiors 
and peers has considerable consequences in terms of their reputation (Tsui & Ashford, 1994) 
and the potential effect of a loss of peer acceptance or a reduction in self-esteem (Janis & 
Mann, 1977) tends to invite strong self-evaluative reactions. As a result, managers may pursue 
choices that minimize the demoralizing effects of adverse social comparison (Bandura, 1997). 
Social comparison information operates as a primary factor in the self-appraisal of 
capabilities and does so in part for emotional reasons (Buunk & Gibbons, 2007; Larsen & 
Prizmic, 2004). Decisions in organizational life often depend on perceptions of ability that are 
experienced as social comparisons or as feelings of confidence. Thus good decision outcomes 
may elicit states such as feelings of security, pride and satisfaction, whereas poor performance 
may generate dissatisfaction (Bandura & Jourden, 1991; Cervone & Wood, 1995). The social 
construal of ability beliefs may be communicated to an individual either directly, through the 
comments of supervisors and colleagues, task instructions, and appraisals, or indirectly, 
through rewards and promotions (social incentives feedback and social incentives) (Tabernero 
& Wood, 1999). Consequently, managers may adopt decision strategies focused on avoiding 
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negative possibilities in competence to pursue a goal to avoid incompetence (Elliot & Dweck, 
2005). 
Overwhelming situational demands other than time limitations such as competitive 
activities (cognitive load conditions) and uncertain decision consequences may prompt 
managers to conserve their volitional attentional resources for action when an appropriate 
opportunity or need presents itself. Consequently, inaction may occur simply because a 
manager does not recognize that an opportunity has presented itself or that there is a need to 
make a decision. One may simply be maintaining energy for a later time rather than 
deliberately avoiding a decision. As pointed out earlier in the chapter, the individual capacity 
for volition is limited and managerial work requires initiative and decision making so 
frequently that it may deplete attentional resources in the individuals who hold these positions. 
A manager who has just made a great number of decisions is likely to be depleted and may 
begin to make poor decisions. Active choice-making depletes attentional resources (Schmeichel 
& Baumeister, 2004) and frequent decisions may exhaust attentional resources that, in turn, 
decrease subsequent attempts for the self-regulation of effort  and affect. Consequently, 
managers may become progressively worse at making good decisions. This may not be due to 
declining motivation but can be accounted for by fatigue which disables individuals in 
accessing enough attentional resources necessary for effective subsequent decision making. 
This is discussed in the next subsection.  
 
Decisional fatigue 
 
Fatigue is inherently a subjective aversion to expending effort (Hockey, Maule, Clough, 
& Bdzola,  2000) and a shift towards a preference for activities that require less effort or 
limited use of high-level control actions (Hockey, 1997). As a symptom emanating from 
prolonged stress, fatigue reflects in the exhaustion component of occupational burnout (i.e., 
feelings of being overextended and depleted of one‘s emotional and physical resources) 
(Baumeister, 2001; Maslach, Schaufeli, & Leiter, 2001).  Consequently, attentional effort 
conservation is a strong feature of the fatigued state and rather than evoking a problem-focused 
choice in decision processing, decisional fatigue operates as a signal to reduce attentional 
resources in decision processing and choice.  Thus, fatigue appears to operate more as a signal 
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for reducing engagement in active information-processing and it favours passive-evasion and 
avoidance options in decision making (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998).  
Decisional fatigue is more likely to signal a threat from a prolonged over-commitment 
of attentional resources that reduces effort expenditure, persistence, and task involvement  
(Hockey, 1997). Most managers are engaged in some aspect of decision making at any moment 
in any day (Brousseau et al., 2006) and they can tire of the endless demands of inter-temporal 
choice (i.e., decisions between consequences occurring at different points in time). 
Consequently, choice, to the extent that it requires greater decision making among options, can 
become burdensome and ultimately counterproductive (Vohs et al., 2008). There is thus a 
hidden cost in making frequent binary choices that may exhaust the attentional resources 
necessary for effective subsequent decision making (Fitzsimons & Bragh, 2004).  Prolonged 
and frequent decision making depletes attentional resources for effective subsequent decision 
making (Twenge, Tice, & Baumeister, 2000; Vohs et al., 2005).  
Decisional fatigue and exhaustion can alter the desirability of making choices and 
decrease the desirability of further increments of effort (Loewenstein, 1996). Fatigued 
individuals display a higher propensity to avoid risky decisions and fatigue increases in risk for 
more important decisions (Hockey et al., 2000). Under normal conditions, most managers 
display a natural bias for risk that may be overridden by an inhibitory self-regulation process 
after evaluation of options (i.e., attentional resources applied for a systematic-comprehensive 
decision process in order to achieve an accuracy goal).   
Throughout this chapter it has been argued that managers devote attentional resources to 
a course of action in response to the subjective appraisals of the environment and to meet 
multiple and, at times, conflicting goals.  Further, MDM is more than the mere expression of 
knowledge and skills in decision making. MDM is a motivated, cognitive and social process 
and the literature provides a strong argument for the inclusion of self-efficacy beliefs as an 
individual-in-context construct that reflect estimates about how attentional effort and ability 
will combine and the type of affect a manager will experience in response to decision demands. 
Moreover, MDM is inherently conditional on the independent and interactive influence of self-
efficacy beliefs (via its regulation of motivation and affect) as a contributing factor in the 
application of individual capabilities, decision processes, concomitant decision-generated affect 
and fatigue as has been illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
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As agents for decisions in their organizations, managers‘ appraisals of constraints and 
ambiguity can divert their goals away from effort and accuracy concerns to affective self-
evaluative concerns. These affective concerns interfere with the allocation of attentional 
resources by diverting volition attentional resources away from exercising quality in MDM 
processes and outcomes. The next subsection presents MDM as a cognitive and substantive 
process and as the use of rational modes of social influence in order to secure resources, resolve 
divergent interests and counteract political pressures in order to make decisions that serve the 
interests of the organization. 
   
MDM Decision Behaviour 
 
The social-cognitive perspective adopted for the purposes of this study views MDM as 
an integrated and interactive process that is regulated extensively by the individual variable 
factors of the decision maker, organizational environment (i.e., task and context demands) as 
multiple and reciprocal determining factors (Bandura 1991). The properties of the 
organizational environment (i.e., accountability and social constraints, ease of access to 
organizational resources) and the level of challenge it prescribes represent the environmental 
determinants. The individual factors are indexed by distal individual ability and traits and the 
proximal influence of self-efficacy beliefs. The decision making processes that are selected 
constitute the behavioural determinant. This is illustrated in Figure 2.1. From this social-
cognitive perspective, how managers appraise and interpret their environment impacts the 
application of effort and affect. Subsequently, how well they use the capabilities they possess is 
mediated by their self-efficacy beliefs. How these capabilities are used alters their 
environments which, in turn, informs the selection of the subsequent quality of MDM processes 
and outcomes.  Consequently, in this conceptualization all these factors operate as interacting 
determinants that influence each other bidirectionally. 
As agents of decisions for their organizations managers are required to deal with a dual 
process in their decision making as illustrated in Figure 2.1. The following subsections of the 
chapter discuss the temporal and evolving nature of decision making processes and outcomes 
as the behavioural determinant in MDM in terms of social-cognitive theory.   
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MDM Processes and  Outcomes 
 
Application of a systematic-comprehensive process 
 
MDM can be conceptualized as an effortful systematic-comprehensive decision process 
that includes seeking and gathering information and processing the information acquired in a 
procedurally rational manner as well as an effortful rational mode of social influence (i.e., 
willingness and ease to counteract the political pressures of divergent self-interests that detract 
from procedurally rational decisions) in order to maximize the accuracy of decisions that serve 
the best interest of the organization. The following subsections provide an elaboration of this 
process.   
 
Procedural Rationality  
 
Simon (1945) states that one function that an organization performs is to place 
managers in a psychological environment to enable them to adapt their decisions to 
organizational objectives and provide them with the information needed to make these 
decisions correctly. Consequently, as an agent for decisions, managers need to make rational 
decisions that result from an appropriate process of deliberation, the duration and intensity of 
which are free to vary according to the perceived importance of the choice problem that 
presents itself. 
A focal issue in MDM is thus to make a good decision that conforms to a normative 
process in order to yield decisions that are oriented toward organizational goals (i.e., accuracy 
goals). Fredrickson and Mitchell (1984) argue that a measure of rationality of the decision 
process is the attempt to be exhaustive or inclusive (comprehensiveness) in making decisions. 
Janis and Mann (1977) argue that such a comprehensive process leads individuals to process 
information more vigilantly. Bazerman (2006) describes, for example, a rational decision 
making process that includes steps such as defining the problem, identifying relevant criteria, 
weighting these criteria, generating alternatives, rating alternatives on each criterion, and 
computing the optimal decisions. Consequently, a vigilant decision-process is systematic and 
comprehensive (Wood et al., 2000) and based on the extensive and less selective use of 
information (Payne & Bettman, 2007). A systematic-comprehensive process is also referred to 
as motivated processing (see, for instance, Forgas et al., 2004) or System 2 (Evans, 2003, 2008; 
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Kahneman, 2003; Stanovich & West, 2000). Such a systematic-comprehensive decision 
process is a slow, effortful, logic-based process that results in decisions that are made 
sequentially rather that simultaneously. Moreover, the underlying assumption regarding the use 
of a systematic-comprehensive decision-process is that it requires a greater use of appropriate 
information and analysis (Kahneman, 2003) and that a greater use of such a process results in 
better solutions to more complex problems (Leaptrott & McDonald, 2008; Stanovich & West, 
1998a, 1998b). 
These conceptualizations suggest that a motivated, controlled decision process serves to 
decontextualize and depersonalize problems (i.e., deal with problems without social/affective 
content) that make the process more attuned to normative rationality. Attempts to gather 
information of criteria for a range of alternatives and to process the acquired information in a 
systematic manner is cognitively more effortful (Connolly & Ordonez, 2003) and to make good 
decisions one must do so accurately and thoroughly (Frisch & Clemen, 1994). Consequently, 
individuals make more correct, better decisions and inferences when they try extra hard 
(Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994). For example, some managers can make very poor 
decisions, with devastating consequences for their organizations, while others in similar 
circumstances make better decisions (e.g., Lovallo & Kahneman, 2003; Malmendier & Tate, 
2003). Such variation in decisions could not exist if constraints alone were accountable for the 
quality of decisions. Consequently, the way individuals make decisions may well be a function 
of the quality of the decision-process followed (see Shafir & LeBoeuf, 2002; Stanovich and 
West, 1998). The quality of the decision-process thus influences the accuracy of choices 
managers make and, consequently, the fortunes of their organizations (Audia et al., 2000; Goll 
& Rasheed, 1997; Tasa & Whyte, 2005; Wong et al., 2008).  
Dean and Sharfman (1993) define procedural rationality as the extent to which the 
decision process involves the collection of information relevant to the decision and the reliance 
on analysis of this information in making decisions. The term ‗procedural‘ is used to focus on 
the decision making process and to distinguish the construct from more global conceptions of 
rationality (Dean & Sharfman, 1996). For the purposes of this thesis, a systematic-
comprehensive process is defined as an effortful decision process that includes seeking and 
gathering information of criteria for a range of alternatives and processing the information 
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acquired in a procedurally rational manner to maximize the accuracy of decisions that serve the 
best interest of the organization.   
 
Rational social influence 
 
Decision making in organizations also requires managers to exercise social persuasion 
(Bandura, 1997; Beach & Connolly, 2005). Managers face the political problem of resolving 
the divergent political and self-serving interests of individuals or groups in order to gain the 
compliance of others in a manner that promotes accuracy in decisions (see, for example, Ferris 
et al., 2007; Hochwarter et al., 2006). These covert attempts are products of compromises based 
on elaborate and complex social patterns of political influence and social encounters (i.e., 
negotiating and bargaining) in an attempt to advance interests to influence final decisions 
(Beach & Connolly, 2005). Consequently, a distinguishing characteristic of MDM is dealing 
with these dependencies and constraints. While it is theoretically possible that all of these 
individuals would automatically act in just the manner that a manager wants and needs, such is 
almost never the case in reality (Kotter, 1977; Mintzberg, 1973, 1983, 1999). Kotter (1999, p. 
9) observes in this regard: 
All effective GMs (General Managers) seem to get things done with these 
methods, but the best performers tend to mobilize more people to get more things 
done, and do so using a wider range of tactics to influence people… they ask, 
encourage, cajole, praise, reward, demand, manipulate, and generally motivate 
others with great skill in face-to-face situations. They also rely more on indirect 
influence than do the ‗good‘ managers, who tend to apply a narrower range of 
techniques with less finesse.  
 
Engaging in effective social influence requires a blend of hard and soft tactics as well as 
the willingness and capability to demonstrate such knowledge (Hochwarter et al., 2007; 
Schwarzwald et al., 2004). Over two decades ago, Mintzberg (1983, p. 183) stated that 
managers need to possess ―political will and political skill‖ to deal with the ambiguous and 
often turbulent environments of politicized organizations.  Political skill is defined as the ability 
to effectively understand others at work and to use such knowledge to influence others to act in 
ways that enhance one‘s personal and/or organizational objectives (Ferris et al., 2005). 
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Confidence to exercise social influence is manifested in socially relevant situations that reflect 
beliefs about social efficacy to control and exert influence in social interactions (see, for 
example,  O'Connor & Arnold, 2001; Sullivan et al., Burris, 2005; Smith & Betz, 2000; Xie, 
2007).  
For the purposes of this thesis, rational social influence is perceived as a 
multidimensional construct that represents the willingness and ease to exercise rational and 
supportive modes of influence to assume independence in decisions (i.e., the readiness to make 
decisions) in order to advance compliance in the service of accuracy of decisions. Moreover a 
rational mode of social influence includes the effortful application of verbal resources to 
explore, gather and analyse relevant information for rational deliberation and persuasion in 
order to advance and influence final decisions.  
To conclude, procedural rationality (i.e., the systematic-comprehensive process to make 
a good decision) and a rational mode of social influence (i.e., willingness and ease to counteract 
the political pressures of divergent self-interests that detract from procedurally rational 
decisions) are central to the MDM literature. These constructs are also empirically distinct as 
pointed out earlier in the chapter. Further, successful decision outcomes emanate from the 
quality of MDM processes, that is, they are positively related to a systematic-comprehensive 
process and negatively related to acquiescence in order to gain favours to meet the self-serving 
interests of dominant coalitions that are embedded in the political context. Consequently, both 
constructs explain how the quality of MDM processes influences managers‘ contingent 
decision behaviour in order to accomplish their multiple goals. In addition, the quality of MDM 
processes affects decision accuracy through the mediating influences of attentional effort.   
Throughout this chapter it has been demonstrated that MDM is a motivated, cognitive 
and social process that is more than the mere expression of knowledge and skills. The 
conceptual evidence and the links among the relevant constructs provide for a plausible 
explanation of how the simultaneous effects of context, managers‘ cognitions, multiple goals, 
individual variable factors and decision-generated affect combine to impact on volitional 
allocation of attentional resources that in turn impact on the quality of MDM processes and 
outcomes (see Table 2.1).  In the next subsection a conceptual model of relations is outlined as 
a plausible conceptualization of MDM.  
 
66 
 
 
An Integrative Model of MDM 
 
Frisch and Clemen (1994) argue that discovering ways in which decisions go astray, 
one gains insight into psychological processes and also opportunities to improve decision 
making. The present researcher pointed out that psychological process models provide causal 
explanations for decision making regularities that emphasize the adaptive use of an abundance 
of decision processes. Decision process models include many variables, multiple constraints, 
intermediate and temporal states of the decision maker and the simultaneous, antecedent 
conditions that mediate decision behavior (Brousseau et al.,  2006; ; Forgas et al., 2004; Hough 
& White, 2003; Lerner  & Tetlock, 2003; Payne & Bettman, 2007). A conceptual model of 
relations is presented to reflect the constellations or potential associations of individual factors 
and their time-ordered influences on the allocation of attentional effort and the subsequent 
quality of decision processes and outcomes under highly contingent conditions.  
To the researcher‘s knowledge no such perspective (i.e., jointly incorporating individual 
ability and motivational variable factors) in the conceptual literature on MDM currently exists. 
Self-efficacy beliefs are afforded a prominent position in this thesis. The researcher advances 
the argument that self-efficacy beliefs are a proximal contributing factor in the application of 
distal individual variable factors (see Figure 2.1). Moreover, the influence of individual factors 
on the functional relationships in MDM varies depending on the level of self-efficacy beliefs. It 
is thus argued that MDM is inherently conditional on the proximal independent and interactive 
internal attributions of self-efficacy beliefs in combination with individual variable factors in 
the prediction of the quality of MDM processes and outcomes through temporal mediating 
processes (decision-generated affect and fatigue).  
The conceptual model of relations in MDM is presented in Figure 2.3. This conceptual 
model represents a plausible explanation to reflect the constellations or potential associations of 
distal individual variables (cognitive ability and social-self-confidence) as time-ordered 
influences in the prediction of the quality of MDM processes and outcomes. The arrows in the 
conceptual model represent direct causal linear relationships between the distal variables 
(cognitive ability and social self-confidence) with decision-generated affect and the allocation 
of attentional resources. The curved arrows between cognitive ability and self-efficacy beliefs, 
social self-confidence and self-efficacy beliefs, indicate that these variables covary in their 
relations. Further, the direct arrow from decision-generated affect reflects a direct causal linear 
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relationship with allocation of attentional resources, which in turn is hypothesized to account 
for the quality of MDM processes and outcomes. 
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The conceptual model of relations in Figure 2.3 illustrates the postulated ordering of 
causal paths from individual factors and their time-ordered influences on decision-generated 
affect and the subsequent engagement and allocation of attentional resources that give rise to 
the volitional selection of cognitively effortful information search, deliberation and rational 
social influence in MDM.   
  
 
Summary 
 
In this chapter it has been pointed out that individuals make decisions in order to 
achieve varied goals. Unlike individual decision making, MDM differs in that decisions are 
made as an agent for the organization. This makes MDM context-specific since managers as 
agents deal with decisions in contexts that are very different to those faced by individuals. 
Managers are required to make decisions in order to meet multiple and, at times, conflicting 
goals within a context of organizational constraints and great ambiguity. Their cognitive 
appraisals of these constraints and ambiguity alter the goals they have and, consequently, 
influence the quality of MDM processes and outcomes.   
Moreover, as environmental time constraints and ambiguity increase, attentional 
resources can be diverted away from effort and accuracy concerns in decisions to affective self-
evaluative concerns. Consequently, affect occupies a prominent position in this model because, 
not only does it interfere with the allocation of attentional resources, but it also impacts on 
decision processes and guides decisions in order to avoid affective concerns such as 
incompetence, failure, and adverse social comparisons. 
In addition, MDM presents special demands that cannot be explained merely at the 
individual variable factor level but need to be approached with attention to the demands of the 
task and broader context and how these factors interact. Moreover, managers do not operate as 
autonomous agents nor is their decision behaviour wholly determined by contextual influences 
since the exercise of self-efficacy beliefs forms part of the co-determining conditions (Bandura, 
2008).  
Self-efficacy beliefs are a central integrating variable in MDM. These comprehensive 
state-based judgments of perceived individual and context-specific capabilities influence the 
interpretative biases of the conditions under which managers must decide and the goals they set 
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for themselves. In addition, self-efficacy beliefs influence perseverant application of effort, as 
well as how well managers are able to balance their decision-generated affect and outcomes 
with deliberative analysis in MDM.  
The next chapter reviews the extant research and confirmatory evidence of the 
importance of MDM as a multidimensional process.  In addition, the review illustrates how 
attributions to subjectively experienced decision difficulty is influenced by individuals‘ 
appraisals of decisional demands that influence their confidence in their abilities and the extent 
to which they believe they can control the decision context. Confirming evidence is presented 
to illustrate the contribution of distal individual variable factors in MDM, followed by a review 
of the evidence of the contribution of self-efficacy beliefs in the prediction of performance and 
of specific interest to MDM.  The extant research of the antecedents and consequences of 
decision-generated affect on the application of attentional effort in the prediction of the quality 
of MDM processes and outcomes is also reviewed. Finally, there is a review of the few studies 
that have investigated the independent contributions of distal individual differences (cognitive 
ability and social self-confidence traits) in combination with proximal self-efficacy beliefs, and 
the concomitant mediated differences in affect on the allocation of attentional resources in the 
prediction of MDM processes and outcomes. 
  
CHAPTER THREE 
 
RESEARCH REVIEW 
 
The previous chapter described the interactive association between contingent decision 
demands, goals, individual variable factors, decision-generated affect, fatigue and self-efficacy 
beliefs, all of which impact on the quality of MDM processes and outcomes. It was argued that 
managers respond affectively to the onerous aspects of consequential decisions and that 
decision-generated affect and fatigue redirect attentional resources from the decision process 
(i.e., on-task focus) to the affective experience (i.e., off-task focus). Further, it was argued that 
self-efficacy beliefs mediate between individual variable factors (i.e., cognitive ability and 
social self-confidence) by re-allocating attentional resources and affect to on-task, effortful 
MDM processes.  
Conceptual research, however, has outpaced empirical research on MDM (Zaccaro, 
2001). There are several reasons for this. First, managers as subjects are notoriously unwilling 
to submit themselves to research and many of the studies in the empirical review in this chapter 
involve predominantly North American students. Undergraduate and postgraduate business 
students, however, may not be ideal surrogates for managers and extant empirical research 
conducted using such students may thus not generalize to managers. For example, Remus 
(1996) compared the decision making of managers to that of graduate and undergraduate 
business students using a complex decision task. Although no significant differences between 
the managers and graduate business students were observed, undergraduate students made more 
costly decisions, used less effective decision strategies and were more erratic than the managers 
and graduate students.  
Secondly, the nature of MDM does not lend itself readily to experimental analysis in 
actual organizational situations (Bandura, 1991, 1997; Bandura & Jourden, 1991; 
Critchfield & Kollins, 2001; Hodgkinson & Healey, 2008; Hough & White, 2003). 
Although experimental research is clearly important for the further refinement of 
decision-making process theories, the process of determining how consequential 
decisions are made in real life business contexts faces challenges not easily replicated in 
experimental research (Leaptrott & McDonald, 2008). There is no experimental parallel 
to real life business decision-making situations that permits a systematic manipulation 
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of interactive psychological mechanisms and patterns of influence in order to clarify 
and define the multiple relevant factors which combine in real life MDM (Bandura & 
Locke, 2003). Finally, social and ethical constraints limit the opportunities to apply 
experimentally designed influences in MDM in real organizations with real managers.  
This research review is presented in several sections. In the first section confirmatory 
evidence of the importance of MDM is reviewed, as well as evidence to confirm that MDM is a 
multidimensional process.  The review proceeds to show that individuals‘ objective and 
subjective appraisals of decisional demands influence their confidence in their abilities and the 
extent to which they believe they can control the decision context.  Self-efficacy beliefs are 
shown to mediate the interpretative biases of decisional complexity that impact on the 
application of attentional effort and affective outcomes. Research evidence is then presented to 
illustrate the contribution of distal individual variable factors in MDM, followed by a review of 
evidence of how individual variable factors, in combination with self-efficacy beliefs, impact 
on general work performance and decision making. Finally, empirical evidence is presented 
related to the antecedents and consequences of decision-generated affect and fatigue and how 
these factors impact on the allocation of attentional resources that account for the propensity to 
avoid decisions. 
     
Importance of MDM 
 
A number of international and national studies confirm that decision making is a central 
feature of managerial work. These studies include: surveys (Alimo-Metcalfe & Alban-
Metcalfe, 2001; Lombardo, Ruderman, & McCauley, 1988); a meta-analysis of validation 
studies (Bartram, 2005); behaviour-centred observations in assessment centres (Craik et al., 
2002; Geyling, Visser & Fourie, 2003); situational inventories (Chan & Schmitt, 2002; 
McDaniel, Morgeson, Finnegan, Campion, & Braverman, 2001; Weekley & Ployhart, 2005); 
qualitative studies (Kotter, 1982; Mintzberg, 1973, 1983); and longitudinal and correlation field 
studies (for example, Conway, 2000; Elbanna and Child, 2007; Dean and Sharfman, 1996; Goll 
and Rasheed, 1997; Maslyn, Farmer and Fedor, 1996; Wayne et al., 1997).  In addition, in a 
recent empirical investigation of a USA representative sample of over 8,600 incumbents from 
52 different managerial occupations, Dierdorff, Rubin, and Morgeson (2009) demonstrated that 
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behaviour-based managerial work role requirements were best represented by six factors one of 
which was managing decision making. 
South African studies also confirm the importance of decision making in managerial 
success (Loubser & de Jager 1995; Mbokazi, Visser & Fourie, 2004). An additional South 
African study (Wheeler, 1993a) tested a two-facet model of MDM, namely, an intuition-
process versus analysis, judgment and communication. Wheeler (1993b) also demonstrated that 
task dimensions and personality traits played a strong moderating role in participative decision 
making in South African managers.  
The evidence to date illustrates that the value of managers resides in their decision 
making. For example, Howard and Choi (2000) demonstrated that decision making accounted 
for significant variances in salary levels and job performance ratings of business managers. 
Sound decisions result in valuable outcomes, while flawed decisions impact negatively and 
potentially quite widely. For example, the ill-fated launch of NASA‘s Challenger flight and the 
escalation of the USA-Vietnam war (Staw, 1981) serve as vivid evidence of flawed decision 
making. Further, the significant impact on global economies that resulted in 50 million global 
job losses is also an example of the cumulative effects of poor decision making in the financial 
markets during 2009. Despite the significant impact of decision making on human affairs, the 
empirical evidence on MDM remains fragmented and scant.   
A systematic and extensive content analysis and review of published research in 
industrial-organizational psychology in two leading journals (Journal of Applied Psychology 
and Personnel Psychology) from January 1963 to May 2007 revealed that research on decision 
making represented only 165 out of a total of 5780 (i.e., 2.9%) published articles over four and 
a half decades (Cascio & Aguinis, 2008).  The present researcher has continued with a search 
from June 2007 to August 2009 and found no new published articles on decision making in 
both journals. This lack of prominence suggests a low priority in research on decision making 
and highlights the need for such research, as well as for the development of theory which can 
inform human resources practitioners, senior managers, or outside stakeholders and public 
policymakers on practices that may improve MDM.  
Although evidence on the relationship between the quality of MDM processes and  the 
accuracy of decisions is limited, most research supports a positive relationship. For instance, 
Janis and Mann (1977) were the first to demonstrate an explicit positive relationship between 
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the quality of MDM processes in reaching quality decisions. In addition, Fredrickson‘s (1984) 
research with senior executives  demonstrated a strong association between measures of a 
systematic-comprehensive decision process and organizational performance. More importantly, 
each aspect of a systematic-comprehensive decision process (i.e., seeking information, 
alternative generation, alternative evaluation and decision integration) exhibited a strong 
positive relationship with decisional performance. These studies suggest that decision makers 
who use more information, consider more alternatives, and seek a greater amount of advice 
(i.e., a systematic-comprehensive decision process) make more accurate and higher quality 
decisions.  
In a similar vein, Goll and Rasheed (1997) confirmed a significant positive relationship 
between the quality of MD processes and the return on assets and sales in dynamic, volatile 
business environments.  This contradicted earlier findings by Fredrickson (1984) and 
Fredrickson and Mitchell (1984) which demonstrated that comprehensiveness in decision 
making processes was positively related to performance in an industry with a stable 
environment but negatively related to performance in an industry with a dynamic environment.  
However, even when environmental uncertainty was included in a regression model, Dean and 
Sharfman (1996) demonstrated that managers who collected information and used a systematic-
comprehensive process made decisions that were more effective than those who did not. 
Furthermore, whilst MDM is the product of a systematic-comprehensive process, the accuracy 
of decisions is also shaped by social, institutional and political influences. In their study, Dean 
and Sharfman (1993b) empirically demonstrated that a systematic-comprehensive process was 
in fact independent from a contextual, institutional political process in MDM. Successful 
decisions were positively related to a systematic-comprehensive process and negatively related 
to ‗political‘ behaviour.     
It was pointed out in Chapter Two that accountability to others activates distinct social 
and cognitive coping strategies in order to deal with decision ambiguity (Green et al., 2000; 
Janis & Mann, 1977; Lerner & Tetlock, 1994, 2003; Tetlock, Skita, & Boettger, 1989). A study 
by Smith, Peterson, and Schwartz (2002) illustrates how middle managers facing ambiguous 
situations frequently consult other individuals for guidance and Chen et al., (1996) 
demonstrated that ‗impression-motivated decision processing‘ (i.e., a ‗go along to get along‘ 
heuristic) biased decision processes in a direction consistent with others‘ opinions in order to 
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satisfy valued social goals. Moreover, individuals high in political skill used appropriate 
influence tactics in order to neutralize the ambiguity of contextual and accountability demands 
(Hochwarter et al., 2007).  
Further, three investigations by Ferris et al. (2005) reported significant correlations 
between ease of social influence (i.e., political skill) and upward influence and forming 
coalitions. Social astuteness displayed a strong correlation with political savvy.  Moreover, 
politically skilled individuals were also shown to make better decisions (Kolodinsky et al., 
2007).  In addition, political skill was found to be a significant and positive predictor of 
rationality, suggesting that it is a potent upward influence tactic.   
What follows is a review of the extant research that demonstrates MDM as a cognitive 
problem of attempting to find the best solution and making decisions against a background of 
divergent political interests. Table 3.1 provides a summary of these empirical findings in order 
to illustrate MDM as a dual, systematic-comprehensive and political/social process. The table 
lists authors, methodology employed and a synopsis of major findings.  
The findings reported in Table 3.1 confirm that MDM is a product of a systematic-
comprehensive decision process and also shaped by embedded institutional politics (see also, 
Elbanna, 2006; Elbanna & Child, 2007; Brousseau et al., 2006; Garvin & Roberto, 2001; 
Papadakis, 2006; Tsui & Ashford, 1994). The co-existing requirements of both a systematic-
comprehensive decision process and social-political constraints, however, both favour quality 
decisions and outcomes.  The reason for this is that skilled managers are rarely likely to coerce 
decisions that would be irrational and managers increase their likelihood of success by 
engaging in modes of influence that are generally justified and defended on rational grounds 
(Chen et al., 1996; Ferris et al., 2005; Hochwarter et al., 2007; Schwarzwald et al., 2004; 
Sullivan et al., 2003; Wayne et al., 1997). 
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Table 3.1 Empirical Research: MDM as a Dual, Systematic-Comprehensive and Political/Social Process   
  Methodology   
Study Sample Design Analysis (level of analysis) Major findings 
Fredrickson and 
Mitchell (1984) 
109 managers Cross-sectional Correlation (decision level) Quality of  MDM processes were positively related to 
performance  
Bourgeois and 
Eisenhardt (1988) 
4 computer firms A multiple case study; 
longitudinal 
 
Content analysis 
(organization-level) 
The higher the quality MDM processes, the better the 
performance of the firm 
Savard and Rogers 
(1992)  
3 studies, 120 
students 
Role-play simulations 
Mixed experimental 
design 
Repeated –measures MANOVA Individuals chose to reason, made requests, and made the focal 
person feel good more frequently than assertive threats, 
bargaining 
Dean and 
Sharfman (1993a) 
57 strategic 
decisions in 24 
firms 
Multiple-informant, 
structured interviews 
Multiple regression 
(decision level) 
Environmental uncertainty impacted the quality of MDM 
processes. Competitive threat and uncertainty degraded the 
quality of MDM process 
Dean and 
Sharfman (1993b) 
61 strategic 
decisions in 24 
companies  
multiple-informant, 
structured interview  
Multiple regression 
(decision level) 
The substantive task of rationality/ comprehensiveness and the 
institutional/social/political context were distinct dimensions of  
MDM processes 
Dean and 
Sharfman (1996) 
52 decisions Field study; 
longitudinal 
Multiple regression 
(decision-level) 
Procedural rationality was positively related 
to decision effectiveness 
Maslyn et al. (1996)  225 employees Field study; cross-
sectional; 
mail survey 
SEM  Upward influence actions following a failed influence attempt 
were predicted with individual differences and the agent-target 
relationship 
Goll and Rasheed 
(1997) 
62 firms Field study; cross-
sectional; mail survey 
Correlation; multiple regression The quality of MDM processes were positively associated with 
performance 
Wayne et al.(1997)  247 dyads 
subordinates and 
managers  
Field study; cross-
sectional; 
mail survey 
SEM  Influence tactics were related to managers' 
perceptions of subordinates' interpersonal skills, use of 
reasoning, assertiveness, and favours. Bargaining and self-
promotion were negatively related to these perceptions 
Papadakis (1998) 38 firms Field study; cross-
sectional 
Zero-order correlation  
(decision-level) 
A positive relationship between the quality of MDM and 
performance was reported 
Papadakis, Lioukas, 
and Chambers (1998) 
70 decisions  Multi-method, in-depth 
field research study 
Multiple regression; 
factor analysis 
(decision-level) 
Quality of MDM processes were affected by both decision-
specific characteristics and internal context 
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e 3.1(continued) 
  Methodology   
Study Sample Design Analysis (level of analysis) Major findings 
O'Connor and Arnold 
(2001) 
58 student dyads Role-play simulation ANOVA; regression 
 
Negotiators who reached an impasse experienced negative 
affect, developed negative perceptions of their 
counterpart/process, were less willing to work together, shared 
less information of managing conflicts 
Hough and White 
(2003) 
400 decisions 
examined from 54 
executive teams 
Simulation ANOVA; correlation; 
Regression (decision level) 
Positive relationship between the quality of MDM and 
performance (volatility moderated the relationship between 
rationality and decision quality) 
Schwarzwald et 
al.(2004) 
194 workers, 97 
supervisors 
Field study; cross-
sectional; 
mail survey 
SEM, ANOVA Managers and subordinates reported similar perceptions about 
the use of influence tactics; soft tactics were found to be the 
most popular 
Ferris et al.(2005) 35 School 
administrators 
148 Branch 
managers 
Field study; cross-
sectional; mail survey 
Regression analysis Political (social influence) skill significantly predicted job 
performance and effectiveness ratings in two samples made up 
of distinct occupational groups 
Tasa and Whyte, 2005 162 business 
undergraduates  
Simulation 
experimental, between-
subjects design 
Regression analysis, ANOVA The quality of MDM processes was positively related to 
decision outcomes 
De Dreua et al.(2006)  220 students in 
dyads  
3 Experiments; factorial 
design  
ANOVA, regression analysis  Cooperative dyads reached higher joint outcomes; engaged in 
more problem solving 
Elbanna and Child 
(2007)  
169 managers  Multi-method field 
study, cross-sectional; 
mail survey 
Regression analysis  
(decision-level) 
The quality of MDM processes influenced decision effectiveness 
Firm performance rather than environmental uncertainty 
appeared to be the most important moderator of the relationship 
between the quality of MDM and decision effectiveness. 
A positive relationship between a systematic-comprehensive 
process and organizational outcomes and a negative relationship 
between political behaviour and organizational outcomes were 
found 
Kolodinsky et 
al.(2007) 
Dyads of 291 
subordinates and 
their supervisors 
Field study; cross-
sectional; mail survey 
Hierarchical multiple regression 
analysis 
Political skill was found to relate directly to the use of rational 
influence and supervisor ratings of job performance 
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Summary  
 
In summary, making decisions is a central feature of managerial work yet empirical 
research on decision making is under-represented in published articles over four and a half 
decades.  Notwithstanding this limitation, the following is evident: 
 
 A positive and strong association between the use of a systematic-
comprehensive decision process and organizational performance.  
 This being said, MDM is not only a cognitive problem of attempting to find the 
best solution. MDM is also a political/social process shaped by embedded 
institutional politics which require the rational modes of social influence in 
order to secure resources, resolve divergent interests and counteract political 
pressures in order to make decisions that serve the interests of the organization. 
 
Various authors (Elbanna & Child, 2007; Finucane & Lees, 2005; Haleblian. et al., 
2004; Hambrick et al., 2005b; Hiller & Hambrick, 2005; Papadakis, 2006; Papadakis & 
Barwise, 2002; Zaccaro, 2001) have argued that a greater understanding of why and how 
different decision processes are followed might be obtained by including individual differences 
and contextual variable interactions (as moderating variables), to provide insights into MDM 
processes and outcomes. This is the topic of the next subsection which reviews empirical 
evidence that differential appraisals arise from an individual‘s ongoing interaction with the 
decision context. These differential appraisals moderate individuals‘ subjective experiences of 
complexity, ambiguity and conflict in their attempts to made good decisions. 
 
Appraisal of Organization Context 
   
Appraisals about certainty and control equate to confidence in an individual‘s 
competence to exercise control in MDM. Furthermore, appraisals of certainty and control exert 
an influence on risk assessments in decision making. For instance, Krueger and Dickson (1994) 
in an experimental study involving business graduates showed that individuals who were led to 
believe they were not very competent saw more threats and took fewer risks in decision 
making. Consistent with the previous study, Raghunathan and Pham (1999) confirmed that 
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students who were experimentally induced to feel anxious (see also Pham, 2004, in this regard), 
preferred uncertainty-reducing decisions.  Evidence that anxiety evokes a preference for 
decisions that are safer or enhance one's sense of control is robust and generalizable across 
different types of decisions (Raghunathan et al., 2006).  
Another important topic to consider in MDM is that of subjective appraisals and their 
influence on effortful performance. Two different cognitive tasks may take similar amounts of 
time, but one task might be seen as much more effortful than the other (Kahneman, 1973). In 
fact, Bettman, Johnson and Payne (1990) reported that the overall correlation index between 
time spent on a task and self-reported effort is 0.29. This indicates that the degree to which 
tasks are experienced as complex is related to the attentional effort expended. Various authors 
have advanced the notion that when a task is difficult individuals are prompted to increase their 
allocation of effort toward on-task activities (Foo et al., 2009; Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989; 
Kanfer et al., 1996). Moreover, theory and research also suggest that difficulty and effort are 
related to each other and when individuals are aware that they have exerted more effort they 
rate a task as more difficult (Fisher & Noble, 2004). In fact, attentional effort and task difficulty 
may represent similar constructs. In this regard, Yeo and Neal (2004) illustrated that attentional 
effort and perceived task difficulty were highly correlated in a multilevel analysis that 
investigated the relationships at within- and between-person levels of analysis, with multiple 
trials of practice on an air traffic control task.  Perceived difficulty and subjective attentional 
effort are thus sensitive to  task difficulty but may be mediated by individual differences in 
reactions to perceptions of task difficulty (Yeo & Neal, 2008).  
Consequently, task difficulty can be both a subjective (requiring attentional effort) and 
an objective parameter of task difficulty. Hochwarter et al. (2007) demonstrated that 
individuals occupying comparable work environments with equivalent demands and 
expectations, reported levels of felt accountability that were inconsistent and even 
contradictory.  Further, Fox, Dwyer, and Ganster (1993) reported that objective workload 
demands for institutional nurses explained less than 10% of their subjectively reported work 
demands. Similarly, findings by Alexander et al. (2006) and Hochwarter et al. (2007) 
demonstrated that operative constraints are largely mediated by individuals‘ subjective 
interpretations of objective accountability conditions.  
7
6
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The next subsection presents empirical evidence to illustrate that managers‘ confidence 
in their ability to exercise control over the context accounts for differences in decision making 
processes. 
 
Certainty and Confidence  
 
Confidence in its common meaning refers to a certainty about handling something and 
its antonym is uncertainty or doubt about handling something (Stajkovic, 2006). Empirical 
evidence across laboratory and field settings supports the argument that uncertainty is related to 
individuals‘ confidence.  For instance, a series of experiments demonstrated that individuals 
were willing to choose risky decisions even when offered an equally probable chance event as 
an alternative when they were confident in their competence (Heath & Tversky, 1991).  
Similarly, in other studies greater confidence accounted for decisions involving risk in difficult 
social encounters (i.e., negotiation) (Ferrari, 1994; Haleblian et al., 2004; Stevens & Gist, 1997, 
1998; Sullivan et al., 2003). Conversely, in studies by Effert and Ferrari (1989), Ferrari (1991b, 
2000, 2001) and Ferrari and Dovidio (2001) low confidence was shown to be related to a delay 
in decision making.  In fact, findings by Mirels, Greblo, and Dean (2002) illustrated that self-
doubt was associated with a general tendency to avoid responsibilities, especially in situations 
involving decision making.  Further robust evidence was provided in a study by Goodie and 
Young (2007), in a laboratory setting, that indicated a correlation of 0.86 between decision 
accuracy and confidence. Similarly, in a series of simulation studies, Bandura and Jourden 
(1991) and Wood et al. (1990) illustrated that self-doubt in decision making impaired the 
quality of decision making processes.  
 
Control 
 
Apart from confidence, beliefs about control also impact on decision making. In a study 
with entrepreneurs, managers, employees and students as respondents, Le Roux et al. (2006) 
demonstrated that control beliefs accounted for a significant positive relationship with the 
decision to start a business  and a significant negative association with perception of risk. 
Experimental evidence by Goodie (2003) and Goodie and Young (2007) illustrated that 
individuals who believed they were in control showed increased persistence and initiative in 
risk taking, even when their competence was relatively low. Beliefs about control moderate the 
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decision to pursue a business venture or not. For example, in a random sample of 217 
entrepreneurs, Markman, Baron and Balkin (2005) reported that perceived control over 
adversity and perceived responsibility regarding the outcomes of adversity differentiated 
entrepreneurs from non-entrepreneurs. Moreover, managers‘ efforts toward organizational 
governance and compliance are influenced by their perceived ability to comply.  This very 
specific appraisal of control of imposed compliance requirements was mediated by perceived 
controllability in a study by Jenkins (1994). Jenkins demonstrated that the importance of 
managerial cognitions in corporate compliance with the law accounted for a unique 
contribution of self-perceptions of capability over and above perceptions of actual control. 
Managers who demonstrate beliefs in their ability to exercise control are able to achieve 
good organizational functioning and decision making even when they have low perceived 
support.  In this regard, Hochwarter et al. (2006) illustrated that social skill was positively 
related to job performance among individuals who experienced constraints in terms of 
insufficiency of resources, information and cooperation. Similarly, in a series of studies, 
perception of more control was illustrated to neutralize the dysfunctional effects of ambiguity 
and role conflict via the exercise of political skill (Perrewé et al., 2004; Perrewé, Zellars, Rossi, 
Ferris, Liu, Zinko, & Hochwater, 2005). 
In a field research programme by Bandura and Wood (1989), beliefs about the 
controllability of organizations were experimentally induced. Findings demonstrated that 
appraisals of the degree to which the environment can actually be controlled influenced 
decision making performance.  In addition, managers who saw organizations as controllable 
maintained a strong sense of confidence in their abilities, set increasingly challenging goals, 
and applied effortful decision processes. Moreover, when individuals believed that their 
operative environment was controllable they increased their effort, which validated their 
confidence and enhanced their likelihood of success.  
In addition, a number of studies have demonstrated that low perceived control 
contributed to stress, anxiety and burnout (see, for example, Jerusalem and Schwarzer, 1992; 
Jex, Bliese, Buzzell, & Primeau, 2001; Jex & Gudanowski, 1992; Maslach et al., 2001; 
Rothmann & Malan, 2003; Salanova, Peiro, & Schaufeli, 2002; Schwarzer, 1992; Schwarzer & 
Hallum, 2008; Xie, 2007). Thus, taken as a whole, the evidence suggests that individuals‘ 
internal attributions of certainty and control affect how they interpret the conditions under 
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which they make decisions. Further, the context of MDM provides an opportunity for 
individual judgments to be exercised about one‘s own capabilities and the extent to which one 
can exercise control over imposed and accountability demands.   
 
Summary 
 
Differential appraisals moderate individuals‗subjective experience of complexity that 
influence effortful performance. The following points are important in this regard: 
 
 MDM provides an opportunity for individual judgments to be exercised about 
one‗s own capabilities and the extent to which one can exercise control over 
imposed and accountability demands. The empirical evidence suggests that 
individuals‗internal attributions (appraisals) about certainty and control affect 
how they interpret the conditions under which they make decisions.   
 Individuals‗objective and subjective appraisals of decisional demands influence 
their confidence in their abilities and the extent to which they believe they can 
control the decision context. Self-efficacy beliefs mediate these interpretative 
biases that impact on the application of attentional effort as a covariate of 
perceived certainty and control. These subjective appraisals influence the 
allocation of attentional resources which give rise to the volitional selection of 
cognitively effortful information search, deliberation and rational social 
influence in MDM. 
 
The next subsection presents research that demonstrates that self-efficacy beliefs 
influence perceptions of confidence and control by regulating attention and reducing adverse 
affect. 
 
Self-Efficacy Beliefs 
  
Self-efficacy beliefs have been remarkably prominent in research over the past two 
decades. For example, by 2007 Judge, Jackson, Shaw, Scott, and Rich reported that 10, 000 
investigations and 800 articles had been published in organizational journals on self-efficacy 
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beliefs. A South African search for studies for the period 1979 to 2009 by the present 
researcher revealed 128 publications and articles. This interest in self-efficacy beliefs is evident 
in the growth in hits from 1,180,000 in May 2007 to 3,520,000 in August, 2009 on Google, 
conducted for the term "self-efficacy" by the researcher.  In spite of this prominence, self-
efficacy beliefs have received limited attention and have not been investigated sufficiently in 
decision related research even though  it is seen to be an important determinant of MDM 
(Zacarro, 2001). In fact, Hiller and Hambrick (2005) state in their review that they are not 
aware of studies that have examined self-efficacy beliefs and decision making in executive 
samples. A review of the South African publications by the present researcher also revealed no 
published studies that have focused on self-efficacy beliefs and MDM. Given such a 
voluminous amount of research on self-efficacy beliefs in general and its widespread 
application, the following subsection examines existing empirical evidence of what 
contribution self-efficacy beliefs make to individual work performance and decision making 
processes.  
 
Self-efficacy Beliefs:Certainty and Control  
 
The subjectively experienced demands of MDM are not a fixed property of situational 
constraints but represent a relationship between perceived coping capabilities and potentially 
aversive aspects of the environment. Thus, how the demands of MDM are subjectively 
experienced is not dependent on situational constraints, but on the relationship between 
perceived coping abilities and situational constraints. Chapter Two provided an argument that 
an individual‘s subjective perceptions and appraisals of decision difficulty depend in part on 
differences in self-efficacy beliefs. Mangos and Steele-Johnson (2001) illustrated that self-
efficacy beliefs mediated the effects of subjectively experienced task demands on performance. 
In a similar vein, Maynard and Hakel (1997) have demonstrated that individual appraisals of 
task complexity partially mediate the effects of objective task complexity. In addition, both 
objective and subjective task complexity were significantly related to task performance. 
Further validity to the general thesis that decision making difficulty is determined 
relationally rather than according to absolute properties was confirmed by Bandura and Jourden 
(1991). In an additional study, Hu et al. (2007) demonstrated that the closer the match between 
self-efficacy beliefs and perceived task complexity, the more extensively individuals searched 
84 
 
for information in order to make decisions. Brown et al. (2001) assessed the processes by 
which information seeking and self-efficacy contribute to effectiveness in industrial selling and 
demonstrated that  individuals with high self-efficacy beliefs seek, integrate, and use 
information more effectively, whereas individuals with low self-efficacy beliefs appear less 
capable of integrating information obtained through different methods and using it effectively 
in order to increase their role clarity and performance. Similarly, Lucas et al. (2006) 
demonstrated that an individual‘s subjective perceptions of problem difficulty depended, in 
part, on individual differences in self-efficacy beliefs. Consequently, self-efficacy beliefs via 
appraisal-generated cognitions help define decisions as difficult or not.  
Self-efficacy beliefs and goals represent important proximal mediators to performance.  
In this regard, Locke and Latham (2002) reported that self-efficacy beliefs related to 
performance and to goal setting, with the latter also associated with performance. In fact, the 
relationship between self-efficacy beliefs and goals is strong (Judge et al., 2007). Moreover, 
Payne, Youngcourt, and Beaubien (2007) reported a strong negative relationship between self-
efficacy beliefs and avoidance as a goal.  Support for the notion that motivation (i.e., effort) 
stems from challenges created by goals and self-efficacy beliefs have been consistently 
reported (Cervone, Jiwani, & Wood, 1991; Chen et al., 2000; Martocchio & Judge, 1997; 
Phillips & Gully, 1997).  
Studies by Latham and Seijts (1999) and Latham and Brown (2006) illustrated the 
negative effect of goals on performance according to the type of goal (i.e., proximal vs. distal) 
and demonstrated that individuals who pursued proximal outcome goals (i.e., present-directed 
intentions) realized higher performance than those who pursued ‗do your best‘ as a vague distal 
goal.  Similarly, Cervone and Wood (1995) demonstrated that across 10 weeks of a simulated 
business activity, where individuals (graduates) served as ‗managers‘ of a business 
organization, goals, specific feedback and self-efficacy beliefs combined to predict nearly half 
of the variability in changes in performance.   
The next subsection reviews the prominence, utility and empirical evidence of the role 
that self-efficacy beliefs play in the exercise of control.   
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Self-efficacy beliefs and the exercise of control  
 
The exercise of control involves the level of confidence in one‘s ability to effect 
changes in the environment through the productive use of one‘s capabilities and enlistment of 
effort (Bandura, 1991, 1992, 1999). For instance, control beliefs accounted for 36% to 46% of 
the variance in self-efficacy beliefs in perceived behavioural control and intention in one study 
(see, for example, Armitage & Conner, 1999). Further, Ajzen (2002) illustrated that perceived 
control accounted for a significant portion of variance in behavioural intentions in a study with 
students. Similarly, a South African study by Pretorius and Rothmann (2001) demonstrated that 
self-efficacy beliefs showed a significant inverse relationship with external control.   
This conceptualization of self-efficacy beliefs as "people's beliefs about their 
capabilities to exercise control over their own level of functioning and over events that affect 
their lives" (Bandura, 1991, p. 257) is especially relevant to MDM.  Perceived control over 
events accounts for considerable variance in intentions and actions (Ajzen, 1991, 2002). 
Ajzen‘s Theory of Planned Behavior postulates that, by keeping intention constant, the effort 
expended to bring a course of action to a successful conclusion, is likely to increase with 
perceived behavioural control.  Thus, behavioural intention is under volitional control, that is, 
an individual can decide at will to perform or not perform the behaviour. In these arguments, 
the concern is with control over behaviour itself, not with control over outcomes or events. 
Perceived behavioural control can, however, be used as a substitute for a measure of actual 
control.  
Any work context contains potential opportunities to take initiative. Taking initiative 
represents the exercising of control over these challenges. In a longitudinal study with full time 
employees in East Germany (N = 543), Speier and Frese (1997) illustrated that half of the 
common variance of control and initiative was mediated by self-efficacy beliefs. Consequently, 
self-efficacy beliefs acted as an intervening variable between initiative and making autonomous 
decisions to exercise control.   Managers need to continuously decipher and monitor their 
understanding of the organization's and significant others‘ expectations in MDM. According to 
Weick (1995, p. 92), the absence of a clear and accurate understanding of role expectations 
―means that the assumptions necessary for rational decision making are absent‖. Self-efficacy 
beliefs moderate the appraisal of uncertain/ambiguous environments and facilitate sensemaking 
by integration and effective use of complex information. For instance, Brown, Westbrook, and 
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Challagalla (2005), in a survey of 340 sales people, illustrated that self-efficacy beliefs 
moderated the inquiry and monitoring of information. Further, individuals with high self-
efficacy beliefs responded more adaptively to their decision environment by using feedback 
and were able to translate their learning into improved performance (Cervone et al., 1991). 
Moreover, Seijts et al. (2004), in a study of MBA students in a complex business simulation, 
demonstrated that self-efficacy beliefs and information search accounted for learning and 
performance.    
These results suggest that managers with high self-efficacy beliefs seek, integrate, and 
use information to improve their clarity concerning roles and expectations and thereby reduce 
ambiguity. In so doing they prevent misdirected or insufficient effort and inability to anticipate 
organizational expectations.  
 
Self-efficacy Beliefs and Work Performance  
 
Substantial research demonstrates a link between self-efficacy beliefs and work 
performance  (Hysong & Quiñones, 1997; Judge & Bono, 2001; Locke & Latham, 2002; 
Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998a, 1998b). Bandura and Locke (2003) also presented converging 
evidence from nine meta-analyses that represented diverse methodological and analytic 
strategies that self-efficacy beliefs enhanced motivation and performance attainments. 
Similarly, a review and meta-analysis by Sadri and Robertson (1993) illustrated a positive 
relationship between self-efficacy beliefs and performance. This relationship in simulated 
situations showed a coefficient of 0.60 that was stronger than compared to performance in real 
situations.    
Self-efficacy beliefs‘ association with performance, however, varies in relation to 
several moderating variables. In a meta-analysis of the relevant literature Judge et al. (2007) 
illustrated that self-efficacy beliefs‘ association with performance was moderated when: the job 
or task was low (vs. high) in complexity; there was a short or intermediate (vs. long) interval 
between the measure of self-efficacy beliefs and work-related performance; goals were 
assigned vs. no goals; individuals had prior (vs. no prior) exposure to the job or task; and when 
the participants were undergraduate versus postgraduate students.   
There is some existing research on the effects of self-efficacy judgments on 
performance in a complex decision making task (Bandura & Jourden, 1991; Bandura & Wood, 
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1989; Cervone et al., 1991; Cervone & Wood, 1992; Wood & Bandura, 1989). However, this 
research has mostly studied the same task and setting, in which participants manage the 
employees of a simulated manufacturing business. A recent study by Arenas et al. (2006) 
illustrated that  self-efficacy beliefs impacted decision making via positive affect in a study in a 
manufacturing setting.  
 
Self-efficacy Beliefs: Influence on Effort and Persistence 
 
Evidence from experimental settings and cross-sectional research has demonstrated that 
individuals with higher self-efficacy beliefs were more likely to engage and persist in cognitive 
tasks than those with lower self-efficacy beliefs (Bouffard-Bouchard, 1990; Cervone & Peake, 
1986; Khan & Nauta, 2001; Multon, Brown, & Lent, 1991; Nel, 2007; Phillips & Gully, 1997). 
Individuals with stronger beliefs in self-efficacy, specifically in relation to goal attainment, 
display greater intensification of effort than those with weaker self-efficacy beliefs (Bandura & 
Cervone, 1983).  In addition, individuals with high self-efficacy beliefs persisted longer in their 
influence attempts when compared to those low in self-efficacy beliefs (Savard & Rogers, 
1992). High self-efficacy beliefs also reduced the effects of failed negotiations. In this regard, 
O'Connor and Arnold (2001) demonstrated that individuals with low self-efficacy beliefs who 
failed in negotiations were less willing to work together in the future, planned to withhold 
information, behaved less cooperatively, and lost faith in negotiation as an effective means of 
managing conflicts.  
Strong self-efficacy beliefs have also been positively related to the intention to set up an 
independent business. In a cross-sectional study, Chen, Greene and Crick (1998) reported that 
self-efficacy beliefs differentiated entrepreneurship students from students in both management 
and organizational psychology. Further, self-efficacy beliefs of actual small business founders 
were higher when compared to non-founders and Markman et al. (2005) revealed that 
entrepreneurs displayed higher overall perseverance given their strength in self-efficacy beliefs. 
Contradictory to this, Le Roux et al. (2006) could not confirm that business risk perception was 
influenced by self-efficacy beliefs. These authors showed that the correlations between self-
efficacy beliefs and the decision to start a business and business risk perception were all low 
and insignificant. Possible reasons that may have accounted for this included whether the 
instrument they used was a valid measure of self-efficacy beliefs. Partial support was found 
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however for the association of entrepreneurial cognition and entrepreneurial self-efficacy 
beliefs in another South African study. In a survey with individuals (N = 161) with varying 
demographics who met qualifying criteria from an unrestricted range of businesses and 
industries, Urban (2008) demonstrated a modest association between entrepreneurial cognitions 
(i.e., the mental maps about the contacts, relationships, resources and assets necessary to 
engage in entrepreneurial activity) and self-efficacy beliefs, based on the decision to start a new 
venture.   
Although a large corpus of empirical evidence supports a symmetric relationship 
between self-efficacy beliefs and persistence, other studies reveal a non-monotonic relationship 
between self-efficacy beliefs, attentional effort and persistence. For example, Tasa and Whyte 
(2005), in a study with groups of business students who participated in a complex business 
strategy simulation, illustrated a significant curvilinear relationship between self-efficacy 
beliefs and vigilance (i.e., a systematic-comprehensive process) in decision making. As self-
efficacy beliefs increased from low to moderate levels, the quality of the systematic-
comprehensive MDM process increased. However, when the level of self-efficacy beliefs 
surpassed relatively moderate levels, the reliance on a vigilant systematic-comprehensive 
process declined. These findings supported studies by Bandura and Jourden (1991) and Stone 
(2002). Higher perceptions of ability relative to others predict greater degrees of 
overconfidence (Larrick et al., 2007) in individuals‘ beliefs about the accuracy of their 
decisions, but without an increase in the application of an effortful decision process (see, for 
example, Malmendier & Tate, 2003). Such overconfidence and high beliefs in self-efficacy 
thus lead to the withdrawal of cognitive effort. For example, Stevens and Gist (1997), in a 
study with 60 MBA students, confirmed that individuals with high self-efficacy beliefs 
demonstrated greater cognitive withdrawal than those with low self-efficacy beliefs. 
High self-efficacy beliefs also contribute to an irrational escalation of commitment to a 
losing course of action. Dysfunctional persistence was pronounced under conditions of high 
self-efficacy beliefs in a study with undergraduates (Whyte, Saks, & Hook, 1997). Similarly, a 
study of the airline and trucking industries over a ten-year period revealed that greater past 
successes on the part of managers led to more confidence in the correctness of past strategies, 
higher self-efficacy beliefs and, consequently, poorer quality MDM processes (Audia et al., 
2000). Greater satisfaction with past performance has been related to dysfunctional persistence 
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with the status quo and little need to adjust subsequent decisions (Geletkanycz & Black, 2001). 
Further, in contrast to the conventional wisdom that rational thinking increases decision quality, 
Wong, Kwong, and Ng (2008) illustrated that high scorers in rationality were more likely to 
have an escalation bias than those individuals with lower scores. Their results showed that high 
rational ability increases beliefs in prior decisions which in turn increases an escalation bias. 
Rational decision making, consequently, entrenches the belief in prior decisions and these 
beliefs were significantly related to an escalation tendency.   
Taken as a whole, these findings indicate that high self-efficacy beliefs produce 
overconfidence in individuals‘ beliefs about the accuracy of their decisions, but without 
increasing their application of an effortful decision process.  Overconfidence creates 
‗complacent self-assurance‘ which may reflect a ‗deviation-amplifying loop‘ (Lindsley, Brass, 
& Thomas, 1995) where higher performance and higher self-efficacy beliefs create an upward 
spiral. For instance, Shea and Howell (2000) examined the pattern of the relationships between 
self-efficacy beliefs and performance in a study involving 148 students working on a 
manufacturing task over four trials. The findings demonstrated that the pattern of changes in 
self-efficacy beliefs and performance contained self-corrections. Across successive trials, 
successful performance outcomes fostered faster, more superficial and routine information 
processing and individuals deferred to actual performance as the strongest predictor of 
confidence for future performance.  In support of this notion, a longitudinal field experiment by 
McNatt and Judge (2004) illustrated that self-efficacy beliefs became less predictive of 
performance as the interval between self-efficacy beliefs and subsequent performance 
increased. Furthermore, Richard, Diefendorff and Martin (2006), Vancouver et al. (2002), and 
Vancouver, Thompson, and Williams (2001) have all demonstrated that the positive 
relationship between self-efficacy beliefs and performance might be due, in greater part, to the 
influence of performance on self-efficacy beliefs than the influence of self-efficacy beliefs on 
performance. 
These findings suggest that perseverance and effort, along with strong self-efficacy 
beliefs, may lead to dysfunctional confidence that affects the allocation of effort and attentional 
resources, thereby affecting the quality of decision making processes.  Consequently, self-
efficacy beliefs become more of an effect and less of a direct cause of performance as 
individuals experience greater mastery (Ewart, 1995).  
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In conclusion, the relationship between self-efficacy beliefs and the quality of MDM 
processes appears to be curvilinear, at least in the context of ambiguous decision demands.  
Consequently, complacency with the validity of current decision processes, associated with 
stronger beliefs and higher goals (that accompany past success), might induce a decrease in 
attentional effort in the application of systematic-comprehensive decision processes.  
 
Self-Efficacy Beliefs, Arousal and Affective Outcomes  
 
The previous subsection illustrated that differential appraisals provide an affective 
summary of specific threats or benefits that arise from an individual‘s ongoing interaction with 
the decision context and demands. Self-evaluative reactions and affect reflect the match 
between self-efficacy beliefs and the subjective appraisal of the situational constraints that can 
redirect attentional resources from the decision process task to the affective experience. 
Bandura (1986) argued that self-efficacy beliefs shape affective experiences and thus mediate 
the information conveyed by a particular affective outcome.  Although most authors generally 
accept the theoretical assumption that self-efficacy beliefs mediate affect, the empirical 
evidence suggests that the relationships between self-efficacy beliefs and affective outcomes 
are reciprocal. On the one hand, self-efficacy beliefs have a mediating effect on anxiety, arousal 
and vulnerability to stress whereas, on the other hand, affective states serve as information that 
can impact on self-efficacy beliefs. Consequently, in some instances self-efficacy beliefs 
influence affect while, in other instances, affect influences appraisals of self-efficacy beliefs 
(Ewart, 1995).   
Less than adequate self-efficacy beliefs tap resources that inherently decrease the 
attentional focus that can be dedicated to complex tasks like decision making (Beal et al., 2005; 
Brief & Weiss, 2002; Weiss et al., 2005). In this regard, Sarason et al. (1996) provided 
considerable evidence that anxiety presents a significant problem of intrusive, interfering 
thoughts which diminish attentional resources that can be devoted to the efficient execution of 
tasks. Moreover, Schwarzer (1996) reported a correlation of 0.67 between time spent on 
worrying (i.e., cognitive interference) and anxiety. Cognitive interference is thus closely linked 
to anxiety (see, for example, Baumeister et al., 1994; and Yee & Vaughan (1996) for a review) 
and a number of studies have provided evidence to show that intrusive thoughts undermine the 
effective use of capabilities (see, for example, Bhattacharjee and Moreno, 2002; Kanfer & 
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Ackerman, 1989, 1996; Peters et al., 2006; Proost, Derous, Schreurs, Hagtvet, & De Witte, 
2008; Smillie et al., 2006).  
Further confirmatory support in the form of a study by Ackerman, Kanfer, and Goff 
(1995) attests to the fact that intrusive thoughts accounted for a significant and substantial 
amount of variance in performance, which is consistent with the role that deficits in affect 
regulation have on task performance (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1996). Bandura, Caprara, 
Barbaranelli, Gerbino, and Pastorelli (2003) also provide robust findings of a structural pattern 
of influences that verify that self-efficacy beliefs regulate affect that impacted on socio-
emotional adaptation. Moreover, their findings suggested that beliefs in self-efficacy mediated 
affect regulation. 
In addition, self-efficacy beliefs have been demonstrated to lessen the effect on negative 
affect resulting in impasses in a negotiation study by O'Connor and Arnold (2001). Similarly, 
Bandura and Jourden (1991), in a path analysis study, provided corroborating evidence to 
illustrate that self-efficacy beliefs impacted the quality of decision processes and that affective 
reactions operated as significant determinants of decisional performance attainments. Arenas et 
al. (2006) also reported that individuals with higher self-efficacy beliefs displayed more 
positive affect in a management task that involved decision making under conditions of 
uncertainty.  
Frequently recurring affect may stabilize and become affective traits or motivational 
components of temperament/personality traits. In a meta-analysis, Judge and Illies (2002) 
provided confirmatory evidence that leaders with lower emotional stability tend to have lower 
self-efficacy beliefs in accomplishing their leadership functions. Lower emotional stability was 
related to self-efficacy beliefs because of a general tendency to be anxious and less confident of 
oneself. In a study of 230 employees (with approximately one third as supervisors) from three 
large oil companies in Brazil over a fifteen-month period, Perrewé et al. (2004) demonstrated 
that political skills exhibited a significant negative correlation with anxiety and also displayed a 
positive relationship with self-efficacy beliefs. Consequently, the relationships between self-
efficacy beliefs and negative affect (i.e., anxiety) are moderated by the use of political skills.  
Individuals with strong self-efficacy beliefs are therefore more likely to be comfortable 
in ‗high demand‘ jobs where they can exercise personal judgment. For example, Jex and Bliese 
(1999), in a large sample of military personnel (N = 2273), found that self-efficacy beliefs 
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moderated several stressor-strain relationships. Respondents with strong self-efficacy beliefs 
reacted less negatively, in terms of psychological and physical strain, to long work hours and 
work overload than those reporting low levels of efficacy beliefs. In addition, individuals with 
high self-efficacy beliefs displayed little negative affect in response to stressful experimental 
manipulations in a study by Jerusalem and Schwarzer (1992).  Jex et al. (2001), in a survey of 
1500 US military staff, demonstrated that coping with stressors was strongest among those 
participants who displayed high self-efficacy beliefs. Their results suggest that high levels of 
self-efficacy may indeed help individuals cope more effectively with stressors and that these 
individuals might not react as negatively to work overload as those with low self-efficacy. This 
is likely to occur because individuals with high levels of self-efficacy are also likely to have 
developed more effective ways of coping with stressors than those with low levels of self-
efficacy.  
 Strong self-efficacy beliefs therefore enhance resilience by reducing the attentional 
resources required by a situation (through personal control over aversive affect) and also by 
moderating the perceptions of organizational stressors as well as the impact that organizational 
stressors have on the emotional and physical health (and burnout) of individuals (e.g., 
Rothmann & Malan, 2003; Schwarzer, 1992). For instance, in a study of 140 workers that used 
new technologies in their jobs, Grau et al. (2001) illustrated that individuals with low levels of 
self-efficacy beliefs displayed more emotional exhaustion in increased-stress situations, 
whereas an increase in stressors was not associated with strain for those with high levels of 
self-efficacy beliefs. In a similar vein, Salanova et al. (2002) demonstrated that computer-
specific self-efficacy beliefs moderated the relationship between job demands and control, as 
well as the levels of burnout. Conversely, having high job control exacerbated the association 
between job demands and poor health among inefficacious individuals (Schaubroeck, Jones, & 
Xie, 2001). Consistent with these findings, in a longitudinal study of teachers (N = 1203) in 
Syria and Germany conducted over a period of one year, Schwarzer and Hallum (2008) 
demonstrated that self-efficacy beliefs protected participants from the experience of job strain 
and the escalation of burnout. A cross-lagged panel analysis also confirmed the direction of 
effects hypothesis to show that earlier low self-efficacy beliefs accounted for later burnout. 
This confirmed other cross-cultural research that these authors have conducted with teachers. 
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These studies illustrated that perceptions of high job control lessened the linkage between job 
demands and poor health among individuals with high self-efficacy beliefs.  
Schaubroeck and Merritt (1997), in a study with health professionals, identified self-
efficacy beliefs as a moderating variable that determined whether job control contributes 
positively or negatively to coping with work stressors. Similarly, Brown et al. (2005) reported a 
pattern of moderated mediation in which high sales self-efficacy beliefs were related to 
performance when role overload was low but not when role overload was high. Thus, an 
environmental constraint (i.e., lack of autonomy or job control) seems stressful particularly for 
individuals with high levels of self-efficacy beliefs. These findings suggest that there are 
boundaries regarding the effects of self-efficacy beliefs on goal setting and performance.  
However, feeling incompetent and not having control over the task still remains the most 
exhausting combination of factors because individuals with low self-efficacy beliefs may not 
believe that they will be able to carry out their job responsibilities, display more negative affect 
and view stressors as threatening.  
Affect also provides implicit information about one‘s self-efficacy beliefs (see an 
elaboration of affect as information in a later subsection of this research review). In this regard, 
Bandura (1991) explained that affect is repeatedly recruited in the service of behaviour that 
reflects on personal competence. Affect, once elicited, has a dynamic influence on how 
information is selected, interpreted, processed and remembered (e.g., Forgas et al., 2004). For 
instance, positive affective cues are experienced as self-efficacy (Isen, 2001; Schwarz & Clore, 
2003) and negative arousal might be thought to confer negative information about oneself and 
one's abilities (Gasper & Isbell, 2007).  Physiological arousal as one prominent constituent 
source of self-efficacy beliefs was reported in a study of 1,030 employees in three different 
organizations (van Vianen, 1999). Similarly, Gerhardt and Brown (2006) illustrated that 
individuals who experienced high negative arousal interpreted difficulties or challenges they 
encountered during training as signs that they were incapable of successfully mastering 
training. 
In conclusion, affect acts as one source of information (amongst others) that individuals 
use to assess personal competence. Forgas (2003, p. 602) concludes in his authoritative chapter 
in The Handbook of Affective Sciences that ―most of the research suggests a fundamental 
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affect-congruent pattern: positive affect improves, and negative affect impairs, the value of 
self-conceptions‖.  
It was pointed out in the previous chapter that individual factors represent distal, 
domain-independent individual capabilities and are indirect in their relationship to decision 
making. The next subsection reviews the individual variables of cognitive ability and social 
self-confidence that reflect a rough estimate of the upper limit of individual attentional 
resources that can be devoted to MDM. Further, MDM was conceptualized as a dual process 
that represents a task (i.e., substantive) cognitive process and a contextual social process. 
Consequently, it can be argued that the strongest effects of cognitive ability are on the 
application of a systematic-comprehensive process and that social self-confidence impacts on 
exercising control over the social-political context. The next subsection reviews the empirical 
evidence of the independent functional relations of cognitive ability and social self-confidence 
in the prediction of the quality of MDM processes (as illustrated in Table 2.1).  Additionally, 
existing research on the joint contributions of distal individual variable factors (i.e., cognitive 
ability and social self-confidence traits) and self-efficacy beliefs to the prediction of general 
work performance and decision making is reviewed.  
 
Distal Individual Variable Factors 
 
It was pointed out in Chapter Two that the dynamic nature of decision making can be 
observed in the time-ordered effects and multiplicity of constituent variables that impact MDM. 
Individual variable differences represent more distal influences in the prediction of the quality 
of MDM processes. The term distal implies that these factors are general and domain-
independent individual variables that typically represent ability and trait constructs (Austin & 
Klein, 1996; Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989, 1996; Kanfer, 1990; Kanfer & Heggestad, 1997). In 
the following subsections the empirical evidence regarding the independent contributions that 
cognitive ability and social self-confidence traits make to the prediction of MDM is reviewed. 
 
Cognitive Ability 
 
The association between cognitive ability and performance is among the most well-
established predictions in the existing literature (Chen et al., 2000; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998, 
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2004; Kehoe, 2002; Viswesvaran & Ones, 2002).  A number of meta-analytic studies have 
reported that cognitive ability significantly predicts performance (Bertua et al., 2005; Judge et 
al., 2007; Schmidt et al., 2008).  Schmidt and Hunter (2004), in a review of the research 
evidence illustrate that cognitive ability predicts both occupational level attained and 
performance within one's chosen occupation and does so better than any other ability, trait, or 
disposition as well as better than job experience. The magnitude of the relationship between 
cognitive ability and performance is however moderated by occupational group. These 
occupational groups include professional, scientific, and upper management jobs, complex 
technical jobs such as computer-systems trouble shooting or complex manufacturing jobs, 
skilled workers, technicians, mid-level administrators, paraprofessionals, and semi-skilled 
work. Occupational groups that entail greater information-processing demands (complexity) 
showed stronger or more direct relations (Gottfredson, 2002; Hunter & Hunter, 1984; Schmidt 
& Hunter, 1998). These effect sizes for high complexity jobs (professional, scientific, and 
upper management jobs) are in the order of 0.58 which is rare in psychology and large for the 
social sciences.  
Individuals with low cognitive ability were shown to react more strongly to perceptions 
of task difficulty because they had fewer attentional resources (Yeo & Neal, 2008). Conversely, 
when they appraise a task as difficult, high cognitive ability individuals with a higher source of 
attentional resources deploy smaller amounts when compared to their counterparts. Schmidt 
and Hunter (1998) note that it is possible that individuals with low cognitive ability would 
perceive tasks as being more difficult whereas those with high cognitive ability would judge the 
same tasks as less difficult. This relationship between perceived difficulty and the subjective 
experience of attentional effort was confirmed in a study of air traffic controllers by Yeo and 
Neal (2008).  Consequently, a stronger positive relationship between cognitive ability would 
exist at higher levels of task complexity and the relations of cognitive ability with performance 
become stronger or more direct or both as task complexity increases (Chen et al., 2001; Kanfer 
& Ackerman, 1989).  
Complex decision making tasks demand a higher level of general cognitive ability 
(Hollenbeck, LePine, & Ilgen, 1996) and various studies have demonstrated that cognitive 
ability is important for decision making (e.g., Bartram, 2005; Conway, 2000; McDaniel et al., 
2001; Parker & Fischhoff, 2005; Schmidt et al., 2008; Stanovich & West, 2000; Weekley & 
96 
 
Ployhart, 2005). In fact, the lack of cognitive ability impairs making high quality decisions in 
ambiguous circumstances and contributes to managerial failure (see, for example,  Lombardo et 
al., 1988). More specifically, verbal and numerical abilities reveal a strong relationship with 
analyzing/interpreting competencies (i.e., analytical and inferential competence) (Bartram, 
2005). Peters et al. (2006) have provided evidence that greater numerical and quantitative 
reasoning is associated with more accuracy in making decisions.  
In contrast to these findings, Chan and Schmitt (2002) and Howard and Choi (2000) 
reported a small degree of common variance between cognitive abilities and MDM. The effects 
of cognitive ability on job performance are largely indirect through its effect on job knowledge. 
Schmidt, Hunter and Outerbridge (1986), in a study of 1474 path analyses, demonstrated that 
job experience led to the acquisition of skills, techniques and methods that directly produced 
improvements in performance. Further, cognitive ability led to an increased acquisition of job 
knowledge, and this effect was stronger than the direct impact of ability on work sample 
performance. Quiñones, Ford and Teachout (1995), in a meta-analysis of work experience as a 
moderator (N = 25911; K = 44), revealed an estimated population correlation of 0.27 between 
experience and performance after correcting for sampling error and criterion unreliability. In 
addition, work experience had the highest correlation with hard (e.g. work samples) as opposed 
to soft (e.g., ratings) measures of job performance.  Consistent with the above, a simulation 
study with 200 undergraduate students by Palumbo, Miller, Shalin and Steele-Johnson (2005) 
demonstrated that job knowledge is the mechanism through which cognitive ability influences 
performance.  
 
Cognitive ability and self-efficacy beliefs 
 
Bandura (1997, 1999) argues that self-efficacy beliefs mediate the influence of distal 
variables in predicting performance since self-efficacy beliefs represent the mechanism through 
which such generalized tendencies manifest themselves. Bandura (1997, p. 2) stated in this 
regard  that "people's level of motivation, affective states, and actions are based more on what 
they believe than on what is objectively true. Consequently, individuals are typically guided by 
their beliefs when they engage in work since their perceptions help determine what they do 
with the knowledge and skills they have. It is however less clear whether ability has a direct 
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influence, an indirect influence through its effects on self-efficacy, or if both direct and indirect 
effects exist.  
It has been proposed that distal individual differences (e.g., cognitive ability and 
personality traits) influence the formation of self-efficacy beliefs (e.g., Gist & Mitchell, 1992).  
At a simple level, Kanfer and Ackerman (2005) stated that self-efficacy beliefs may be a 
threshold variable that determines whether the individual chooses to engage (i.e., deploy 
attentional resources) in a task. In this regard, Mitchell and Daniels (2003, p. 227) state that 
―actual ability can influence your behavior, and knowledge of your ability can influence your 
motivation, which can influence your behavior‖.  Moreover, because self-efficacy beliefs are 
construed as a more proximal (i.e., task- and situation- specific) construct, it has been proposed 
that self-efficacy beliefs act as a key mediator of the cognitive ability–performance relationship 
(Austin & Klein, 1996; Kanfer, 1990; Martocchio & Judge, 1997; Phillips & Gully, 1997). 
Despite these theoretical arguments, only limited empirical research has directly tested whether 
self-efficacy beliefs mediate the cognitive ability–performance relationships.   
Eyring, Johnson and Francis (1993) demonstrated that cognitive ability correlated 
significantly with self-efficacy beliefs (in cross-level units-of-analysis) in the skill acquisition 
of individuals working in a laboratory air traffic control simulation. In support of this notion, 
learning has also been related to the self-efficacy beliefs of high cognitive ability individuals 
but unrelated to the self-efficacy beliefs of low cognitive ability individuals (Bell & Kozlowski, 
2002). Also, consistent with previous research (e.g., Bandura, 1986, 1997), Mangos and Steele-
Johnson (2001) demonstrated a positive correlation between cognitive ability and self-efficacy 
beliefs. Chen et al. (2000) illustrated that self-efficacy beliefs fully mediated the cognitive 
ability–performance relationship; however Martocchio and Judge (1997) demonstrated that 
self-efficacy beliefs failed to mediate this relationship. Also, whereas Phillips and Gully (1997) 
reported a positive correlation between cognitive ability and self-efficacy, a study by Ford, 
Quiñones, Sego, and Sorra (1992) found a negative correlation between these variables.  
These contradictory findings suggest the possibility of a critical pathway of how 
cognitive ability influences self-appraisals of ability. In fact some evidence suggests that an 
interaction effect between cognitive ability and self-efficacy beliefs is possible (Judge et al.,  
2007). Stajkovic and Luthans (1998b) also argue that individuals may be less likely to 
accurately assess their self-efficacy beliefs for complex tasks, which results in an inaccurate 
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allocation of resources when performing such tasks (see, for example, Cervone & Peake, 1986). 
Second, because complex tasks involve more distal outcomes than simple tasks, self-efficacy 
beliefs have a more indirect influence on complex tasks (e.g., through task-knowledge 
acquisition processes; Bandura, 1997; Cervone et al., 1991). Thus, despite the presumption in 
the literature that  self-efficacy beliefs represent the mechanism through which cognitive ability 
manifests itself (i.e., mediating effect), self-efficacy beliefs may be more a moderator of the 
effects of cognitive ability. Thus, self-efficacy beliefs may interact with cognitive ability in the 
prediction of decision making in managers such that high self-efficacy beliefs are more 
beneficial for managers with high cognitive ability.  
It was pointed out earlier that decisions in organizations are products of compromises 
based on elaborate social encounters (i.e., negotiating and bargaining) in an attempt to advance 
interests and thereby influence final decisions.  Further, social self-confidence traits are likely 
to contribute to the quality of MDM processes above and beyond that accounted for by 
cognitive ability alone. Moreover, although cognitive ability and social self-confidence traits 
are empirically and conceptually distinct, they are related in a temporal order in MDM. In fact, 
Russell (2001) demonstrated that cognitive abilities helped short-term business execution and 
that social influence predicted subsequent longer-term performance trends amongst executives. 
The next subsection reviews the empirical evidence of the relationship between personality 
traits and social skills and their contribution to MDM.    
 
Personality Traits and Social Abilities 
 
Extant research demonstrates that extraversion is consistently linked to greater 
sensitivity to positive or rewarding stimuli. Larsen and Ketelaar (1991) provided experimental 
support for Costa and McCrae's (1980) argument that extroverted traits contribute to positive 
affect although they do not generally appear to reduce the unpleasantness of adverse 
circumstances. Extravert traits however also demonstrate an inverse correlation with affect. For 
instance, a negative–extraversion link may exist in situations in which the affective or social 
aspects of a situation are made more attentionally salient to suggest that affiliative bonds (or 
lack thereof) between people are sufficient to induce greater negative affect in extraverts 
(Hutcherson, Goldin, Ramel, McRae, & Gross, 2008).  
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Barrick and Mount (1991), in a meta-analytic study of 162 samples from 117 studies, 
demonstrated that extraversion was a valid predictor (across the criterion types) of managerial 
performance. One of the findings of a meta-analytic analysis of 29 validity studies (N= 4861) 
from the UK, European countries, Turkey, Middle East, South Africa, the Far East and the 
USA, across different industries, also confirmed that leading and deciding (i.e., taking  control, 
initiating action, giving direction, and taking responsibility.) correlated with extraversion 
(Bartram, 2005). Optimistic, outgoing, and talkative individuals (i.e., those who display 
extraverted and socially confident traits) accounted for higher performance in settings that 
required interaction with others (Barrick & Mount, 2005; Barrick, Mount, & Judge, 2001; 
Barrick, Stewart, Neubert, & Mount, 1998; Craik et al., 2002; Mount, Barrick, & Stewart, 
1998). Judge and Illies (2002), in a quantitative review that included 150 correlations from 65 
studies, illustrated that extraversion was also a moderately strong correlate of self-efficacy 
beliefs. This was particularly noteworthy given that positive affect is characteristically a 
hallmark of extraverts, who also display confidence in their social abilities. Additional evidence 
from Judge, Bono, Ilies and Gerhardt (2002) showed that extraversion was the most consistent 
correlate of leadership across study settings, where leadership was defined as whether (or to 
what degree) an individual is viewed as a leader by others and regarded as being able to 
influence their subordinates.  
Ones, Dilchert, Viswesvaran and Judge (2007), in a comprehensive summary of 
published meta-analyses on the Big Five personality traits, reported that personality variables 
measured at the Big Five level are predictive of interpersonal behaviours and teamwork. 
Specifically, a study by Ones, Hough, and Viswesvaran (1998) (N = 11009) illustrated that 
extraverted traits are important for managerial work.  Thoms, Moore and Scott (1996) in their 
study of the Big Five also demonstrated that individuals who are assertive, sociable, and 
energetic and who are dependable, responsible and achievement-oriented believe that they can 
perform the tasks necessary to operate successfully in self-managed work groups. These traits 
significantly accounted for the variance in self-efficacy beliefs for participating in self-managed 
work groups.     
Political skill, which reflects a composite of sociability, dominance, ambition, positive 
emotionality and excitement-seeking, was shown to have a significant positive correlation with 
extraversion (Liu et al., 2007).  Individuals high in political skill, however, used appropriate 
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influence tactics in order to neutralize the ambiguity of contextual and accountability demands 
(Hochwarter et al., 2007). Further, three investigations by Ferris et al. (2005) reported 
significant correlations between ease of social influence (political skill) and upward appeal and 
forming coalitions. Also, social influence (operationalized as political skill) and self-efficacy 
beliefs show a positive linear relation (Ferris et al., 1999; Perrewé et al., 2004). Further, social 
astuteness as a dimension of political skill, also displayed a strong correlation with political 
savvy, which has been demonstrated to be a significant and positive predictor of rationality 
(Kolodinsky et al., 2007). Other than a potent influence tactic, politically skilled individuals 
thus also make better decisions.   
From the conceptual and empirical research it has been pointed out that accurate 
decisions are positively related to a systematic-comprehensive process (i.e., task performance) 
and negatively related to acquiescence in order to gain favours to meet the self-serving interests 
of dominant coalitions that are embedded in the political context (i.e., contextual performance; 
Motowidlo et al., 1997). Cognitive ability contributes to contextual performance through its 
effects on personality traits as individual characteristic adaptations. Ferris et al. (2005) and 
Ferris et al. (2001) empirically demonstrated that social influence and cognitive ability display 
a non-significant correlation. Social self-confidence is however not subsumed by cognitive 
ability in performance and the latter  authors suggest that each is related to a different type of 
flexibility. Cognitive ability may be associated with cognitive flexibility, whereas social 
influence may be most closely associated with interpersonal effectiveness.  
As shown earlier, the subjective appraisal of context moderates the behavioural 
expression of a trait. For example, in a study of adult workers, Hochwarter et al. (2006) 
revealed that low organizational support as a contextual cue activated the expression of social 
traits to enlist cooperation and acquire the resources needed to meet performance expectations. 
Further robust findings of trait activation are reported in a large-scale investigation of the 
convergent and discriminant validity findings obtained in assessment centers (Lievens et al., 
2006). Findings from this latter study confirmed that ratings in assessment centre simulations 
converged to relevant and specific personality traits.  Unfavourable appraisals of the context 
may, however, inhibit trait expression (e.g., cognitive withdrawal and unwillingness to deploy 
attentional resources). For example, in a study with 80 adults, Hill (1989) demonstrated that 
ambiguity within a social situation together with low self-efficacy beliefs affected individuals‘ 
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willingness to expend effort (i.e., deploy attentional resources) to enact social behaviours (see 
also Stevens & Gist, 1997; Treadway et al., 2005).  
 
Confidence 
 
Confidence is a relatively stable individual disposition to meet challenging task 
demands in a wide variety of situations (Bandura, 1997). Wolfe and Grosch (1990) reported 
that the accuracy of individuals‘ decisions showed little stability across tasks whereas their 
confidence in these decisions showed a fair amount of consistency. This pattern of coefficients 
suggests that individuals exhibit consistent patterns of individual self-enhancing illusions, such 
as unrealistic optimism. Taylor and Brown (1988) hypothesized that unrealistic optimism is 
predictably associated with positive affect, social skills, and intellectual functioning. To test 
this hypothesis, Wolfe and Grosch (1990) obtained data from 162 undergraduate students and 
demonstrated support for Taylor and Brown's hypothesis. As reported earlier, Larrick et al., 
(2007) illustrated that higher perceptions of ability predicted greater degrees of overconfidence, 
and this relationship held across individuals and across ability domains. Levels of confidence 
that lead individuals to infer that they have more talent than others thus mediate choices and 
judgments. 
Empirical and anecdotal evidence attests to the contribution that confidence makes to 
decision making in management. A confident disposition impacts on managers‘ competence in 
interaction (Bartram, 2005). This is confirmed in a study based on a sample of 1464 male and 
female top, senior, and middle-level managers and professionals working in organizations in 
two large UK public sectors (Alimo-Metcalfe & Alban-Metcalfe, 2001). Similarly, confidence 
accounts for making risky decisions in competitive decision contexts (Haleblian et al., 2004). 
Moreover, confident negotiators are shown to achieve better outcomes (Stevens & Gist, 1997; 
Sullivan et al., 2003), whereas individuals who display self-doubt delay decisions (Ferrari & 
Dovidio, 2001; Frost & Shows, 1993). Indecisiveness is associated with a higher threshold for 
certainty before making a decision (Frost & Shows, 1993). Consequently, the extent of one‘s 
confidence is critical to effective decision making and individuals with greater confidence 
display lower self-doubt, whereas those who doubt their decisions are linked to 
apprehensiveness about the fallibility of their judgment and about the possibility of being 
wrong (Mirels et al., 2002). They thus needlessly hesitate, defer to others, or otherwise prevent 
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others from discovering  their inability to identify sound courses of action (Parker & Fischhoff, 
2005).  
Affective reactions are potent indicators for the activation of social self-confidence as 
demonstrated by dominance, sociability, and energy level (i.e., available attentional resources). 
Social self-confidence is thus inversely related to the availability of attentional resources. 
Interpersonal influence and social coordination require effortful energy (see, for example, 
Finkel et al., 2006) and individuals who are self-confident select effortful rational modes of 
social influence (e.g., Sullivan et al., 2003; Wayne et al., 1997), whereas individuals with less 
self-confidence view interpersonal requests and negotiation as potential threats to be avoided 
(e.g., Forgas & Laham, 2005; Mirels et al., 2002). Unfavourable appraisals of the context may, 
however, inhibit social self-confidence trait expression (e.g., Hochwarter et al., 2006; Lievens 
et al., 2006; Tett & Burnett, 2003; Tett & Guterman, 2000) and contribute to: avoidance (e.g., 
Anderson, 2003, 2007); decisional procrastination (e.g., Ferrari, 2001; Ferrari & Dovidio, 2000; 
Ferrari & Pychyl, 2007; Van Eerde, 2000); biased decision processes in a direction consistent 
with others‘ opinions to satisfy valued social goals (e.g., Chen et al., 1996; Lerner & Tetlock, 
2003); and evasion, escape or adopting the status quo option (e.g., Luce, 1998). 
In Chapter Two it was pointed out that distal individual differences make time-ordered 
and different contributions in their functional relations to MDM. The application of a rational, 
systematic-comprehensive decision-making process requires the application of cognitive 
abilities, whereas the ease and willingness to initiate and participate in social influence relies on 
social personality traits. Cognitive ability and social personality traits therefore represent the 
two broad ‗generalizable predictors‘ that reflect the ‗can do‘ distal individual differences for the 
quality of MDM processes. Self-efficacy beliefs, in contrast, represent a proximal (i.e., task- 
and situation- specific) motivational construct through which effortful control of attention and 
affect regulation is manifested. Consequently, self-efficacy beliefs reflect a measure of the ‗will 
do‘ processes that mediate between distal individual differences in the prediction of the quality 
of MDM processes.  
 
 Individual Variables and Self-Efficacy Beliefs  
 
Earlier it was pointed out that cognitive ability significantly predicts performance 
through a number of factors that moderate the relationship between cognitive ability and 
103 
 
performance. Cognitive ability has been shown to be important for the decision making of 
managers. In addition, personality and social traits were shown to contribute incremental 
validity in the prediction of performance above and beyond that accounted for by cognitive 
ability. Although there is evidence that individual variables and self-efficacy may each offer 
significant predictive value in relation to complex performance, they have by and large been 
examined in isolation from each other. To date few studies have estimated the independent 
contributions of distal individual differences (cognitive ability and social self-confidence traits) 
in combination with proximal self-efficacy beliefs, as well as the concomitant mediated 
differences in affect in order to predict performance or examine the communalities among these 
constructs. In one study by Phillips and Gully (1997) there was strong support for a model 
linking individual personality traits, ability, self-efficacy, and goal processes into a common 
framework that explained and predicted individual academic performance. Ackerman et al. 
(1995) also demonstrated that distal cognitive abilities accounted for the major share of 
predicted individual differences in air traffic control performance. They demonstrated that self-
efficacy beliefs provided no significant contribution to performance that was not accounted for 
by task-related affect. The magnitude of the relationship between cognitive ability and self-
efficacy beliefs was demonstrated to vary with task complexity (see, Chen et al., 2001; Judge et 
al., 2007). Consequently, the contribution of self-efficacy beliefs to the prediction of 
performance might be smaller for high cognitive ability individuals but larger for low cognitive 
ability individuals.   
There are even fewer studies that have investigated the independent and combined 
contributions of individual variables and self-efficacy beliefs to predict the quality of MDM 
processes. In fact, Hiller and Hambrick (2005) have commented that, although a substantial 
amount of research on managers has been conducted over the last 20 years, scholars still only 
possess a fragmented understanding of the antecedents and implications of managerial 
behaviours such as resourcefulness, decisiveness, dominance, independence, and social 
presence. The lack of information on how self-efficacy beliefs mediate the relationships of 
particular distal individual variable factors in scientific models has, consequently, contributed 
to a lack of progress in theory building.  
Notwithstanding this limitation, a few studies warrant attention in the light of the 
purpose of this thesis. Motivation is central in the definition of conscientiousness as a construct 
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and self-efficacy beliefs represent the mechanism through which the generalized tendencies of 
conscientiousness manifest themselves (Martocchio & Judge, 1997). Conscientiousness 
includes taking initiative, persistence in applying extra effort and dependability in completing 
tasks. It has been demonstrated to be one of the most generalizable predictors of individual 
differences in performance (Mount & Barrick, 1995). This was consistent with earlier findings 
by Barrick and Mount (1991). On the basis of data from 146 managers, Barrick and Mount 
found that conscientiousness was a valid predictor of various job-related criterion types (job 
proficiency, training proficiency, and personnel data) across five occupational groups 
(professionals, police, managers, sales, and skilled/semi-skilled). Further, these authors 
reported significant relationships between conscientiousness and supervisor-rated job 
performance.  Their results indicated that two variables of individual difference, that is 
conscientiousness and extraversion, were significantly related to job performance. Moreover, 
the relation between conscientiousness and extraversion was greater for managers with higher 
autonomy compared to managers with lower autonomy within their jobs. 
Consequently, managers who apply effort and are persevering (i.e., conscientious) and 
those who are sociable, outgoing, and assertive (i.e., extraverted) are likely to perform better 
when awarded autonomy and discretion in selecting the appropriate work behaviours to be 
performed. Consistent findings by Judge and Ilies (2002) confirm that conscientiousness is a 
strong correlate of leadership. Self-efficacy beliefs, in turn, significantly influence 
conscientiousness as shown in a number of studies (Chen, Gully, & Eden, 2001; Judge & Ilies, 
2002; Judge et al., 2007; Thoms, Moore, & Scott, 1996). Individuals with high self-efficacy 
beliefs are more conscientious and are more likely to set goals and to display higher 
expectations that their efforts will result in favourable consequences.   
 McHenry, Hough, Toquam, Hanson and Ashworth (1990) investigated the joint 
relationships between various cognitive and personality trait composite scores and five 
components of performance, using enlisted soldiers in nine US Army occupations. Their 
findings revealed that the best prediction was obtained when both cognitive ability and 
personality traits were combined to predict effort and leadership performance. Personality trait 
composites were also the best predictors of individuals putting in extra effort, supporting peers, 
and exhibiting personal discipline. In another study of ninety-three trainees across two weeks of 
skill acquisition practice on a complex, air traffic controller simulation task, Ackerman et al. 
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(1995) demonstrated that distal cognitive abilities accounted for the major share of predicted 
individual differences in performance (approximately 30% to 45% of the variance in 
performance). Proximal self-report measures (i.e., personality and conative traits, vocational 
interests and self-estimates) and affect accounted for a small and insignificant amount of 
variance in performance.  Moreover, self-efficacy beliefs, as assessed prior to task engagement, 
provided no significant contribution to the prediction of individual differences in performance 
that was not accounted for by the frequency of affect. The proximal measures of negative and 
positive affect and self-efficacy were, however, related to task performance. 
In a similar vein, Judge et al. (2007) investigated the joint influence of self-efficacy 
beliefs and distal individual factors on general work performance. The regression and path 
analyses revealed that, when self-efficacy beliefs were entered into the equation with the distal 
variables (i.e., cognitive ability, Big Five traits and experience), the coefficient was non-
significant, whereas cognitive ability, conscientiousness and experience predicted performance. 
When all these variables are controlled self-efficacy beliefs accounted for no improvement in 
the prediction of performance. In addition, cognitive ability significantly influenced self-
efficacy beliefs, conscientiousness, extraversion, emotional stability and experience. Thus, 
cognitive ability, conscientiousness and experience influenced work-related performance but 
self-efficacy beliefs did not significantly influence performance.  
These findings suggest that the incremental validity of self-efficacy beliefs on task and 
especially job performance was substantially attenuated by the inclusion of distal individual 
differences. The incremental validity of self-efficacy beliefs may thus overstate its true unique 
effect on performance. The incremental contribution of self-efficacy beliefs is thus insignificant 
when distal individual differences are taken into account in the prediction of job performance. 
In fact, the incremental validity of non-cognitive abilities in the presence of cognitive ability 
may be far less than previously thought. For instance, Schmidt et al. (2008), in a meta-analysis 
of 2057 studies demonstrated that the incremental validity of personality traits is smaller (less 
important) relative to cognitive ability than previously believed.  
A plausible argument is that the incremental validity of cognitive ability is stronger 
when compared to distal personality traits and the proximal influence of self-efficacy beliefs 
when individuals are faced with broader and complex tasks. It is noteworthy that a large and 
consistent distinction among occupations is the complexity of their information processing 
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demands. Task complexity correlates with processing skills, such as compiling and combining 
information,  reasoning and analyzing, decision making, negotiating and persuading 
(Gottfredson, 2002). Consequently, the relationship between cognitive ability and performance 
become stronger or more direct or both as complex information processing in tasks increases. 
Task complexity is thus an important moderator of the joint relationship between cognitive 
ability, personality traits and self-efficacy beliefs in the prediction of performance and also, by 
implication, MDM.   
However, individuals‘ perceptions of their abilities as they relate to diverse domains of 
performance may mediate ability-performance relations in complex ways. This is particularly 
the case when successful performance involves the regulation of effortful attention (i.e., 
conscientiousness and persistence) and affect.  Self-efficacy beliefs are dynamic dispositions 
and differ from static global traits in that they reflect the likelihood of successful performance 
in a specific task, measured immediately before any effort is expended on the task (Bandura, 
1997).  In this regard, in a review of self-efficacy beliefs and their relationship with sport 
performance, Moritz et al. (2002) illustrated that the most important moderator was that of 
concordance, that is the match between measures of self-efficacy beliefs and performance (see 
also, Gist, Stevens, & Bavetta, 1991; Lucas et al., 2006; O'Connor & Arnold, 2001; O'Connor 
et al., 2005; Oeij, 2006; Smith & Betz, 2000; Weigand & Stockham, 2000; Xie, 2007).   
Further, Bandura (1997) stated that the structure of the relationship between self-
efficacy beliefs and action requires that both tap similar capabilities. By implication, self-
efficacy beliefs thus reflect individuals‘ momentary belief in their capability to perform a 
specific task at a specific level of performance. Measures of self-efficacy belief thus serve as 
another potential moderator in the prediction of specific performance (Bandura, 1997; Gist & 
Mitchell, 1992). This notion fits with the bandwidth–fidelity debate that suggests that the use of 
broad decontextualized individual and self-efficacy belief measures focus more on the 
characteristic responses that individuals make to broad environmental demands than on 
context- and task-specific performance. Although broad measures (i.e., composite measures) 
offer greater bandwidth and higher cross-situational replication to the prediction of broad 
performance criteria, they are less likely to predict specific performance criteria.  
To enhance prediction Hogan and Holland (2003), Hogan and Roberts (1996) and Ones 
and Viswesvaran (1996) proposed that validity is enhanced when the bandwidth of predictors 
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and criteria are matched. In fact, broadband predictors assess global criteria better than specific 
criteria and vice versa (see, for example, Erez & Judge, 2001).  In this regard, self-efficacy 
beliefs, given their relatively domain-specific nature, are patterned differently across 
individuals and spheres of activity and are likely to be a stronger predictor of narrow 
performance measures (Bandura, 1999) and thus decisional performance.  
 
Summary 
 
The preceeding review can be summarized as:  
 
 Cognitive ability and social self-confidence personality traits are empirically and 
conceptually distinct individual differences.  
 Cognitive ability exerts its strongest effects on the application of a systematic-
comprehensive process and social self-confidence impacts on exercising control over 
the social-political context.  
 Individuals with a high cognitive ability possess a higher source of attentional resources 
to deploy.  
 Cognitive ability displays a stronger direct positive relationship with decision 
complexity.  
 Personality and social traits contribute incremental validity in the prediction of 
performance above and beyond that accounted for by cognitive ability. Also, social self-
confidence traits and self-efficacy beliefs show a positive linear relation.  
 Social self-confidence as demonstrated by dominance, sociability, and energy level (i.e., 
available attentional resources) are related to the availability of attentional resources 
and individuals who are self-confident select effortful rational modes of social 
influence. 
 Notwithstanding the conclusion from studies, the effects of self-efficacy beliefs and 
personality traits are constrained by the inclusion of cognitive ability as an individual 
difference factor.  
 Self-efficacy beliefs and appraisals shape influence the type and intensity of affect as 
well as the cognitions that determine affective responses.  
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Although non-cognitive measures are shown to provide little incremental validity in 
accounting for variance in individual performance, incidents of proximal negative and positive 
affect consistently add significant incremental prediction of differences in individual 
performance. One question posed by the present research was thus to determine whether 
cognitive ability, self-efficacy beliefs and social self-confidence independently account for the 
prediction of decision-generated affect in MDM. The next subsection reviews research on how 
affect shapes the quality of decision processing and acts as a motivator in decision behaviour. 
 
Decision-Generated Affect 
 
Pham (2007) observed that the empirical literature on affect and rationality is 
fragmented and seemingly inconsistent. Attempts to incorporate the wide empirical base 
regarding affect in decision making into a single, parsimonious framework may thus be overly 
ambitious (see, for instance, Raghunathan & Pham, 1999), indeed a challenge the present 
researcher faced. The study of the relationship between affect and decision making is 
multifaceted (Baumeister et al., 2007; Baumeister et al., 2007; Han et al., 2007; Pham, 2007; 
Pfister & Böhm, 2008; Schwarz & Clore, 2003, 2007) as illustrated in Table 2.1 in Chapter 
Two. The empirical generalizations presented in the next subsection review affect as 
information that impacts on the comprehensiveness of deliberation and act as a motivator of 
information processing and behaviour in decision making.   
 
Affect as Information  
 
Decision making is neither a dispassionate process nor one driven solely by the desire to 
maximize self-interest (Bandura, 1997; Shafir & LeBoeuf, 2002; Simon, 1998). Decision 
making requires information for evaluation and deliberation about alternatives, and individuals 
use their perceived affect as relevant information in their judgments.  In many decisions affect 
may be the most useful information an individual has (Raghunathan & Pham, 1999). The 
impact of affect on decision making is, however, a function of its perceived informational 
value. Rather than affect itself, the information conveyed by affect is crucial. Affective cues 
influence judgments directly by serving as experiential and bodily information regarding how 
one feels and such experiential information can be faster and more compelling than thoughts 
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(Clore & Huntsinger, 2007). This has been acknowledged by many researchers, albeit with 
varying emphasis (Baumeister et al., 2007; Gasper & Isbell, 2007; Han et al., 2007; Isen & 
Labroo, 2003; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; Loewenstein & 
O‘Donoghue, 2007; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Pfister & Böhm, 2008; Schwarz & Clore, 2003; 
2007).  
Individuals reach good-bad assessments in a rapid, automatic, and relatively effortless 
manner. In a series of seminal papers with titles such as "Feeling and Thinking: Preferences 
Need No Inferences" (1980) and "On the Primacy of Affect" (1984), Zajonc presented the 
results of studies which demonstrated that individuals can often identify their affective reaction 
to something more rapidly than they can even say what it is.  Affective signals, originating in 
bodily states and acquired by learning from previous experiences, act as markers about the 
valence (positive or negative) of immediate experiences and operate automatically, influencing 
decisions even before a deliberate intention is generated (Damasio, 1994).  Damasio 
documented the negative consequences of being unable to use affective feelings as information 
for making everyday judgments and decisions. Further, Damasio and colleagues (Bechara, 
Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997; Shiv, Loewenstein, Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2005), 
in an influential series of studies, illustrated that individuals with affective deficits related to 
damages in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex area displayed impaired decision making, not 
just in laboratory tasks, but also in decision making in general. Consequently, Damasio (1994) 
reasons that a reduction in emotion may constitute an important source of irrational behaviour. 
The informational influence of affect also impacts on social judgments, as evidenced in 
numerous studies (Forgas & George, 2001; Forgas & Laham, 2005; Forgas, Kipling, & Laham, 
2004; Schwartz & Clore, 2003, 2007). For instance, Forgas (1998, 2002) illustrated that 
affective information impacted on deliberations prior to complex, unpredictable social 
encounters (such as the formulation of and responses to requests), as well as on the use of 
persuasive arguments in negotiation and bargaining encounters.  In a review of studies by 
Finucane et al. (2003), there was evidence to demonstrate that individuals rely in part on their 
affect to recognize the best option in decision situations.  For example, Slovic, Finucane, Peters 
and MacGregor (2002) investigated the inverse relationship between risk and benefit judgments 
under conditions designed to limit the use of analytic thought and enhance the use of affect as 
information (‗the affect heuristic‘). As expected, individuals relied on an affect heuristic when 
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the opportunity for analytical deliberation was reduced and an efficient mode of judgment was 
needed. Similarly, Finucane et al. (2000) conducted experiments designed to manipulate affect 
by increasing or decreasing both perceived risk and perceived benefit. In each experiment there 
was no apparent logical relationship between the information provided (e.g., information about 
risks) and the non-manipulated variable (e.g., benefits). Their data demonstrated that risk and 
benefit judgments were constructed, at least in part, by reference to some overall affective 
evaluation. 
The extent or type of affect (e.g., weak versus strong affect) focuses the decision maker 
on new information.  Kisfalvi and Pitcher (2003) empirically demonstrated that MDM carries 
an essential affective component. Their research design was a single-case, longitudinal field 
study that focused on the top manager, the management team, and team dynamics. Data 
collection included interviews, direct observations, documents and archival materials, as well 
as participants‘ descriptions over a nine month period. Their findings illustrated that, in making 
decisions, individuals tended to do what feels right (‗an emotional heuristic‘).  Affective 
information aided in the selection of a ‗rational‘ solution and played an important part in MDM 
by acting as a decision heuristic.  
The effects of affect on managerial perceptions were measured among 149 managers 
from a variety of industries and companies. It was found current managerial mood state 
influenced the way managers perceived the amount of information they gathered when making 
business decisions relative to colleague managers, the amount of time they spent gathering 
information relative to comparable managers, and their own willingness to undertake risky 
business propositions relative to similar managers (Williams, 2004). 
The importance of affect as information was also highlighted for risk perceptions and 
risk-related decisions. In a stock investment simulation, stock investors rated their feelings on 
an internet website, while making investment decisions each day for 20 consecutive business 
days (Seo & Barrett, 2007). Contrary to the popular belief that affect influences the quality of 
decision making, the authors reported that individuals who were less influenced by their 
immediate affect in determining the level of risk in their daily stock portfolios, achieved higher 
daily investment returns on average throughout the simulation. Individuals anticipate how they 
will feel about the outcomes of decisions and use their predictions to guide their choices. 
Mellers, Schwartz, and Ritov (1999) provided evidence that choices between risky options may 
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depend on maximising the anticipated affective experience, rather than on only maximising the 
expected utility of the chosen outcome. Similarly, Lerner and Keltner (2000), Raghunathan and 
Pham (1999) and Raghunathan Pham and Corfman (2006) also illustrated that anxious decision 
makers preferred uncertainty-reducing decisions.  
Individuals also tend to rely on affect as information even when the actual source of the 
affect is totally unrelated to the object of attention. In a classic study, Schwarz and Clore (1983) 
found that individuals mistakenly inferred that their weather-induced moods reflected how they 
felt about their personal lives. Similar irrational misattributions have been found in numerous 
studies. The puzzling effects of the weather on inducing affect as information may explain the 
widespread misattribution of affect within decision making.  In a challenge to the hypothesis 
that financial and share markets are citadels of rationality, a number of studies have recorded 
above-average stock market performance on sunny days and below-average performance on 
rainy and winter days (e.g., Hirshleifer & Shumway, 2003). A plausible explanation is that 
sunny weather puts investors in a good mood, which they misinterpret as optimism (anticipated 
affect) about the share market, therefore taking more risks; rainy or winter weather puts 
investors in a depressed mood that they misinterpret as pessimism about the share market, 
therefore taking fewer risks. In addition, Simonsohn (2006) studied 682 actual university 
admission decisions and, as predicted, found that applicants‘ academic attributes were weighted 
more heavily on cloudier days, and non-academic attributes more heavily on sunnier days. 
S. L. Williams (1995) illustrated that much latitude exists in how individuals interpret 
the meaning of their affect and that individuals are notoriously poor at estimating their 
automatic arousal. Even if they could accurately perceive their viscera, they could be misled 
because of the empirically poor relationship between physiological arousal and coping 
capabilities (see also Feltz, 1982). The impact of decision makers‘ affect on decision making 
can be eliminated,  however, when individuals attribute affect to an irrelevant source. For 
example, Bhattacharjee and Moreno (2002) confirmed that the presence of available but less 
relevant affective information had a differential impact on decisions amongst confident auditors 
whereas those who doubted their ability made lower risk decisions.  
Positive and negative affect also function as heuristic cues to signal whether enough 
effort has been exerted to perform a task (Fisher & Noble, 2000). Earlier it was pointed out that 
physiological and affective arousal is an important source of information that determines self-
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efficacy beliefs (Bandura, 1986, van Vianen, 1999; Xie, 2007). Positive affect may thus be 
used to infer self-efficacy. Evidence by Maddux and Meier (1995) confirms a self-efficacy 
beliefs/affect covariation and other studies have shown that the more intense induced affect, the 
greater is its impact on self-efficacy beliefs (Forgas, Bower, & Moylan, 1990; Salovey & 
Birnbaum, 1989). For instance, Kavanagh and Bower (1985) demonstrated that experimentally 
induced negative affect diminished self-efficacy beliefs across different spheres of functioning, 
whereas positive affect enhanced perceived self-efficacy beliefs in performance.   In a study of 
62 undergraduates, Cervone and Peake (1986) illustrated that the same affective heuristic 
process that influences judgments of factual and social information might be integral to 
forming judgments about self-efficacy beliefs. In their study, randomly assigned competence 
biases created highly significant differences between the low-and high-affect heuristic 
conditions that impacted on measures of self-efficacy beliefs and persistence.  
It was pointed out earlier that the relationship between affect and self-efficacy beliefs is 
reciprocal, with self-efficacy beliefs exercising a greater influence on affect than that exercised 
by affect on self-efficacy beliefs (i.e., asymmetrical). In fact, in a study by Cervone, Kopp, 
Schaumann,  and Scott  (1994) affect was shown to have no influence on self-efficacy beliefs. 
In their series of experimental studies with undergraduates, induced affect of a negative nature 
evoked higher personal standards for performance, and participants‘ confidence in their 
capabilities remained unaffected by the mood inductions. The authors concluded that meeting 
or not meeting minimal performance standards naturally evoked assessments of affective 
reactions of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with prospective performances.  
In conclusion, affect provides speed in its ability to facilitate reasoning, but it is also 
limited by its dependency on context and experience, thus allowing individuals to be led astray 
or manipulated, inadvertently or intentionally, into making poor choices (Slovic et al., 2002). 
Although affect has a direct effect on decision processing, its effect is mediated by individual 
differences in the level of self-efficacy beliefs. The next subsection reviews the empirical 
evidence of the impact of affect in decision processing.  
 
Affect and  Decision Processing 
 
Affect can take precedence over cognitive scrutiny and rationality in decision making 
(Baumeister et al., 2007; Pham, 2007), causing individual goals to shift from that of effort and 
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accuracy towards that of minimizing negative affect (i.e., to feel better) (Luce et al., 1997). 
Numerous studies confirm a relationship between positive and negative affect and decision 
making, and they illustrate that positive affect promotes beneficial decision processes and 
negative affect contributes to dysfunctional decision processes. The impact of affect on 
decision processing is however curvilinear. For example, high affective arousal restricts the 
breadth, search and ability to judge the usefulness of information (Bettman, Johnson, Luce, & 
Payne, 1993; Janis & Mann, 1977; Rothstein, 1986). Consequently, individuals who experience 
negative affect make faster and less discriminate use of information (Luce et al., 1997) and 
adopt simplifying (heuristic) decision processes (e.g., Payne, Bettman, Coupey, & Johnson, 
1992; Payne et al., 1993).  Similarly, Maule et al. (2000) illustrated that time-pressured 
participants increased the proportion of overall decision time they devoted to processing 
general information in order to develop a broad understanding of the decision problem rather 
than making a detailed evaluation of particular alternatives and their outcomes. This is 
consistent with Payne et al. ‘s (1993) findings which indicated that individuals prefer to have a 
relatively small amount of information about all alternatives rather than detailed information 
about a few of them when subjected to negative affect. On the whole, these findings suggest 
that decision makers adjust their decision processes to ‗easier‘ strategies by altering their 
processing to reduce experienced negative affect..  
On the other hand, negative affect also promotes greater attention to detail and promotes 
detail-oriented processing (for a review see, Payne et al., 1993, and Schwarz and Clore, 2003, 
2006). Consistent with the finding that negative affect fosters a more detail-oriented processing 
style, Luce et al. (1997) observed that decision processes under increasing negative affect 
become more extensive. Schwarz (1990) argued that negative affect signals that one's current 
situation is problematic, thus evoking an effortful, analytical decision-process strategy. 
Negative affect may thus relate positively to effort on tasks that are immediately required and 
may therefore operate as an incentive to make an accurate decision (Foo et al., 2009). Further 
support from Luce, Bettman and Payne (1997) illustrated that negative affect simultaneously 
signaled decision importance and encouraged the kind of decision processing associated with 
maximizing accuracy (i.e., a systematic-comprehensive process).  
Recent studies have also revealed more nuanced effects that specific negative affect has 
on decision processes. For example, fearful individuals make relatively pessimistic and risk-
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aversive choices, whereas sadness results in high-risk, high-reward choices (Raghunathan & 
Pham, 1999; Raghunathan et al., 2006). Studies by Lerner and Keltner (2000) demonstrated 
that fear and anger influenced decision risks in opposite ways: fearful individuals made 
pessimistic judgments about future events, whereas angry individuals made optimistic 
judgments. Lerner and Tiedens (2006) also confirmed that anger has a similar impact on 
decision making, leading to increased risk taking and optimism. Consequently, while the event 
causing anger may be negative, the effects on subsequent experience (a sense of ability to 
control the situation through increased energy) suggest that anger may in fact be a positive 
affect, especially in the sense of motivating future actions.  
Anxiety, as a response to threats, with its more narrow attention focus and bias toward 
threatening information, prompts a goal of uncertainty reduction in risky decisions (e.g., 
Haleblian et al., 2004; Maner et al., 2007; Raghunathan & Pham, 1999). Further, sadness, a 
common response to the loss or absence of a reward, prompts a preference for options that 
provide greater reward or comfort. Whereas fearful individuals make relatively pessimistic and 
risk-averse choices, sadness results in high-risk, high-reward choices (Raghunathan & Pham, 
1999; Raghunathan et al., 2006). Tice, Bratslavsky and Baumeister (2001) also demonstrated 
that the decision processes used by sad individuals was due to participants placing a higher 
priority on immediately improving their affect rather than taking full advantage of the long-
term gains that could be obtained by careful, rational decision making.  Similarly, Lerner and 
colleagues (2004) demonstrated that induced sadness affected economic decisions, that is, 
prompted by a desire to change their sad circumstances subjects offered more money to acquire 
items.  
Empirical evidence attests to the notion that sadness elicits self-focused attention (see, 
for instance,  Green & Sedikides, 1999, Sedikides, 1994, and Sedikides & Green, 2000). This 
has an adaptive function in that sadness increases the degree to which individuals seek out 
detailed and diagnostic information, which fosters systematic, detail-oriented decision 
processes. For instance, planning and executing interpersonal behaviours typically involves a 
degree of elaborate information processing, and Forgas (2002) illustrated that individuals in sad 
moods paid more attention to the quality of arguments and used more persuasive arguments 
when compared to individuals with positive affect.  
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Conversely, positive affect indicates that the current environment is free from risk 
and/or presents the potential to obtain reward and that promotes cognitive flexibility, 
innovation, problem solving and creativity in many different contexts (see, for example, Isen & 
Labroo, 2003). Positive affect produces more confident, assertive, optimistic, and cooperative 
behaviours (see, for example,  Forgas & George, 2001, and Forgas & Laham, 2005). During 
negotiations, positive affect promotes creative thinking which, in turn, makes negotiators more 
likely to engage in innovative problem solving, thereby resulting in favourable negotiated 
outcomes. For instance, Kopelman, Rosette, and Thompson (2006) illustrated that negotiators 
who displayed positive affect were more likely to persuade their opponents to accept their 
offers and were more likely to extract concessions from the opposing party. Further, managers‘ 
affect influenced the way they perceived the amount of time they spent gathering information 
and the amount of information gathered in the process of making business decisions (S. L. 
Williams, 2004). Staw and Barsade (1993) illustrated that positive affect influenced the amount 
of information requested and found the use of quantitative information to be significantly 
different between MBA students with high and low affect. Similarly, Estrada, Isen and Young 
(1997) demonstrated that positive affect impacted on clinical decision making among 
practicing physicians. Positive affect also predicted superior decision making and performance 
in a study by Cervone and Wood (1995). 
Individuals in a positive mood have been found to be more likely to voluntarily expose 
themselves to threatening but diagnostic information. Studies by Trope, Ferguson and 
Ragunanthan (2001) also illustrated that positive affect influenced the relative weight that 
individuals assigned to the emotional costs versus the informational benefits of receiving 
negative feedback. It seems that positive affect functioned as a buffer, enabling individuals to 
deal better with the emotional costs of negative self-related information.  
Positive affect however produces a more superficial (i.e., a heuristic) decision process 
in that it promotes a general, schematic way of thinking that relies more on the deductive use of 
existing knowledge than on the inductive use of external, piecemeal information (Bless, 2000).  
Heuristic decision processing is, by nature, aimed at achieving anticipated valued social goals 
(i.e., to have a pleasant interaction). Chen et al. (1996) illustrated that impression-motivated 
decision processing reflected a ‗go along to get along‘ heuristic that biased decision processes 
in a direction of complying with others‘ opinions. Accountability predicaments, in particular, 
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evoke low-effort decision processing as mediated by anxiety. Studies have demonstrated that 
making a decision in the face of disagreement and then being forced to justify that decision 
activated different decision processes. One coping pattern is an ‗acceptability heuristic‘ in 
which individuals acted in a manner they believed would be most likely to be acceptable to the 
relevant audience (Green et al., 2000; Lerner & Tetlock 1994, 2003; Tetlock et al., 1989). 
Individuals under such conditions avoided the ‗unnecessary‘ cognitive work (i.e., search, use 
and deliberation about alternative courses of action) in their decision processes. How affect is 
appraised may cause decrements in decision making that force shifts in attentional resource 
allocations to an off-task, affective focus and thus dilute the comprehensiveness of decision 
processes (Bettman & Payne, 1997).  
Empirical evidence also illustrates that a strong motivation to do well overrides the 
effect of negative affect on the quality of decision processes. Once a threshold level of negative 
affect is reached, individuals adapt their decision processes to limit the impact of affect towards 
a motivated systematic-comprehensive decision process (Arenas et al., 2006; Luce et al., 1999; 
Maule et al., 2000). In fact, Foo et al. (2009) found support for a curvilinear relationship 
between negative affect and effort (i.e., allocation of attentional resources) in a study of 56 
entrepreneurs from 22 start-up ventures. In this study, initial negative decision-affect related 
positively to effort. However in terms of affect-as-information, persistent negative affect that 
signalled a less opportunity-affording opportunity led entrepreneurs to disengage from their 
ventures. Whether the experience of affect is positive or negative, therefore, depends entirely 
on an appraisal of the situation in which it is experienced.  
 
Affect and Information Processing and Decision Behaviour 
 
Individuals select decision strategies and choose low effort, ‗easy‘ options in order to 
conserve finite attentional resources. In Chapter Two it was stated that it is not the sheer 
volume or pace of information but the ambiguity of information that matters most in MDM 
(Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Hambrick et al., 2005a, 2005b; Mintzberg, 1973). This subjective 
experience contributes greatly to complexity (e.g., Gottfredson, 2002). The process of dealing 
with such ambiguous or indeterminate information in decision making represents the very 
conditions that allow for affect infusion (Forgas, 1995), whereby affectively loaded information 
becomes incorporated in decisional processes and eventually biases the decisional outcomes. 
117 
 
A number of studies have shown that the affective results of the appraisal of certainty 
and control play a mediating role in determining whether individuals engage in a low effort, 
quick and more superficial heuristic decision process (i.e., substantive processing or System 1) 
or a motivated systematic, effortful, comprehensive, logic-based decision process (i.e., 
motivated processing or System 2) (Forgas, 1995, 2000b; Forgas & George, 2001; Kahneman, 
2003; Payne & Bettman, 2007; Stanovich & West, 2000).  These two modalities operate in a 
temporal sequence (Forgas, 1995; Forgas & George, 2001; Forgas et al., 2004) where 
individuals minimize effort by shifting their decision processes between open, substantive 
processing (processing of both affective and non-affective information) and a motivated 
processing (a more controlled, selective processing strategy that reduces the chances of relying 
on affective information) in order to limit affect infusion and subsequent biases during decision 
making (Forgas, 1995, 2000b, 2002, Forgas & George, 2001).  
For example, Peters et al. (2006), in a series of four studies, explored how the ability to 
understand and transform probability numbers related to performance on judgment and 
decision tasks. The alternative hypothesis, that numeracy‘s effect on decisions was due to 
cognitive ability, was not supported by these studies. Their findings illustrated that affect 
partially mediated the influence of numeracy in decision processing, and that performance was 
influenced more strongly by irrelevant affective sources. Affect thus, once elicited, can have a 
dynamic influence on how social information is selected, interpreted, processed, and 
remembered (Forgas, 1998, 200l, 2003). Jones and George (1998) also presented experimental 
findings concerning the role of affect in managerial information processing and decision 
making in order to illustrate that managers differed in the extent to which they are aware of 
these affective infusion effects.  
A number of studies have provided substantial evidence for the mediating impact of 
‗defensive‘ decision processes in order to reduce the influence of affect infusion in decision 
processes (Forgas, 2000a, 2000b, 2003; Forgas & Ciarrochi, 2002; Forgas & George, 2001; 
Forgas & Laham, 2005; Sedikides, 1994).  For instance, in a study with share investors on the 
internet, who rated their feelings while making investment decisions each day for 20 
consecutive business days, Seo and Barrett (2007) demonstrated that those who were more 
ignorant about their affective states, and thus less able to identify them at the moment of 
decision making, performed more poorly due to affective infusion which they ignored. 
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Conversely, those individuals who experienced more intense affect achieved higher decision-
making outcomes because they were better able to identify affect and distinguish between 
different forms of affect. As a result, they achieved better performance via their enhanced 
ability to control the possible biases induced by their affect.  
In recognition of this, Finucane and Lees (2005, p. 2) refer to  ―affective fluency‖ as an 
important ability in decision making. Affective fluency is defined as the extent to which 
individuals appropriately balance affective information processing with deliberative analysis in 
decision making. Forgas and Laham (2005), in a review of the empirical evidence, including 
several studies from their own research, demonstrated that fleeting, superficial mood states 
have highly predictable and significant motivational influences on how individuals make 
decisions. They conclude that individual difference variables such as self-esteem (i.e., a global 
affective trait that reflects an individual's characteristic affective evaluation of the self) 
moderated the effects of affect on social judgments and behaviours. Individuals with low self-
esteem displayed less certain and stable self-conceptions and were thus likely to be more 
influenced by situational/contextual variables. Similarly, Sedikides (1995) experimentally 
demonstrated no affect infusion effects for highly consolidated, central self-conceptions. Lower 
self-conceptions were influenced by affect because they were less elaborated and consolidated, 
and because they were held with lower certainty this increased the likelihood of the occurrence 
of affect-infusing heuristic decision processes (see also, in this regard, Sedikides & Green, 
2000). The absence of a strong motivational influence (high affective self-regulation via self-
efficacy beliefs) thus offers less scope to identify and distinguish among the bias-induced 
effects of affect in individual decision processes.  
Bandura (1997) stated that self-efficacy beliefs play a pivotal role in the self-regulation 
of affective states. Self-efficacy beliefs enable the regulation of affective outcomes by: (1) 
creating attentional biases in how events are construed and cognitively represented; (2) via 
perceived cognitive abilities to control intrusive thoughts; and (3) by supporting effective 
courses of action in order to transform the environment in ways that alter its emotive potential 
(Bandura, 1997). Moreover, positive affect mediated by self-efficacy beliefs serves as a 
personal resource that enables individuals to make transitions from heuristic processing to a 
motivated, controlled decision process in order to deal with the emotional costs of negative 
self-related information.  
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Motivated decision processing, and its concomitant positive congruent effect, ‗protect‘ 
managers from the possible biases induced by their affect by causing them to deliberately 
revisit important information in their decisions. It was pointed out earlier that affect influenced 
the relative weight that individuals assigned to the emotional costs versus the informational 
benefits of receiving negative feedback (Trope et al.,  2001). Managers who have a low ability 
to regulate the influence of affect (e.g., who have low self-efficacy beliefs) find decision 
challenges threatening because their affect constantly interferes in the quality of their decision 
processes. The very concept of ‗emotional intelligence‘, defined by Mayer et al. (2008, p. 511) 
as ―…the ability to carry out accurate reasoning about emotions and the ability to use emotions 
and emotional knowledge to enhance thought‖, refers to the individual‘s ability to promote or 
inhibit affect infusion.  
These findings demonstrate that information loaded with affect does not only exert a 
direct influence on the quality of decision processes. It also functions as directional input to 
motivated actions, via effortful attentional allocation, and it directs actions. Accordingly, 
decision-generated affect is counterproductive when individuals misallocate limited, conscious, 
attentional resources to decisional processes that reduce their negative affect. A social-
cognitive interpretation of these findings suggests that individuals have a repertoire of decision-
process strategies from which to choose and that they decide how to decide by considering a 
number of goals in response to decision demands.  
Whether affect actually hinders or assists decision making is thus largely determined by 
how individuals experience and regulate their affect. Self-efficacy beliefs account for the 
adoption of a motivated, controlled decision process as mediated by the degree to which affect 
is regulated. Coping with negative affect is one salient goal in decision making (Luce, 2005) 
and decision makers adapt to negative affect by adopting easier-to-implement decisions or 
avoiding decisions.  
 
Summary  
 
The empirical findings reviewed point to the following:  
 
 Individual‗s subjective perceptions and appraisals of MDM demands depend in part on 
differences in self-efficacy beliefs.  
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 These differential appraisals provide an affective summary that reflect the match 
between self-efficacy beliefs and the subjective appraisal of the situational constraints.  
 
 Decision-generated affect exerts a direct influence on the quality of decision processes 
since it functions as directional input to motivated actions by redirecting attentional 
resources from the decision processes to the affective experience.  
 
 Self-efficacy beliefs account for the adoption of a motivated, controlled decision 
process as mediated by the degree to which decision makers adapt to negative affect by 
adopting easier-to-implement decisions or avoiding decisions..  
 
 Self-efficacy beliefs mediate between experienced decision-generated affect by re-
allocating attentional resources and affect to on-task, effortful MDM processes. 
 
The next subsection reviews empirical evidence which demonstrates that decisional 
avoidance responses are moderated by contextual factors and that they serve the purpose of 
avoiding or minimizing decision-generated affect. 
  
Allocation of Attentional Resources   
 
There are multiple reasons people may seek to avoid choice, not the least of which is a 
reluctance to be held responsible for negative outcomes stemming from one‘s decision. 
Another reason, however, may be that the decision process itself is costly, insofar as it 
consumes valuable resources. These two decisional response patterns are described in the next 
subsections. 
 
Decisional Procrastination 
 
Experimental studies with undergraduate students have demonstrated that indecisive 
individuals take longer in decision making tasks (Ferrari & Dovidio, 1997, 2000; Ferrari & 
Pychyl, 2007; Frost & Shows, 1993).  Individuals delay their decisions when they feel that they 
do not have enough information to make a decision, as demonstrated in studies of nurse 
managers by Jatulis and Newman (1991) and in a study of undergraduates by Rassin, Muris, 
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Franken, Smit and Wong (2007). Moreover, indecisive undergraduate individuals were shown 
to search for and focus more on information within the same choice alternatives. This impacted 
on decision making time for the choice they ultimately made (Ferrari & Dovidio, 2000), 
particularly when they had to choose between more alternatives. Ferrari and Dovidio also 
demonstrated that for indecisive individuals, the number of alternatives moderated decisional 
avoidance. In fact, the propensity to avoid choice tended to be stronger when there were five 
alternatives compared to two. The full regression equation accounted for 36% of the variance in 
decision times. This was consistent with findings by Tversky and Shafir (1992) that the 
difficulty of choosing among options created conflict that increased the tendency to defer the 
choice.  In fact, indecisive individuals were shown to avoid the necessary information needed 
to make an accurate, fully informed choice when equally attractive alternatives were presented, 
because making a decision required more attentional effort (Ferrari & Pychyl, 2007). These 
findings are consistent with other evidence indicating that difficult trade-off decisions required 
an increase in the attentional effort required to select choices and therefore increased the 
propensity to avoid decisions (Luce, 1998). 
Moreover, individuals high and low in decisional avoidance differed fundamentally in 
the types of decision strategies they used. Indecisive individuals were shown to use narrower 
and rigid strategies (Ferrari & Dovidio, 1997, 2000). In another study of college students, 
Ferrari and Dovidio (2001) report a significant propensity to avoid decisions under high 
attentional load and individuals with lower self-confidence and greater anxiety delayed 
decision making as an avoidance strategy. The tendency to avoid decisions however, was not 
related to a lack of cognitive ability. General cognitive ability (e.g., abstract thinking and verbal 
reasoning) and the propensity to avoid decisions were shown to be uncorrelated (Ferrari & 
Dovidio, 1997).  In a meta-analytic review, Steele (2007) also reported the relationship between 
indecision and intelligence at an insignificant level, which supports the aforementioned 
findings.  
Based on the findings above it is evident that the failure to regulate attentional resources 
(due to affective concerns) induces the propensity to avoid decisions.  Previously it was shown 
that the existence of distractions (i.e., affective concerns) reduces accessibility to attentional 
resources (Sarason et al., 1996) and that subjectively experienced complexity is inherently 
effortful (Lucas et al.,  2006; Mangos & Steele-Johnson, 2001; Maynard & Hakel, 1997). 
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Moreover, when individuals are aware that they have exerted increased effort they rate a task as 
more difficult than those tasks involving less effort (Fisher & Noble, 2004; Yeo & Neal, 2004, 
2008). In support of this, the correlation between perceived task difficulty and effort intensity 
has been found to be significant (Smillie et al., 2006). Frost and Shows (1993), in an 
experimental decision-making task, also demonstrated that perceived unpleasant decisions 
motivated delays in decision making. This relationship between aversion to tasks and delaying 
tasks was confirmed as consistent and strong in Steel‘s (2007) meta-analytic review on 
procrastination. Therefore, the more individuals dislike a task, the more they consider it 
effortful or anxiety provoking, and the more they procrastinate.  
Luce et al. (2001) documented evidence that decision makers are concerned about 
minimizing negative affect in order to save attentional resources. In three experiments that 
involved different manipulations of task-related negative affect and decision processing, Luce 
et al.‘s (1997) study of undergraduates showed that individuals experienced more negative 
affect when they faced conflicting choices and high trade-off difficulty. Furthermore, the 
interaction between conflict and trade-off difficulty was significant with increased affect also 
associated with higher threat. Personal volition affects the willingness or effort expended to 
enact appropriate decision making. Patalano and Wengrovitz (2007), in a study with 
undergraduate students, demonstrated that decisive individuals modulated their deliberation in 
response to the presence versus absence of risk, whereas indecisive individuals did not. Their 
results however illustrate that indecisive individuals do not uniformly increase delays in their 
decisions but that their delay behaviour may be more striking in its unresponsiveness to risk. 
Threat avoidance is thus a core component of risk-avoidant decision-making as 
demonstrated in various studies (Finucane et al., 2000; Finucane et al., 2003; Haleblian et al., 
2004; Simon et al., 1999; Slovic et al., 2002). Across these studies, negative affect (i.e., 
anxiety) had a pronounced impact on the tendency to engage in risk-avoidant decision making.  
For instance, anxiety, worry, and social anxiety were each associated with risk-avoidance in a 
risk-taking task in three studies involving undergraduate students by Maner et al. (2007).  
Baumeister et al. (2007) argued that minimizing affect is a prime motivator in most 
behavioural choices and a great deal of inaction stems from mimimizing aversive affect (see 
also Anderson, 2003, for a review).  Individuals who doubt their ability to make good decisions 
use affect-focused coping to alter the affect they experience either by avoidance (Anderson, 
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2003, 2007), decisional procrastination (Ferrari, 2001; Ferrari & Dovidio, 1997, 2000, 2001; 
Ferrari & Pychyl, 2007; Orellana-Damacela, Tindale, & Suarez-Balcazar, 2000; Renn et al., 
2005; van Eerde, 2000), by changing the meaning of the situation (e.g., evasion or escape) 
thereby letting others make the choice (e.g., developing spurious arguments that favour the 
least objections) (Lerner & Tetlock, 2003; Lucas et al., 2006; Mirels et al., 2002),  or by 
showing an increased preference for the status quo option or any other option that is easier to 
justify to oneself or others (Geletkanycz & Black, 2001; Luce, 1998). 
Earlier it was shown that individuals make strong external attributions to subjectively 
experienced task difficulty. Consequently, attentional effort may display a negative association 
with performance because high effort is taken as indicative of low ability (see also Bandura, 
1991; Jourden, Bandura, & Banfield, 1991; Wood & Bandura, 1989b). Effert and Ferrari 
(1989) illustrated that indecisive individuals reported less confidence and avoided decisions in 
order to prevent disclosure of perceived inabilities and incompetence. Furthermore, Ferrari 
(1991d) demonstrated that indecisive individuals avoided self-relevant information in order to 
complete easy, less effortfu1 tasks. Other consistent evidence suggests that a delay in making 
decisions is related to low self-esteem, to low self-confidence, as well as to concerns about 
anxiety and social comparisons of performance (Ferrari, 1991b, 1991c).  
Janis and Mann (1977) demonstrated that hypervigilance (quick closure) refers to the 
desire for certainty and intolerance for ambiguity through the inclination to ‗seize‘ and then 
‗freeze‘ on early judgment cues. Cheng (2003), in a study with first year students, illustrated 
that ambiguity and uncertainty induced individuals to act toward their own goals (e.g., to 
minimize affect to solve the problem) and motivated them to bring information processing to a 
close by leaping to a conclusion. This, subsequently, biased their choices toward closure-bound 
pursuits and induced positive affect when the goal was attained or not attained.  
Given the hypothesis that self-efficacy beliefs play a role in motivating and initiating 
behaviour, Haycock, McCarthy, and Skay (1998) noted that it is surprising that few published 
studies have attempted to examine the association between self-efficacy beliefs and the 
propensity to avoid decisions.  In one study by Jatulis and Newman (1991) it was demonstrated 
that self-efficacy beliefs accounted for a main effect on the readiness to make a decision. 
Managers‘ level of self-efficacy beliefs thus mediated their need for additional information to 
evaluate decisions and for time to decide. The propensity to avoid decisions was also related to 
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self-efficacy beliefs and anxiety in a study by Haycock et al. (1998).  Moreover, procrastination 
was inversely and significantly related to efficacy level, cumulative efficacy strength and 
average efficacy strength (Steel, 2007). Steel reported a negative relationship between self-
efficacy beliefs and procrastination with conscientiousness (effort and persistence) inversely 
related to avoidance.   
Payne et al. (2007) presented an empirical review of the presumed effects of 
antecedents, proximal and distal consequences of learning, prove performance, and avoidance, 
as goals in academic, task and job performance. Distal consequences in this study included 
learning, task and job performance and academic performance. Antecedent variables included 
cognitive ability, an implicit theory of intelligence, the need for achievement, self-esteem, 
general self-efficacy beliefs (domain-independent confidence), and the Big Five personality 
traits. Proximal consequences included task-specific self-efficacy beliefs, self-set goal level, 
learning strategies, feedback seeking, and state anxiety. General self-efficacy beliefs 
(confidence) acted as an antecedent to an avoidance goal orientation, and task-specific efficacy 
beliefs correlated negatively with avoidance. Avoidance, as a goal, also correlated negatively 
with feedback seeking, and individuals with strong avoidance tendencies tended to set low 
goals for themselves.    
Taken as a whole, these findings suggest that affect has a motivational and volitional 
effect by interrupting or changing goal setting, planning, and action initiation. Consequently, 
individuals who are plagued by self-doubts (accompanied by lack of self-confidence, anxiety 
over skills, and insecurities about task abilities) fail to develop challenging intentions, and 
become stuck in fruitless contemplation processes that reflect a failure in the self-regulation of 
attentional effort and affect.  The following subsection reviews empirical evidence 
demonstrating that acts of choice and self-control cause attentional resource allocation that 
leads to subsequent decrements in the quality of decision processes due to the mediating effects 
of decisional fatigue (see Table 2.1 in this regard). 
 
Decisional Fatigue 
 
Fatigue is different from typical negative affect. Fatigue is more likely than negative 
affect to operate as a signal to reduce engagement in active information processing as it reflects 
an over-commitment of attentional resources to decision making processes and favours passive-
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evasion and avoidance options in decision making (Baumeister et al., 1998). Relatively few 
studies exist concerning the direct effects of fatigue on decision making. This discussion 
proceeds to outline empirical findings of the effects of fatigue on decision making, followed by 
the effects that exercising choice has on the depletion of attentional resources, thereby 
contributing to decisional fatigue. Fatigue is an inherently subjective aversion to expend effort 
(Hockey et al., 2000) and represents an end-state of extended self-regulation in which there is a 
shift towards a preference for activities that require less effort or limited use of high-level 
control actions (Hockey, 1997).  
The effects of extended self-regulation lead to attentional resource depletion and 
increased subsequent passivity (Baumeister, 2001; Schmeichel & Baumeister, 2004). 
Consequently, decisional fatigue and exhaustion can alter the desirability of making decisions 
and decrease the desirability of further increments of effort. Vohs et al. (2008) undertook four 
laboratory studies with undergraduates in which one group of individuals had to make 
decisions whereas other groups only had to contemplate the same options without making 
decisions. Findings demonstrated that making decisions led to reduced self-control as indexed 
by less physical stamina, reduced persistence, higher propensity to avoid further decisions and 
poorer numerical processing. Furthermore, it was shown that making a decision depleted 
attentional resources more so than merely deliberating and forming preferences about options. 
Deliberating without choosing also depleted attentional resources but not as much as 
deliberating and deciding.  Anticipated positive affect also reduced attentional resource 
depletion when making a single decision but this was not the case when making many 
decisions (see also Vohs et al., 2005). 
 Self-regulatory exertion was also shown to lead to decrements in a study with 
undergraduates by Muraven et al. (1998). In a series of experiments it was shown that 
individuals who tried to regulate affect (either by amplifying or suppressing it) performed 
worse on a subsequent task. Individuals who suppressed thoughts about an arbitrary stimulus 
were also more likely to give up quickly on a subsequent, frustrating task, compared to 
individuals in a control condition. Furthermore, Baumeister et al. (1998) demonstrated that 
individuals in a suppress-affect condition reported that they found regulating their affect more 
effortful when compared to a no-regulation condition.   
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There is also empirical support that such depletion leads to poorer cognitive 
performance on complex tasks (Schmeichel et al., 2003). Undergraduates were used in this 
latter study and were required to regulate their attention and affect whilst their performance on 
simple to complex cognitive tasks was measured. The results indicated that higher order 
cognitive processing was affected but that simple information processing was unaffected by the 
same manipulations in the studies. 
Also interpersonal influence, although sometimes efficient and effortless, is at times 
effortful. Limited attentional resources are easily consumed in dyadic settings that can make 
individuals particularly susceptible to others‘ influence attempts. This notion was examined by 
Janssen et al. (2008) in a series of field experiments in which adults were requested to 
participate in a short study. These authors demonstrated that the depletion of attentional 
resources explained social influence techniques aimed at inducing consumer compliance. Their 
results support the prediction that conservation of attentional resource  fosters the use of 
heuristics and concomitant compliance with requests. Across five studies with undergraduates, 
Finkel et al. (2006) subjected individuals to either a high- or a low-maintenance interaction 
before engaging in an individual-level task requiring self-regulation (i.e., a challenging task 
with high reward potential involving an anagram performance, exam performance, physical 
stamina and fine motor control). The findings uniformly supported the hypothesis that 
experiencing high-maintenance interaction impaired self-regulatory success on subsequent, 
unrelated tasks. Accommodating choices made by others is also effortful and consumes 
attentional resources.  In five studies with undergraduates who made a series of choices 
regarding consumer products, Vohs et al. (2008) demonstrated that making choices showed 
poorer task persistence and performance, as compared to individuals who viewed or rated 
similar options without making choices. Moreover, the latter findings point out that a lack of 
choice or accommodating choices made by others, consume attentional resources that 
contribute to fatigue. Consequently, contemplation of alternatives and selection among them is 
as effortful as a psychological act as accommodating oneself to external dictates. 
Hockey et al. (2000) demonstrated a correlation between fatigue and making risky 
choices in a study with undergraduate students. Fatigue enhanced the adoption of low effort 
decision processing (i.e., heuristic decision processing) because self-regulation may be less 
effective with the onset of fatigue (Hockey, 1997; Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998). These 
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results confirmed the relatively strong effect of fatigue on making risky decisions. At low or 
moderate levels of fatigue, anxious individuals showed a preference for safe options, consistent 
with the view that anxiety enhances risk avoidance (Haleblian et al., 2004; Maner et al., 2007; 
Raghunathan & Pham, 1999; Raghunathan et al., 2006). Conversely, a high level of anxiety 
facilitates increased risk taking under conditions of fatigue.  
Positive affect, however, buffers and counteracts the effects of attentional resource 
depletion. Tice et al. (2007,) in a study of undergraduate students, demonstrated that inducing 
positive affect counteracted the effects of attentional resource depletion across four studies that 
involved tasks requiring high levels of self-regulation of effort, persistence and affect. The 
finding that positive affect did not only counteract the depletion of resources of previous effort 
exertions but also enhanced the self-control on subsequent self-control tasks was noteworthy. 
This improvement was shown to be specific to positive affect and not a product of arousal, 
distraction, or other variables. In addition, positive affect resulted in significantly higher 
persistence .  
 
Summary 
 
The following can be concluded from the review of findings:  
 
 Decision-generated affect exerts a direct influence on the quality of decision processes 
since it functions as directional input to motivated actions that induce a motivational 
and volitional propensity to avoid decisions.  
 The failure to regulate attentional resources (due to affective concerns) induces the 
propensity to avoid decisions. Consequently, individuals who are plagued by self-
doubts fail to develop challenging intentions that favour decision evasion and 
avoidance.  
 The tendency to avoid decisions however, is not related to a lack of cognitive ability or 
social self-confidence.  
 Individuals with resilient self-efficacy beliefs are however better at conserving effort 
(i.e., attentional resources), a strong feature of the subjective aversion to expend effort 
in fatigue.  
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 Fatigue operates as a signal to reduce engagement in active information processing as it 
reflects an over-commitment of attentional resources to decision making processes that 
alter the desirability of making decisions and decrease the desirability of further 
increments of effort. 
 Self-efficacy beliefs are, however, not a direct mediator of decisional fatigue. Bandura 
(2004) asserted that individuals read and interpret their fatigue in order to judge their 
capabilities.  
 Individuals with resilient self-efficacy beliefs are however better at conserving effort 
(i.e., attentional resources), a strong feature of the subjective aversion to expend effort 
in fatigue (Hockey, 1997; Hockey et al., 2000).   
 Decisional fatigue is a more distal consequence of attentional resources allocation.  
 
One question posed by the present reszesrch is whether decision-generated affect and the 
allocation of attentional resources as temporal processes, mediate the quality of MDM 
processes and outcomes? 
 
Integrative Summary  
 
The central thesis in this study argues that managers apply decision making processes to 
make choices in the service of both individual and organizational goals. Existing research 
confirms that decision making is a critical aspect of managers‘ work and that the quality of 
their decision making impacts significantly on their organization‘s performance. Furthermore, 
extant research confirms that high quality decision processes lead to more desirable outcomes 
than do poor quality decision processes. In spite of its significance, research on MDM remains 
limited and the present empirical knowledge on managers as decision makers is relatively 
scarce. A review of published research in leading international journals revealed limited 
research published on decision making over four and a half decades and the researcher found 
only a few articles related to South Africa.  
Emprical findings are largely based on non-managerial samples in laboratory settings. 
Research conducted using students is questionable since findings may not generalize to 
managers in real life decision making. By its very context-specific nature, how decisions are 
actually made and how better decisions could be made in organizational settings does not lend 
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itself to simple analysis. It presents challenges that are not faced by experimental research. In 
addition, absent from most studies in decision making is the failure to elucidate what 
constellation of individual attributes are jointly necessary to influence decision making. 
Moreover, relatively little is known about the motivational and volitional processes that 
account for individual differences in managerial decision making. In spite of the popularity of 
the motivational and volitional effect of self-beliefs in efficacy there has been surprisingly few 
efforts to determine the unique or incremental validity of self- beliefs in efficacy in order to 
justify its incremental contribution in MDM. As was evident in the empirical review, few 
studies have examined the independent and joint individual-variable ability-factors (objective 
cognitive ability), non-ability factors (self-report, personality and affect), and conative factors 
(self-regulatory and motivational) in order to estimate their contributions to the prediction of 
individual differences in the quality of MDM processes. This has contributed to slow progress 
in the development of a useful, integrative understanding of MDM.  
In the absence of a coherent and adequate theoretical framework, the researcher adopted 
social-cognitive theory as a plausible framework towards understanding both MDM processes 
and affect as a function of the individual variables of the manager as the decision maker, as 
well as the behavioural expressions of choice, given an imposed operative environment in 
organizations. After reviewing the large corpus of empirical findings from research concerning 
performance and decision making, in diverse settings, with various measures, scattered across 
laboratory and field settings, and using students, employees and managers, the researcher was 
able to extract confirmatory empirical research relevant to the present study. These empirical 
generalizations afforded the researcher an opportunity to select and extract empirical links in 
order to support the plausible constellations or potential associations of individual variable 
factors, together with their time-ordered influences, and the cumulative effects they bring to 
bear on the prediction of decision-generated affect, volitional allocation of attentional resources 
and subsequent quality of decision processes and outcomes (as illustrated in Figure 2.3 on page 
66).  
Chapter Four outlines the broad problem statement, which provides a point of departure 
for the present investigation. On the basis of the problem statement, research questions for the 
present study are also presente
  
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS   
 
The primary motives for research in the behavioural sciences are to develop scientific 
theories and to solve problems that occur in everyday life. Accordingly, a major goal for any 
research is the development of theory, or explanations, for the phenomena studied. Theories, in 
turn, are of necessity built on a foundation of facts that consist of relationships that need to be  
established and which the proposed theory must incorporate and explain (Schmidt et al., 2008). 
In Chapter Two it was noted that conceptual research has outpaced confirmatory empirical 
research in MDM and, despite a strong conceptual foundation, there is insufficient empirical 
evidence to confirm how managers make decisions in organizations. In fact, various authors 
have called for more research on the degree to which  individual variables and proximal self-
regulatory skills in concert apply to decision making processes that result in decisions in the 
service of both individual and organizational goals. 
By framing the research at the individual level decision  making is conceptualized as the 
intentional and explicit commitment to devote attentional resources to a course of action in 
order to satisfy multiple goals in response to the subjective appraisals of the environment. 
Despite its theoretical and practical importance, the absence of a coherent and adequate 
theoretical framework to organize, simplify and explain how managers make decisions as 
agents for organizations has limited progress and an understanding of MDM. It was argued that 
MDM is an integrated and interactive psychological process that is regulated extensively by the 
organizational environment (i.e., task and context demands) and individual variable factors as 
multiple and reciprocal determining factors of the intentions and direction of managerial 
decision behaviour.  Chapter Two provided a conceptual framework of the theoretically 
relevant constructs and conceptual relations in MDM based on social cognitive theory. Social 
cognitive theory (with self-efficacy beliefs as a central integrating variable) was argued to be 
descriptively adequate in order to organise and simplify the theoretically relevant managerial 
decision making constructs in a coherent and parsimonious manner. Further, a social cognitive 
approach regards MDM as conditional on the independent and interactive influence of self-
efficacy beliefs in the application of individual capabilities in order to reflect how effort and 
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ability will combine and the type of affect a manager will experience in response to decision 
demands.     
The empirical review and generalizations in Chapter Three provided for a reasoned 
assertion that suggests the constellations or potential associations of variables (i.e., jointly 
incorporating individual ability and temporal motivational process variables) in a causal time-
ordered structure that account for individual differences in the quality of MDM processes and 
outcomes. These conceptual and empirical underpinnings culminated in a conceptual model of 
relations represented by the series of specific causal paths linking individual variable factors 
(distal influences) and self-efficacy beliefs (proximal influences) that bear on the construct of 
MDM.  
MDM is embedded, however, in a rich nomological network that contains numerous 
antecedent and/or consequential variables that are likely to be transmitted through additional 
links in a causal chain. Further, Bandura (2008) argues that such multiple influences do not 
imply symmetry in strength nor are these influences fixed. There is thus no question that 
decision making is complex and not easy to translate into mathematical or otherwise simplified 
models (Weber & Johnson, 2009).  
In addition, MDM does not lend itself to simple linear, antecedent-consequence analysis 
in actual organisational situations (Bandura, 1997; Critchfield & Kollins, 2001; Fischhoff, 
2008; Hodgkinson & Healey, 2008; Hough & White, 2003). Therefore, any understanding of 
how managers actually make real decisions in business contexts faces challenges not faced by 
experimental research (see, in this regard, Leaptrott & McDonald, 2008). Critchfield and 
Kollins (2001, p. 101) elaborate on this point:  
behaviors of interest may not lend themselves readily to direct observation or 
experimental manipulation, and that these behaviors, as well as the 
environmental events that affect them, occur over such extended time frames 
that discrete relations between responses and consequences become difficult to 
discern.  
 
Further, Bandura and Locke (2003) state that there is no experimental analogue nor a 
single investigatory approach to investigating the multiplicity and time-ordered effects of 
antecedents and consequences in complex behaviour. In order to overcome the multiplicity of 
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potential influences in a naturalistic setting, the present research makes use of a simulated 
decision environment to examine and observe the temporal dynamics in MDM so as to 
elucidate the relations under investigation. It is argued that such a setting provides for a degree 
of controlled enquiry in order to make it possible to reproduce the behaviours of the real world 
of MDM by controlling many potentially confounding variables while maintaining business 
decision making relevance.   
A testable assumption underlying the present study is that decisions are related to the 
quality of decision processes in MDM. By framing the study at the individual decision process 
level, the present researcher focuses on the independent and combined contributions of 
individual variable factors and self-efficacy beliefs in the prediction of decision-generated 
affect. Moreover, the volitional-undermining effect of decision-generated affect acts as a 
mediating influence on the quality of MDM processes and outcomes.  This ordering of the 
variables is chosen a priori and presented as a causal chain of influences in order to underscore 
the dynamic nature of MDM (as was illustrated in Figure 2.3).  
 
Primary Aim 
 
The researcher proposes a structural model of relations (as illustrated in Figure 2.3) in 
which distal individual variable factors and self-efficacy beliefs combine to mediate the 
availability of attentional resources (as indexed by decision-generated affect and avoidance) 
that predict the quality of MDM processes and outcomes. The single and primary aim of the 
study is  to establish the postulated ordering of a causal path linking individual variable factors 
(distal influences), self-efficacy beliefs (as proximal influences) and temporal processes as a 
whole, as a plausible model to account for individual differences in the quality of MDM 
processes and outcomes. The demonstration of causality in the present research does not lie in 
the analytical methods chosen but refers to the theoretical justification provided to support the 
analyses (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001; Ullman, 1998).  
 
Research Question 
 
The theoretical argument proposed depicts distal individual factors (cognitive ability 
and social self-confidence) and the proximal influence of self-regulation of effort and affect 
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(via self-efficacy beliefs) as causal sources of influence in the prediction of the quality of 
MDM processes and outcomes. In accordance with the proposed model of relations in MDM, 
the research problem is subsequently posed as ―What are the direct and indirect (mediated) 
effects of the independent and combined contributions of individual variable factors and self-
efficacy beliefs as predictors of the quality of MDM processes and outcomes?‖  
 
Specific Aims  
 
On the basis of the problem statement, it is possible to develop specific aims to guide the 
study. These specific aims are presented below:   
 The first aim is to evaluate to what extent the proposed model offers an empirical fit 
that specifies how individual variable factors in conjunction with self-efficacy beliefs 
govern decision-generated affect and the propensity to avoid decisions in the prediction 
of the quality of MDM processes and outcomes.  
 The second aim is to determine whether cognitive ability, self-efficacy beliefs and 
social self-confidence independently account for the prediction of decision-generated 
affect in MDM.   
 The third aim is to determine whether decision-generated affect influences the 
allocation of  attentional resources in MDM.   
 The fourth aim is to determine whether the allocation of attentional resources accounts 
for the prediction of the quality of MDM processes and outcomes. 
 
The research hypotheses and statistical hypotheses are presented in Chapter Six 
when the statistical analysis methods employed are outlined. Considerations for inclusion of 
variables in a multivariate analysis include availability, reliability and theoretical 
relationships among variables. The depicted constructs in Figure 2.3 on page 66 were 
deliberately created to represent a collection of concrete forms of behaviour which qualify 
as indicators of unobserved variables (i.e., the underlying construct). Any assessment of the 
substantive relations of interest (i.e., the associations among the variables themselves) 
requires an investigation of the psychometric integrity of the measures that are used to 
operationalise the variables comprising the proposed model.  In keeping with the literature 
and empirical research, Chapter Five is dedicated to the operationalization and 
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psychometric evaluation of measures pertaining to the study. The conceptualization and 
operationalization of each of the variables as illustrated in Figure 2.3 are presented.  As part 
of the study it was necessary to construct and validate custom indicator measures in an 
independent pilot study from the same population. The evolving nature of sample data 
collection provided an opportunity for non-probability, purposive sampling. The pilot study 
determined the factor structures of the dimensionality and internal consistency of the 
measures in order to aid in the development and validation of the custom-designed 
measures. The external construct validity by way of both convergent, as well as, 
discriminative validity of the custom-designed scales are also presented. Finally, univariate 
normality of the measures are outlined and presented. 
  
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
OPERATIONALIZATION OF CONSTRUCTS   
 
The conceptual and empirical evidence of earlier chapters afforded the researcher an 
opportunity to formulate plausible specific paths linking individual variable factors (distal 
influences), self-efficacy beliefs (proximal influences) and temporal processes that have a 
bearing on the construct of MDM.   All the variables in the path diagram (as illustrated in 
Figure 2.3) can be placed into one of two classes, that is exogenous and endogenous variables. 
Exogenous variables, sometimes referred to as source variables or independent variables, are 
those that are the starting point for the proposed model because they are assumed not to be the 
effects of other variables in the model except for (potentially) other exogenous variables. Byrne 
(2001) describes exogenous variables as being synonymous with independent variables, that is  
they ‗cause‘ fluctuations in the values of other variables in the model. In contrast, endogenous 
variables are synonymous with dependent variables and, as such, are influenced by the 
exogenous variables in the model, either directly or indirectly. 
The exogenous and endogenous variables that are relevant to the present study are 
specified in Table 5.1. 
 
The researcher operationally defined the exogenous and endogenous variables in terms 
of theoretically measured behaviour in order to serve as operational indicators that represent an 
empirical grasp of the variables. The depicted constructs are deliberately created to represent a 
collection of concrete forms of behaviour which qualify as indicators of the construct. This 
assessment of the behaviour constitutes the direct measurement of the relevant variable, albeit 
the indirect measurement of an unobserved variable in question (i.e., the underlying construct). 
Since the use of any measuring instrument implies a degree of trust in its psychometric 
properties it is important to evaluate the extent to which these measured indicators succeed in 
 
Table 5.1 Exogenous and Endogenous Variables  
Exogenous variables Endogenous variables 
Cognitive ability  
Social self-confidence 
 
 
Self-efficacy beliefs  
Decision-generated affect  
Allocation of attentional resources  
MDM processes and outcomes  
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providing a comprehensive empirical understanding of the constructs under consideration.  
Clearly, unless the quality of the measures can be trusted, any assessment of the substantive 
relations of interest (i.e., the associations among the variables themselves) will be problematic. 
Table 5.2 lists the variables and their respective measured indicators and measurement scales.   
*Custom designed  
 
The following subsections describe the conceptualization, operationalization and 
psychometric evaluation of each of the measures as listed in Table 5.2. Some of the measures 
of the endogenous variables were custom designed and this has been indicated in the Table by 
an asterisk. Preliminary studies were conducted in order to evaluate the psychometric 
properties of the indicators used as measures. The  exploratory factor (EFA) and internal 
reliability (Cronbach α) analyses computed for custom-designed measures however ran a risk 
 
Table 5.2 Variables, Indicators and Measures 
Exogenous variables  Indicators   
 
Measures 
Cognitive ability   Verbal ability   
Numerical ability  
Critical Verbal and Numerical Reasoning Test 
(CRTB2)  
Social self-confidence   Assertion  
Social boldness  
 
15 Personality Factor E (15FQ+)  
15 Personality Factor H (15FQ+)  
Endogenous variables  
 
Indicators  
 
Measures 
Self-beliefs in efficacy   Social influence efficacy *  
Exploratory search and 
processing efficacy *  
Thought and affect control 
efficacy *  
Risk tolerance efficacy *  
Analytical and inferential 
efficacy * 
 
Decision Making Self-Efficacy Questionnaire 
(DMSEQ) 
 
Decision-generated affect   Immediate affect * 
Anticipated affect * 
 
Custom-designed self-descriptive scale 
Allocation of attentional resources  Fatigue  
Decisional procrastination  
 
Profile of Mood States (Fatigue subscale) 
The Decisional Procrastination (DP) Scale 
Quality of MDM processes (and 
outcomes   
 
Procedural rationality  
Decision quality * 
Rational social influence * 
Bargaining * 
Independence * 
 
Critical Business Planning (CBP)  
Role play simulation observation scale  
Role play simulation observation scale 
Role play simulation observation scale 
Role play simulation observation scale 
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in that the solutions might be optimal for the specific samples on which they were obtained but 
not for the sample used in the study and they might not be generalizable for the population.  
The sample used to gather psychometric information on the measures is also limited to 
experienced managers in South Africa in industry-specific companies in the Western Cape. As 
such, findings may not necessarily be generalizable to other geographical areas, economic 
sectors or cultural groupings.   
In the case of the available standardized measures (i.e., verbal and numerical ability, 
assertion, social boldness and procedural rationality), the researcher reports on both their 
psychometric properties as well as statistically significant differences between ethnic groups.   
The discussion that follows describes each of the variables and the evaluation of their 
indicators. The operationalization of the exogenous variables and their indicators are discussed 
first, followed by a description of the operationalization of the endogenous variables.  
 
Exogenous Variables  
 
Cognitive Ability  
 
Cognitive ability is a significant determinant of individual differences in performing 
tasks that involve the active manipulation of information. Both verbal and numerical ability are 
required for decision tasks such as analyzing/interpreting and understanding relevant 
information, creating/conceptualizing and integrating information, and reasoning about the 
information (Parker & Fischhoff, 2005; Peters & Levin, 2008; Peters et al., 2006; Schmidt & 
Hunter, 2004; Schmidt et al., 2008; Stanovich & West, 1998a, 1998b; Yeo & Neal, 2008).   
 
Operationalization 
 
The measurement of individual managers‘ ability to think in a rational, critical way and 
to make logical inferences is measured with a standardized psychometric measure, the Critical 
Verbal and Numerical Reasoning Test Battery (CRTB2; Psychometrics Limited, 2002a). The 
verbal reasoning measure assesses the ability to understand semi-technical reports requiring 
quick, accurate and reliable interpretation of written reports, and to draw logical conclusions 
and inferences from such written information. The numerical reasoning measure assesses the 
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ability to understand and critically evaluate a wide range of numerical information presented in 
tabular form, and to use this information accurately and in a logical way.    
The publisher compared the CRTB2 measure to The Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking 
Appraisal (W-GCTA) and reported a convergent validity of r = .57 in their manual (CRTB2; 
Psychometrics Limited, 2002a). The W-GCTA (Watson & Glaser, 1980) has set the standard in 
the assessment of abilities that are relevant in MDM and the use of the CRTB2 can be regarded 
as an acceptable alternative. The test publisher also reports that the CRTB2 verbal and 
numerical reasoning has a predictive validity of  .47 and .43 respectively with business 
decision-making in MBA graduate performance.  Both measures, critical verbal and critical 
numerical reasoning, have been standardized for South African conditions and display 
respectable K-R 21 reliabilities of .84 and .80 respectively.  The test publisher also reports a 
Cronbach  of .88 for critical verbal and .84 for critical numerical reasoning in a multi-cultural 
sample with a minimum grade 12 level education. The mean  was .86.  In addition, the 
publisher reports a relationship between the two measures ( r = .52, p = .01). The researcher 
could confirm this relationship (N = 264, r = .59, p = .001) in the present study suggesting that, 
while the two constructs are related, they share only 35% of common variance.   
The researcher has investigated the results of the CRTB on a separate sample of 154, of 
which 39% were black managers. The mean verbal score for black managers was 19.37 (SD = 
7.2); the mean score for the remaining sample was 20.7 (SD = 7.3). A one-way ANOVA 
revealed no significant difference between black and other managers [F(1,152) = 1.229, p < 
.269].  The mean numerical score for black managers was 12.0 (SD = 4.8),  the mean score for 
the remaining managers was 12.6 (SD = 4.4). A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant 
difference between black and other managers [F(1,153) = .516, p < .474] in this sample. The 
actual difference in mean scores between managerial groups was small. The effect size, 
calculated using eta squared, was .008 and .003 for verbal and numerical abilities, respectively. 
An eta square value of .02 is considered a small effect size (Cohen, 1988). This was 
encouraging given previous research that shows that cognitive ability measures are not always 
equivalent across diverse language groups and there are indications that some bias may exist 
for English second language test-takers, especially if they are black (e.g., Foxcroft & Aston, 
2006). 
139 
 
These psychometric properties were encouraging given the fact that cognitive ability 
tests have been shown to result in the largest demonstrated mean differences between African-
Americans and whites. A difference between means of 1 standard deviation has been reported 
in a number of studies where white individuals have been shown to score significantly higher 
mean cognitive ability test scores than black individuals (e.g., Gottfredson, 2002; Hunter & 
Hunter, 1984; Roth, BeVier, Bobko, Switzer, & Tyler, 2001). 
 
Social Self-Confidence 
          
It was pointed out earlier that social self-confidence is a broad construct that includes 
the basic capacity to interact socially at work.  The present researcher used social self-
confidence as a socio-political expression of personality in a socially adaptive fashion (Mayer, 
2005) in order to  reflect the level of surgency (the degree of impact and forcefulness) and the 
availability of attentional resources (energy) that is manifested in resourcefulness, decisiveness, 
dominance, independence, social presence and energy to act decisively and influence others. 
Further, social self-confidence reflects a domain-independent and stable individual disposition 
to meet challenging task demands and thus reflects generalized self-efficacy beliefs.    
 
Operationalization   
 
Ferris et al. (2002) have observed that a critical direction for future research is to 
investigate and establish the construct validity and precise delineation of the construct domain 
space of social effectiveness as a construct. Schneider, Kanfer, and Ackerman (1996) 
developed a measure that included seven factors (i.e., Extraversion, Warmth, Social Influence, 
Social Insight, Social Openness, Social Appropriateness, and Social Maladjustment). 
Schneider, Roberts, and Heggestad (2002) explored the structure of social competence, using 
the above self-report social competence inventory and confirmed five factors (i.e., social 
mastery, social maturity, social responsiveness, social control and social intelligence). Hogan 
and Hogan (2002) suggested that individuals who are socially astute, insightful, inspire trust 
and liking from others are sociopolitically intelligent which they argued was the foundation of 
social skill.  
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Given the absence of an existing social self-confidence measure the present researcher 
used Hogan and Shelton‘s (1998) conceptualization of sociability/affiliation (i.e., high scorers 
are gregarious, outgoing, approachable, participative, talkative, and ambitious/potency (i.e., 
energetic, forceful, and competitive)  as central traits of social self-confidence. To 
operationalize social self-confidence the researcher chose the 15FQ+ (Psychometrics Limited, 
2002b), a self-report personality inventory that provides for a comprehensive assessment of 
personality traits and which has been standardized for South African conditions. The measure 
displays respectable psychometric properties with a mean Cronbach α of .75. The following 
factors were used in the present research: 
Factor E+: Assertion. A low score taps the trait of accommodating, submissive, 
deferential (i.e., polite), and avoiding confrontation. A high score (dominant) is 
associated with an independent-minded, direct and determined interpersonal style. 
Factor E is also associated with a lack of social confidence. The Cronbach α is  .75 (n = 
226) for South African managers. 
Factor H+: Social Boldness. This taps the traits of social boldness, venturesome, 
talkative, and socially confident. A high score is associated with a tendency to 
participate in social and group activities in a lively, enthusiastic manner. High scorers 
also feel self-assured and confident in social settings and actively seek out roles that 
place them ‗in the limelight‘. The Cronbach α is .82 (n = 226 for South African 
managers). 
 
The 15FQ+ has been used on a variety of samples (Tyler 2003) and demonstrates 
construct equivalence across all language groups in South Africa (Meiring, Van de Vijver, 
Rothmann & Barrick, 2005).  Moreover, studies show reasonable to strong reliability 
coefficient values of 0,60 to 0,85 for the 15FQ+ scales (Tredoux, 2004; Tyler, 2003). Meiring, 
Van de Vijver and Rothmann (2006) report reliability findings for the 15FQ+ with a mean of 
0,75 for South African professional and management development candidates. Moyo (2009) 
used a sample of 241 black managers assessed between 2002 and 2006 in order to study the 
item- and dimensionality analyses of the 15FQ+ subscales to determine whether these subscales 
represent the underlying personality constructs. The outcome of both the item and 
dimensionality analyses demonstrated that, although the items in each of the subscales seemed 
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to be representing the underlying personality construct, they were not without problems. Factor 
E and H showed little support for the assumption that all items comprising the constructs reflect 
one indivisible underlying construct. Moyo‘s study illustrated that Factor H meets the 
benchmark reliability standard of .76, whereas the reliability coefficient for Factor E was .60. 
The cutoff value of .70 for evaluating the internal reliability of measures used in an applied 
setting should be kept in mind (Nunnally, 1978), especially as the reliability of personality 
measures are generally lower than those typically found in cognitive ability measures (Smit, 
1996). 
The present researcher investigated a separate sample of 607 managers of which 198 
(33%) were black managers. The assertion factor (Factor E) for black managers revealed a 
mean of 17.1 and a standard deviation of 4.5 and the remaining managers displayed a mean of 
16.8, with a standard deviation of 4.2. A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant difference 
between black and other managers [F(1,605) = .444 , p < .505]. The social boldness factor 
(Factor H) revealed a mean of 15.8 for black managers and a standard deviation of 6.0 and for 
other managers a mean of 13.6, with a standard deviation of 6.2. A one-way ANOVA revealed 
a significant difference between black and other managers [F(1,605) = 17.761 , p < .000]. The 
actual difference in mean scores between the groups was, however, quite small. The effect size, 
calculated using eta squared, was .007 and .03 for Factor E: assertion and Factor H: social 
boldness, respectively, both of which can be considered as small effect sizes (Cohen, 1988).  
The next subsection presents the design, development and operationalization of the 
endogenous variables and their indicators.  
 
Endogenous Variables 
 
The design, construction and evaluation of indicator measures for self-efficacy beliefs, 
decision-generated affect, the allocation of attentional resources and the quality of MDM 
processes and outcomes are discussed below. 
 
Self-Efficacy Beliefs 
  
It was important to differentiate between problem solving and decision making for the 
purposes of this research. The former involves an overall estimate of one‘s ability to assess a 
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present and desired state of affairs and of finding ways to move from the former to the latter 
state  (Heppner & Lee, 2002; Heppner, Pretorius, Wei, Lee, & Wang, 2002; Heppner & Wang, 
2003; Maydeu-Olivares & D'Zurilla, 1997). These beliefs are not tied to specific situations or 
behaviour but generalize to a variety of situations (Heppner, Witty, & Dixon, 2004).  Decision 
making, conversely, is a sequence of interrelated decision processes in the service of choices of 
action to meet multiple goals. One distinction between decision making (i.e., making choices) 
and problem solving is that problems of choice are generally ill-defined (Hambrick et al., 
2005b), are affected by a host of contextual factors (Beach & Connolly, 2005; Elbanna, 2006; 
Hough & White, 2003; Krantz & Kunreuther, 2007; Lerner & Tetlock, 2003; Padadakis, 2006; 
Sutcliffe & McNamara, 2001). They also give rise to affective self-reactions in relation to 
conflict between highly valued goals that consume finite attentional resources (Beal et al., 
2005; Luce, 2005; Luce et al., 2001; Payne & Bettman, 2007). Self-efficacy beliefs in decision 
making, accordingly, refer to domain-specific beliefs of an individual‘s appraisal of capability 
to use decision processes in order to make decisions so as to accomplish multiple goals.  
From this line of reasoning decisional self-efficacy beliefs are conceptualized as a 
specific and situational view of perceived decision making competence at specific levels of 
performance in order to:  mobilize motivation (effort and perseverance), exert rational and 
attentional resources (analytic and problem solving skills), exercise independence in social 
influence (to gain compliance, enlist cooperation and acquire resources), control disruptive and 
aversive cognitions, and implement courses of action in order to make accurate decisions.  No 
such measure currently exists in the literature. The present researcher considered related 
measures of self-efficacy beliefs in decision making.  The Career Decision-Making Self-
Efficacy Scale (Taylor & Betz, 1983) was considered but in spite of the respectable internal 
reliability the measure is more appropriate as a measure of career decision-making self-efficacy 
beliefs.  In addition, Watson, Brand, Stead and Ellis (2001) demonstrated that the subscales are 
questionable for the South African context. The South African Entrepreneurial Self-Efficacy 
Scale developed by Urban (2006) was also reviewed as a possible measure but it contained 
subscales that are not totally relevant to MDM. Although these measures reflect a reasonable 
commonality with decision making they aim to measure different kinds of decisions in contexts 
that are very different to those faced by managers as agents of decision making in 
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organizations. Consequently, decisional self-efficacy beliefs was operationalized in a 
questionnaire, the Decision Making Self-Efficacy Questionnaire (DMSEQ). 
 
Operationalization 
 
The validity of a test is closely linked to the validity of the theory (Foxcroft, 2004). The 
construction of the items for decisional self-efficacy beliefs relied on an informative conceptual 
analysis of the factors governing MDM. The present researcher avoided broad decontextualized 
self-efficacy belief items that focus on responses that individuals make to broad environmental 
demands since the interest of the present study was focused on managers‘ context- and 
decision-specific performance. 
MDM was conceptualized as: (1) an initiating activity (appraising the challenge, 
framing or structuring the problem, selecting situations requiring decisions); (2) a design phase 
(searching for potential solutions, surveying alternatives, seeking and weighing alternatives); 
and (3) making a choice (deliberating about and accepting one alternative from the available 
alternatives, influencing others, adhering to the decision despite negative feedback and 
opposition). Relying on this informative conceptual analysis of the aspects governing MDM, 
enabled the present researcher to define decision making self-efficacy beliefs as specific 
competence beliefs in which cognitive, social, emotional and behavioural sub-skills have to be 
organised effectively into proficient decision making actions. As such, these self-efficacy 
beliefs act as an active contributor to the allocation of effort to the identification and use of 
information, social persuasion and readiness to make decisions.   
The DMSEQ was designed using the suggested guidelines for response format and 
construction of self-efficacy beliefs scales (Bandura, 1997, 2005; Moritz et al., 2000; Pajares, 
2002). The standard methodology for measuring self-efficacy beliefs was employed where 
individuals were presented with items that portrayed different levels of decisional task demands 
and they were required to rate the strength of their belief in their ability to execute the requisite 
decision making activities regularly. Individuals recorded the strength of their self-efficacy 
beliefs on a 100-point scale, ranging in 10-unit intervals from 0 (‗cannot do‘) through 
intermediate degrees of assurance, 50 (‗moderately certain can do‘), to complete assurance, 100 
(‗certain can do‘). Sufficient graduations of difficulty were built into the self-efficacy belief 
items to avoid ceiling effects. The non-reactivity of self-efficacy belief assessments is not a 
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great concern and this is corroborated by Bandura (1997).  Findings have demonstrated that 
individuals‘ levels of motivation, affective reactions, and performance attainments are the same 
regardless of whether they do or do not make prior efficacy judgments. Nor are efficacy 
judgments influenced by a responding bias to appear socially desirable, regardless of the 
domain of activity.  
With regards to administration, the standard procedure for measuring self-efficacy 
beliefs was employed. The administration used a number of safeguards to minimize any 
potential motivational effects of the self-assessment. These safeguards were built into the 
instructions and the mode of administration. A nondescript title ‗Business Problem Solving and 
Decision Making Appraisal‘ rather than ‗Self-efficacy beliefs‘ was used. To encourage frank 
answers, the importance of participants‘ contribution to the research was explained clearly.   
 
Sample 
 
The questionnaire was administered to 146 managers as part of an extensive assessment 
process. Participants had at least five years experience in management and were employed in 
middle to senior management positions across a number of organizations in the private sector. 
The mean age was 38.5 years (SD = 7.8), of the sample 79% had a graduate or postgraduate 
qualification. Both genders were represented (males accounted for 67% of the sample) and the 
majority of the sample were white.     
 
Item Reduction 
 
 Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was used to verify the homogeneity of the original 
30-item scale. The EFA was performed using the principal axis method and oblique, direct 
oblimin factor rotation to determine the factor structures of the dimensionality of the custom 
designed indicator measures (using SPSS for Windows Version 17.0). Oblique factor rotation is 
generally more desirable than orthogonal rotation at an early stage of scale development 
because of the fewer constraints it imposes (see, for instance, Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & 
Black, 1998) and is thus most appropriate when the a priori theory indicates that the obtained 
factors or dimensions are likely to be correlated.  The items with the highest loadings on each 
measure were selected as construct indicators in order to assist in identifying understandable 
and interpretable factor structures associated with each of the endogenous variables under 
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consideration.  Kaiser‘s criterion of eigen-values over one and an item-factor structure 
coefficient of .60 or above were used as the ‗cutoff points‘ for extracting and identifying 
factors. A Cronbach alpha of .70 was used as the generally agreed lower limit in order to 
evaluate the internal consistency of scales (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998; Tredoux & 
Durrheim, 2002; Pallant, 2001).  
The items tapping the same domain of self-efficacy beliefs grouped into five factors that 
suggested the multi-dimensionality of the DMSEQ. The items, together with their loadings on 
their primary factors, are reported in Table 5.3. 
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Table 5. 3 DMSEQ: Standard regression coefficients obtained via EFA (Oblimin Rotation with Kaiser Normalization)  
DMSEQ Items Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5 
Feel that I am making the right decisions .820 
    
Influence decisions with certainty that they will work .793 
    
Remain confident to make sound judgments and the right choices .769 
    
Convince others of my decision choice even when opposition mounts .741 
    
Trust my own judgment and express my opinions firmly .740 
    
Persevere in my persuasive attempts to convince others of my decision choice  .719 
    
Know what to do next in decision making .712 
    
Make difficult decisions under time pressure .681 
    
Make decisions and persevere with actions to make them pay off .652 .645 
   
Influence decisions regardless of the amount of control I have over organizational constraints  .647 .605 
   
Search for new information and alternatives  .869 
   
Narrow down a list of alternatives that appear as effective options     .792 
   
Discover a range of alternative/several solutions  .777 
   
Obtain information by seeing what needs to be known  .762 
   
Weigh negative and positive consequences of each alternative option  .754 
   
Secure resources to implement my decisions .650 .746 
   
Appraise a business decision problem situation quickly  .734 
   
Choose the best alternative given the situation  .663 
   
Limit negative thoughts entering my mind    .801 
  
Contain my self-doubts about my ability to deal with adverse consequences   .766 
  
Refrain from worry about my decision choices and consequences   .727 
  
Readily commit to my decisions .602 
 
.644 
  
Think clearly and keep all the relevant factors in mind   .643 
  
Refrain from putting off difficult decisions     .853 
 
Make decisions that contain risks and potentially unfavourable consequences    .802 
 
Analyze and interpret numerical/quantitative data accurately     .905 
Manipulate quantitative data to identify trends, problems and their causes     .756 
Use a methodical thinking process in my decisions     .702 
Refrain from changing my mind to the least objectionable alternative*      
Percentage of variance 46.4 6.5 5.0 3.5 3.5 
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Inspection of the correlation matrix revealed many coefficients above .3. The Kaiser-
Meyer-Oklin value was  .93, which exceeds the recommended value of .60 (Hair,  Black,  
Babin,  Anderson,  & Tatham, 2006; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001) and the Barlett‘s Test of 
Sphericity reached statistical significance, supporting the factorability of the correlation matrix.  
EFA analyses of the DMSEQ scale yielded five factors with eigen values greater than 1. Four 
items loaded on more than one factor and it was decided to retain these items under the factor 
with the larger loading.  Two items (marked by an *) were rejected and 28 of the original 30 
items were retained. Following this, the first factor accounted for 47.1% (46.4% in the original 
scale) of the variance and was labeled Social Influence Efficacy in decision making. This factor 
confirmed Bandura‘s (1997, 1999, 2008) argument that effective decision making in 
organizations requires high levels of managerial efficacy in social persuasion. This factor 
included 9 items.  
The second factor accounted for 6.9% of variance (6.5% in the original scale). It was 
labeled Exploratory Search and Processing Efficacy (see, for example, Wood, Atkins, & 
Tabernero, 2000) and contained 8 items. Factor 3 included 5 items and was labeled Thought 
and Affect Control Efficacy (Bandura, 1997, 1999; 2004). It accounted for 5.1% of the variance 
(5% in the original scale).  
Factor 4 (Risk Tolerance Efficacy) contained 2 items and accounted for 3.8% (3.5% in 
the original scale) of the variance. Various authors have confirmed that perceived decisional 
efficacy affects risk taking through its impact on perceptions of opportunities and threats (see, 
for example, Bandura, 1997; Barbosa, Gerhardt, & Kickul, 2007; Goodie & Young, 2007;  Le 
Roux et al., 2006; Simon et al., 1999; Vecchio, 2002). Factor 5 was labelled as Analytical and 
Inferential Efficacy (4 items) and it accounted for 3.7% of the variance (3.5% in the original 
scale). This supported the argument that MDM requires a strong sense of efficacy in effortful 
analytical thinking (Bandura & Jourden, 1991; Bandura & Wood, 1989; Cervone & Wood, 
1995; Wood et al.,  2000; Wood et al., 1990).  
 
Internal Reliability  
 
The alpha coefficients for each subscale were computed as illustrated in Table 5.4.   
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Table 5.4 DMSEQ: Internal Consistency Coefficients: Full-Scale and Sub-Scales 
Factors: Subscale      Items Cronbach  
1. Social influence efficacy         10 .92 
2. Exploratory search and processing efficacy           8 .91 
3. Thought and affect control efficacy           5 .82 
4. Risk tolerance efficacy            2 .60 
5. Analytical and inferential efficacy           3 .80 
6. Full Scale         28            .95 
 
Nunnally (1978, p. 246), however, cautions against the use of Cronbach alpha in scales 
across different domains:    
the result would be quite erroneous unless the x variables were all measures of the 
same trait, e.g., alternative forms of a test of spelling ability. The reliability of 
samples of items from the same (author‘s emphasis) domain depends entirely on 
the average correlation among the samples, but this does not hold for samples of 
items from different (author‘s emphasis) domains. 
Using Nunnally‘s suggestion, the reliability of the linear combination of the subscales 
was subsequently calculated as:  
 
 where;    and rtti =  of each subscale 
S²i = variance of each subscale and S²t = variance of combination of subscales  
Based on this analysis the 28 item full scale DMSEQ‘s internal reliability was ( [rtt]) = 
.92). The internal reliability of the full scale was encouraging and comparable to another South 
African domain-specific self-efficacy beliefs scale (the Entrepreneurial Self-Efficacy Scale 
Urban, 2006) whose Cronbach    of  .89. 
Urban (2006) also demonstrated that the South African designed Entrepreneurial Self-
Efficacy Scale (ESE) showed comparatively little difference in scores between Indian, Black 
and Caucasian groups. In one subscale, ESE innovation (i.e., engage in new ventures, new 
ideas, new markets/products/technologies), Indian South Africans differed significantly from 
Black South Africans. The DMSEQ full and subscale differences between black and other 
managers based on a pilot sample of 146 of which 26 (21%) were black managers was also 
investigated. A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant difference between black and other 
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managers on all subscales as illustrated in Table 5.5. In addition, the effect size, calculated 
using eta squared, ranged from .002 to .01.  
 
 
These findings were encouraging and provided a degree of trust in the psychometric 
properties of the scale to measure self-efficacy beliefs for the purposes of this study. As the five 
operational indicators displayed respectable psychometric properties in providing a 
comprehensive empirical understanding of self-efficacy beliefs they were retained as 
indicators.  The internal consistency of the DMSEQ subscales was also encouraging. For 
example, Bandura's Multidimensional Scales of Perceived Self-Efficacy ranged from = .70 to 
.87 (Miller, Coombs, & Fuqua, 1999). In addition, one of the most widely used efficacy 
measures is Sherer et al‘s. (1982) General Self-Efficacy Scale (GSE) (Sherer & Maddux, 
1982), originally developed for clinical and personality research. It has also been used in 
organizational settings. Evidence with regard to the reliability of the GSE scale in 
 = .76 to .89) (Gardner & Pierce, 1998; Imam, 
2007; Schaubroeck & Merritt, 1997). Chen et al. (2001) also developed a new GSE scale 
(NGSE) that demonstrated ‘s of between .86 to .90.  
 
Construct Validity 
 
Campbell and Fiske (1959) argued that for the establishment of construct validity, 
convergent as well as discriminant  validation is required. After ensuring that the full scale and 
subscales of the DMSEQ conformed to their conceptual definitions, the external construct 
validity of the full scale DMSEQ was investigated by way of both convergent as well as 
discriminative validity. High discriminant validity is however highly unlikely, particularily in 
psychology (Byrne, 2006). Convergent validity with the revised Problem Solving Self-Efficacy 
Inventory (PSI-PSSE: Mayden-Olivares & D‘Zurilla, 1997) was used to investigate evidence of 
Table 5.5 ANOVA. DMSEQ: Anova: Full- and Subscales 
Factors: Subscale   
1. Social influence efficacy  [F(1,144) =   .001,    p <  .969]  
2. Exploratory search and processing efficacy  [F(1,144)  =   .367,    p < .546]  
3. Thought and affect control efficacy  [F(1,144)  =   .411,    p < .522]  
4. Risk tolerance efficacy   [F(1,144)  = 2.397,    p < .124]  
5. Analytical and inferential efficacy  [F(1,144)  = 2.366,    p < .126]  
6. Full Scale  [F(1,144)  =   .121,    p < .729]  
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construct validity.  This 35 item (inclusive of three filler items) 6-point Likert scale inventory 
does not assess problem-solving skills but rather the perception of problem-solving beliefs and 
style. It was argued that low correlates could be construed as partial support for the construct 
validity of the DMSEQ.   
The discriminant validity of the DMSEQ was also investigated by comparing it to the 
personality trait of confidence. As discussed earlier, self-efficacy beliefs as a context-specific 
judgment of capability are much more variable than the enduring notions of personality. Self-
confidence, measured at a more general level of specificity, includes the evaluation of 
competence and the feelings of self-worth associated with decision making behaviour (Ferrari, 
2001; Ferrari & Dovidio, 2001; Haleblian et al., 2004; Lucas et al., 2006; Mirels et al., 2002; 
Parker & Fischhoff, 2005). The 15FQ+ (Psychometrics Limited, 2002b) provides for a 
comprehensive assessment of trait-based personality factors and the researcher compared 
Factor O (i.e., apprehensive, insecure, self-doubting [Cronbach  = .81, n = 226, South African 
managers]) with the full scale DMSEQ.   
The DMSEQ was tested by calculating a 3 x 3 matrix of zero-order Pearson correlation 
coefficients. A directional hypothesis (one-tailed) with a 5% significance level was used as 
support for a low positive relationship with the PSI and a negative relationship with Factor O. 
The sample of 146 has been described earlier. The results are presented in Table 5.6. 
 
Although both the PSI-PSSE and DMSEQ tap into beliefs about individual self-efficacy 
beliefs, the constructs differ in their scope. The PSI Problem-Solving Self-Efficacy subscale 
was designed to operationalize beliefs in problem-solving skills, effectiveness or competence 
Table 5.6 DMSEQ: Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations 
Variable n Mean SD 1 2 3 
1. DMSEQ  146 2162.24 290.71    
2.PSI-PSSE (Problem Solving Self- 
Efficacy) 
 
143* 37.10 6.52 .323**   
3. PSI-PSS (Problems Solving 
Skills) 
 
143* 44.95 6.08 .498** .335**  
4. Factor O: Apprehensive, 
insecure, self-doubting 
146 10.88 5.83 -.364** -.255** -.275** 
**p < .01, one-tailed; * denotes missing data 
 
151 
 
and, consequently, represents a rather restricted view of self-efficacy beliefs in decision 
making. The DMSEQ, in contrast, taps into multiplicative constellations of activities in relation 
to MDM processes that shape decision behaviour.  Arguably, it was expected that the PSI 
would be somewhat distinct from the DMSEQ.  In support of discriminant validity, the PSSE 
subscale of the PSI shared only 11% and the PSI-PSS only 23% of the common variance with 
the DMSEQ.  It is worth noting that, although PSI-PSSE and DMSEQ may share similar 
antecedents (e.g., actual experience, vicarious experience, verbal persuasion, psychological 
states [Bandura, 1997]), DMSEQ may be less resistant to ephemeral influences than the PSI 
when individuals face ill-defined contexts and consequential choices in organizational settings.   
Bandura (2005) argues that measures in self-efficacy beliefs are best achieved by 
focusing on a specific context and activity domain. In this regard, Moritz et al. (2002, p. 282) 
note that the most important moderator in measurement is that ―the structure of the relationship 
between efficacy beliefs and action requires that both tap similar capabilities‖. Moreover, the 
more task-specific or context-specific one can make the measurement of self-efficacy beliefs, 
the better the predictive (and possibly explanatory) role of self-efficacy beliefs is likely to play 
in task-specific outcomes of interest (Bandura, 1997; Pajares, Hartley, & Valiante, (2001). 
Confidence is a relatively stable individual characteristic and basically reflects a 
generalized self-efficacy belief (Chen et al., 2000). Confidence is, however, distinct from the 
malleable, context-specific self-efficacy beliefs (Bandura 1997). Given the highly conditional 
nature of self-efficacy beliefs it was unrealistic to expect that confidence as a trait, cast in non-
conditional generalities, would display convergence with DMSEQ.  The findings demonstrated 
that DMSEQ was empirically distinct and shared little common variance with confidence as a 
trait (i.e., only 8%). This provided empirical evidence to suggest that self-efficacy beliefs are 
indeed different from confidence as a static trait disposition.  
In conclusion, the DMSEQ displayed an acceptable factorial composition and 
homogeneity among its items that provided the necessary confidence to use it in the present 
study. In addition, the DMSEQ displayed respectable internal consistency for its subscales and 
the discriminant validity evidence confirmed DMSEQ as an acceptable operational indicator 
for self-efficacy beliefs.  The next subsection describes decision-generated affect as a 
multidimensional variable.  
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Decision-Generated Affect 
 
As reactions to appraisal-generated representations of situations with respect to positive 
or negative implications for goals, decision-generated affect was conceptualized as a 
multidimensional construct where immediate affect was represented as thought and emotional 
interference that disrupts on-task attentional resources allocation that compete with available 
attentional resources (Beal et al., 2005; Carver, 2004; DeShon et al., 1996; Kanfer & 
Ackerman, 1996; Sarason et al., 1996; Weiss et al., 2005).  Conversely, anticipated affect was 
conceptualized as self-evaluative and social comparative concerns about personal competence, 
vulnerability and the consequences of one‘s decisional prowess (Bandura, 1991; Bandura & 
Jourden, 1991; Brown et al., 2007; Buunk, Ybema, Gibbons, & Ipenburg, 2001; Larrick et al., 
2007; Moore, 2007).   
 
Operationalization: Scale development 
 
Decision-generated affect was defined as the subjective emotions, moods, and 
evaluations that are elicited by the perception that there is a meaningful decision to be made in 
order to resolve multiple, viable, competing options that require individuals to prioritize some 
goal(s) over another (others). Unlike affective dispositions (i.e., neuroticism, emotionality), 
which are enduring traits over time, affective states are not well conceptualized as between-
individuals constructs and are not characteristic of individuals since they are inherently 
transient experiential states or outcomes that vary meaningfully within individuals over time 
(see for example, George, 1996; Kaplan, Bradley, Luchman, & Haynes, 2009).   
Watson, Clark, and Tellegen (1988) developed the Positive (PA) and Negative Affect 
(NA) Schedule (PANAS) as a reliable (alpha reliabilities of the PANAS PA and NA scales 
were .86 and .87) and valid measure of these two important affective states. High PA reflects 
the extent to which an individual feels enthusiastic, active, and alert in a state of high energy, 
full concentration, and pleasurable engagement. Conversely, low PA is characterized by 
sadness and lethargy. In contrast, NA is a general dimension of subjective distress and 
unpleasurable engagement that subsumes a variety of aversive affective states, including anger, 
contempt, disgust, guilt, fear, and nervousness, with low NA being a state of calmness and 
serenity.  
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Thompson (2007) modified the scale which resulted in the International PANAS Short 
Form (I-PANAS-SF) in a series of validation studies (N = 1789). The cross-sample stability, 
internal reliability, temporal stability, crosscultural factorial invariance, and convergent and 
criterion-related validities demonstrated that the I-PANAS-SF can be offered for cross-cultural, 
English-based studies as a brief research tool that is reliable, valid, and efficient as a means of 
measuring and further investigating PA and NA. The ‗Profile of Mood States‘ (McNair, Lorr, 
& Droppleman, 1992) is a similar scale of six identifiable affective states.  
Although these scales demonstrated usefulness in studying qualitatively distinctive 
intra-individual affective state fluctuations within-individual investigations (see, for example, 
Watson et al., 1988), they are not domain-specific with regards to decision making. In the 
absence of a suitable decision-generated affect scale, a domain-specific self-report scale was 
developed in order to measure experienced affect retrospectively following the decision making 
simulations. The scale was designed to capture experienced affect during decision making, as 
well as cognitive predictions (or forecasts of affective consequences) as anticipated (i.e., more 
distal) affect.  
The design of the decision-generated affect scale was developed using a modification of 
Kanfer and Ackerman‘s (1989) self-report questionnaire that was designed based on the studies 
by Sarason, Sarason, Keefe, Hayes, and Shearin (1986). These latter authors describe two 
instruments constructed to assess intrusive thoughts. One instrument obtains self-reports of 
cognitive interference immediately after performance on a task. The other one assesses the 
general tendency to experience intrusive thoughts. Their results suggest that these items are 
valuable in order to assess thoughts pertaining to evaluative negative and positive self-reactions 
and off-task thoughts. The present researcher selected 22 items and reworded some of these in 
order to represent a pre-occupation with personal deficiencies, social comparative and self-
evaluative concerns about personal competence (self-referent intrusive thinking), experienced 
time pressure (somatic tension) and disruptive emotions (vulnerability to adverse effects of 
failure, positive self-reactions, and off-task thoughts). Sarason et al. (1996) suggest that these 
measures can be practically useful in identifying individuals who are at risk for experiencing 
debilitating preoccupations when confronting the challenges posed by particular situations as 
influenced by situational parameters. In fact, there is evidence suggesting that such off-task 
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cognitive interference can be increased by emphasizing the evaluative aspects of the 
performance situation.  
The custom designed decision-generated self-report questionnaire comprised of items to 
assess the frequency and occurrence of these various types of thoughts and affect using a 5-
point Likert rating scale (1 = never through to 5 = very often), to indicate how frequently the 
thought described in each statement occurred while performing a just completed task. In 
particular, items assessed attention to task components, thoughts pertaining to performance 
evaluation, negative and positive self-reactions, and off-task thoughts. The internal consistency 
reliability estimates of the composite scales for different self-report variables ranged from .32 
to .85. 
 
Sample and procedure 
 
Data was collected on 112 experienced managers (with a mean age of 39.6 years, SD = 
7.5). Eighty-two percent were graduates and postgraduates and 18 were black managers. The 
items were presented in such a manner as to elicit a response in terms of the frequency of 
affective reactions experienced during decision simulation exercises. The instructions were 
formulated as follows: 
―During these exercises, how much and frequently were you concerned about the item 
in question‖.  Use the scale below to record your response to each item. 
1 = rarely (less than 10% of the time); 2 = occasionally (about 25% of the time); 3 = 
sometimes (about 50% of the time); 4=frequently (about 75% of the time); 5 = usually 
(more than 90% of the time). 
 
Item reduction and reliability 
 
The EFA resulted in reducing the scale from 22 to 13 items. The items, together with 
their loadings on two primary factors, are shown in Table 5.7. The Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin value 
was  .82, which exceeded the recommended value of .60 and the Barlett‘s Test of Sphericity 
reached statistical significance, supporting the factorability of the correlation matrix.  
Consistent with extant research, a two-factor structure emerged that reflected distal predictions 
(or forecasts) about the affective consequences of decisions, and immediate affective 
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experiential states and physiological responses under time pressure.  In respect of the former, 
Loewenstein and Lerner (2003, p. 620) argued that ―expected emotions are not experienced as 
emotions per se at the time of decision making; rather, as the label suggests, they are 
expectations about emotions that will be experienced in the future‖. The latter, immediate 
affect, reflects arousal experienced in response to time pressure and making accurate decisions 
that can disrupt on-task attentional resources effort allocation by redirecting attention to the 
affective experience and physiological arousal (see, for example, Luce, 1998, 2005, Luce et al., 
1997; Luce et al., 2001). 
 
 
The two factors confirmed the multi-dimensionality of decision-generated affect. To 
assist in interpretational clarity Factor 1 was labeled as Anticipated Affect (i.e., self-evaluative 
Table 5.7 Decision-Generated Affect: Standard Regression Coefficients obtained via EFA 
Oblimin Rotation with Kaiser Normalization  
Decision-generated affect items 
 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
feeling unable to influence the demands placed on me  
 
.794  
feeling that I have little control to perform at my best 
  
.767  
how dissatisfied I was with my performance 
 
.728  
concerns about not making a fool of myself 
 
.701  
feeling discouraged about my progress and performance 
 
.700  
not to be among the poorest performing managers 
 
.687  
thinking that other managers are naturally better in decision making than me  
 
.686  
how poorly I was doing 
 
.675  
the quantity of work I was expected to do given the time allowed 
 
 .876 
how pressurized I was to perform these tasks/exercises, given the time allowed 
 
 .875 
about how much time I need to complete the exercises 
 
 .861 
focusing my attention on making few errors in the time-based measures and avoid failure 
 
 .660 
feeling that I worked under a great deal of tension 
 
 .626 
Percentage of variance 35.0 11.7 
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and social comparative concerns) and Factor 2 as Immediate Affect. These affective outcomes 
represent cognitive interference (Carver, 2004; Sarason et al., 1996), intrusive cognitions 
(Bandura, 1997; Carver et al., 1989; Kuhl, 1992; Wood & Bandura, 1996), rumination 
(Baumeister et al., 1994; Baumeister et al., 2007; Brief & Weiss, 2002), and disruptive arousal 
and affect (Bandura, 1999; Lerner , Han, & Keltner, 2007; Mano, 1992; Pham, 2007).   
Table 5.8 illustrates the decision-generated affect scale means, standard deviations, and 
the internal consistency of the two sub-scales.  
 
The satisfactory factorial composition and internal consistency properties of the 13-item 
decision-generated measure displayed respectable psychometric properties for the purposes of 
the present study. A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant difference between black and 
other managers on both subscales. In addition, the effect size, calculated using eta squared, 
ranged from .001 for immediate affect to .006 for anticipated affect.  
 
Construct Validity 
 
The measure was also investigated for discriminant validity in relation to Factor O 
(apprehensive, insecure, self-doubting) of the 15FQ+ (Psychometrics Limited, 2002b). Table 
5.9 illustrates the discriminant validities.  
 
 A sample of 111 was available to compare Factor O with immediate and anticipated 
affect. Consistent with other research (Baumeister et al., 2007; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003), 
Table 5.8 Decision-Generated Affect Subscales: Internal Consistency Coefficients 
Subscale statistics Factor Mean SD Number of items Cronbach  
 Anticipated affect 
 
13.82 5.90 8 .879 
 Immediate affect 14.58 5.08 5 .859 
Table 5.9 Decision-Generated Affect: Means, Standard Deviations and Intercorrelations 
Variable n Mean SD 1 2 
1. Anticipated affect (Y7) 111 13.82 5.90   
2. Immediate affect (Y6) 111 14.58 5.08 .427**  
3. Factor O:(Apprehensive, insecure, 
    self-doubting) 
111 11.51 5.67 .108 .316** 
**p < .01, one-tailed      
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immediate and anticipated affect were found to be interrelated and complementary (r = .427, n 
= 111, p > .01, one-tailed). The main feature of Factor O as an aversive dispositional trait is its 
stability over time and consistency across tasks (or situations).  Accordingly,  individuals high 
on Factor O are likely to display a pronounced bias toward making risk avoidant choices (see, 
for example, Ferrari, 2001; Forgas & Laham, 2005; Haleblian et al., 2004; Hockey et al., 2000; 
Lauriola, Levin, & Hart, 2007). Dispositional anxiety is thus incidental and unrelated to the 
decision at hand (Loewenstein & Lerner 2003; Maner et al., 2007; Pham, 2007).  
The findings in Table 5.9 confirm that Factor O and immediate affect are independent 
of anxiety as a dispositional trait.  Anxiety is thus incidental to immediate decision-generated 
affect (r =  .108). Factor O however demonstrated a positive relationship with anticipated affect 
(r = .316, n = 111, p > .01, one-tailed). The effect size was, however, small (r² = .010).  This 
was to be expected since anticipated affect consists of cognitive predictions (or forecasts) based 
on an attentional bias toward threats as well as an exaggeration of anticipated positive or 
negative consequences and concerns.   
One possible limitation with the results is that they may have been inflated by common 
sources of variance. In interpreting the findings, it is important to recognize the limitations of 
the potential bias of retrospective accounts of the scale. The measurement approach may have 
resulted in a form of self-generated validity in which responses to one part of the scale are 
reactive to another, although these were administered in a temporal order with personality traits 
measured last.  Because all variables were self-reported, one may wonder whether the relations 
were inflated.  Although the scale was psychometrically justified, it may have obscured 
patterns of other emotions that are difficult to capture. Also, individuals‘ affect may have been 
influenced by a variety of factors such as features of the specific simulations, associations, 
memories or thoughts about events outside the context of the assessment (Brown et al., 2005; 
Judge et al., 2006; Roseman & Evdokas, 2004).     
The operationization of the allocation of attentional resources is discussed in the next 
subsection.  
 
Allocation of Attentional Resources 
 
It has been argued that there is considerable volition that permits individuals to exert 
more or less effort despite how difficult they perceive the task to be.  For instance, Yeo (2003) 
158 
 
illustrated this by showing a significant linear relationship between effort and perceived 
difficulty. Consequently, it is argued that the motivational and volitional impact of decision-
generated affect induce complex cognitive, affective, and behavioural processes that underlie 
decisional avoidance (see, for example, Anderson, 2003; Ferrari, Johnson, & McCown, 1995; 
Renn et al., 2005; Van Eerde 2000).  
 
Decisional Fatigue 
  
It was argued that decisional fatigue disables individuals from accessing enough 
attentional resources necessary for effective decision making as a consequence of attentional 
resources conservation. Fatigue operates as a signal for reducing attentional resources 
allocation and alters further increments of attentional effort (Loewenstein, 1996) and, 
subsequently, the desirability of acting (i.e.,  making choices).  Fatigue thus favours passive-
evasion and avoidance options in decision making (Baumeister et al., 1998).  
In this study individuals were subjected to intertemporal decisions (i.e., making 
decisions at different points in time) and the nature of the two simulations in quick succession 
required them to make choices among options that exhausted the attentional resources 
necessary for effective subsequent decision making. The extant research suggests that fatigue 
induces an aversion to expend effort and therefore signals a threat from an over-commitment of 
attentional resources (see, for example, Finkel et al., 2006; Hockey et al., 2000; Schmeichel, 
Vohs & Baumeister, 2003; Vohs et al., 2008; Vohs et al., 2005). Fatigue reduces persistence, 
alters the desirability of making decisions and decreases the desirability of further increments 
of effort. Accordingly, fatigue favours passivity, indecision and decisional avoidance for 
reasons other than declining motivation.   
 
Operationalization  
 
Fatigue was measured by a factor analytically derived adjective rating scale, ‗Profile of 
Mood States‘ (McNair et al., 1992), measuring six identifiable mood or affective states. The 
researcher used the 7-item Fatigue-Inertia (weariness and fatigued) scale which was 
administered after completion of the decision simulation exercises. This scale was chosen in 
order to measure an individual's typical and persistent mood reactions to their current situation 
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because it was suitable to measure affect over a very brief rating period and thus suitable to 
focus on relatively recent affective reactions. The inventory provides for a high degree of 
sensitivity to change in subjective states. The publisher has reported acceptable psychometric 
properties with reliabilities being highly satisfactory (internal consistencies are near .90 or 
above).  Further, test-retest reliability over three time periods have suggested reliability 
estimates that range from .65 to .74 across shorter time intervals. However, over longer periods 
this decreases to .43 to .52.  This is far less than the .80 levels expected for context independent 
stable personality constructs. The test developer reports research across psychotherapy studies, 
outpatient substance abuse, cancer research, emotion-inducing situations, and sport 
performance.  
The researcher could only perform a one-way ANOVA on the final study sample of 196 
managers in order to obtain representativity of black and other managers. The results revealed 
no significant difference between black and other managers.  A one-way ANOVA for 
immediate affect revealed no significant difference between black and other managers [F(1,194) 
= .220, p < .640].  For anticipated affect, a one-way ANOVA also revealed no significant 
difference between black and other managers, [F(1,194) = .003, p < .954].  
 
Decisional Procrastination 
  
Various authors have argued that decisional procrastination is a result of proximal 
motivational-affective states rather than distal individual influences (i.e., personality traits) 
(see, for example,  Renn et al., 2005; Steel, 2007; Van Eerde, 2000). Individuals who doubt 
their ability to make good decisions, in combination with a low dispositional variation in their 
sense of certainty and personal control, tend to alter their experienced affect (see, for example, 
Haleblian et al., 2004; Lucas et al., 2006; Mirels et al., 2002; Raghunathan & Pham, 1999). 
Affect minimization concerns (Bettman et al., 1998) thus impact on the willingness or the 
expenditure of attentional resources in order to translate intentions into action. Avoidant, 
evasive and escape behaviours (Anderson, 2003, 2007) reflect attempts to circumvent decision-
generated affect in order to pursue positive affect (Baumeister et al., 2007; Schwarz & Clore, 
2007; Spunt, Rassin, & Epstein, 2009). In order to operationalize the allocation of attentional 
resources the present researcher used decisional procrastination as a means of coping with 
decision-generated affect.    
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It has been pointed out that making a decision is a volitional action among alternative 
courses of action (Payne et al., 1993).  There is considerable volition that permits individuals to 
exert more or less attentional resources despite how difficult they perceive decisions to be. 
Decisional procrastination thus represents a volitional response for inaction by way of 
attentional resources withdrawal to engage in deliberation and the willingness to exercise a 
rational display of social influence and control in order to make decisions. Accordingly, 
volitional acquiescence blunts a manager‘s willingness to deploy attentional resources to act on 
the opportunity-affording features of a decision and thus makes them favour the maximization 
of positive affect by the avoidance of decisions (Patalano & Wengrovitz, 2007). 
 
Operationalization 
 
Little empirical research has addressed the measurement of decisional procrastination 
(Rassin et al., 2007). As far as could be ascertained only two measures exist. The most common 
self-report scale measures of indecisiveness are Frost and Shows‘ (1993) 15-item 
Indecisiveness Scale (IS) and Mann‘s (1982) 5-item Decisional Procrastination Scale (DP) 
based on the Conflict Theory of decision making (Janis & Mann, 1977). The Decisional 
Procrastination Scale focuses on decisional delay, with items such as ‗‗I put off making 
decisions‘‘ and ‗‗I waste a long time on trivial matters before getting to a final decision.‘‘ The 
Indecisiveness Scale, in addition to delay, incorporates decisional difficulty, as in ‗‗I find it 
easy to make decisions‘‘ or ‗‗I always know exactly what I want,‘‘ and it proposes affective 
components including anxiety, worry, low confidence, and regret. These two scales reflect 
different views on the major components of indecisiveness, that is, delay only versus a 
combination of difficulty, delay and negative affect. Despite this, both scales are highly 
reliable, with the internal reliabilities somewhat higher for the Indecisiveness Scale (internal α 
= .87; temporal stability (one month) test-retest α = .67 (Frost & Gross, 1992; Wengrovitz & 
Patalano, 2006) than for the Decisional Procrastination Scale (internal α =  .70; 1-month test-
retest α  = .69 (Beswick, Rothblum, & Mann, 1988; Effert & Ferrari, 1989). 
Rassin et al. (2007) found supporting evidence for the validity of the IS. Their findings, 
however, indicated that 5 items did not load adequately on the scale. It was decided to employ 
the DP in the present study because the scale measures volitional actions when individuals are 
faced with conflicts and choices in addition to its relatively widespread usage. A number of 
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studies have used the scale (see, for example, Burnett, Mann, & Beswick, 1989; Effert & 
Ferrari, 1989; Ferrari, 1994; Ferrari & Dovidio, 2000, 2001; Orellana-Damacela et al., 2000). 
High scores on this scale indicate a tendency to put off decisions.  
As was the case with decision-generated affect, a one-way ANOVA was performed on 
the total sample of managers (N = 194). The results revealed no significant difference between 
black and other managers [F(1,194) = .002, p < .963].  The DP was subsequently used to 
operationalize the degree to which individuals engage in attentional resources minimization 
strategies when they face decisional conflict.   
 
Quality of MDM Processes and Outcomes  
 
In Chapter Two MDM was conceptualized as a cognitive problem of attempting to 
arrive at an accurate (rational) solution (mostly under pressure of time), and choosing between 
multiple goals (i.e., make decisions against a background of divergent political interests) 
(Elbanna & Child, 2007; Ferris et al., 2002; Papadakis, 2006).  The quality of MDM processes 
is measured in the present study by using two business simulations that encompass the types of 
decisional activities required in complex dynamic environments (i.e., exercising a systematic-
comprehensive process and influencing others to gain agreement). Simulations are valuable in 
reproducing the behaviours of the real world and offer a viable solution by controlling many 
potentially confounding variables while maintaining contextual relevance (Hough & White, 
2003) in order to ‗achieve parity in relevance‘ with studies conducted in natural contexts 
(Dutton & Stumpf, 1991). 
Simulations as ambiguous behavioural situations offer a unique opportunity to provide 
objective measures of the variability in individual differences in behavioural responses in order 
to examine the quality of decision making processes at the individual level of analysis (see, for 
example, Hough et al., 1998). Consequently, they avoid the potential bias of retrospective 
accounts since stimulus materials are realistic, engaging and immune to demand effects. Chan 
and Schmitt (1997) argued that individual decision making is nearly always multidimensional 
in nature in the sense that an adequate solution or handling of the problem would involve 
several ability and skill dimensions. Decision making in simulations reflects more than just 
cognitive ability (Parker & Fischhoff, 2005), and overconfidence and individual-difference 
162 
 
measures of affect (including optimism), conscientiousness, extraversion, social cognition 
(need for cognition, self-monitoring, self-efficacy), experience and cognitive ability have been 
shown to correlate with decision making (see, for example, McDaniel et al.,  2001; Weekley & 
Jones, 1999; Weekley & Ployhart, 2005; Wolfe & Grosch, 1990). Table 3.1 in Chapter Three 
illustrates the frequency with which simulations have been used in order to study MDM.  
The two simulations utilized provided an opportunity to measure the application of a 
procedurally rational decision process, as well as the ease to demonstrate rational social 
influence and independence in decision making.  
 
Procedural Rationality 
 
The conceptual and empirical research suggests a strong association between the 
application of an effortful, controlled decision process and the quality of decisional outcomes 
(e.g., Bazerman, 2006; Dean & Sharfman, 1993b, 1996; Goll & Rasheed, 1997; Hough & 
White, 2003; Payne & Bettman, 2007; Tasa & Whyte, 2005). Consequently, a more rational, 
systematic-comprehensive decision process is adopted when decision accuracy is prioritized 
over saving cognitive effort (attentional resources) in order to meet the best interests of the 
organization. 
The application of such an effortful, rational, systematic-comprehensive process, also 
referred to as motivated processing (Forgas et al., 2004) or System 2 (Evans, 2003, 2008; 
Kahneman,2003; Stanovich & West, 2000), leads individuals to process and deliberate with 
information more vigilantly (Janis & Mann, 1977; Tabernero & Wood, 1999). It makes the 
decision process more attuned to normative rationality and tends (on average) to lead to better 
outcomes than do poor decision making processes (Frisch & Clemen, 1994; Kleindorfer et al., 
1993). The underlying assumption regarding the use of a systematic-comprehensive decision-
process is that it requires greater attentional resources (Baumeister et al., 1994; Connolly & 
Ordonez, 2003) in the use of appropriate information and analysis (Kahneman, 2003) and 
greater use of such a process results in better solutions to more complex problems (Leaptrott & 
McDonald, 2008; Stanovich & West, 2000).  
Dean and Sharfman‘s (1993a) definition of procedural rationality was adopted as an 
effortful systematic-comprehensive process to reflect the quality and extent to which the 
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decision process involves the collection of information relevant to the decision and the reliance 
on analysis of this information in making an accurate decision. 
The next subsection describes the measurement of procedural rationality for the 
purposes of this study. 
 
Operationalization: Simulation 1 
 
The first simulation, Critical Business Planning (CBP; Psychometric Research & 
Development, 1998), is a 40-minute, time-based paper and pencil business decision making 
simulation inventory. The inventory consists of 48 decision scenarios based on a business de-
merger scenario and provides a measurement of performance in discerning apparent patterns 
embedded in complexity, use and reason with business information presented in graphs, tables 
and charts, hypothesis testing and finding effective concepts to operate with, rather than 
working to pre-set patterns.  The simulation requires a reasonable level of verbal 
comprehension, reasoning and numerical abilities, and the stimulus materials are realistic, 
engaging and immune to demand effects since individuals are required to discover and learn the 
concepts and methods underlying information presented to them and to apply these to novel 
situations (e.g., organizational structure changes, budget variances, legal and IT problems, and 
staffing).  For these reasons the present researcher viewed the simulation as an appropriate 
measure to provide an objective measure of the variability in individual differences in 
procedural rationality at the individual level of analysis. Procedural rationality was calculated 
as the difference between the number of cases attempted and the actual number of correct 
decision responses (i.e., the application of an effortful decision process in order to achieve 
decision accuracy goals). Poorer performance was regarded as evidence of failure to 
differentiate between information that is relevant or irrelevant, reliable or unreliable, supportive 
or non-supportive to the interests of decision accuracy.  
A large discrepancy between attempted items and correct items was regarded as 
evidence of premature closure (Eisenhardt, 1989) and  hypervigilance (Janis & Mann, 1977) as 
a result of individuals‘ reactions to a threat in conditions characterized by informational 
overload and a lack of time to search and deliberate. Low scores could thus be construed to 
reflect attentional effort minimization concerns in order to escape decision-generated affect 
posed by the situation. Cheng (2003) showed the need for closure is a motivational process in 
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order to bring information processing to a close by leaping to a conclusion as an individual 
difference in coping. 
The publisher has conducted a variety of analyses to investigate the impact on reliability 
and/or the standard error of measurement, and whether reliability varies by gender or ethnic 
group and reports no significant or even modestly substantial variation was found, with 
estimates of reliability varying by no more than about .02 either side of α = .73. Moreover, the 
present researcher confirmed the reliability (K-R 21 of .74) to be very similar to that of the 
publisher (K-R 21 of .73) in a separate analysis from the present study.  Further, the publisher 
reports that in the development sample there were no statistically significant differences 
between males and females, or between white and other ethnic groups. In their development 
sample black managers, however, performed somewhat poorer with the average number of 
correct responses for black managers as 47.88 compared with 56.00 for other managers. These 
differences correspond to about .72 and 1.3 standard deviations respectively. Following a more 
detailed examination, it was revealed that the difference in average scores between black and 
other managers in the development sample reflected language and educational differences, not 
ethnic differences per se, and may be largely a matter of speed / error trade-off. 
 The present researcher has standardized the simulation for South African conditions 
and has investigated the results of the simulation based on a separate sample of 390, of which 
31% were black managers (M = 35.26, SD = 13.98), with the remaining managers (M = 36.59, 
SD = 13.26). A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant difference between black and other 
managers [F(1,368) = .812 , p < .368]. The actual difference in mean scores between the groups 
was quite small. The effect size, calculated using eta squared, was .002 which was considered 
small (Cohen, 1988).  
Other than the application of a procedurally rational process, MDM is also a process 
that relies on elaborate and complex social patterns of social-political influence and social 
encounters in order to influence final decisions (Bandura, 2001; Beach & Connolly, 2005; 
Zaccaro, 2001). As managers‘ work is enmeshed in webs of interdependent relationships they 
are required to defend their decisions and reasoning to peers, subordinates, or superiors 
(Brousseau et al., 2006; Green et al., 2000; Lerner & Tetlock, 2003; Sedikides & Herbst, 2002). 
This requires that managers exercise social influence in order to resolve divergent interests and 
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counteract the political interests of divergent groups (Hochwarter et al., 2007; Lucas et al., 
2005; Schwarzwald et al., 2004; Sullivan et al., 2003; Wayne et al., 1997; Zaccaro, 2001). 
The following subsection introduces the use of the second simulation in order to 
operationalize rational social influence and independence in making a decision in the service of 
quality decision outcomes obtained in a face-to-face situation. Rational social influence is 
defined for the purpose of the present study as the willingness and ease to assume 
independence in decisions (i.e., the readiness to make decisions and the low susceptibility to 
social opposition) in order to advance compliance in the service of accuracy of decisions. To 
exercise rational social influence requires an effortful decision process (i.e., an increased level 
of attentional effort to meet accuracy goals) in order to justify their decisions in anticipation of 
how it will be evaluated by others given the unknown interests of others and the legitimate 
reasons for inquiring into the reasons behind the manager‘s decisions. 
Operationalization: Simulation 2 
 
The second simulation is a standardized role-play (Sigma, 2000) employed to observe 
and measure social influence and persuasive behaviour.  It has been pointed out that traits-as-
dispositions and situational properties activate relevant behaviours that low support 
environments compel individuals to activate social skill. Consequently, role play simulations 
provide a high activation potential in order to elicit behaviour to aid observations of 
individuals‘ behaviour. As individuals necessarily differ in the cues pre,sented, these 
observations are fruitful and informative with regard to social influence (Lievens et al., 2006; 
Tett & Burnett, 2003).  
 
Procedure 
 
Individuals are provided with background information and detail relating to funding for 
a specific project that needs to be obtained.  They are granted 20 minutes to study the brief and 
30 minutes to present their position in an interactive situation.  The exercise provides 
observational data on how well an individual is able to define a problem, chose the best 
business alternative, and influence and persuade others to accept a financial business proposal.   
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Sample 
 
A pilot sample (i.e. non-probability, purposive sampling) of 150 managers, with at least 
ten years experience in management, employed in the private sector (financial, utilities, oil, 
pharmaceutical, IT technology, manufacturing, fast moving consumer goods, professional 
firms, and agriculture) was used to evaluate the measure. The mean age was 39.9 years (SD = 
7.9), 85% were graduate and postgraduates, 16% were black and 67% were males. The sample 
represented experienced managers with good educational achievements, industry experience 
and accomplishments.   
 
Item Reduction and Reliability 
 
Guided by the publisher‘s scoring manual, conceptual frameworks and previous 
research (Ferris et al., 2007; Hochwarter et al., 2007; Koslowsky & Schwarzwald 2001;  Liu et 
al., 2007; Schwarzwald et al., 2004; Sullivan et al., 2003),  a 20-item observation scale was 
designed in order to record observations during the simulation. A six-point ordinal scale that 
permitted the classification of observations was used and ranged from ―Not at all true of 
individual (to no degree or extent)‖ to ―Definitely true of individual (to a great degree and with 
no doubts at all)‖.  One limitation of the measure was the failure to evaluate interrater 
reliability. 
The 20 item measure‘s EFA and internal consistency reliability analysis details are 
presented in the discussion that follows. The items, together with their loadings on their 
primary factors, are shown in Table 5.10. 
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The correlation matrix revealed many coefficients above .3 and the Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin 
value was  .87, which is above the recommended value of .60. The Barlett‘s Test of Sphericity 
also reached statistical significance, supporting the factorability of the correlation matrix.  The 
four factors are described in the next subsection. 
 
Table 5.10 Simulation 2 Observation Scale: Standard Regression Cooefficients  
Social Influence Items Factor 
1 
Factor 
2 
Factor 
3 
Factor 
4 
Identified the key areas for negotiation and the evidence available in a 
logical and unbiased manner 
.907 
   
Showed an awareness of all the variables that can be manipulated in 
reaching a solution 
.904 
   
Selective and constructive in the use of information used to support 
proposals 
.866 
   
Interpreted information soundly/correctly and arrived at appropriate 
solutions 
.835 
   
Confident when describing or defending own position; had a good grasp 
of the facts 
.806 
   
Expertise claimed frequently, presented self as knowledgeable and 
capable 
.802 
   
Continued trying to persuade of the value of proposed solutions, 
persistent in effort 
.749 
   
Made a number of influence attempts, even when confronted with 
opposition and resistance 
.727 
   
Presents arguments convincingly .651 
   
Funding agreement secured     .797   
Time taken to reach acceptable decision  .765   
Royalty agreement secured  .710   
Used bargaining to influence competitor-offer   .792  
Conceded points rather than attempting to turn them around   -.583  
Experienced information as sufficient enough to make the decision    .915 
Needed less information and time, displayed less need to talk to others, 
no delay in decision-making 
   .891 
Percentage of variance 46.5 12.3 7.4 6.7 
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Rational Social Influence 
 
Table 5.10 shows that 16 items loaded on four factors that accounted for 72.8% of the 
variance.  Nine items loaded substantially on  Factor 1 which was labeled as Rational Social 
Influence (i.e., reliance on relevant information in deliberation and persistence in verbal 
reasoning in arguments to influence proposals when confronted with opposition). It has been 
pointed out that making decisions is often the result of a form of negotiation, sometimes covert, 
sometimes overt, in order to influence the problem definition and option formulation as well as 
exercise an influence on the final decision (Beach & Connolly, 2005).  Engaging in such social 
influence requires a blend of soft and hard tactics and Mayer (2005, p. 299) has argued that 
behaviour such as political skill ―represents the expression of personality in a socially adaptive 
fashion. It includes social skills, role knowledge, and emotionally preferred expressions‖. The 
empirical review has illustrated significant relations between ease of social influence (political 
skill) and upward appeal and forming coalitions (Ferris et al., 2005) and also that political skill 
is a significant and positive predictor of rationality that enable individuals to make better 
decisions (Kolodinsky et al., 2007).  
For the purposes of this study the researcher conceptualized rational social influence as 
a multidimensional construct that represents the application of an effortful process to gather 
and analyse relevant information for rational deliberation in order to persuade and to obtain 
cooperation and resources to advance decisions in the service of the accuracy of those 
decisions. This conceptualization thus includes the willingness and ease to exercise rational and 
supportive modes of influence in order to gain compliance in accepting decisions that promote 
accuracy, even in cases where opposition is likely to be high. In accordance with this 
conceptualization the extracted items provided a good empirical grasp of behaviours that make 
up rational social influence and were thus retained.   
 
Decision Quality 
 
One advantage of the simulation was that the criteria for a successful agreement were 
stringent, requiring participants to make a decision within the pre-specified time limit and 
secure a favourable agreement based on objective and quantifiable financial data. Therefore, 
the assessment of the quality of the final decision was methodologically objective and scored to 
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a pre-determined set of quantitative criteria and time taken. Objective evaluation of the final 
outcomes was noted in terms of a scoring key for actual funding and royalty agreements 
achieved in real monetary terms, as well as the time taken (in minutes) to reach the agreement. 
A three-point ordinal scale was used ranging from ―Less than specified‖ to ―More than 
specified‖.  This index provided for an objective index of decision quality. Factor 2 consisted 
of three items to this effect.  
 
Bargaining 
 
Factor 3 is represented by two items, that were labeled as Bargaining.  The orthogonal 
(uncorrelated) relationship between rational social influence and the use of bargaining was 
encouraging. Bargaining is a complex, indeterminate, and personally involving cognitive task 
that is likely to induce effort minimization goals. Negative affect produces pessimistic and 
negative thoughts that induce individuals to engage in bargaining tactics to circumvent 
decision-generated affect.  Bargaining is conceptualized in this study as attempts to use 
coercive tactics for quick closure in order to reduce uncertainty (i.e., ending the decision before 
all the relevant information has been examined).  Dysfunctional cognitions inhibit social 
behavioural responses and prevent the demonstration of the social skills irrespective of the 
social skills knowledge individuals possess. Consequently, individuals with less confidence 
view risky interpersonal endeavors (for example, requests and negotiation) as potential threats 
to be avoided whereas confident individuals select more rational modes of influence. 
 
Independence in Decision Making 
 
The items in Factor Four were indicative of a willingness to make independent 
decisions (i.e., refrain from making a decision, or a delay or deferral to avoid a decision). 
Bandura (1982) observes that the exercise of personal control carries considerable 
responsibility for the negative consequences of decisions and actions and such  burdensome 
aspects dull the appetite for personal control. Furthermore, independence in decision making is 
a function of the level of perceived individual control. Individuals who doubt their influence 
prowess tend to shy away from accountability for independent decision making (Jatulis & 
Newman, 1991; Mirels et al., 2002). Lucas et al. (2006) demonstrated that individuals who are 
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highly resistant to social influence do so primarily because they perceive both independence 
and their influence attempts to be subjectively less difficult. They are thus less likely to 
acquiesce when opposed.  Consequently, as tasks become more difficult, individuals tend to 
become more susceptible to the influence of others. Perhaps the most dramatic examples of 
task difficulty affecting social influence are derived from Janis's (1972) research on groupthink, 
which demonstrated that difficult tasks facilitate the perception of stress. Task difficulty 
generally increases the potential for individuals to demonstrate groupthink (see also, Tasa & 
Whyte, 2005). Deferral of a decision is thus a willingness to avoid the exercise of independence 
in decision making in order to reduce negative affect (Anderson, 2003, Luce, 1998).  
The two items that loaded on Factor 4 were used as operational indicators to represent 
Independence in decision making.   
 
Overall Scale Statistics 
  
The satisfactory factorial composition of the observation scale also displayed 
respectable internal consistency for Factors 1 and 4 (rational social influence and independence 
in decision making) as illustrated in Table 5.11.  
 
One-way ANOVA‘s revealed no significant difference between black and other 
managers on all these subscales. In addition, the effect sizes, calculated using eta squared, were 
small.   
 
Construct Validity 
 
The construct validity of the subscales was further investigated by calculating a matrix 
of zero-order Pearson correlation coefficients.  The measure was also investigated for 
discriminant validity in relation to Factor O (apprehensive, insecure, self-doubting) of the 
Table 5.11 Rational Social Influence and Independence: Internal Consistency 
Coefficients of Subscales 
Scale item n Mean SD Number of items Cronbach  
Rational social influence  150 34.32 10.10 8 .942 
Decision quality 150 7.46 2.42 3 .682 
Bargaining  150 8.88 2.13 2 .627 
Independence in decision 
making  
150 8.57 3.45 2 .858 
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15FQ+ (Psychometrics Limited, 2002b). Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations are 
provided in Table 5.12. 
 
As expected, stronger rational social influence showed a significant positive 
relationship with decision quality and independence in decision making. Bargaining was 
distinct from rational social influence but also showed a significant linear relationship with the 
quality of the decision and independence in decision making.  Numerous studies (see, for 
example, Isen & Labroo, 2003; Forgas, 1998, 2002; and Kopelman et al., 2006 ) have 
demonstrated that individuals behaved more cooperatively and were more willing to use 
integrative strategies and make and reciprocate deals than were those in a negative mood. Such 
effects on bargaining behaviour produced significantly better outcomes for those in a positive 
mood. However, this effect is not unconditional.  
Individuals who display negative affect (i.e., anger) can be effective in bargaining and 
attaining higher gains (Lerner &  Tiedens, 2006).  Sinaceur and Tiedens (2005) and Van Kleef, 
De Dreu, Pietroni and Manstead (2006) demonstrated that a strategic display of anger was 
effective in extracting value in face-to-face bargaining since individuals facing an angry 
opponent made larger concessions compared to those who faced a happy opponent in order to 
avoid an impasse, entrapment and the probability of deadlocks. Reasoning, bargaining and 
assertiveness, however, have significant positive effects on the long-term relationships with 
others, whereas bargaining is negatively related to interpersonal assessments (Wayne et al., 
1997). In this regard, Lerner and Tetlock (1994, p. 3) comment that such individuals are 
Table 5.12 Rational Social Influence and Independence: Means, Standard Deviations and 
Intercorrelations 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
1. Rational social influence      
2. Decision quality    .396**    
3. Bargaining               .102 .344**   
4. Independence in decision making  .519** .465** .201**  
5. Factor O:(Apprehensive, insecure, 
self-doubting) 
            -.090      -.042      .098 -.042 
** p < .01, one-tailed 
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―hopelessly inept politicians who may try to maintain good working relations with important 
constituents, but who instead frequently wind up antagonizing them‖.  
In fact, bargaining may be a form of emotion-focused coping and subsequent cognitive 
withdrawal (i.e., minimizing attentional effort). For example, Stevens and Gist (1997) 
demonstrated that individuals‘ cognitions account for cognitive withdrawal in analytical task 
strategies (i.e., hurried through the negotiation and tried to get the negotiation over with 
quickly). It is thus possible that bargaining is associated with external attributions of control 
and certainty to deflect blame for poor outcomes to other sources in order to protect individuals 
from the negative effects of impasses (see, for example, O'Connor & Arnold, 2001, and 
Sullivan et al., 2003).  
Finally, in accordance with the available theorizing and research, rational social 
influence, independence in decision making and bargaining were also empirically distinct from 
Factor O (apprehensive, insecure, self-doubting) as an aversively dispositional trait to account 
for performance (see, for example, Smillie et al., 2006). Unlike affective dispositions which are 
enduring over time, affective states fluctuate and change (George, 1986) and context-dependent 
motivational processes (e.g., self-efficacy beliefs) mediate the relation between these 
dispositional affective traits and performance (Kanfer & Heggestad, 1997). 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
Psychometrically sound instruments bear importantly on the credibility of all the 
present study‘s findings, and they become even more critical when the indicators are presumed 
to represent underlying constructs (Byrne, 2001). Given the intention of the instruments to 
measure the specific defined constructs an exploratory approach was followed to operationalize 
the latent variables. EFA identified understandable and interpretable parsimonious factor 
structures associated with each of the latent variables under consideration in keeping with the 
literature and empirical research. Reliability estimates also confirmed a degree of trust in the 
measures‘ psychometric properties to provide an uncontaminated measure of the defined 
constructs. A summary of the psychometric properties of the validated and custom-designed 
measures is provided in Table 5.13.  
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        * K-R 21 of .74  
 
The data in Table 5.13 suggest that the measures display respectable psychometric 
properties. The majority of the reliability estimates confirmed a degree of trust in their ability to 
provide a valid and reliable measure of the defined constructs. For early-stage research with 
new measures, Nunnally (1978) suggested reliabilities of .7. However, Hair et al. (1998) 
suggest .60 to be acceptable for exploratory research.   
The distributional characteristics of the majority of the measured indicators, however, 
violated the assumptions of univariate normality and suggested that the distributions might 
reflect the idiosyncrasies unique to the specific sample. Especially noteworthy were high levels 
Table 5.13 Psychometric Properties of Validated and Custom Indicator Measures 
 
 
Latent Variable     N     Mean    SD Number 
of items 
  Std error 
(σM)  
Cronbach  
 
 
Verbal ability   196 19.53     7.39 40 .528 .883  
Numerical ability   196 12.00    4.86 25 .347 .835  
Social influence efficacy   146   785.29 108.07 10    8.94 .922  
Exploratory search and processing 
efficacy  
 146   622.76   89.31   8    7.39 .915  
Thought and affect control 
efficacy   
 146 
 
  377.94 
 
 64.73   5    5.36 
 
 
.822 
 
 
Risk tolerance efficacy   146 
 
  142.36 
 
34.77 
 
  2 
 
   2.88 
 
.604 
 
 
Analytical and inferential efficacy  146   229.37 42.89   3    3.55 .802  
Assertion (Factor E)  226     17.92 4.28 12 .306 .750  
Social boldness (Factor H)  226     15.62 6.37 12 .455 .820  
Anticipated affect  112     13.82 5.90   8 .560 .879  
Immediate affect   112 14.58 5.08   5 .482 .859  
Fatigue   112  5.74 5.71   7 .549 .900  
Decisional procrastination   196 7.89 2.86   5 .204 .700  
Procedural rationality  196    63.10 13.95      48 .996 *  
Rational social influence   150    34.32 10.10   8 .825 .942  
Decision quality   150      7.46 2.42   3 .198 .682  
Bargaining   150 4.15 1.86   1 .152 .627  
Independence   150 8.57 3.45   2 .282 .858  
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of leptokurtosis (i.e., highly peaked) for some indicators that is particularly troublesome in this 
study. Multivariate statistical analyses is sensitive to strong kurtosis (skewness) in the data (see 
Bentler, 2006, Hair et al., 1998) and this violation of normality might compromise any 
inferences drawn from parametric statistical analyses though investigation may still be 
worthwhile according to Cohen, Cohen, West and Aiken (2003).   
Unfortunately, in many fields data often are non-normal and the distributions involved 
are hard to specify. In psychology, for example, Micceri (1989) found that the distributional 
characteristics of 440 large-sample achievement and psychometric measures were all 
significantly non-normal at the alpha .01 significance level. Moreover, several classes of 
contamination were found and Micerri stated that the underlying tenets of normality-assuming 
statistics appear fallacious for these commonly used types of data. Bentler (2006) also makes 
the observation that the assumption of underlying normality may be questionable in some 
contexts. In Table 5.13, for example, the nature of the measured indicators for Immediate 
Affect, Anticipated Affect, and Fatigue makes normality assumptions unreasonable to expect 
given the context within which these indicator measures were observed.   
The next chapter presents the research and sampling design, data analysis techniques, 
the data collection, the procedures followed, the ethical considerations, the data analysis and 
data techniques. The chapter also outlines a description of variables, as well as the substantive 
and statistical hypotheses which focus and refine the broad aim of the study.  
  
CHAPTER SIX 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
A testable assumption underlying the present study is that the simultaneous effects of 
context, managers‘ cognitions, multiple goals, distal and proximal individual variable factors 
and decision-generated affect combine to impact on the volitional allocation of attentional 
resources in the prediction of individual differences of quality of MDM processes and 
outcomes.  The single and primary aim of the study is to establish the postulated ordering of a 
causal path linking individual variable factors (distal influences), self-efficacy beliefs (as 
proximal influences) and temporal processes as a whole, which may bear on the construct of 
MDM as was illustrated in Figure 2.3on page 66.  
Emanating from this model of MDM, the following sections of this chapter describe the 
research and sampling design, the procedures followed, the ethical considerations, and the data 
analysis and data techniques. This is followed by a description of the variables and substantive 
and statistical hypotheses which further focus and refine the broad aim of the study. 
 
Research Design 
 
The clearest way to classify non-experimental quantitative research is to base such a 
classification on the major or primary research objective, that is what the researcher is 
attempting to accomplish in the research study. Johnson (2001) classifies studies into categories 
of descriptive, explanatory and predictive research. Whether the primary objective is 
descriptive depends on answers to the following questions: is the research primarily describing 
a phenomenon, and is the researcher documenting the characteristics of the phenomenon?  If 
the answer is yes (and there is no manipulation) then the term descriptive non-experimental 
research should be applied.  
Further, in order to determine whether the primary objective is explanatory depends on the 
answers to two questions: one is whether the researcher is developing or testing a theory about 
a phenomenon in order to explain ‗how‘ and ‗why‘ it operates. The second question is whether 
the researcher is trying to explain how the phenomenon operates by identifying the causal 
factors that produce change in it. If the answer is yes (and there is no manipulation) then the 
term explanatory non-experimental research should be applied.  
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To determine whether the primary objective was predictive, one needs to answer the 
following question: did the researcher conduct the research in order to predict or forecast some 
event or phenomenon in the future (without regard for cause and effect)? If the answer is yes 
(and there is no manipulation) then the term predictive non-experimental research should be 
applied.  
It has been pointed out that causality is a logical and experimental matter and not a 
statistical issue (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Causality requires variables to be related, the 
existence of temporal antecedence conditions (i.e., changes in latent variable A cause changes 
in latent variable B), and that observed relationships are not due to confounding extraneous 
variables (i.e., the lack of an alternative explanation condition or a non-spuriousness condition). 
Therefore, no other plausible alternative explanation for the observed relationships must exist 
prior to drawing any causal conclusions.  
A cause is a direct effect of a variable on another within the context of a complete 
model, with its magnitude and direction given by a partial regression coefficient. Consequently, 
in order to draw a causal conclusion no other plausible alternative explanation for the observed 
relationship must exist for causality to exist. This is the case when the complete model contains 
all the relevant influences on a given exogenous variable and causal precursors are correctly 
specified. In practice, however, models may omit key predictors and may, accordingly, be 
misspecified so that the model may be inadequate as a ‗causal model‘ in a philosophical sense 
(Byrne, 2001).  A theoretical explanation or rationale for the observed relationships is also 
important in order to make sense of the causal relationship and for the testing of hypotheses 
with new research data.  
Non-experimental research is useful for identifying relationships, but it is weak on time 
order and temporal antecedence conditions (i.e., for variable A to cause changes in variable B, 
then A must occur before B). Non-experimental research is especially weak in ruling out 
alternative explanations because of the problem of spuriousness. As an ex post facto study, the 
variables of interest in this research are not subject to direct manipulation, as the nature of the 
setting within which the study takes place does not provide an opportunity to manipulate the 
variables. Further, as data collection is cross-sectional it cannot rule out cohort effects. 
Moreover, individuals respond to measures at just one point in time and, given the subjective 
nature of some of the measures, it is possible that individuals might respond differently at a 
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different time or context. These are the exact arguments Vancouver et al. (2001) and 
Vancouver et al. (2002) used to argue that an over-reliance on cross-sectional, correlational 
designs might mask the complexity of the relation between self-efficacy beliefs and 
performance. That being said, it is important to acknowledge that experimental methodologies 
lack the ecological validity (i.e., real-life conditions) afforded by the current research design.  
In conclusion, using Johnson‘s (2001) framework the present study can be described as 
an ex post facto explanatory-predictive research study. 
 
Sample 
 
Sampling Design 
 
The available population for this study provided an opportunity for non-probability, 
purposive sampling in order to collect data. The question of sample size addresses the issue of 
generalizing findings to the target population of experienced managers. As the main aim of the 
study is to test a model of relations in MDM, generalization is not the main consideration but 
the model would have to be explored using various samples before final conclusions can be 
reached about generalizability. This means that findings need to be tempered with an 
interpretation of the extent of similar settings to which the findings can be expected to apply.  
 
Population 
  
Sample size has a direct impact on the appropriateness, generalizability and statistical 
power of the use of multivariate techniques (Hair et al., 1998; Pallant, 2001; Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2001). In any study the use of a non-probability sample of the target population requires 
caution when making generalizations of findings to the target population. It was pointed out 
earlier that it is difficult to access measurements obtained from experienced managers. A 
practical and viable option thus was to focus on an available sample of experienced managers. 
The accessible population from which the present sample of participants was selected consisted 
450 of experienced managers in the Western Cape region of South Africa, all employed in 
private and public organizations. The research setting was a private practice that conducts 
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assessments of experienced managers with well-developed cognitive abilities and task-specific 
knowledge.  
 
Defining the Sample 
 
The private practice selects and screens managers (by in-house human resources 
professionals) for appointment in more senior managerial positions, as well as processing 
referrals for executive management assessments. This provided an opportunity for a non-
probability, purposive sampling to collect data for the present research.  The accessible 
population that is assessed annually in the practice consisted of 73% males, 13% black African, 
and 50% employed in middle management positions, with 34% in senior positions.  The sample 
drawn from this accessible population is defined in the following subsection.  
 
Describing the sample  
 
This subsection describes the characteristics of the selected sample of managers (N = 
196) used in this study.  The mean age of the sample was 38.9 years, with a SD of 7.49 (range 
25 to 61 years).  Ethnic black managers constituted 15.8% of the selected sample of managers.  
In terms of gender 30.1% was female and 69.9% male. The levels of education of  the selected 
sample are depicted in Table 6.1. From these analyses the managers in the present sample 
predominantly represented experienced white male managers, aged around 40 years, with 
postgraduate education (77%). 
 
Table 6.1 Education Levels of Managers   
 n  Percent  
Grade 12 10  5.2 
Diploma 34 17.3 
Graduate  79 40.3 
Post-graduate  73 37.2 
Total   196                   100.0 
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Representivity  with regards to job level   
 
The job levels occupied by managers in the sample were recorded in order to ascertain 
what managerial levels they occupied at the time of assessment. Based on the work of Jaques 
(1996), Prinsloo (1992) developed ‗The Cognitive Task Assessor‘ in order to measure level of 
work according to an adapted version of the Stratified Systems Theory. Individuals were 
required to distribute a total of six points among the descriptions that they thought applied most 
to their present position.  These points could be distributed among several options, all options 
or, in extreme instances, a single option.  A maximum score of 144 described the most complex 
job level (level 4), a score of 100 (level 3), a score of 64 (level 2) and a score of 16 described 
level 1. The description of dimensions and continuum of scores which summatively defined job 
level and grouped into four dimensions.      
Job dimension 1: When it comes to management, and/or technical responsibilities at 
work, I am responsible for: my own productivity (1); supervise the work of others (2); manage 
via measurement, control, planning, budgeting (3); do general management (4); manage and 
coordinate various divisions or business units (5); am a senior executive at corporate level or on 
the board of directors (6).  
Job dimension 2: I work with, and am directly responsible for: handling objects, like 
documents (1); diagnoses of symptoms, causes and effects, solving problems (2); managing 
structures, the input, throughput and output of the division (3); longer term policies and 
strategies related to business unit structure and function (4); analyses of opportunities and 
macro-economic factors (e.g. labour, technology) within the national business context (5); and 
moving quickly on international vulnerabilities and opportunities (6).  
Job dimension 3: If I were to make a serious mistake at work, or used poor judgment at 
work, this would directly affect: the quality of the products manufactured, and/or the services 
provided  (1); cycle times, customer satisfaction and productivity (2); divisional profits, general 
process efficiency of the division (3); organizational growth, market share, the long term goal 
achievement of the organization, (4); the strategic direction of the organization (5); loss of 
shareholder value and trust, group / industry reputation, long-term, international sustainability 
of group (6). 
Job dimension 4; I am directly responsible for: day-to-day production and service (1); 
diagnostics and maintenance (2); market segment coverage, pricing, customer satisfaction 
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divisional structures (3); cost leadership product and market focus (4); national mergers, 
strategic alliances or divestitures, generating and evaluating broad strategy (5); international 
resource allocation, representing group interests in international public domain, significant long 
term investments, the future health of the group (6).  
The total mean job dimension score obtained was 71.23 (SD = 19.5; n = 190). The 
modal score was 48 and the median was 71. The representation of managers across job 
dimension is depicted in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2 Managers Across Job Levels 
 n Percent  
Level 4 17   8.7 
Level 3         101 51.5 
Level 2  43 21.9 
Level 1  29 14.8 
Incorrect responses   6  3.1 
Total         196        100.0 
              
Most managers (60%) occupied positions (levels 3 and 4) that entailed the management 
and coordination of divisions or business units at a senior or executive level. Level 3 and 4 job 
dimensions entail the analyses of opportunities and macro-economic factors within a national 
business or international context. In addition, these job levels require individuals to set the 
strategic direction of the organization, with individuals accountable for shareholder value and 
group/industry reputation, long-term sustainability, investments, and the future health of the 
business through national mergers, strategic alliances or divestures.   
The sample reflected the expected profile in the Western Cape in that black managers 
are a minority in terms of the population demographics. In terms of population the highly 
urbanised Western Cape is home to about 24.7% of the black population with the white and 
coloured population amounting to 74.5%  (Provincial Decision-Making Enabling Project, 
2005). The fact that the sample is reflective of experienced managers in industry-specific 
companies in the Western Cape region of South Africa is however not necessarily generalizable 
to other geographical areas, economic sectors and countries. Qualitatively different situations 
or industry characteristics are thus likely to covary and it may be that smaller entrepreneurial or 
significantly larger enterprises could provide different conclusions. Future research using larger 
samples within-situations to test the individual and situation interaction effects might aid 
further modifications and refinements of the model to advance insights into MDM. 
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Consequently, solutions and generalities (external validity threats) in this specific setting may 
need to be explored in similar settings (Welman & Kruger, 2001).  
 
Data Collection 
 
The following subsection provides information on how data for the present research was 
collected.  
 
Procedure  
 
The setting of an assessment practice uses compliant assessment procedures in terms of 
the Employment Equity Act of South Africa (Act No. 55 of 1998), and the choice of 
instruments is determined by valid and reliable psychometric properties. This specific practice 
is also governed by the ethical and best practice guidelines as specified by the South African 
Society for Industrial Psychology (1998) and the internationally recognised best practice 
assessment guidelines published by the International Test Commission (2000). A registered 
industrial psychologist met with each nominated assessment candidate to explain the purpose of 
assessment and to clarify expectations. The full-day process started with biographical data 
collection, followed by a structured interview of approximately 45 minutes. 
The data collection for this research was incorporated into the standard assessment 
procedures that the practice employs. Candidates thus participated in the research voluntarily 
and with informed consent. In the present study, the researcher formalized the variables on an a 
priori basis prior to actual measurement, and the collection of data followed in a temporal 
order. The exogenous variables (cognitive ability and social self-confidence) were measured 
first, followed by the measurement of the endogenous variables (starting with self-efficacy 
beliefs). Measured in close temporal proximity, self-efficacy beliefs as a prospective measure 
and the self-description of experienced affect as a retrospective measure were integrated with 
the simulations and personality traits measures, in order to assess individuals‘ subjective 
context-specific appraisals of their competence and reactions over a brief rating period.  The 
temporal order of measures were: cognitive abilities followed by self-efficacy beliefs and 
personality measures. The simulations followed thereafter. This temporal order of data 
collection followed Bandura‘s (1997, p. 67) assertion that the contribution of self-efficacy 
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beliefs and subsequent behaviour is revealed most accurately when they are measured in close 
temporal proximity, since the strength of self-efficacy beliefs is likely to ―waver as the time of 
performance draws near‖.   
The measurement of individuals‘ systematic-comprehensive decision process was 
completed first after an appropriate briefing and instructions. This was followed by a 30-minute 
role-play simulation with a registered industrial psychologist. One observer, trained in the role-
play observation scale, was responsible for taking notes and scoring. On completion of the 
simulations a self-descriptive measure to index the phenomenological experiences of decision-
generated affect was admininistered.  The results of all measures were processed and 
downloaded onto a database from which relevant data for the purposes of this research were 
extracted. It must be noted that this data collection differed from the standard managerial 
assessment in that it included additional measures on self-efficacy beliefs, decisional 
procrastination, and the measurement of phenomenological experiences of decision-generated 
affect and fatigue.  
 
Ethical Considerations 
 
The decision to undertake the present research rested on a considered judgment about 
how best to contribute to psychological science and human welfare.  The research proposal was 
submitted to the Human Ethics Committee of the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University for 
approval. On the basis of this consideration, the researcher carried out the investigation with 
respect and concern for the dignity and welfare of the individuals who participated, taking 
cognizance of statutory and professional standards that govern the conduct of research with 
human participants.  
The researcher provided information to each individual to help them understand the 
study, as well as to inform them as to what they would be asked to respond to during the 
assessment, the risks and benefits, and their rights as study subjects. It was pointed out that the 
research has been approved by the Human Ethics Committee of the Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan University.  It was also pointed out that some of the measures to be used during 
the managerial assessment will be clearly marked ―for research purposes only‖. Assurance was 
given in this regard that the findings would not be used for the purposes of the assessment they 
had been nominated for.  Moreover, each individual was informed that participation in the 
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research was completely voluntary and should they wish not to participate, they would incur no 
consequence to which they might be entitled.  Assurance was also given that they would remain 
anonymous. Following this briefing by the researcher a written informed consent to participate 
was obtained [See Appendix I and II for an example of consent documentation]. 
Other than the managerial assessment findings, the information collected for the 
purposes of this study was shared with participants who requested such information in a verbal 
feedback session with the researcher. Furthermore, due to the provisional nature of the study, 
findings collected for the purposes of the study were not disclosed to the source of referral as 
part of the assessment findings.  
 
Data Analysis and Techniques 
 
The choice of data analysis techniques is dependent on the type of research questions 
posed by the present study. This necessitated the use of multivariate analysis techniques to deal 
with multiple relationships of dependent and independent variables that are interrelated in such 
a way that their different effects cannot meaningfully be interpreted separately. Statistical 
techniques that accommodate multiple dependent variables (e.g., multivariate analysis of 
variance and canonical correlation) are thus not applicable in this situation because they allow 
for only a single relationship between dependent and independent variables (Cohen et al., 2003; 
Hair et al., 1998; Hair et al., 2006). The following subsection elaborates on the data analysis 
techniques that were employed to test the propositions.  
 
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) 
 
 The use of SEM sets it apart from the older generation of multivariate procedures. By 
demanding that the pattern of intervariable relations be specified a priori, SEM lends itself well 
to the analysis of data for inferential purposes in contrast to most other multivariate procedures. 
Traditional multivariate procedures (e.g., those rooted in regression or general linear models) 
are incapable of either assessing or correcting for measurement error, whereas SEM provides 
explicit estimates of these error variance parameters. Traditional methods assume that error(s) 
in the explanatory (i.e., independent) variables disappears. However, this in fact ignores error 
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which may lead ultimately to serious inaccuracies, especially when errors are sizeable (Byrne, 
2001).  
Furthermore, SEM is suitable for testing the entire system of direct and mediated 
relations in the causal structure, not just the contribution of isolated predictors (Hayashi, 
Bentler, & Yuan, 2008). In a study that compared regression to SEM methodologies in terms of 
superiority in identifying mediation structures, Iacobucci, Saldanha and Deng (2007) reported 
an advantage of SEM over regression due to the fact that the standard errors in the SEM 
approach were reduced because of the simultaneous estimation of all parameters in the SEM 
model. Iacobucci, Saldanha and Deng (2007, p. 145) comment:  
Fitting components of models simultaneously is always statistically 
superior to doing so in a piece-meal fashion… The SEM results work to 
the researcher‘s benefit, in being more likely to detect existing patterns of 
mediation, being truer to the known population structural characteristics, 
and finally in also being statistically more defensible, given the elegance 
of the simultaneous estimation.  
 
Consequently, even with the simplest of data sets SEM is seen to be the superior data 
analysis strategy. Structural equation modeling (SEM) is commonly used (see, for example, 
MacCallum & Austin, 2000) and a significant number of the studies reviewed in Chapter Three 
used this analysis technique. Furthermore, Viswesvaran and Ones (1995, p. 881) note that 
―structural equations modeling facilitates building theories of work behaviour that capture the 
richness and complexity of real world phenomena, a richness and complexity uncapturable in 
individual studies‖. Moreover, SEM is valuable in estimating the unique contribution of self-
efficacy beliefs to subsequent performance after controlling for a host of other possible 
determinants (Bandura, 1997). The presence of multiple relationships of dependent and 
independent variables implies that SEM can estimate the unique contribution of self-efficacy 
beliefs to the prediction of the quality of MDM processes after controlling for distal individual 
variable factors. SEM can, thus, evaluate the patterns of influences as a whole in the proposed 
model and disentangle the unique contribution of self-beliefs within the posited relations 
(Bandura & Locke, 2003).  Based on this assertion, the researcher adopted SEM as the data 
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analysis strategy of choice. The statistical package that is used in the analysis was EQS 6.1 
(Bentler, 2006) and AMOS 17.0 for Windows (Arbuckle, 2008). 
 
Structural  and Measurement Model 
 
The true value of SEM arises from the benefits of using the structural and measurement 
models simultaneously, each playing distinct roles in the overall analysis.The structural model 
of relations as illustrated in Figure 2.3 is decomposed into two basic components: the 
measurement and the structural models. The measurement model defines relations between the 
latent variables (i.e., unobserved constructs) and their respective indicators that provide the link 
between measurements and the underlying constructs they are designed to measure. The 
measurement model is used to assess the contribution of each indicator measure as well as its 
reliability in the estimation of the relationships between the exogenous and endogenous 
variables. Thus it represents a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) model that specifies the 
pattern by which each measure loads on a particular exogenous or endogenous variable.  
In contrast, the structural model is the ‗path‘ model which defines the relations between 
the exogenous (independent) and endogenous (dependent) variables. Accordingly, it specifies 
the manner by which particular variables directly or indirectly influence (i.e., cause) changes in 
the values of other variables in the model.  
In the next subsection the primary latent variables and their measured indicators are 
presented followed by a discussion of the measurement model. 
 
Primary Latent Variables and Measured Indicators 
 
The proposed structural model as depicted in Figure 2.3 contains six constructs deliberately 
created to represent a collection of concrete forms of behaviour relevant to MDM. As abstract 
phenomena these constructs represent latent variables (unobserved) that must operationally be 
defined in terms of behaviour believed to represent it. As such, the latent variables are linked to  
the direct measurement of an observed variable, albeit the indirect measurement of an 
unobserved variable (i.e., the underlying construct). Table 5.1 identified these latent variables 
as exogenous (independent variables) and endogenous variables (independent variables).  
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The standard LISREL notations were used to identify the latent variables and 
measurement indicators (see, for example, Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2000; Jöreskog & 
Sörbom, 2003). The exogenous variables (i.e., cognitive ability and social self-confidence) are 
represented by  (ksi‘s) with their indicators represented by X‘s. The endogenous variables 
(i.e., self-efficacy beliefs, decision-generated affect, allocation of attentional resources and the 
quality of MDM processes and outcomes) are represented by  (eta‘s) with their indicators 
represented by Y's. Table  6.3 lists the latent variables and their measurement indicators. 
 
 
The next subsection presents the measurement model in greater detail. 
 
 
 
Table 6.3 Latent Variables and their Indicators 
Exogenous variables  
(ξi; i = 1, 2,)  
Indicators  
(Xj; j j = 1,…4)  
Cognitive ability (ξ1)  Verbal ability (X1)  
Numerical ability (X2)  
Social self-confidence (ξ2)  Assertion (X3)  
Social boldness (X4)  
Endogenous variables  
(εi; i = 1, … 4)  
Indicators  
(Yj; j = 1, ……….14)  
Self-efficacy beliefs (ε1)  Social influence efficacy (Y1)  
Exploratory search and processing 
efficacy (Y2)  
Thought and affect control efficacy (Y3)  
Risk tolerance efficacy (Y4) 
Analytical and inferential efficacy (Y5) 
 
Decision-generated affect (ε2)  Anticipated affect (Y6) 
Immediate affect (Y7) 
 
Allocation of attentional resources (ε3)  Fatigue (Y8) 
Decisional procrastination (Y9) 
 
MDM processes & outcomes (ε4)  
 
Procedural rationality (Y10) 
Decision quality (Y11) 
Rational social influence (Y12) 
Bargaining (Y13) 
Independence (Y14) 
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The measurement model 
 
The measurement model specifies the correspondence of indicators to the exogenous 
and endogenous variables. Diamantopoulos and Siguaw (2000, p. 89) state: 
Clearly, unless we can trust the quality of our measures, then any 
assessment of the substantive relations of interest (i.e., the links among 
the latent variables themselves) will be problematic. Thus an 
evaluation of the measurement part of the model should precede the 
detailed evaluation of the structural part of the model. 
 
To specify the measurement model, a confirmatory approach is adopted. Based on both 
conceptual and empirical grounds, the present researcher used and selected multiple indicator 
measures and linked these to their appropriate exogenous and endogenous variables on an a 
priori basis.  There is no upper limit for the number of indicators for a variable, though as a 
general rule it is important to work with fewer indicators in relation to sample size according to 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2001).  Cognitive ability is represented by two indicator variables, 
social self-confidence by two, self-efficacy beliefs by five, decision-generated affect by two, 
the allocation of attentional resources by two and the quality of MDM processes and outcomes 
are represented by five measured indicators.  
The second step involves a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to verify the 
psychometric quality of the measurement model and the magnitude of the relations between 
latent variables. Error associated with measured indicators also represents measurement error, 
which reflects on the indicators‘ adequacy in measuring the related variables. In this regard, 
SEM takes a confirmatory, rather than an exploratory, approach to the data analysis and thus 
sets it apart from the older generation of multivariate procedures since these techniques assume 
that error(s) in the explanatory (i.e., independent) variables vanishes. Thus, applying those 
methods when there is error and ignoring error may lead, ultimately, to serious inaccuracies 
(Byrne, 2006). SEM provides explicit estimates of these error variance parameters. Error 
associated with exogenous and endogenous variables represents measurement error that reflects 
on the adequacy of measured indicators in measuring the related variable underlying factors. 
Measurement errors for indicators of exogenous variables are denoted by delta (δ) and for 
indicators of endogenous variables as epsilon (ε). In fact, Byrne (2001) asserts that it is worth 
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noting that both measurement and structural error terms, in essence, represent unobserved 
variables. 
The measurement model thus not only provides reliability data but also establishes the 
independence of the variables in the proposed model. Once it is known that the measurement 
model is operating adequately, it provides for confidence in findings related to the assessment 
in order to determine the adequacy of its goodness of fit to the sample data. The hypothesized 
CFA model appears in Figure 6.1. 
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Figure 6.1 Hypothesized CFA Model  
 
Composite reliability 
 
Beyond the examination of the loadings for each indicator, a principal measure used to 
assess the measurement model is the composite reliability of each variable. Reliability as a 
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measure of the internal consistency of the latent variable indicators depicts the degree to which 
they ‗indicate‘ the variables under consideration. More reliable measures provide greater 
confidence that the individual indicators are all consistent in their measurements. A commonly 
used threshold value for acceptable reliability is .70, but values below this are deemed 
acceptable if the research is exploratory in nature (Hair et al., 1998). 
The reliability and variance extracted for the variables were computed separately for 
each multiple indicator variable in the model and should exceed .50 (i.e., approximately 
correspond to a standardized loading of .70). Diamantopoulos and Siguaw (2000, p. 90) suggest 
the following to calculate composite reliability values: 
ρc = (Σλ)2/[(Σλ)2 + Σ(ζ)]  
where: ρc = composite reliability; λ = completely standardized indicator loadings; ζ = 
completely standardized indicator error variances (i.e. variances of the δ‘s and ε‘s); and Σ = 
summation over the indicators of the latent variable. 
A satisfactory composite reliability greater than .60 is accepted to indicate that the 
composite indicators are linked to a given variable. Hair et al. (1998) also suggest variance 
extracted (ρv) as another measure of reliability. This measure indicates the amount of variance 
ascribed to the variable in relation to the amount of variance due to measurement error. 
Consequently, it reflects the overall amount of variance in the indicators accounted for by the 
variable. Higher variance extracted values occur when the indicators are truly representative of 
the latent variable  (ρv values less than .05 indicate that the measurement error accounts for a 
greater amount of variance in the indicators than the underlying variable does). If this is indeed 
the case, then serious doubts arise regarding the soundness of the indicators and/or the variable 
itself.  
Variance extracted is calculated according to Diamantopoulos and Siguaw (2000) as: 
pv = (Σλ2)/[(Σλ2) + Σ(ζ)]  
where: λ = completely standardized indicator loadings; ζ = completely standardized indicator 
error variances (i.e. variances of the δ‘s and ε‘s); and Σ = summation over the indicators of the 
latent variable. 
In contrast to the measurement model, the structural model represents the linear 
relationships among measured indicators and the exogenous (independent) to endogenous 
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(dependent) variables with the smallest number of causal paths. The next subsection introduces 
the structural model. 
 
The Structural Model 
 
Based on the theoretical assertion and empirical research the structural model allows for 
the specification of the regression structure among the indicators and, accordingly, specifies the 
manner by which the proposed exogenous and endogenous variables directly or indirectly 
(mediate) influence or ‗cause‘ changes in the values of the subsequent variables in the model. 
Hair et al. (1998) assert that causal relationships can take many forms and meanings, from strict 
causation to the less well-defined relationships encountered in behavioural research, such as the 
‗causes‘ or the ‗reasons‘ of performance.  
A researcher can assume causation between two variables in the theoretical justification 
provided to support such analyses. Causal assertions can thus only be made that are based on: a 
sufficient association between the two variables; the existence of a temporal antecedence of the 
cause versus the effect; a lack of alternative causal variables; and a theoretical basis for the 
relationships.  Accordingly, ―although in many instances all of the established criteria for 
making causal assertions are not strictly met, causal assertions can possibly be made if the 
relationships are based on a theoretical rationale‖ (Hair et al., 1998, p. 592-593). 
In order to determine the goodness of fit between the hypothesized model and the 
sample data, structure is imposed on the sample data to test how well the observed data fits the 
restricted and specified causal relationships of the proposed structural model. Failure of the 
model to fit the data results in model falsification, whereas a good fit supports the theoretical 
arguments that the model is, at least, one model that provides adequate goodness-of-fit to the 
sample data. The full structural model of relations together with indicators is depicted in Figure 
6.2. 
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Figure 6.2 The Structural and Measurement Model of MDM 
Where: Verbal ability (X1); Numerical ability (X2); Assertion (X3); Social boldness (X4): Social influence efficacy (Y1); Exploratory search and processing efficacy (Y2); 
Thought and affect control efficacy (Y3); Risk tolerance efficacy  (Y4); Analytical and inferential efficacy (Y5); Anticipted affect  (Y6); Immediate affect (Y7);  Fatigue (Y8); 
Decsional procrastination (Y9); Procedural rationality (Y10); Decision quality (Y11); Rational social influence (Y12); Bargaining (Y13); Independence (Y14) 
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The arrows in the model represent specific relationships between variables with a 
straight arrow indicating a direct causal relationship from one variable to another and curved 
arrows (between cognitive ability and self-efficacy beliefs, social self-confidence and self-
efficacy beliefs) indicating that two variables covary.  It was pointed out earlier that MDM is 
embedded in a rich nomological network that contains many antecedent and/or consequential 
latent variables. The most critical error in developing theoretically based models is the 
omission of one or more key variables, a problem known as specification error (Hair, 
Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998).  The fact that the selection of latent variables is made on 
an a priori basis represents error in the prediction of endogenous factors from exogenous latent 
variables and is depicted by zeta ( ).  The relationship between the variables and their 
indicators is captured by lambda ( ). Measurement errors for indicators of exogenous variables 
are denoted by delta (δ) and for indicators of endogenous variables as epsilon (ε). The non-
directional (covariance) relationship between the two exogenous variables (i.e., cognitive 
ability and social self-confidence) is depicted by a curved line with double arrows and 
designated by φ (phi).The regression effect of ‘s on ‘s is represented by  (gamma) and the 
regression effect of ‘s on ‘s by  (beta).   
 
Model Identification 
 
A model is identified if it is possible to obtain a unique solution for every parameter. An 
over-identified model is the goal for all structural models since this suggests the existence of 
more information in the data matrix than the number of parameters to be estimated (i.e., a 
positive number of degrees of freedom). This is desirable since an overidentified model offers 
the opportunity to use one set of estimates to test the model. Degrees of freedom represent the 
number of sources of information available to estimate the sampling distribution of the data 
after all model parameters have been estimated. The goal in fitting the model is to maximize 
the degrees of freedom. 
 The number of degrees of freedom as proposed by Hair et al. (1998) was calculated as:  
df = ½[(p + q)(p + q + 1)] – t;  
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 where; t = number of parameters to be identified, i.e., number of estimated coefficients 
in the proposed model (free parameters); and  s = p(the number of endogenous indicators) + 
q(the number of exogenous indicators) calculated as (p + q)(p + q + 1). 
A model is overidentified if t < s/2 and this is desirable. Furthermore, the number of 
parameters to be estimated should also be smaller than the sample size (i.e., t < n). 
It is also important to investigate the statistical power associated with testing the model. 
Unfortunately, this issue is more often than not neglected, but it is important to understand that 
any model evaluation would be incomplete if power considerations were ignored. Statistical 
power refers to the probability of rejecting an incorrect model and Diamantopoulos and Siguaw 
(2000, p. 93) explain this as follows; 
When we test a model‘s fit by, say, the chi-square test, we emphasize the probability 
of making a Type I error, i.e. rejecting a correct model; this probability is captured 
by the significance level, α which is usually set at 0,05. A significant chi-square 
result indicates that if the null hypothesis is true (i.e. the model is correct in the 
population), then the probability of incorrectly rejecting it is low (i.e. less than five 
times out of 100 if α= 0,05). However, another error that can occur is not to reject 
an incorrect model. This type of error is known as Type II error and the probability 
associated with it is denoted as β. The probability of avoiding a Type II error is, 
therefore, 1-β and it is this probability that indicates the power of our test; thus the 
power of the test tells us how likely it is that a false null hypothesis (i.e. incorrect 
model) will be rejected. 
 
The importance of conducting a power analysis stems from the critical role that sample 
size plays in the decisions made in model testing. In large samples the decision to reject a null 
hypothesis of exact fit (or a null hypothesis of close fit) becomes problematic because it is not 
clear whether the model was rejected because of severe misspecifications in the model or to the 
(too) high sensitivity of the test to detect even minor flaws in the model. Conversely, in small 
samples the decision not to reject the null hypothesis of exact/close fit results in ambiguity 
because it is not clear whether the decision was due to the accuracy of the model or to the 
insensitivity of the test to detect specification errors in the model. 
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The present researcher used two types of power calculations. First, the power associated 
with a test of exact fit [i.e. testing the null hypothesis that the model fits perfectly in the 
population (as done by the conventional model fit test)], taking into account that this may only 
be an approximation of reality and thus rarely fits exactly in the population. In addition, the 
reseacher applied power associated with a test of close fit. In this instance, the null hypothesis 
states that the model has a close but imperfect fit in the population and takes the error of 
approximation into account and is, therefore, more realistic. The power of the test, however, 
becomes a function of the degrees of freedom in the model and all other things being equal, the 
higher the degrees of freedom, the greater the power of the test (Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 
2000).   
Power tables compiled by MacCallum et al. (1996) make provision for degrees of 
freedom ≤ 100 and N ≤ 500. The researcher used a SPSS translation of the SAS syntax 
provided by MacCallum et al. (1996) in order to derive power estimates for the tests of exact 
and close fit, with a significance level (α) of 0,05 and a sample size of 196.  
 
Model Size 
 
In addition to its role in determining statistical power, sample size also affects the 
generalizability of the results through the ratio of measured indicators to variables. A low ratio 
runs the risk of ‗overfitting‘ to the sample, making the results too specific to the sample and, 
consequently, lacking external validity (i.e., generalizability). A rule of thumb is to have at 
least 10 observations per indicator (Savalei & Bentler, 2006).  The proposed model employs 14 
indicators. The sample size of 196 thus met the requirement of 10 observations per indicator.  
Hair et al. (1998), however, recommend that when the data violate the assumptions of 
multivariate normality, the ratio of respondents to parameters needs to increase with a generally 
accepted ratio of 15 respondents for each parameter (210 in the case of the present study).  
Further, these authors recommend a sample size of 200 as being the ‘critical sample size‘. A 
sample size of about 200 is adequate for small to medium models (Ullman, 1998).  The sample 
of 196, accordingly, was regarded as a reasonably adequate sample size for the purposes of the 
present study. 
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Input Matrix 
 
Other than the sample size that is required to meet research objectives the researcher 
was fortunate enough to have no missing data. In order to address the estimation of the 
specified model, a correlation matrix was used as input data because the objective in the present 
study was the exploration of a pattern of interrelationships/correlations. Use of correlations is 
appropriate when the objective of the research is to understand the pattern of relationships. 
Furthermore, correlations among the latent variables aid in nomological validity (Hair et al. 
2006). Research has shown that the correlation matrix provides a more conservative estimate of 
the significance of coefficients. However, results should be interpreted cautiously since they 
may not be generalizable to different situations (Hair et al., 1998). 
In conclusion, the proposed structural model met the necessary conditions that provided 
confidence to proceed with the analysis. The theoretical model with the path diagram was 
specified in more formal terms through a series of equations that defined: the measurement 
model specifying which indicators measured which variables; the structural equations linking 
the variables; and a set of matrices to indicate the hypothesized correlations among variables. 
Each type of equation or matrix is outlined in the next section. 
 
Estimation Procedure 
 
Given in practice that most data fail to meet the assumption of multivariate normality 
(Bentler, 2006), this makes SEM sensitive to the distributional characteristics of the data, 
particularly the departure from multivariate normality or a strong kurtosis in the data (Byrne, 
1998, 2006; Hair et al., 1998; Hair et al., 2006). The standard, and most widely researched, 
method of estimation used in SEM is Maximum Likelihood (ML). ML has been found to 
provide valid results for sample sizes between 100 to 150. This is a very robust estimation 
method that functions well under less-than-perfect conditions (i.e. non-normality) (Hair et al., 
2006). Despite the restrictive normality assumption the ML parameter estimates are actually 
fairly robust to the violation of this assumption and, ML is thus the preferred method of 
estimation even if this assumption is violated. The standard errors for parameter estimates as 
well as the model fit are, however, affected by non-normality (see Bentler, 2006; Savalei & 
Bentler, 2006). The potential sensitivity of ML to non-normality, however, raised a need for an 
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alternative estimation approach. Given the rejection of the null hypothesis of multivariate 
normality, robust maximum likelihood (RML) to fit the measurement and structural models 
(see Bentler, 2006) was employed. In the sample of 196 managers there was no missing data.  
 
Model Evaluation 
  
A wide range of goodness-or-fit indices are available that can be used as summary 
measures of a model's overall fit. Unfortunately, none of them is unequivocally superior to the 
rest in all circumstances, because particular indices have been shown to operate somewhat 
differently given sample size, estimation procedure, model complexity, violation of the 
underlying assumptions of multivariate normality and variable independence, or any 
combination thereof (see, for example, Bentler, 2006; Bentler & Yuan, 1999; Byrne, 2006; 
MacCallum & Austin, 2000; McDonald & Ho, 2002; McIntosh, 2007; Savalei & Bentler, 2006; 
Tomarken & Waller, 2005).  
The researcher evaluated the goodness-of-fit for the measurement model and the 
specific evidence of construct validity using AMOS 17.0 for Windows (Arbuckle, 2008) and 
EQS (Bentler, 2006). Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) recommend EQS as the data analysis 
program of choice when data are non-normal. It is also the only program that offers the Satorra-
Bentler scaled χ² and residual-based tests (Yuan-Bentler Residual-Based Test Statistic and the 
Yuan-Bentler Residual-Based F-Statistic) as the most accurate methods for dealing with non-
normal data.  
The next subsection presents the fit statistics employed in the present study.   
 
Absolute Fit Statistics 
 
The following absolute fit statistics, the Satorra-Bentler Scaled Chi-square, (SB-χ²), the 
Yuan-Bentler Residual-Based Test Statistic, the Yuan-Bentler Residual-Based F-Statistic, and 
the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), were used. These absolute fit indices 
are direct measures of how well the proposed model as specified reproduces the observed data. 
As such, they provide the most basic assessment of how well the model and theory fits the 
sample data. The SB-χ² scaled test and the Yuan-Bentler residual based and F-tests are 
presently the most reliable test statistics under distributional violation (Bentler, 2006). 
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A nonsignificant χ² is desired to develop a model that fits the data.  The null hypothesis 
(Ho) postulates that specification of the factor loadings, factor variances/covariances, and error 
variances for the MDM model are valid and χ² tests the extent to which this specification is 
true. The probability value associated with χ² represents the likelihood of obtaining a χ² value 
that exceeds the χ² value when Ho is true. Thus, the higher the probability associated with χ², 
the closer is the fit between the hypothesized model under Ho and the perfect fit (Byrne, 2001).  
However, it is not very practical to assume that data must fit the proposed model perfectly since 
any model is an approximation of reality. Moreover, χ² is influenced by sample size, that is, as 
the sample increases so does the value of χ². In addition, χ² is also influenced by model 
complexity. As the number of indicators (observed variables) increase (i.e., making the model 
more complex), so does χ². In order to address these negative consequences of χ², other fit 
indices are used to compliment the evaluation of model fit.  
Byrne (2001) notes that the RMSEA has only recently been recognized as one of the 
most informative criteria in covariance structure modeling. The RMSEA takes into account the 
error of approximation in the population and asks the question of how well the model, with 
unknown but optimally chosen parameter values, fits the population covariance matrix if it 
were available. This discrepancy, as measured by RMSEA, is expressed per degree of freedom 
and makes the index sensitive to the number of estimated parameters in the model (i.e., the 
complexity of the model). Zero values are desired where values < .05 indicate a good fit and 
values as high as .08 represent reasonable errors of approximation in the population. The 
routine use of the RMSEA is argued for at least three reasons: it is adequately sensitive to 
model misspecification; it yields appropriate conclusions regarding model quality; and it is 
possible to build confidence intervals around RMSEA values (Bentler, 2006).  
Some authors note that RMSEA values ranging from .08 to .10 indicate mediocre fit, 
and those greater than .10 indicate poor fit. Bentler (2006) and Byrne (2001) note that the use 
of confidence intervals is valuable in order to assess the precision of RMSEA estimates since it 
can provide assistance in the evaluation of model fit.  Presented with a small RMSEA but a 
wide confidence interval, it is possible to conclude that the estimated discrepancy value is quite 
imprecise, thereby negating any possibility of accurately determining the degree of fit in the 
population. In contrast, a narrow confidence interval argues for good precision of the RMSEA 
value in reflecting model fit in the population.  EQS (Bentler, 2006) generates a report to 
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indicate a 90% interval around the RMSEA value. In contrast to point estimates of model fit 
(which do not reflect the imprecision of the estimate), confidence intervals can yield more 
information, thereby providing more assistance in the evaluation of model fit.  
 
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) 
 
The difference between the observed covariance matrix (derived from the observed 
data) and the estimated covariance matrix (derived from the theoretical model) is known as a 
residual. Thus, the error in prediction for each covariance term creates a residual. By squaring 
these residuals and obtaining their average residual it is possible to determine the square root of 
these mean residuals resulting in the root mean square residual (RMSR). The standardized root 
mean residual (SRMR) is thus an alternative fit index that can be used to compare different 
models with each other. The SRMR is known as a badness-of-fit measures with higher values 
being indicative of poor model fit. An arbitrary cut-off of between .05 and .08 is suggested for 
SRMR (Byrne, 1998).  
 
Incremental and Parsimony Fit Statistics 
 
Indices of comparative fit that use as a baseline an independence or null model, contrast 
the ability of the model to reproduce the observed covariance matrix with that of a model 
known a priori to fit the data poorly, namely one that postulates no paths between the variables 
in the model. Bentler-Bonett Normed Fit Index (NFI) is one of the classic fit indices. It ranges 
between 0 and 1 and a model with perfect fit would produce an NFI of 1. A value >.90 was 
originally considered representative of a well-fitting model and a revised cutoff value close to 
.95 has recently been suggested. Bentler (2006), however, notes that NFI is affected by sample 
size and may not reach higher values even when the model is correct.  
Parsimonious fit measures adjust the measures of fit to provide a comparison between 
models with differing numbers of estimated coefficients, the purpose being to determine the 
amount of fit achieved by each estimated coefficient. More complex models are expected to fit 
the data better, so fit measures must be relative to model complexity before comparisons 
between models can be made. Like other fit indices, relatively high values represent relatively 
better fit to compare one model to another. The present researcher used the following 
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combination to conclude satisfactory measurement model fit. The NFI has been revised to take 
sample size into account and, consequently, the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) is a better fit 
measure of model complexity.   
The expected cross validation index (ECVI) focuses on overall error and assesses 
whether a model is likely to cross-validate across samples of the same size from the same 
population. This value is not informative in itself as there is no appropriate range of values for 
the ECVI coefficient. In order to assess a model's ECVI, it needs to be compared against the 
ECVI values of other models and the model with the smallest ECVI value is then chosen as 
representing the greatest potential for replication (Byrne, 1998; Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 
2000). Other models used for comparison purposes include the independence model, that is a 
model of complete independence among all variables (i.e. all observed variables are 
uncorrelated) as the most restricted model. The saturated model, on the other hand, is a vacuous 
model in the sense that it is guaranteed to fit any set of data perfect when no constraints are 
placed on the population moments.  
Finally, various authors conclude that satisfactory model fit is indicated by CFI values 
no smaller than .90, RMSEA values no higher than .08, and SRMR values no higher than .10 
(see, for example, Hair et al., 2006).  
 
Model Modification 
 
Statistical hypothesis testing can be a poor tool for choosing a model (Arbuckle, 2008).  
A model can be useful without being true and rejection of a model on purely statistical grounds 
(particularly with a large sample) is not necessarily a condemnation. Although the wide range 
of fit indices provides for a good sense of how well the model fits the empirical data, fit 
indexes alone cannot envelop all that needs to be known about a model in order to judge its 
adequacy.  In fact, scientific progress could be impeded if fit coefficients (even appropriate 
ones) are used as the primary criterion for judging the adequacy of a model (Byrne, 2001). 
Byrne also states that an exclusive reliance on goodness-of-fit indices provides no guarantee 
that a model is useful and it is entirely possible for a model to fit well and yet be incorrectly 
specified. As fit indices yield only information on a model‘s lack of fit, they do not reflect the 
extent to which a model is plausible, since the researcher makes this judgment. Thus, any 
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assessment of model adequacy must be based on multiple criteria that take into account 
theoretical, statistical, as well as practical considerations.   
 
Post Hoc Analyses 
 
Model modification indices are aimed at answering the question as to whether any of 
the fixed parameters, when freed in the model, would significantly improve the parsimonious 
fit of the model. Undoubtedly, post hoc model fitting in the analysis of covariance structures is 
problematic. With multiple model specifications, there is the risk of capitalizing on chance 
factors because model modification may be driven by characteristics of the particular sample 
on which the model was tested (e.g., sample size, sample heterogeneity) (see, for example, 
Byrne, 2001).  Further, with multiple model specifications, there is increased risk of making 
either a Type I or Type II error. Hair et al. (1998), in this regard, state that such modifications 
need to be done with utmost care and only after deliberate, clear and convincing theoretical 
justification. Savalei and Bentler (2006, p. 346) are of the opinion that there is nothing wrong 
with trying to find a set of relationships that explains observed covariances: ―After all, data can 
be expensive to obtain, and throwing them out without fully discovering what they have to say 
is not the wisest thing to do‖. One approach to addressing the problems associated with post 
hoc model fitting is to employ a cross-validation strategy whereby the final model derived from 
the post hoc analyses is tested on a second (or more) independent sample(s)  (i.e., estimated on 
a separate set of data) before the modified model can be accepted (see, for example, Bentler, 
2006; Hair et al., 1998; Savalei & Bentler, 2006; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001; Ullman, 1998). 
The present study was approached in order to evaluate the causal relations in MDM and 
not only to improve model fit.  It was thus realistic to recognize the obvious impracticality in 
the termination of all subsequent model analyses. Hypothesized models represent only 
approximations of reality and thus cannot be expected to fit real-world phenomena exactly as it 
is. Thus, in the interest of future research, it is justified to explore in depth the question of why 
a model is not fitting in order to aid insights into the multiplicity of antecedents and 
consequences in MDM.  
The present researcher also formulated additional research hypotheses in order to 
explore the direct and independent and combined contributions of individual variable factors 
and self-efficacy beliefs to the prediction of the quality of MDM processes.  The first segment 
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of the posited model specifies the independent functional relations of cognitive ability (ξ1), 
social self-confidence (ξ2) and self-efficacy beliefs (ε1) on decision-generated affect (ε2).  
 
Exogenous and Endogenous Measurement Model 
 
The measurement model (depicted in Figure 6.1) can be expressed in terms of the 
following set of measurement equations. The loadings (λXj) of the observed Xj variables on the 
exogenous variables (ξi), are expressed as X = ΛXξ + δ, and the loadings (λYj) of the observed 
Yj variables on the endogenous latent variables (εi) are expressed as Y = Λyε + ε. These 
measurement model equations are listed in Table 6.4.   
 
The proposed structural model, which serves as the basis for this study, can be 
expressed as a set of structural equations that represent the research problems that will be 
  
Table 6.4 Measurement Model Equations 
Exogenous indicators Exogenous variables Error 
X1 = λX1,1ξ1 + δ1 
X2 = λX2,1ξ1 + δ2 
X3 = λX3,2ξ2 + δ8 
X4 = λX4,2ξ2  + δ9 
Endogenous indicators Exogenous variables Error 
Y1  = λY1,1ε1 + δ3 
Y2 = λY2,1ε1 + δ4 
Y3 = λY3,1ε1  + δ5 
Y4 = λY4,1ε1  + δ6 
Y5 = λY5,1ε1 + δ7 
Y6 = λY6,2ε2 + ε1 
Y7 = λY7,2ε2  + ε2 
Y8 = λY8,3ε3  + ε3 
Y9 = λY9,3ε3  + ε4 
Y10 = λY10,4ε3  + ε5 
Y11 = λY11,4ε3 + ε6 
Y12 = λY12,4ε4  + ε7 
Y13 = λY13,4ε4 + ε8 
Y14 = λY14,4ε4  + ε9 
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investigated. The structural model is expressed as ε = Βε + Γξ + δ and represented by a set of 
structural equations in Table 6.5.  
 
Table 6. 5 Structural Model Equations 
  
Endogenous variable  Exogenous variables Endogenous variable Error 
ε2 =  γ2,1ξ1 + γ2,2ξ2  + β2,1ε1  + δ1 
ε3 =  γ3,1ξ1 + γ,2ξ2  + β3,2ε2 + δ2 
ε4   = β43ε3 + δ3 
 
In accordance with the proposed research question and the derived structural model, the 
following substantive research hypotheses and associated statistical hypotheses were 
formulated. 
  
Substantive Research and Statistical Hypotheses 
 
Research Hypothesis 1 
 
The research hypothesis was that the structural model (as depicted in Figure 6.2) 
provides a valid account of the causal and combined contribution of distal individual variable 
factors (cognitive ability and social self-confidence) and self-efficacy beliefs in the prediction 
of the quality of MDM  processes and outcomes.   
The exact model fit hypothesis was formulated as: 
H01a: RMSEA = 0 
Ha1a: RMSEA > 0 
The close model fit hypothesis was formulated as: 
H01b: RMSEA  .05 
Ha1b: RMSEA = .08 
 
Failure of the model to fit the data will result in model falsification, whereas a good fit 
supports the theoretical argument that the model of relations is, at least, one potential model 
that might provide adequate goodness-of-fit to the sample data. Repeated failures to falsify the 
hypothesized model in different studies, particularly when other competing theories are also 
tested and disproved, would then add strength to the confidence of the theoretical model. 
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Although no model can be definitively confirmed, the status of a model as ‗not yet 
disconfirmed‘ is often a powerful one in science (Cohen et al., 2003).   
 
Research Hypothesis 2  
 
Distal individual variables (cognitive ability and social self-confidence) reflect a rough 
estimate of the upper limit of individual attentional resources that can be devoted to MDM. 
This implies that individuals with higher cognitive and social self-confidence levels have a 
larger pool of attentional resources and require a smaller proportion to achieve the same 
performance outcome when compared to their counterparts. Self-efficacy beliefs, as a proximal 
and contextually situated individual factor, influence individuals‘ interpretative biases that 
reflect estimates about the amount of attentional resources that will be required and thus 
mediate the level of affect a manager will experience in response decision demands.  
From this the substantive research hypotheses and associated statistical hypotheses are 
formulated. 
Cognitive ability (ξ1) will predict decision-generated affect (ε2) with high levels of 
cognitive ability accounting for lower decision-generated affect. This is expressed in a 
statistical hypothesis as: 
H02a:  2,1 = 0 
Ha2a:  2,1 < 0 
Social self-confidence (ξ2) will predict decision-generated affect (ε2) with high levels of 
social self-confidence accounting for higher decision-generated affect. This is expressed in a 
statistical hypothesis as: 
H02b:  2,2 = 0 
Ha2b:  2,2 < 0 
Self-efficacy beliefs (ε1) will predict decision-generated affect (ε2) with high levels of 
self-beliefs in efficacy accounting for lower decision-generated affect. This is expressed in a 
statistical hypothesis as: 
 
H02c:  β2,1 = 0 
Ha2c:  β2,1 < 0 
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The second segment of the posited model specifies the impact of decision-generated 
affect (ε2) on minimizing affect and conservation of attentional resources (ε3). This leads to the 
third research hypothesis. 
 
Research Hypothesis 3 
 
Decision-generated affect (ε2) will account for the volitional allocation of attentional 
resources (i.e., minimizing affect and conservation of attentional resources) (ε3) with higher 
levels of decision-generated affect accounting for a higher propensity to avoid decisions. This 
is expressed in a statistical hypothesis as: 
H03a: β3,2 = 0 
Ha3a: β3,2  > 0 
 
Research Hypothesis 4 
 
Minimizing affect and conservation of attentional resources (ε3) will account for lower 
quality MDM processes and outcomes (ε4). This is expressed in a statistical hypothesis as: 
H04a: β4, 3 = 0 
Ha4a: β4, 3 < 0 
 
Summary 
 
The research problem seeks to answer how distal individual variables (cognitive ability 
and social self-confidence) in combination with the proximal influence of self-efficacy beliefs 
mediate  temporal processes in the prediction of managers‘ information search, deliberation and 
rational social influence in their decision making processes and outcomes. Although MDM is 
embedded in a rich nomological network that contains many antecedent and/or consequential 
latent variables, the present researcher has presented a plausible conceptual model of relations 
in MDM that reflects the potential associations of variables as time-ordered influences on 
decision-generated affect and the allocation of attentional resources as mediating influences on 
the quality of MDM processes and outcomes.  
The current chapter provided an overview of the methodology employed. As an ex post 
facto study, the latent variables of interest were not subject to direct manipulation as the nature 
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of the setting within which the study takes place did not provide an opportunity to manipulate 
the latent variables. In testing hypotheses about model fit, it was necessary to determine N in 
order to have adequate power for detecting false hypotheses. The sample size of 196 was 
shown to meet the requirements to test the model. While the power of inferential statistical tests 
depends on sample size, the findings provided confidence about the representativeness of the 
sample.  Further, the researcher argued for SEM as the data analysis strategy of choice to 
address the research problem.  
The next chapter reports the results of the statistical analyses aimed at testing the stated 
null hypotheses. 
  
 
CHAPTER SEVEN  
 
RESULTS 
 
The theoretical model derived from the literature study hypothesized specific structural 
relationships between the latent variables that could account for the behavioural variation in 
managerial decision making. From this model specific statistical hypotheses were formulated in 
order to test the plausibility of the structural relationships between the latent variables as 
depicted in Figure 5.2. The purpose of this chapter is to report the results of the statistical 
analyses as evidence in order to compare how well the proposed model fits the data and, in 
doing so, evaluate the plausibility of the proposed model. 
The evaluation of the measurement part of the model precedes the detailed evaluation of 
the structural part of the model. Consequently, the presentation of results follows a two-step 
process in which the measurement model was first estimated to assess the contribution of each 
indicator measure as well as its reliability in the estimation of the relationships between the 
exogenous and endogenous variables in order to specify the pattern by which each measure 
loads on a particular exogenous or endogenous variable. Accordingly, the CFA results are 
presented first as a test of the validity of the indicator variables. The findings on multivariate 
normality are followed by the results of  the goodness-of-fit for the measurement model and 
specific evidence of construct validity. Moreover, this evaluation not only provides reliability 
data but also establishes the independence of the variables in the proposed model. 
This is followed by the results of the structural part of the model that focus on the 
substantive linkages between the various endogenous and exogenous variables in order to 
determine whether the theoretical relationships as specified are supported by the data. The 
analysis of the structural relationships are used to confirm whether the proposed structural 
model, and thus the research hypotheses, could be confirmed. Further, the results were 
examined for their correspondence to the proposed model of relations in MDM in order to 
answer questions about the principal relationships with regards to the theory as well as to 
provide insight into alternative formulations of the model that could be supported.  
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Univariate and Multivariate Normality 
 
Multivariate normality is the assumption that all variables, and all linear combinations 
of variables, are normally distributed (Cohen et al., 2003). SEM is more sensitive to the 
distributional characteristics of the data, particularly the departure from multivariate normality 
(less critical in the use of EQS) or a strong kurtosis in the data (Hayashi et al., 2008; McDonald 
& Ho, 2002). A lack of multivariate normality is particularly troublesome because it 
substantially inflates the chi-square statistic (χ²) and creates upward bias in critical values for 
determining coefficient significance. EQS, however, places less stringent assumptions on the 
multivariate normality of the data (Bentler, 2006; Hair et al., 2006). As illustrated in Table 5.13 
earlier, the univariate normality of the indicator variables was rejected in the case of 12 of the 
18 indicator variables and the null hypothesis of normality for multivariate normality had to be 
rejected as well.  
The assumptions of multivariate normality and linearity were evaluated through SPSS 
and EQS. Although the variables were symmetrically distributed, evidence suggested an excess 
of kurtosis as compared to a normal distribution. Mardia‘s coefficient of normalized 
multivariate kurtosis revealed a value of 5.72 which was relatively high (normality can be 
assumed inside a -3 to +3 range). Bentler (2006) states that values beyond 3 reflect nontrivial 
kurtosis while values of 6 and beyond affect modeling statistics. The potential sensitivity of 
ML to non-normality required the researcher to choose Robust Maximum Likelihood (RML) 
estimation to fit the measurement and structural models (see Bentler, 2006). 
 
Assessing the Measurement Model 
 
After specifying the measurement model as illustrated in Figure 5.1, the researcher 
evaluated the goodness-of-fit for the measurement model and the specific evidence of construct 
validity. In the sample of 196 managers there were no missing data. AMOS 17.0 for Windows 
(Arbuckle, 2008) and EQS 6.1 (Bentler, 2006) were used to perform a confirmatory first-order 
factor analysis in order to determine the fit of the model. Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) 
recommend EQS as the data analysis program of choice when data are non-normal since it is 
also the only program that offers the Satorra-Bentler scaled χ² (SB-χ²) and residual-based tests 
(Yuan-Bentler Residual-Based Test Statistic and the Yuan-Bentler Residual-Based F-Statistic) 
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as the most accurate methods for dealing with non-normal data (Bentler, 2006; Tomarken & 
Waller, 2005). 
As no single measure of fit can provide a conclusive verdict on model fit, the researcher 
used a spectrum of indices to assess the fit of the proposed measurement model (Byrne, 2006; 
MacCallum & Austin, 2000; McDonald & Ho, 2002; Savalei & Bentler, 2006). The guidelines 
recommended by Hair et al. (2006) were used in order to determine the acceptability of fit for 
the measurement model. For a model with a sample of N < 250, with 12 to 30 measured 
indicators, these authors suggest fit statistics that require a RMSEA of < .08, a CFI of .95 or 
better, and a SRMR of .08 or less.  
Table 7.1 illustrates the goodness of fit statistics for the initial measurement model.  
Table 7.1 Goodness of Fit of the Measurement Model (RML) 
 
Fit Statistics  
Satorra-Bentler Scaled Chi-square (χ²) of estimated model 
                 218.66 
Degrees of freedom 120 
Significance level               .00 
Yuan-Bentler Residual-Based Test Statistic                 145.55 
Significance level             .06 
Yuan-Bentler Residual-Based F-Statistic            1.89 
Significance level            .00 
Standardized RMR             .07 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA)             .07 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for RMSEA         .05,.08 
  
Incremental and Parsimony Fit Statistics  
Bentler-Bonett Normed Fit Index (NFl)             .82 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI)            .91 
Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI) for estimated model          1.88 
Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI) for saturated model         1.94 
Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI) for independence model         6.88 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for ECVI         1.68 
  
 
Absolute Fit Statistics 
 
The absolute fit indices are a direct measure of how well the measurement model 
reproduces the observed data and, as such, provide the most basic assessment of how well the 
conceptual model of relations fits the sample data of 196 in this study. The null hypothesis (Ho) 
postulates that specification of the factor loadings, factor variances/covariances, and error 
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variances for the MDM model are valid and the SB-χ² tests the extent to which this 
specification is true. Thus, the probability value represents the likelihood of obtaining a SB-χ² 
value that exceeds the SB-χ² value when Ho is true. The higher the probability associated with 
SB-χ², the closer is the fit between the hypothesized model and the more perfect the fit (Byrne, 
2001). The measurement model revealed a non-significant p value for SB-χ². On this index the 
measurement model did not fit the observed correlations and the null hypothesis (Ho) is thus 
rejected in that the proposed MDM model did not fit the data. The residual-based statistics 
(Yuan-Bentler Residual-Based Test Statistic and the Yuan-Bentler Residual-Based F-Statistic), 
however, suggested that the measurement model fitted the data. A statistically insignificant χ²  
for the Yuan-Bentler Residual-Based Test Statistic (p < .05621) and for the Yuan-Bentler 
Residual-Based F-Statistic) (p < .00153) suggested acceptance of the null hypothesis that the 
model fits the population data.  
Various authors (Arbuckle, 2008, Byrne, 2001; Hair et al., 1998; Hair et al., 2006) 
however note that a number of factors make χ² particularly troublesome to evaluate goodness-
of-fit of a model. Other than the lack of multivariate normality, sample size and model 
complexity are also contributors. As the number of measured indicators increase (i.e., making 
the model more complex), so does χ².  In order to deal with these negative consequences of χ², 
other fit indices that compliment the evaluation of the measurement model fit were employed. 
The present researcher proceeded with more explorative analyses to assess the 
measurement model and used the RMSEA which is considered as one of the most informative 
criteria in SEM (Byrne 2001, 2006). RMSEA, expressed per degree of freedom, makes this 
index sensitive to the number of estimated parameters in the model (i.e., the complexity of the 
model). Various authors argue that a RMSEA of .08 represents reasonable errors of 
approximation in the population and regard this cut-off as the upper limit of reasonable fit. The 
measurement model RMSEA of .065 suggested a reasonable fit. Further, in order to test for the 
closeness of fit (i.e., testing the hypothesis that the RMSEA is ‗good‘ in the population), the 
narrower confidence interval for the measurement model also argued for a reasonable fit of the 
conceptual model to the empirical data.  
The root mean square residual (SRMR) reflects a badness-of-fit measure and is 
especially useful in detecting misspecification (Bentler, 2006). Good-fitting models have small 
SRMR and values of .08 or less are desired. An arbitrary cut-off of between .05 and .08 is 
210 
 
 
suggested for SRMR (Hair et al., 2006; Tabachnik & Fidell, 2001). The measurement model 
reflected a SRMR of .068. As this SRMR value is relatively small it suggests that the model fits 
the data well regardless of what other measures of fit may imply. 
 
Incremental and Parsimony Fit Statistics 
 
Indices of comparative fit that use a baseline independence or null model contrast the 
ability of the model to reproduce the observed data matrix with that of a model known a priori 
to fit the data poorly, namely one that postulates no paths between the variables in the model. 
The Bentler-Bonett Normed Fit Index (NFI) is one of the classic fit indices for this purpose. It 
ranges between 0 and 1 and a model with perfect fit would produce an NFI of 1. A value >.90 
was originally considered representative of a well-fitting model (Bentler, 1992) and a revised 
cutoff value close to .95 has recently been suggested. Bentler (2006), however, notes that NFI 
is affected by sample size and may not reach higher values even when the model is correct.  
The NFI for the revised model was .772 suggesting a poorer model fit.  
The Comparative Fit Index (CFI) is better to use for model complexity as a fit measure. 
The CFI of .91 was in line with the proposed cut-off of .95 as a criterion of good fit.   Hair et al. 
(2006) challenge the use of a single cutoff value for fit indices. These authors state that the .90 
rule is simply cited as a reasonable ad hoc rule with no support from previous research and the 
pursuit of achieving a magic value on a fit index can lead to several poor practices in model 
specification. For example, a CFI of .95 indicates a model with better fit than a similarly 
complex model with a CFl of .85. It is thus critically important to realize the distinction 
between testing theory and pursuing a good fit. 
Finally, the expected cross-validation index (ECVI) was used as a means to assess the 
likelihood that the measurement model could be cross-validated across similar sized samples 
from the same population. Because ECVI coefficients can take on any value, the model ECVI 
value of 1.88 was compared to that of both the saturated model (ECVI = 1.94) and the 
independence model (ECVI = 6.88). Given the lower ECVI value for the model, compared to 
both the independence and saturated models, it was concluded that the model was reasonable in 
representing an approximation to the population.  
Measurement model validity also depends on specific evidence of construct validity. 
The next subsection deals with convergent and discriminant validity where the researcher 
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assessed the accuracy of measurements in order to evaluate how well indicator measures from 
the present sample represented the actual true score that exists in the population of managers. 
The next subsection illustrates the convergent validity of the measurement model factor 
loadings with particular attention to non-significant loadings. In addition, the findings of 
reliability and variance extracted of measured indicators are also presented.   
 
Convergent Validity  
 
Loading estimates that are significant provide a useful start in assessing the convergent 
validity of the measurement model. All the loadings should be at least .5 and preferably .7 
(Hair et al., 2006). Computations for each measurement indicator are reported in Table 7.2.  
Table 7.2 CFA Results: Final Measurement Model 
Construct loadings Cognitive 
ability  
(ξ1) 
Self-
efficacy 
beliefs 
(η1) 
Social self-
confidence 
(ξ2) 
Dec. 
gen. 
affect 
(η2) 
Allocation  
of  
attentional 
resources 
(η3) 
MDM 
processes 
and 
outcomes 
(η4) 
X1 Verbal .75      
X2 Numerical .83      
Y1 Social Influence efficacy  .90     
Y2 Exploratory search and 
processing efficacy 
 .86     
Y3 Thought and affect control 
efficacy 
 .80     
Y4 Risk tolerance efficacy  .54     
Y5 Analytical and inferential 
efficacy 
 .69     
X3 Assertion   .73    
X4 Social boldness   .65    
Y7 Immediate Affect    .54   
Y6 Anticipated Affect    .86   
Y9 Decisional Procrastination          .43  
Y8 Fatigue 
Y13 Bargaining  
Y10 Procedural rationality 
Y11 Decisional quality   
Y12 Rational social influence 
Y14 Independence 
     .35  
.27 
.17 
.59 
.86 
.66 
       
 
Problematic were the low loadings for the latent variable, allocation of attentional 
resources. In addition, bargaining and procedural rationality also displayed low loadings. This 
suggested that more of the variance in these indicator measures was due to error variance than 
explained variance. This is indicative of specification error, that is the omission of relevant 
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variables from the specified model. It was concluded that possible omitted but theoretically 
relevant indicators may have accounted for the low loadings on this latent variable.   
Table 7.3 illustrates the measurement error of the indicators. The estimates represent 
squared multiple correlations in order to reflect item reliability and thus show the proportion of 
variance of an indicator that is explained by its underlying construct variable (with the balance 
due to measurement error). High multiple squared correlation values denote high reliability, 
whereas low values are associated with measurement error (Byrne, 2001; Diamantopoulos & 
Siguaw, 2000; Hair et al., 2006). 
Table 7.3 Measurement Error for Indicators 
Measured indicator 
X1 Verbal 
  
    Estimate 
.56 
X2 Numerical   .69 
Y1 Social Influence efficacy   .82 
Y2 Exploratory search and processing efficacy   .74 
Y3 Thought and affect control efficacy   .64 
Y4 Risk tolerance efficacy   .29 
Y5 Analytical and inferential efficacy   .47 
X3 Assertion   .54 
X4 Social boldness   .42 
Y7 Immediate Affect   .29 
Y6 Anticipated Affect   .74 
Y9 Decisional Procrastination    .18 
Y8 Fatigue   .12 
Y13 Bargaining    .08 
Y10 Procedural rationality     .03 
Y11 Decision Quality   .35 
Y12 Rational social influence   .73 
Y14 Independence   .43 
 
The reliability for each construct was further assessed to determine whether the 
specified indicators were sufficient in their representation of the variable as constructs. The 
average percentage of variance were extracted (VE) among the set of measured indicators (see 
Hair et al., 2006, p. 777), and is represented by the following equation:   
 
   
Where: γ represents the standardized factor loading and i is the number of items.  
 
The construct reliability (CR) value was also computed as: 
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These results of these computations are reported in Table 7.4 
 
Table 7.4 Variance Extracted and Reliability Estimates of the Latent Variables 
 Cognitive 
ability  
(ξ1) 
Self-efficacy 
beliefs 
(η1) 
Social self-
confidence 
(ξ2) 
Dec. gen. 
Affect 
(η2) 
Allocation  of 
att resources 
(η3) 
MDM processes & 
outcomes 
(η4) 
 
Variance 
extracted 
.51 .49 .40 .43 .13 .60 
Construct 
reliability 
.67 .82 .57 .59 .18 .64 
 
Variance-extracted is a summary of measured indicators of convergence and values 
should be equal or exceed .5 (50 percent), while .7 is considered the threshold for reliability of 
a construct (Hair et al., 2006). The allocation of attentional resources fell far short of the 
recommended 50 percent. This lower level of variance extracted indicated that more than half 
of the variance for the specified indicators was not accounted for by the latent variable they 
were representing. The composite construct reliabilities were acceptable except for the latent 
variable, allocation of attentional resources. A rule of thumb for reliability estimates is that .70 
or higher suggests good reliability and values between .60 and .70 may be acceptable.   
In conclusion, the researcher may have been overoptimistic in the selection of 
operational indicators to represent an adequate empirical grasp for the allocation of attentional 
resources as a latent variable.  The findings from Tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 indicate that the 
selected operational indicators failed to provide an adequate empirical grasp to reflect this 
latent variable. The researcher adopted the notion that affect induces a motivational process that 
undermines the volitional allocation of attentional resources. For instance, minimizing affect 
and the regulation of attentional resources are emotion-focused forms of coping (see, for 
example, Brown et al., 2005; DeShon & Gillespie, 2005; Finkel et al., 2006; Hockey et al., 
2000; Ferrari & Pychyl, 2007; Luce, 1998; Tice et al., 2007; Vohs et al., 2008).  
The failure of the selected indicators in their representation of the allocation of 
attentional resources suggested that they were more likely representing different underlying 
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latent variables or even a multidimensional construct. Although avoidance, evasion and escape 
behaviours all reflect affect minimization concerns, Spunt et al. (2009) suggest that aversive 
indecisiveness, characterized by negative affect and threat-oriented cognition need to be 
theoretically distinguished from avoidant preferences and difficulties when making decisions.  
Further investigation of construct validity was examined with discriminant validity and 
this is discussed in the next subsection.   
 
Discriminant validity 
 
The interconstruct correlations were examined after standardization of the covariances 
in order to determine evidence of discriminant validity. The findings as reported in Table 7.5 
illustrate the discriminability between the latent variables.    
Table 7.5 Discriminability between Latent Variables 
 Cognitive 
ability 
(ξ1) 
Self-efficacy 
beliefs 
(η1) 
Social self-
confidence 
(ξ2) 
Dec. gen. 
affect 
(η2) 
Allocation  
of att 
resources 
(η3) 
Cognitive ability (ξ1) 1.00     
Self-efficacy beliefs (ε1) .00 
 
    
Social self-confidence (ξ2) .00 
 
.46* 
 
   
Decision-generated affect (ε2) -.22* 
 
-.40* 
 
-.01 
 
  
Allocation of attention resources 
(ε3) 
    -.18 
 
-.96* 
 
-.69* 
 
  .65* 
 
 
Quality of MDM processes and 
outcomes (ε4) 
 
.57* 
 
.18* 
 
.34* 
 
-.15 
 
-.48* 
 
   where * denotes p < .05 
 
The informative description picture of the interrelations in Table 7.5 provide evidence 
to suggest that the latent variables are indeed distinct and capture different phenomena that the 
other variables do not. Cognitive ability and social self-confidence traits were empirically 
distinct and in accordance with previous empirical findings (Hochwarter, Witt, Treadway, & 
Ferris, 2006). Further, cognitive ability (r = .57, p < .05) and social self-confidence (.34, p < 
.05) were independently related to individual differences in MDM (e.g., McDaniel et al., 2001; 
Parker & Fischhoff, 2005; Peters et al., 2006; Schmidt et al., 2008; Stanovich & West, 2000; 
Weekley & Ployhart, 2005). Self-efficacy beliefs also displayed a positive relationship with the 
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quality of MDM processes (.19, p < .05) (e.g., Hu et al., 2007; Le Roux et al., 2006; Tasa & 
Whyte, 2005). The positive relations between social self-confidence and individual differences 
in MDM were also in accord with previous empirical findings (e.g., Ferris et al., 2005; 
Kolodinsky et al., 2007; Sullivan et al., 2003). These findings confirmed that MDM requires 
several abilities (e.g., Finucane & Lees, 2005; Parker & Fischhoff, 2005). 
It was pointed out earlier that objective measures of ability do not always correlate 
highly with self-efficacy beliefs and that the relations between objective (e.g., cognitive ability) 
and subjective beliefs in ability (e.g., self-efficacy beliefs) are relatively unknown (Austin & 
Klein, 1996). As conceptualized by Locke and Latham (1990a) and empirically demonstrated 
(see, for example, Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989, 2000; Mitchell, Hopper, Daniels, George-Falvy, 
& James, 1994), self-efficacy beliefs and cognitive ability were empirically independent. This 
empirical independence of cognitive ability and self-efficacy beliefs underscores self-efficacy 
beliefs as a proximal task-specific motivational construct that acts as a threshold variable in 
determining whether individuals choose to deploy their available attentional resources (i.e., 
cognitive ability) in a task (Kanfer & Ackerman, 2005).  
Self-efficacy beliefs were also linearly related to the quality of MDM processes (.18, p 
< .05) which was in accord with empirical findings  (e.g., Bandura & Jourden, 1991; Huhmann, 
& Hyman, 2007; O'Connor & Arnold, 2001; Sullivan et al., 2003; Tasa & Whyte, 2007). For 
example, Wood and Bandura (1989b) report a linear relationship between self-efficacy beliefs 
and the application of a systematic-comprehensive decision process to be .39, and Wood et al. 
(1990) report .24 in a follow-up study. 
Social self-confidence (i.e., the confidence and willingness to engage in social 
influence) showed a positive linear relationship with MDM (.34, p < .05) and also  displayed a 
positive linear relation with self-efficacy beliefs. This was in accordance with Bandura‘s (1997) 
view that generic self-efficacy beliefs (i.e., confidence) and domain self-efficacy beliefs are not 
entirely independent (see, also, Chen et al., 2000; Haleblian et al., 2004).  Moreover, social 
self-confidence (e.g., political skill as the expression of personality in a socially adaptive 
fashion) was shown to be independent from cognitive ability but related to self-efficacy beliefs 
(Ferris et al., 1999; Ferris et al., 2005; Perrewé et al., 2004). 
Lower cognitive ability (i.e., limited attentional resource capacity) displayed a negative 
relationship with decision-generated affect, where lower ability individuals showed higher 
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negative decision affect when faced with decisional challenges (-.18, p < .05). Self-efficacy 
beliefs also demonstrated a negative relation with decision-generated affect (-.40, p < .05) 
which was in accord with previous research findings.  For instance, Arenas et al. (2006) 
demonstrated that the influence of higher self-efficacy beliefs was significant on positive affect 
(.61) in a study of decision making at a furniture factory when faced with ambiguity. It was 
pointed out that intensity of decision affect is relevant for the allocation of attention to the 
extent that affect impedes complex task performance (Austin & Klein, 1996). Negative 
affective self-reactions (decision-generated affect) are thus related to the diversion of 
attentional resources away from effortful cognitive and interpersonal information collection, 
deliberation, influence and negotiation, and allocated to efforts to the minimization of threat 
and the conservation of attentional resources. Such a cognitive interference redirects attentional 
resources away from the decision process towards volitional inaction that favours the 
maximization of positive affect and the avoidance of decisions (Baumeister et al., 2007; 
Bettman et al., 1998; Foo et al., 2009; Luce, 1998, 2005; Luce et al., 1997). 
In conclusion, these interconstruct correlations among the latent variables aided in 
nomological validity (Hair et al., 2006) and provided confidence to suggest that they were 
related in a manner that supported the theorizing in the proposed model of relations in MDM. 
 
Overall Evaluation: Measurement Model 
 
The Satorra-Bentler Scaled Chi-square (SB-χ²) showed a statistically significant chi-
square suggesting that the model did not fit the population data. Conversely, the Yuan-Bentler 
Residual-Based Test Statistic and Yuan-Bentler Residual-Based F Statistics both revealed non-
significant values. It was pointed out that SEM is sensitive to a strong kurtosis in the data and 
chi-square is sensitive to excessive kurtosis. The Mardia‘s coefficient of normalized 
multivariate kurtosis was 5.72 and values of 6 and beyond affect modeling statistics (Bentler, 
2006).   
With regards to other fit statistics, the  CFI value was not smaller than .90 (.91) and the 
RMSEA value of .07 was not higher than .08. Additionally, the researcher followed Bentler‘s 
(2006) advice to include SRMR with a recommended value of .08 or lower. An arbitrary cut-
off of between 0.05 and 0.08 is also suggested for SRMR by Byrne (1998). The SRMR was 
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.07. A SRMR value of less than .10 is acceptable according to Hair et al. (2006). In addition, 
the measurement model outperformed the independence model given an acceptable ECVI 
value.  
 One problem in the measurement model was the failure of the measured indicators to 
provide an acceptable grasp of the allocation of attentional resources as a latent variable. The 
low level of variance extracted indicated that a significant part of the variance for the two 
specified indicators was not accounted for by the latent variable they were representing.  
Consequently, this lack of convergent validity proved that this latent variable was degrading the 
model and that the analysis of the hypothesized structural relations might be threatened. Except 
for the allocation of attentional resources, however, the composite construct validities indicated 
that the measured indicators represented their latent variables. The general nomological validity 
demonstrated that the latent variables were related to one another. The discriminability between 
the latent variables, and the extent to which each latent variable was truly distinct from other 
latent variables, demonstrated that the latent variables were related to one another in a manner 
that supported the proposed model of relations in MDM.   
The study was approached not only to improve model fit but to evaluate the causal 
relations in MDM.  In spite of the aforesaid limitations, the researcher deemed it necessary to 
retain the offending indicators in order to explore why the model was not fitting, knowing full 
well that if a poor structural model fit would be obtained it would not be possible to 
unequivocally rule out the possibility that it was not due to inherent structural flaws but rather 
to shortcomings in the operationalization of specific latent variables. This was important given 
the fact that MacCallum and Austin‘s (2000) review showed that approximately 20% of SEM 
studies were strictly confirmatory, 25% for model generation and 55% for the investigation of 
alternative models. These authors remarked that the relatively common usage of the first two 
strategies is unfortunate. This is because these strategies are highly restrictive and leave little 
recourse if that model does not work. Such data-driven model modifications may lack validity 
and are highly susceptible to capitalization on chance. 
In evaluating the structural part of the model, the next subsection focuses on the 
substantive relationships of interest (i.e. the linkages between the various endogenous and 
exogenous latent variables) in order to assess whether the theoretically specified relations were 
supported by the data. The emphasis moves from the relationship between constructs and 
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measured indicators to the nature and magnitude of the relationships between the construct 
variables. This assessment includes the signs of the parameters representing the paths between 
the variables to indicate whether the direction of the hypothesized relationships as hypothesized 
is positive or negative. Further, the magnitudes of the estimated parameters provide important 
information on the strength and significance of the hypothesized relationships (at the very least 
these parameters should be significant (p < ,05) as indicated by t-values in excess of 1,96). In 
this instance, the null hypothesis will be rejected. The squared multiple correlations for the 
structural equations indicate the amount of variance in each endogenous latent variable that is 
accounted for by the latent variables that are expected to impact on it. The higher the squared 
multiple correlation, the greater the joint explanatory power of the hypothesized antecedents 
(Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2000) in the prediction of the quality of MDM processes.  
 
Assessment of the Structural Model 
 
Generally, a structural equation model is a complex composite statistical hypothesis 
(McDonald & Ho, 2002) where the specific paths depicted in the structural model represent the 
hypothesised causal linkages derived through theorizing. The proposed structural model that 
served as the basis for this study was portrayed in Figure 5.2.  
 
 Overall goodness-of-fit of the Structural Model  
 
The number of model parameters that were set free to be estimated (t =45) were less 
than the number of non-redundant elements in the observed sample matrix, calculated as s = p 
(the number of endogenous indicators) + q (the number of exogenous indicators) (p + q)(p + q 
+ 1). The degrees of freedom for the structural model were 126. The positive number of 
degrees of freedom indicated an overidentified structural model and thus representative of the 
overall sample of respondents.  
The question that needed to be answered in this study was ‗Does the model produce an 
estimated population covariance matrix that is consistent with the sample (observed) 
covariance matrix?‘ If the model is good, the parameter estimates will produce an estimated 
matrix that is close to the sample covariance matrix. Hair et al. (1998) also express the opinion 
that a covariance matrix should be employed when the objective is to test a model since 
covariances satisfy the assumptions of the methodology and are the appropriate form of data for 
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validating causal relationships. Given the purpose of the study to test a series of causal 
relationships, the researcher selected covariances as the preferred input matrix. A  spectrum of 
the indices to assess the goodness-of-fit statistics for the structural model is presented first and 
a more detailed presentation of these results follows thereafter.  
 
Evaluation of Model Estimates and Modification 
 
The normalized estimate of Mardia‘s coefficient was 5.72 (normality can be assumed 
inside a -3 to +3 range). As the coefficient exceeded this range, robust computational methods 
and robust statistics were used in order to evaluate the model. Bentler (2006) stated that the 
Satorra-Bentler methodology and the residual-based tests are probably the most accurate 
methods for dealing with nonnormal data and the Satorra-Bentler Scaled Chi-square (SB-χ²), 
the Yuan-Bentler Residual-Based Test Statistic and the Yuan-Bentler Residual-Based F-
Statistic to test the goodness-of-fit of factors were used. Better fit is represented by lower chi-
squares and higher probability values. 
Additionally, the present researcher considered a range of multiple fit indices to obtain a 
holistic evaluation of structural model fit.  The RMSEA was used to evaluate how well the 
structural model would, with unknown but optimally chosen parameter values, fit the-
population data if it were available. As indicated earlier, values of < .05 indicate good fit, 
whereas values less than .08 correspond to an ‗acceptable‘ fit (McDonald & Ho, 2002). Further, 
the SRMR as a badness-of-fit measure was used in order to detect possible misspecification 
(Bentler, 2006), where good-fitting models show a small SRMR (values of .08 or less [Bentler, 
2006]).  The CFI was used in which a good fit is >.90.   
 
Overall Model Fit Measures 
 
An admissible solution of parameter estimates of the structural model was obtained 
after 30 iterations. In addition to the examination of the reliabilities for each measured indicator 
earlier (see Table 7.4), the researcher assessed the composite model reliability of the 6-factor 
latent variable model. The model-based reliability, that is the multi-factor internal consistency, 
rho (ρ,), was .91 (see Bentler, 2006). The spectrum of goodness-of-fit statistics of the 
hypothesized structural model are presented next in Table 7.6. 
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The p-value of the Satorra-Bentler Scaled Chi-square (χ²) of estimated model in Table 
7.6 yielded a highly significant result (p < 0.0001).  The null hypothesis is that the model fits 
the population data perfectly and a statistically significant chi-square causes rejection of the 
null hypothesis, implying imperfect model fit and possible rejection of the model. The Yuan-
Bentler Residual-Based Test Statistic of 156.48 (p <.034) and the Yuan-Bentler Residual-
Based F-Statistic of 2.31 (p <  .00001) yielded a weak non-significant result that partly 
supported the model. Given these results, the null hypothesis was rejected, that is that the 
structural model fits the population data.   Relying on these indices alone, however, is highly 
restrictive because it is implausible that any model is anything more than an approximation of 
reality (Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2000) and rejection of a model on purely statistical grounds 
is not necessarily a condemnation (Arbuckle, 2008). 
Indeed, since a null hypothesis that a model fits exactly in some population is known a 
priori to be false, it seems pointless even to try and test whether it is true (Diamantopoulos & 
Table 7.6 Overall Structural Model Fit Measures: Robust Maximum Likelihood (RML) 
Fit Statistics Model 
 
Absolute Fit Statistics 
 
Satorra-Bentler Scaled Chi-square (χ²) of estimated model 258.08     
Degrees of freedom     126 
Significance level      .00 
Yuan-Bentler Residual-Based Test Statistic 156.48 
Significance level       .03 
Yuan-Bentler Residual-Based F-Statistic  (126, 70)     2.30 
Significance level       .00 
Standardized RMR       .09 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA)       .07 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for RMSEA .060, .086 
  
Incremental and Parsimony Fit Statistics  
Bentler-Bonett Normed Fit Index (NFl)        .79 
Bentler-Bonett Non-Normed Fit Index        .85 
Comparative fit Index (CFI)       .88 
Bollens (IFI) Fit Index        .88 
Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI) for estimated model     1.86 
Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI) for saturated model     1.76 
Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI) for independence model     6.70 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for ECVI     1.63 
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Siguaw, 2000). Given the known sensitivity of this statistic to sample size, the use of χ² index 
provides little guidance in determining the extent to which the structural model does not fit. 
Rather than trying to ask whether a model is correct, or whether it fits the population data 
exactly, it seems sensible to assess the degree of lack of fit of the model with reference to other 
measures as well.  Thus, the present researcher regarded it beneficial to rely on other indices of 
fit.  
RMSEA indicated a value of .07. The RMSEA and the wide confidence interval (.06, 
.09), however, suggested that the estimated discrepancy value was quite imprecise, thus 
negating a clear indication to accurately determine the degree of fit in the population.  The 
SPSS translation of the SAS syntax provided by MacCallum, Browne, and Sugawara (1996) 
was further applied in order to derive power estimates for the tests of exact and close fit. A 
power value of .99 was obtained for the test of exact fit. The probability of rejecting the null 
hypothesis of exact fit under the true condition of close fit was thus high. Consequently, there 
may be a high chance of rejecting a good (if not perfect) structural model with the given sample 
size and the likelihood of rejecting the hypothesis of exact fit was thus more than 0.98 that the 
true fit is close.  Therefore, the hypothesis of exact fit was rejected (H01b: RMSEA ≤.05 H0: 
RMSEA=0|RMSEA=0,05]=0,99]) in favour of  Ha1b: RMSEA = .08.  
The assessment of parsimonious fit acknowledges that model fit can always be 
improved by adding more paths to the model and estimating more parameters until perfect fit is 
achieved in the form of a saturated or just-identified model with no degrees of freedom. The 
parsimonious fit measures were subsequently considered. The NFl  Bentler-Bonett Non-
Normed Fit Index (both close to or above 0.90 is typically adopted as an indication of good fit), 
CFI and Bollens (IFI) (best if both are close to .95 or greater) indicate how much better the 
model fits compared to a baseline model, usually the independence model. All these indices fell 
below the desired threshold levels.  The NFl was .79,  the Bentler-Bonett Non-Normed Fit 
Index was .85, the CFI was .87 and Bollens IFI was .88.  
The ECVI was used as a measure to assess whether the model is likely to cross-validate 
across samples of the same size from the same population. As a useful indicator of a model's 
overall fit, the ECVI value was compared against the ECVI values of other models, where the 
model with the smallest difference ECVI value represents the greatest potential for implied 
replication. The 'other' model used for comparison purposes was the independence model (also 
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known as the null model) with complete independence among all variables (i.e., all observed 
variables are uncorrelated). The ECVI value of the model was 1.85, which was much lower 
than that of the independence model (6.70), but slightly more than the ECVI value of the 
saturated model (1.75). This suggested that the model was less likely to be cross-validated 
across samples of the same size from the present population. These incremental and 
parsimonious indices as illustrated in Table 7.6 pointed to the possibility of an alternative 
model that may contain a number of additional paths that may be nested within a more 
elaborate model.  
Finally, in order to ensure a thorough assessment of the fit of the structural model the 
researcher also investigated the standardized residuals and modification indices in order to 
determine the extent of success with which the model explains the observed data. The next 
subsection examines the standardized residuals and modification indices.  
 
Evaluation of Residuals and Modification Indices 
 
Residuals are probably the single most informative set of fit indices because they point 
directly to the location and size of the discrepancy (in meaningful units) between the observed 
and the expected covariances (Savalei & Bentler, 2006). Standardized residuals represent the 
differences between the observed values and the estimated values in a matrix. These residuals 
should be small and centered around zero and the frequency distribution of the residual 
covariances should be symmetric. Non-symmetrically distributed residuals in the frequency 
distribution may signal a poor-fitting model, that is estimating some of the covariances well 
and others poorly (Bentler, 2006; Cohen et al., 2003; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). The 
distribution of standardised residuals was confirmed in terms of symmetry and presented in 
Figure 7.1 and Table 7.7. In Figure 7.1 each "*" represents 5 residuals:  where 1 corresponds to 
residuals smaller than .0 to -.05 and C corresponds to residuals of .5 and more. 
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Figure 7.1 Distribution of Standardized Residuals  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The distribution of standardized residuals clustered in a modestly negatively skewed 
manner around the zero point. Most of the residuals centered in the middle of the distribution 
with a slightly elevated negative tail suggesting a reasonable model fit. There were no 
Table 7.7 Frequency Distribution of Standardized Residuals 
 
 Range Frequency Percentage 
1                 -0.5 to -0.0             0 .00 
2 -0.4 to -0.5             0 .00 
3 -0.3 to -0.4             2           1.17 
4 -0.2 to -0.3             1 .58 
5 -0.1 to -0.2           15           8.77 
6 0.0 to 0.10           79         46.20 
7 0.1 to 0.00           57         33.33 
8 0.2 to 0.10           14           8.19 
9 0.3 to 0.20             3           1.75 
A 0.4 to 0.30             0 .00 
B 0.5 to 0.40             0 .00 
C ++ to 0.50             0 .00 
Total          171       100.00 
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standardized residuals exceeding the - 4.0 approximate benchmark value that would suggest a 
potentially unacceptable degree of error that might call for the deletion of offending items. The 
slight dominance of negative residuals indicated that the model overestimates the covariance 
between the observed variables which could be remedied through the pruning of the paths that 
are associated with the indicator variables in question.  
The present researcher took caution not to consider model respecifications to improve 
fit that could not be theoretically justified (Hair et al., 2006). Although the variables associated 
with these extreme residuals were examined there was no clear identifiable justification to 
suggest a possible model modification given the possibility that the addition of one or more 
paths would probably have improved the fit of the model. It was decided to refrain from 
specification searches based on purely empirical grounds in spite of the existence of a number 
of correlated errors.  Such correlated errors are hard to explain (Savalei & Bentler, 2006) and 
the researcher accepts that such modifications are inconsistent with the theoretical basis of 
SEM. SEM is a large sample technique (Savalei & Bentler, 2006) and it was decided to dismiss 
model modification because of the small sample in this study.  Furthermore, the researcher 
examined the modification indices for any standardized expected change that could suggest 
freeing up some of the parameters. The magnitude of the modification indices associated with 
the parameters did however not warrant setting any of these parameters free. 
The aim of evaluating the structural model was to determine whether the causal 
linkages between the various endogenous and exogenous latent variables as was specified at the 
conceptualization stage (as illustrated in Figure 2.1) were indeed supported by the data. These 
causal linkages were investigated by testing the null hypotheses as formulated in Chapter Four 
and depicted in Figure 5.2.   Depending on the outcome of these tests, the research hypotheses 
were thus either confirmed or rejected.  It is necessary at this stage to point out that obtaining a 
significant path coefficient estimate does not imply proof of a causal effect. Due to the ex post 
facto research design in this study it was not possible to isolate the empirical system 
sufficiently so that the nature of the relationships among the variables can be described as 
causal. Consequently, the nature of the non-experimental research design precluded the 
drawing of causal inferences from significant path coefficients (Theron, Spangenberg, & 
Henning, 2004). 
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Assessing the Structural Model  
 
There are four issues of relevance when evaluating the structural model, that is: the 
significance of the parameter beta and gamma estimates (βi and γi) that represent the 
hypothesized paths between the variables; the consistency of the signs of the parameter 
estimates and the hypothesised nature of the relationships between the latent variables; the 
magnitude of the parameter estimates that indicate the strength of the hypothesized 
relationships; and the proportion of variance in each endogenous variable that is explained by 
the variables linked to it in terms of the hypothesised structural model.  The results depicted in 
Figure 7.2 provide information on the beta (βi) and gamma (γi) path coefficients with which to 
evaluate each of the relevant statistical hypotheses which were formulated earlier. Each of these 
parameter estimates provided information which was used to assess the hypothesized 
relationships between the endogenous variables within the structural model. 
Standardized regression coefficients are particularly useful to index the magnitude of 
causal effects rather than the ß‘s in raw units because of the advantage of simplicity of 
exposition that ensues when one can ignore the units of measurement (Arbuckle, 2008; Cohen 
et al., 2003; Hair et al., 2006; Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007).  The estimated beta (βi) and 
gamma (γi) coefficients are presented in Figure 7.2 and evaluated against each of the relevant 
statistical hypotheses as illustrated in Table 7.8. 
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Figure 7.2 Total Direct Effects: Standardized Path Estimates for the Structural Model of MDM. 
where * denotes p < .05. 
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where * denotes p < .05.
Table 7.8 Hypotheses and Parameter Estimates 
   
Substantive research hypotheses  Statistical hypotheses  Parameter 
Beta (βi) and 
Gamma (γi) 
coefficients 
Supported 
1. The structural model (as depicted in Figure 6.8) provides a valid account  
of the causal and combined contribution of distal individual variable  
factors (cognitive and social self-confidence) and self-efficacy beliefs  
in the prediction of the quality of MDM processes and outcomes.  
The exact model fit hypothesis is 
formulated as: 
H04a: RMSEA = 0 
Ha4a: RMSEA > 0 
The close model fit hypothesis is 
formulated as: 
H04b: RMSEA ≤  .05 
Ha4b: RMSEA = .08 
 
 
 
 
 
RMSEA = .07 
 
 
No 
 
 
Yes 
2a. Cognitive ability (ξ1) will predict decision-generated affect (ε2) such that high 
levels of cognitive ability will account for lower decision-generated affect. 
H01a: γ2,1 = 0 
Ha1a: γ2,1 < 0 
γ2,1 = -.22* Yes 
2b. Social self-confidence (ξ2) will predict decision-generated affect (ε2) such that  
      high levels of social self-confidence will account for higher decision- 
      generated affect. 
H01b: γ2,2 = 0 
Ha1b: γ2,2 < 0 
γ2,2 = .25* 
 
Yes 
2c. Self-efficacy beliefs (ε1) will predict decision-generated affect (ε2) such that  
       high levels of self-beliefs in efficacy will account for lower decision- 
       generated affect. 
H01c: β2,1 = 0 
Ha1c: β2,1 < 0 
β2,1 = -.54* 
 
Yes 
3.  Decision-generated affect (ε2) will predict the allocation of attentional  
     resources such that high levels of decision-generated affect will account  
     for minimizing affect and conservation of attentional resources (ε3) such that  
     high levels of decision-generated affect will account for high avoidance of  
     decisions. 
H02a: β3,2 = 0 
Ha2a: β3,2 > 0 
β3,2 = .34* Yes 
4. The allocation and conservation of attentional resources (ε3) will predict  
     lower quality MDM processes and outcomes (ε4). 
H03a: β4,3 = 0 
Ha3a: β4,3 > 0 
β4,3  = -.64* Yes 
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The null hypothesis that the model fits the population data perfectly was rejected 
(Hypothesis 1). The Yuan-Bentler Residual-Based Test Statistic and the Yuan-Bentler 
Residual-Based F-Statistic however suggested part support for the structural model. In addition, 
the structural model was also not likely to cross-validate across samples of the same size from 
the present population. The RMSEA was also used as an important informative criterion that 
takes into account the error of approximation in the population and revealed a value that 
indicated a less than satisfactory model fit. It was argued that the poor fit may not be due to the 
inherent structural flaws in the model but more because the present researcher could not 
unequivocally rule out the possibility of the shortcomings in the operationalization of some of 
the latent variables. It was possible that omitted but theoretically relevant indicators may have 
contributed to a contaminated measurement of some of the constructs. The fact that the present 
researcher used only two measured indicators could have increased the infeasible solution that 
was obtained. The limited number of measured indicators may not have captured the 
multidimensionality of decision-generated affect and the allocation of attentional resources. As 
MDM is embedded in a rich nomological network with numerous antecedent and/or 
consequential variables, there was a possibility of an alternative model that may contain a 
number of additional latent variables and paths nested within a more elaborate model.  
Support was found for Hypothesis 2a. The total standardized direct effect of cognitive 
ability on decision-generated affect was significant. The total standardized direct effect of 
social self-confidence on decision-generated affect was supported (Hypothesis 2b). Affective 
reactions are potent indicators for the activation of social self-confidence and unfavourable 
appraisals of decisional challenge (i.e., face disagreement and being forced to justify a 
decision) interfere with valued social goals that may inhibit the expression of social self-
confidence. How affect is appraised may thus cause decrements in decision making that force 
shifts in attentional resource allocations to an off-task, affective heuristic in order to get along 
and act in a manner that is most likely to be acceptable to others. Social self-confidence is thus 
inversely related to the availability of attentional resources as mediated by decision-generated 
affect. 
The total standardized direct effect of self-efficacy beliefs on decision-generated affect 
was significant (Hypothesis 2c) and in accord with previous research findings. The total 
229 
 
standardized direct effect of decision-generated affect on the allocation of attentional resources 
in MDM was significant (Hypothesis 3). Increased decision-generated affect accounted for a 
volitional reduction in the allocation of attentional resources (i.e., minimizing affect and 
conservation of attentional resources).  The allocation of attentional resources accounted for the 
prediction of the quality of MDM processes and outcomes (Hypothesis 4).  The total 
standardized direct effect of the volitional allocation of attentional resources on the quality of 
MDM process was also significant.  
One practical question in this study concerned the relative contribution of self-efficacy 
beliefs over that of distal individual factors as an alternative predictor to the quality of MDM 
processes. Earlier (as illustrated in Table 7.5), self-efficacy beliefs were shown to be linearly 
related to the quality of the MDM process and outcomes (r = .18, p < .05). The next subsection 
provides evidence of the differential contribution of self-efficacy beliefs over that provided by 
cognitive ability and social self-confidence.    
 
Direct and Indirect (Mediated) Effects 
 
It was argued that the quality of MDM processes is inherently conditional on the 
proximal independent and interactive internal attributions of self-efficacy beliefs in 
combination with cognitive ability and social self-confidence. The empirical review illustrated 
that relatively few studies have estimated the independent contributions of distal individual 
differences (cognitive ability and social self-confidence traits) in combination with the 
proximal influence of self-efficacy beliefs in performance. There is no extant research with 
regards to this in MDM. Table 7.9 illustrates the standardized indirect effects of the distal 
individual variables (i.e., cognitive ability and social self-confidence) and self-efficacy beliefs 
on the allocation and conservation of attentional resources that in turn have a bearing on the 
quality of MDM processes and outcomes. 
Table 7. 9 Standardized Indirect Effects: Individual Variables, Volition and MDM   
 
Cognitive 
ability  
(ξ1)  
Self-efficacy 
beliefs  
(η1) 
Social  
self-confidence  
(ξ2)  
Allocation of attentional resources (ε3)           -.08 -.19 
.09 
 
Quality of MDM processes & outcomes (ε4)  .42   .12 .35 
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Table 7.9 provides for an informative descriptive picture of the causal relations 
between the distal individual variables and self-efficacy beliefs in order to account for 
individual differences in the quality of MDM processes and outcomes. The distal 
individual variables (i.e., cognitive ability and social self-confidence) exerted their 
effects directly on the quality of MDM processes. Self-efficacy beliefs‘ direct 
contribution was smaller. Given this observation, the researcher explored the model 
further by deleting the influence of cognitive ability and social self-confidence from the 
original model in order to investigate the direct causal and indirect influence of self-
efficacy beliefs in a trimmed structural model without these paths. Table 7.10 illustrates 
the fit statistics of the trimmed structural model. 
 
Table 7. 10 Trimmed Structural Model Fit Measures: Robust Maximum Likelihood (RML) 
Fit Statistics  
 
Absolute Fit Statistics 
 
Satorra-Bentler Scaled Chi-square (χ²) of estimated model  138.10      
Degrees of freedom         73 
Significance level        .00 
Yuan-Bentler Residual-Based Test Statistic  101.42 
Significance level        .02 
Yuan-Bentler Residual-Based F-Statistic  (73, 123)      1.84 
Significance level                    .00 
Standardized RMR        .09 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA)        .07 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for RMSEA .050, .084 
  
Incremental and Parsimony Fit Statistics  
Bentler-Bonett Normed Fit Index (NFl)         .84 
Bentler-Bonett Non-Normed Fit Index          .90 
Comparative fit Index (CFI)         .92 
Bollens (IFI) Fit Index          .92 
Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI) for estimated model        1.11 
Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI) for saturated model       1.08 
Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI) for independence model        4.93 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for ECVI          .95 
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The trimmed model converged after 9 iterations. The model-based reliability (the multi-
factor internal consistency), rho (ρ,), was .90. Fit statistics for the trimmed structural model in 
Table 7.6 indicated that the data fit the model reasonably well (Hair et al., 2006). The trimmed 
model represented a good fit (RMSEA = .07, CFI = .92  and SRMR .09). The standardized 
direct causal effects of self-efficacy beliefs in the trimmed model were subsequently 
investigated and are presented in Table 7.11. 
 
Table 7. 11 Standardized Direct Effects of Self-Efficacy Beliefs on Decision-Generated  
Affect, Volition and MDM   
 
Self-efficacy  
beliefs 
(η1) 
Decision-generated 
affect 
(η2) 
Allocation of 
attentional resources  
(η3) 
Decision-generated affect (ε2) -.44**   
Allocation of attentional resources 
(ε3) 
 .59**  
Quality of MDM processes & 
outcomes  (ε4) 
  -.37* 
 
where ** denotes p < .001 and * denotes < .05 
 
The direct effects of self-efficacy beliefs on decision-generated affect was β2,1 = -.44 (p 
< .05) and the direct effects of decision-generated affect on the allocation of attentional 
resources was also significant (β3,1 = .59, p < .05). This, in turn, had a significant effect on the 
quality of MDM processes and outcomes (β4,1 = -.37, p < .05).  Figure 7.3 illustrates the 
estimated beta (βi) and gamma (γi) coefficients in the trimmed model.  
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Figure 7.3 Standardized Total Direct and Indirect Estimates for the Trimmed Structural of Model of MDM 
where * denotes p <. .05. 
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   β4,3 = -.37* 
   γ3,1 = .15 
   γ1,2 = -.26* 
β4,2 = -.23 
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The next subsection presents the variance in the endogenous latent variables that is 
accounted for by the independent exogenous latent variables by way of squared multiple 
correlations (R²).     
 
       Variance Explained in Endogenous Latent Variables 
 
Squared multiple correlations (R²) indicate the amount of each endogenous latent 
variable that is accounted for by the exogenous latent variable that is expected to impact on it. 
Clearly, the higher the squared multiple correlation, the greater the joint explanatory power of 
the hypothesized antecedent exogenous latent variables (Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2000). 
The R²s for the original and trimmed structural model are illustrated in Table 7.12. 
Table 7.12 Squared Multiple Correlations (R²) for Structural Equations 
Endogenous latent variables Original model 
estimate 
Trimmed model 
estimate 
Decision-generated affect (ε2) 
.27 .20 
 
Allocation of attentional resources (ε3) 
.96 .35 
 
The quality in MDM processes (ε4) .41 .15 
 
It was pointed out earlier that MDM contains many antecedent and/or consequential 
variables that are likely to be transmitted through additional links in a causal chain that is not 
easy to translate into mathematically or otherwise simplified models (Weber & Johnson, 2009). 
These findings indeed confirmed this notion. In the orginal model 59% of the individual 
differences in the quality of MDM processes and outcomes were unaccounted for by the causal 
direct and indirect effects of cognitive ability, self-efficacy beliefs and social self-confidence. 
Deleting the contribution of cognitive ability and social self-confidence shows that 
approximately 85% of the individual differences in the quality of MDM processes and 
outcomes were subsequently unaccounted for.  This suggests that the prediction of individual 
differences in the quality of MDM processes and outcomes in this study was substantially 
attenuated by the inclusion of the distal individual differences, cognitive ability and social self-
confidence as well as self-efficacy beliefs.  
The researcher argued that individuals seldom approach decision making with a state of 
detached affect in making choices that implicate their own interests. In effect, the coexisting 
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and ubiquitous nature of decision-generated affect becomes even more pronounced in higher 
stakes decisions as a mediating influence on the volitional deployment of attentional resources. 
Further, this undermining response of managers is  inherently conditional on the independent 
and combined contributions of individual variables and their internal attributions of their self-
efficacy beliefs (i.e., cognitive appraisal of decisional demands, regulation of attentional 
resources and decision-generated affect) that combine to influence the quality of MDM 
processes and outcomes. The findings thus offered evidence of self-efficacy beliefs‘ 
commonality with the distal individual variables and their mediating effects as determinants of 
the intentions and direction of managerial decision behaviour.  
 
Summary  
 
This study sought to evaluate the hypothesized causal relationship linking the distal 
individual variables and the proximal influence of self-efficacy beliefs with decision-generated 
affect and the allocation of attentional resources as mediators of the intentions and direction of 
managerial decision behaviour. SEM was chosen as the data analysis strategy of choice because 
it is suitable to testing an entire system of direct and mediated relations in this proposed causal 
structure, not just the contribution of isolated predictors. 
As the univariate normality of the indicator variables was rejected in the case of 12 of 
the 18 indicator variables and the null hypothesis of normality for multivariate normality was 
also rejected, the researcher chose robust maximum likelihood (RML) estimation to fit the 
measurement and structural models. The evaluation of the measurement part of the model 
preceded the detailed evaluation of the structural part of the model, where the measurement 
model via CFA was assessed first in order to confirm that the measurement of each latent 
variable was psychometrically sound.  The tentative evaluation of the measurement model 
enabled the researcher to maximize the interpretability of the final structural model. The CFA 
findings failed to find support to satisfactorily confirm an adequate measurement of allocation 
of attentional resources. The inter-construct relations were also inconsistent with expectations. 
Evidence for convergent validity proved that this latent variable was harming the model and 
threatened the integrity of the analysis of the hypothesized structural relations in the proposed 
model.  
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Taking cognizance of this fact the researcher retained the offending indicators knowing 
full well that a poor structural model fit might be due to failure in the operationalization of this 
specific latent variable.  After an admissible solution of parameter estimates of the structural 
model was obtained, the composite model reliability of the 6-factor latent variable model 
revealed a respectable multi-factor internal consistency. The proposed structural model was 
subjected to further scrutiny by way of a spectrum of goodness-of-fit statistics. Absolute 
goodness-of-fit statistics results revealed a highly significant result that implied that the model 
was not adequate and the null hypothesis that the structural model fits the population data was 
subsequently rejected.  
The researcher applied power associated with a test of close fit where the null 
hypothesis was that the model has a close, but imperfect fit in the population. It was found that 
the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of exact fit under the true condition of close fit 
was high and that there might be a high chance of rejecting a good fit of the structural model 
given the sample size used. The researcher proceeded to evaluate the theoretical relationships 
of the proposed structural model to see whether they were supported by the data. The 
consistency, magnitude and significance of the parameter estimates (βi and γi) depicted 
coefficient estimates that supported the statistical hypotheses as formulated.  
The next chapter discusses the results obtained from this study. The conclusions follows 
in the Chapter after that. 
  
CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
This chapter aims to discuss the results by connecting them with the original objectives 
of this study, as well as the theory and research used to support the arguments of the study. The 
central thesis in this study is that decision making is a behavioural expression of choice (or 
intention to choose) one course of action over others. Decision making is a central feature of 
managerial work and, despite an abundance of conceptual research, there is insufficient 
empirical evidence to confirm how managers apply decision making processes in order to make 
choices in the service of both individual and organizational goals. Managers make decisions in 
real life business contexts facing challenges that are very different to those faced by individuals 
in laboratory settings.  Although individual decision making reflects a reasonable commonality 
with MDM, the absence of a coherent and adequate theoretical framework has contributed to 
slow progress in understanding MDM.  
The authoritative viewpoints of previous researchers provided for the conceptual 
underpinnings and theoretical rationale of the relevant constructs in the present research in 
order to formulate a plausible conceptual model of relations in MDM. The present researcher 
adopted social-cognitive theory as a plausible framework towards understanding MDM as a 
function of the individual variables of the manager as the decision maker, as well as the 
behavioural expressions of choice. Such a dynamic perspective accounts for the stream of 
behaviour that integrates context, multiple goals, individual variables and the selection of 
decision processes adopted in MDM.  By ordering the theoretically relevant constructs,  MDM 
is presented as a causal chain of influences that take time to exert their influence via the 
mediating influence of temporal processes (decision-generated affect and allocation of 
attentional resources) that impact on the quality of MDM processes. Based on a priori selection 
of the distal and proximal individual differences to proximal predictors (self-efficacy beliefs), 
the present researcher put forward a conceptual model of time-ordered influences that exert 
their influence on MDM.  It was argued that such a coherent theoretical framework meets the 
current lack of knowledge of MDM in a parsimonious manner.  
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Chapter Five demonstrated the operationalization and psychometric evaluation of 
validated and custom-designed, domain-specific measures pertaining to the present research. 
The exploratory analyses that followed demonstrated that the measures had identifiable and 
interpretable parsimonious factor structures that were encouraging and in keeping with the 
literature and empirical research. Further, the reliability estimates demonstrated encouraging 
results that suggested that the operational measures largely succeeded in providing both a 
comprehensive and empirical grasp of the constructs as defined.  Further, one-way ANOVA 
analyses also revealed no significant difference between black and other managers across the 
pilot samples used to validate the operational measures. On the whole, these custom measures 
revealed small differences between the groups evidenced by small effect sizes. The evidence 
suggested that these measures could be applied with confidence in further studies. 
Extant research findings using students may not generalize or be equivalent to managers 
decision makers.  Students may not be ideal surrogates for managers since empirical findings 
may not generalize to managers. The present researcher was able to overcome this limitation. 
The sample of the present research is reflective of actual managers (mean age of 38.9 years, SD 
of 7.49). Most  managers were postgraduates (77%) with black (15.8%) and women (30.1%) 
managers represented. Most managers (60%) occupied positions that entailed the management 
and coordination of divisions or business units at a senior or executive level. In these positions 
they are required to analyze opportunities and macro-economic factors within a national 
business or international context.  
This study sought to evaluate the hypothesized causal relationship linking the distal 
individual variables and the proximal influence of self-efficacy beliefs with decision-generated 
affect and the allocation of attentional resources as mediators of the intentions and direction of 
managerial decision behaviour. SEM was chosen as the data analysis strategy of choice because 
it is suitable to testing an entire system of direct and mediated relations in this proposed causal 
structure, not just the contribution of isolated predictors. 
 
Discussion of Results 
 
The evaluation of the measurement part of the model was assessed first in order to 
confirm the interpretability of the final structural model. The CFA findings failed to find 
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support that satisfactorily confirmed an adequate measurement of allocation of attentional 
resources. The selection of operational indicators to represent the allocation of attentional 
resources as a latent variable suggested that they were more likely representing different 
underlying latent variables or that the allocation of attentional resources represent a 
multidimensional construct that may incorporate negative affect, threat-oriented cognitions and 
avoidant preferences. 
The interconstruct correlations demonstrated evidence of discriminant validity. Self-
efficacy beliefs and cognitive ability were empirically independent. This empirical 
independence of cognitive ability and self-efficacy beliefs underscores self-efficacy beliefs as a 
proximal task-specific motivational construct to act as a threshold variable that determines 
whether individuals choose to deploy their available attentional resources. Cognitive ability and 
social self-confidence traits were empirically distinct and in accordance with previous 
empirical findings. Self-efficacy beliefs displayed a positive relationship with the quality of 
MDM processes as was expected. Social self-confidence (i.e., confidence and willingness to 
engage in social influence) showed a positive linear relationship with MDM and also displayed 
a positive linear relation with self-efficacy beliefs. This was in accordance with the view that 
generic self-efficacy beliefs (i.e., confidence) and domain self-efficacy beliefs are not entirely 
independent. Moreover, social self-confidence was also independent from cognitive ability but 
related to self-efficacy beliefs.  
Cognitive ability (i.e., upper level of available attentional resources capacity) and self-
efficacy beliefs displayed a negative relationship with decision-generated affect and the 
volitional allocation of attentional resources.  Decision-generated affect is relevant for the 
allocation of attentional resources. Negative affective self-reactions divert attentional resources 
away from effortful cognitive and interpersonal information collection, deliberation, influence 
and negotiation, in order to minimize threat and conserve attentional resources. The inter-
construct correlations confirmed this and provided confidence that they were related in a 
manner that supported the theorizing in the proposed model of relations in MDM. 
Subjecting the structural model to further scrutiny by way of a spectrum of goodness-
of-fit statistics, revealed that the model was not adequate and the null hypothesis that the model 
fits the population data was subsequently rejected.  It was sensible to assess the degree of lack 
of fit of the model with reference to further  measures.  The model was compared to a model 
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with a sample of N < 250, with 12 to 30 measured indicators, which requires a RMSEA of < 
.08, a CFI of .95 or better, and a SRMR of .08 or less. The smaller than .08 value of RMSEA of 
the structural model indicated a reasonable model fit. The CFI compared the goodness of fit 
among several models and an unsatisfactory model fit was indicated by a CFI of .87. Finally, 
the SRMR value was not higher than .10 at .09.  On the whole, these findings suggest the 
possibility of a more elaborate model. Further, the poor evidence found for convergent validity 
of the measured indicators for the latent variable (allocation of attentional resources) made it 
difficult to rule out the possibility that the poor structural model fit was due to inherent 
structural flaws but rather to shortcomings in the operationalization of this latent variable. 
There was some confirmation in accordance with extant theory and previous empirical 
findings (see for example, Ferris et al., 2005; Hochwarter et al., 2006; Judge et al., 2007; 
Kolodinsky et al., 2007; Schmidt et al., 2008; Sullivan et al., 2003; Wayne et al., 1997). Cognitive 
ability and social self-confidence demonstrated jointly accounted for 27% of the variance in 
decision-generated affect. The direct effect of decision-generated affect also showed a 
significant beta weight on the allocation of attentional resources. Further, the indirect effect of 
cognitive ability and social self-confidence on the allocation of attentional resources was also 
significant.    
Of specific importance to this research was the fact that the contribution of self-efficacy 
beliefs was less prominent in the presence of cognitive ability. Removing cognitive ability and 
social self-confidence as influences in the original structural model reduced the causal direct 
and indirect influence of self-efficacy beliefs on the quality of MDM processes and outcomes.  
This suggested that estimates were greater for cognitive ability than for both self-efficacy 
beliefs and social self-confidence in MDM.  By and large, these findings echo previous 
empirical research. A plausible argument is that the incremental validity of cognitive ability is 
stronger when compared to distal personality traits and the proximal influence of self-efficacy 
beliefs when individuals are faced with broader and complex decisions. Consequently, the 
contribution of self-efficacy beliefs as determinants of the intentions that shape the decisional 
behaviour of managers could be smaller for high cognitive ability individuals but larger for low 
cognitive ability individuals (i.e., implying an interaction effect). 
Self-efficacy beliefs and other constructs vie for predictive supremacy in many studies 
of performance and the present study was approached in order to offer evidence of self-efficacy 
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beliefs‘ commonality with other determinants and its mediating effects on managerial 
decisional behaviour.  In this regard, Bandura (1984, 2008) argues that commonality of 
mechanisms should not be confused with exclusivity of mechanism. Accordingly,  the aim of 
this study was not to suggest that self-efficacy beliefs will ―upsurp the lion‘s share of the 
variance in human conduct‖ (Bandura, 1984, p. 252). When these other determinants are 
controlled for, self-efficacy beliefs do prove to contribute to individual differences in MDM 
processes and outcomes.  
The next chapter discusses the theoretical and practical contributions of the present 
research as well as the research‘s limitations and recommendations for future research. 
  
CHAPTER NINE 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
In the absence of a coherent and adequate theoretical framework of MDM the present 
researcher formulated a conceptual model of relations that reflect the constellations of 
theoretically relevant individual factors and their time-ordered influences on the allocation of 
attentional effort and the subsequent quality of decision processes and outcomes. As a 
psychological process MDM is defined as the manner in which managers construe the decision 
making context that influence the engagement and allocation of attentional resources that give 
rise to the volitional selection of cognitively effortful decision strategies to a course of action in 
order to satisfy multiple goals in MDM.  
After reviewing the large corpus of empirical findings empirical research on MDM was 
found to be limited and empirical knowledge on managers as decision makers remains scarce. 
Using scattered empirical findings across laboratory and field settings, the researcher was able 
to extract useful empirical generalizations that guided the formulation of a conceptual model of 
relations in MDM.  Moreover, the utility of a social cognitive approach was adopted to 
examine the interdependencies and cumulative effects among individual factors and affect as a 
temporal motivational processes that bear on the construct of MDM. 
These conceptual and empirical underpinnings culminated in a conceptual model of 
relations represented by the series of specific causal paths linking individual variable factors 
(distal influences) and self-efficacy beliefs (proximal influences). The single and primary aim 
of the study was to establish the postulated ordering of these causal paths linking individual 
variable factors (distal influences), self-efficacy beliefs (as proximal influences) and temporal 
processes as a whole, as a plausible model to account for individual differences that influence 
the engagement and allocation of attentional resources that give rise to the selection of 
cognitively effortful information search, deliberation and rational social influence in MDM.   
This chapter discusses the general conclusions that derive from the results and 
discussion as presented in Chapter Five, Seven and Eight. This will be done by connecting 
these results with the original objectives of this study, as well as the theory and research used to 
support the arguments for the study. The conclusions also include the practical implications and 
recommendations for future research of this type of  investigation. 
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In order to establish whether this proposed model provides a plausible explanation of 
the specific paths or a postulated ordering of causal paths as proposed (as illustrated in Figure 
5.2) the following research questions were investigated:  
 
• Does the proposed model offer an adequate empirical fit that might provide adequate 
goodness-of-fit to the sample data? 
• Do cognitive ability, self-efficacy beliefs and social self-confidence independently account for 
the prediction of decision-generated affect in MDM?  
• Does decision-generated affect and the allocation of attentional resources as temporal 
processes mediate the quality of MDM processes and outcomes? 
 
The first subsection of this chapter summarizes the findings of the EFA in order to 
operationalize the latent variables and to identify an understandable and interpretable 
parsimonious factor structures associated with each of the latent variables.  This is followed by 
a summary of the CFA results used to verify the psychometric quality of the measurement 
model, the magnitude of the relations and independence between latent variables in the 
proposed model. 
 
The Factorial Structure of MDM in the current study 
 
The exogenous variables (i.e., cognitive ability and social self confidence), synonymous 
with independent variables, have been previously operationalized and used in studies 
performed in other contexts. A pilot study was employed to determine the factor structures of 
the dimensionality and internal consistency of the custom designed indicator measures that 
were employed as endogenous, dependent variables in this study. An exploratory approach was 
followed to operationalize the endogenous latent variables and EFA identified understandable 
and interpretable parsimonious factor structures associated with each of the endogenous latent 
variables under consideration. Further, the external construct validity, by way of both 
convergent as well as discriminative validity, of the custom-designed scales provided a degree 
of trust in their psychometric properties and succeeded in providing an empirical understanding 
of the constructs under consideration in keeping with the literature and empirical research. 
Reliability estimates also confirmed a degree of trust in the indicators‘ properties in providing 
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an uncontaminated measure of the defined constructs. In addition, each of the measured 
indicators and their associated factor structures, were structurally equivalent for the major 
ethnic groups in the current study. The present researcher concluded that these population 
groups had similar interpretations of the latent variables used in the subsequent analyses of the 
current study. The distributional characteristics of the majority of the measured indicators 
however violated the assumptions of univariate normality and the high levels of leptokurtosis 
were noteworthy. This suggested that the distributions might reflect the idiosyncrasies unique 
to the specific sample which was particularly troublesome in this study.  
The proposition that a valid, reliable and interpretable factor structure for each of the 
identified latent variables existed was, on the whole, supported but not without some concern. 
The measured indicators based on the initial EFA in the pilot study (as highlighted in Chapter 
Four) provided better levels of fit than that of the subsequent CFA in the main study.  
Noteworthy was the failure of the selected indicators in their representation of two latent 
variables, namely, allocation of attentional resources and the quality of MDM processes and 
outcomes. The low loadings for the latent variable, allocation of attentional resources suggested 
that the selected operational indicators failed to provide an adequate empirical grasp to reflect 
this latent variable adequately because more than half of the variance for the specified 
indicators was not accounted for by the allocation of attentional resources. In addition 
bargaining and procedural rationality also displayed low loadings on the quality of MDM 
processes and outcomes.   
As unidimensionality means that a set of measured indicators has only one underlying 
fit on a single-factor, this failure of unidimensionality suggested that the measured indicators 
were more likely representing a complex multi-dimensional construct and, consequently, 
increased the likelihood of problems with interpretational confounding. Although both fatigue 
and decisional procrastination represented volitional allocation of attentional resources, the 
former might reflect an aversiveness (i.e., conservation) to allocate attentional resources, 
whereas the latter might reflect threat-orientated affect (i.e., an avoidance) toward allocation of 
attentional resources.  Despite the poor evidence for convergent validity the offending 
measured indicators were however retained given that the possibility of the inherent structural 
flaws in the operationalization of this latent variable might be harming the model and that the 
analysis of the hypothesized structural relations might be threatened.  
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Based on the empirical findings the following subsection outlines the viability of the 
proposed model of plausible constellations of associations and causal relationships that bear on 
individual differences in the quality of decision processes and outcomes in MDM. 
 
The Viability of the Proposed Model  
 
The present researcher set out to test the structural model motivated by an attempt to 
capture, in an equation structure, the hypothesized causal relationship linking the distal 
individual variables and the proximal influence of self-efficacy beliefs and mediating 
influences on the intentions and direction of managerial decision behaviour. SEM was adopted 
as the data analysis strategy of choice as implemented in AMOS 17.0 for Windows (Arbuckle, 
2008) and EQS 6.1 (Bentler, 2006). By considering all the relationships among the latent 
variables simultaneously in estimating parameters, SEM enabled the researcher to test the 
hypothesized relationships among the latent variables and to estimate the unique contribution of 
each latent variable in the structural model. EQS was valuable in the sense that it is the only 
program that offers the Satorra-Bentler scaled χ² and residual-based tests (Yuan-Bentler 
Residual-Based Test Statistic and the Yuan-Bentler Residual-Based F-Statistic) as the most 
accurate method for dealing with non-normal data. 
The spectrum of indices of goodness-of-fit statistics suggested that the model was not 
empirically valid in that the structural model did not fit the population data. Given the known 
sensitivity of absolute fit statistics to sample size, a wider range of fit statistics was utilized in 
order to evaluate the degree of lack of fit of the structural model. Benchmarked against a 
sample of N < 250, with 12 to 30 measured indicators, the structural model was acceptable to 
mediocre with a RMSEA of < .07, a CFI of .87 and a SRMR of .09. Furthermore, the structural 
model was less likely to cross-validate across samples of the same size from the present 
population. Finally, in order to ensure a thorough assessment of the fit of the structural model, 
the standardized residuals pointed to an overestimation of the covariance between the observed 
variables which could be remedied through pruning some of the paths. The researcher 
subsequently investigated the modification indices for possible model modification. This 
investigation revealed the existence of a number of correlated errors that suggested the 
possibility of an alternative, more elaborate nested model that might contain a number of 
additional paths. With no clear and convincing theoretical argument these hypothesized 
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additional pathways were problematic to explain and the researcher consequently refrained 
from any modifications because such actions are inconsistent with the theoretical basis of SEM.   
Finally, the discriminability between the latent variables and the extent to which each 
latent variable was truly distinct from other latent variables demonstrated that they were related 
to one another in a manner that supported the proposed model. Moreover, the standardized 
regression coefficients indexed the magnitude of the causal effects between the endogenous and 
exogenous latent variables as conceptualized.  
The present researcher set out to test a theory in an attempt to capture the causal 
processes and the interrelations among the variables as conceptualized in MDM. It is generally 
acknowledged that most models are useful approximations that do not fit perfectly in the 
population and the power of statistical hypothesis testing is to eliminate from consideration 
those models that are inconsistent with the available data. Detecting an underlying 
disagreement between theory and data is however controlled largely by the size of the sample. 
In a very large sample, small and unimportant departures from the null hypothesis are almost 
certain to be detected (Cochran, 1952). The small samples tests will show that the data are not 
significantly different from theory. If the sample is large, the test will show that the data are 
significantly different from those expected on a given theory even though the difference may be 
so slight as to be negligible or unimportant on other criteria (see, Gulliksen & Tukey, 1958). 
Consequently, whether any particular model truly reflects a causal process is hard to determine 
and cannot be done on the basis of empirical results alone, but hinges on placing a proposed 
model into a larger conceptual framework (Arbuckle, 2008; Bentler, 2006). At a minimum, key 
variables of relevance to the structural system must not be omitted, error of measurement must 
have appropriately been taken into account by the use of latent variables, and conditions and 
times of measurement must have been correctly specified to permit obtaining the hypothesized 
effects. 
The next subsection describes the theoretical contribution of the study. 
 
Theoretical Contribution of the Study 
 
A contribution of this study is that individual differences are valuable partners for 
theoretical accounts of MDM. A descriptively adequate and parsimonious understanding of the 
constellations of individual variables underlying MDM is important and an integral part of 
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decision making research. Bandura (1999) argues that the influence of individual variables on 
human functioning is often insufficiently recognized and various authors have called for more 
research on the degree to which individual variables and proximal self-regulatory skills in 
concert influence work behaviour (see, for example, Kanfer & Heggestad, 1997). Despite their 
theoretical and practical importance, Haleblian et al. (2004) observe that individual variables 
have largely been unexplored within decision making research and such a failure to elucidate 
what constellations of individual variables are jointly necessary in the decision making of 
managers has been a serious impediment to the progress and understanding of MDM.  
 For theory development purposes, a focus on the temporal properties of decision 
behaviour leads to an understanding of what a decision maker intends to do. Estimations of the 
causal nature of individual variables and their impact on temporal processes can aid as building 
blocks of theory development (e.g., Schmidt & Hunter,  2004; Klein & Zedeck, 2004). This 
study offers evidence to suggest that distal individual variables (i.e., cognitive ability and social 
self-confidence) exert their combined effects indirectly on individual differences in the quality 
of MDM processes and outcomes as mediated by temporal processes (i.e., decision-generated 
affect and allocation of attentional resources).  
The absolute and relative incremental contribution of self-efficacy beliefs were, 
however, less prominent in the presence of distal individual variables. Moreover, the estimates 
were greater for cognitive ability than for both self-efficacy beliefs and social self-confidence 
as causal influences in the prediction of the quality of MDM processes and outcomes. By and 
large, these findings accord with related empirical research that proximal self-report estimates 
and affect accounted for a small amount of variance in performance (Ackerman et al., 1995; 
Judge et al., 2007; Schmidt et al., 2008).  One possibility of this finding may be due in part to 
the way in which social self-confidence, as personality traits and self-efficacy beliefs, were 
measured. Both measures were self-report measures and Viswesvaran and Ones (2000) have 
pointed out that the coefficient alpha reliability of self-report measures is usually reasonably 
large and may overestimate the reliability because they do not take into account transient 
measurement error (variations in responses from day to day due to changing moods or other 
transient psychological states unrelated to the constructs being measured (Schmidt, Le, & Ilies, 
2003).  
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Other than testing the causal paths that focus on the degree to which self-efficacy 
beliefs mediated the effects of distal individual variables, the present study included the unique 
relationship of self-efficacy beliefs in combination with cognitive ability and social self-
confidence as distal individual variables. Further, the findings do not suggest that personality 
traits and self-efficacy beliefs have no utility. The present researcher pointed out that MDM is 
over-determined and embedded in a rich nomological network that contains numerous 
antecedent and/or consequential variables.  For theory development purposes, an accurate 
calibration of the absolute and relative sizes in isolation and in conjunction with one another 
provide evidence for the relative independence or communality of the various constructs for the 
purposes of predicting managerial decision behaviour.  
Although personality and social traits are considered to be proportionately less 
important than cognitive ability in MDM, the findings suggest that they are not subsumed by 
cognitive ability and that these traits make an incremental contribution to the quality of MDM 
processes and outcomes. The convergence and values of variance-extracted of the measured 
indicators confirmed the criterion space of MDM as grounded in high information-processing 
demands and complex social encounters.  MDM was confirmed as a dual, multifaceted process, 
i.e., a cognitive problem as well as the application of a rational mode of social influence in 
accordance with conceptual and empirical research. This confirmed that MDM requires 
empirically distinct and independent individual variables (i.e., cognitive ability and social self-
confidence personality traits).  
In addition, the evidence suggested that when the effects of distal individual variables 
(i.e., cognitive ability and social self-confidence) are removed, self-efficacy beliefs mediated 
the temporal processes (i.e., decision affect and allocation of attentional resources) to account 
for individual differences in the intentions and direction of managerial decision behaviour.  The 
underlying premise of self-efficacy beliefs is self-regulation of behaviour by cognitive, 
affective and motivational processes (Bandura, 1997, 2001) that determine their affective 
reactions, how much effort (i.e., allocation of attentional resources) they will expend and how 
long they will persevere when confronting obstacles in the face of adverse situations. Self-
efficacy beliefs were operationalised as a multidimensional construct as the exercise of 
personal control over affective outcomes by thought (creating an attentional bias which 
determines whether events are construed benignly or as emotionally perturbing) and action 
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(regulating affective states by supporting effective courses of action). The findings were in 
accord with previous empirical evidence that demonstrated that mediating influences as bearing 
on managers‘ internal attributions of their decision making competence.   
The evidence also suggests that cognitive ability and social self-confidence (as well as 
self-efficacy beliefs) have an effect on the quality of MDM processes and outcomes through 
multiple pathways. The relatively small incremental contribution of self-efficacy beliefs may 
have been suppressed by the inclusion of  cognitive ability as a suppressor variable. A 
suppressor variable is one that, when partialled out of another measure, increases the other 
measure‘s validity or regression weight by ‗suppressing‘ or partialling out invalid components 
of the first measure. Such suppression effects are common in complex models according to 
Cohen et al. (2003). Consequently, despite the hypothesis that higher self-efficacy beliefs 
caused an increase in decision-generated affect, such increases in affect could also have caused 
a change in cognitive ability (e.g., increased effort). Thus, self-efficacy beliefs may interact 
with cognitive ability such that high self-efficacy beliefs are especially beneficial for 
individuals with high cognitive ability and that the estimate of a causal effect of self-efficacy 
beliefs may be conditional on the level of cognitive ability as a moderator in the model. 
The causal process represented in the structural model is highly consistent with goal 
theory and adds importantly to it by illustrating how decision-generated affect is transformed 
into goal-directed behaviour.  In this model affect acts as information and as an incentive to be 
comprehensive and rational in decision making (i.e., to meet an accuracy goal) or to minimize 
decision-generated affect or to save attentional resources (i.e., resort to low-effort and 
impression motivated heuristics to economize decision processing). 
MDM constitutes effortful psychological acts that consume attentional resources. 
Although the selected indicators failed in their representation of the latent variable, allocation 
of attentional resources, the researcher alluded to the possibility that this latent variable is likely 
a multidimensional construct. The present researcher used decisional procrastination and 
fatigue as indicators yet they did not converge or share a high proportion of variance in 
common (i.e., convergent validity). Further, the composite construct reliability of .18 also 
served to confirm weak convergent validity. Parsimony encourages researchers to use the 
smallest number of indicators to adequately represent a latent variable and the researcher was 
faced with a dilemma in deciding how many indicators were needed to provide an  empirical 
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grasp in order to represent the allocation of attentional resources and still maximize reliability.  
More indicators require larger sample sizes and can make it difficult to produce truly 
unidimensional latent variables factors and increase the likelihood that artifact factors will be 
produced. The fact that the researcher has used only two measured indicators may not have 
captured the multidimensionality of attentional resources and may have increased the infeasible 
solution. 
In spite of this, the study suggests that choice aversion as a function of allocation of 
attentional resources may not in fact be a unitary construct. Weber and Johnson (2009) note, in 
this regard,  that although individuals are restricted by finite attentional capacity they are also 
blessed by an abundance of ways in which they can focus and utilize this finite capacity. These 
ways extend from goals to processes, one of which is to adopt an aversive stance to choice via 
one of several avoidant patterns (Anderson, 2003, 2007).  These patterns are all however 
subsumed by the volitional allocation of attentional resources as a higher order construct. 
Volitional processes determine whether or not an intention to act is fulfilled (Kuhl, 1987) and  
the attentional allure of off-task concerns or affective events can present a great challenge to 
individuals‘ ability to regulate task-focused attention (Weiss et al., 2005).  Consequently, 
volitional acquiescence to deploy attentional resources can provide the conceptual framework 
to study managers‘ willingness to act on the opportunity-affording features of a decision or 
favour aversion and avoidance to choice. These findings may advance what Frost and Shows 
(1993, p. 683) noted: ―almost all of the work on indecisiveness has been theoretical or 
descriptive‖and that ―further research on the nature of indecisiveness is warranted‖.   
 As was pointed out in Chapter Three there are no studies that have investigated a 
comprehensive model that includes cognitive ability, personality traits and self-efficacy beliefs 
in managerial samples and MDM (Hiller & Hambrick, 2005). This study is the first to 
investigate the relative independence or communality of distal individual differences and self-
efficacy beliefs as co-determinants of the quality of MDM processes and outcomes using actual 
managers.     
Other than a theoretical contribution, the study aids in both heuristic and applied utility. 
The work of managers is becoming more global and requires them to adjust to challenges in 
multi-cultural and multi-national settings. The nature of self-efficacy beliefs as a construct 
suggests that it is configurally equivalent across countries (see, for example, Sadri, 1996; 
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Schwarzer, 2002; Scholz, Dona, Sud, & Schwarzer, 2002) which thus substantiates it as 
universal and relevant to the study of MDM.   
 
Practical Utility of the Study 
 
Bandura (1984) asserted that human behaviour is multiply determined and its 
understanding and explanation require an appreciation of the interplay among the determinants 
that act as common mechanisms of personal agency. Commonality of mechanism, Bandura 
cautioned, should however not be confused with exclusivity of mechanism.  The present 
researcher approached this study not to suggest predictive supremacy of self-efficacy beliefs 
but to illustrate their communality and as a co-determinant of the ‗will-do‘ as opposed to the 
‗can-do‘  aspects of managerial decisional behaviour.  
The findings have important implications for understanding and theory construction and 
also for practical applications in employment selection (see, for example, Maertz, Bauerb, 
Mosley, Posthumad, & Campion, 2005). In applied settings, thorough assessment of individual 
differences in cognitive abilities is often excluded for a variety of reasons. Personality trait 
predictors may provide a useful partial proxy for such assessments when ability data are 
unavailable. However, as shown in this study, such proxy measures may introduce systematic, 
non-performance-related variance into the equation. 
Decision making is arguably the most critical component of a manager‘s job, and 
flawed decision making processes and outcomes decide the fate of their organizations with 
consequential outcomes. Competence in decision making is not synonymous with performance. 
The multidimensionality of performance in MDM is influenced by a number of factors, 
including individual ability and stable personality traits internal to an individual (e.g., 
knowledge and skills), external factors (e.g., contextual factors), and transitory factors (e.g., 
proximal task and context influences).  In most instances, managers undertake the decision 
process in a context of competing goals and objectives, together with information overload—
conditions that greatly exceed individuals‘ cognitive (attentional resources) capability, the very 
conditions that evoke affect as by-products of the decisional process. This makes managers 
most vulnerable to the volitional deployment of effort precisely when they are extended to deal 
with such demands.  
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Cognitive ability, personality traits and proximal (task-situation specific) motivational 
constructs, particularly self-efficacy beliefs should consequently be used to identify individuals 
who can;  perform in such roles (see, for example, Chen et al., 2000; Ferris et al., 2001), deal 
with high levels of accountability (e.g., Hochwarter et al., 2007), manage work stressors (e.g., 
Schaubroeck & Merritt, 1997), and cope with role overload (e.g., Brown et al., 2005).  In this 
regard, Beal et al. (2005) assert that, although assessments of stable levels of cognitive ability 
have been exceedingly successful in selecting better performing individuals, the ability to 
regulate behaviour and attention represents a set of abilities that is relatively untapped in the 
realm of personnel selection.  The DMSEQ developed for this study may prove useful in this 
regard.  
Further, in spite of their relative small incremental contribution to MDM, one advantage 
of self-efficacy beliefs is that they are relatively malleable contextually situated patterns that 
are relatively easy to change (Chen et al., 2000; Kanfer 1996; Kanfer & Ackerman, 1996; 
Kanfer & Heggestadt, 1997). Changes in self-efficacy beliefs and performance show self-
corrections where individuals defer to actual performance as a stronger predictor of confidence 
for future performance (McNatt & Judge, 2004; Richard et al., 2006; Shea & Howell, 2000; 
Vancouver et al., 2002; Vancouver et al., 2001). Given appropriate cognitive ability, successful 
performance is often as much a matter of beliefs in capability (Wood & Bandura, 1989a) and 
when individuals believe that their competence is dynamic, malleable, and able to be developed 
(an incremental theory), they tend to focus less on fixed ability and traits and appreciate 
outcomes and actions in terms of more specific behavioural or psychological mediators 
(Dweck, 2006; Dweck & Molden, 2005; Elliot & Dweck, 2005; Kanfer & Ackerman, 2005; 
Wood & Bandura, 1989a). Consequently, measures of self-efficacy can help practitioners 
predict pretraining motivation, tailor specific coaching or training programmes, and moderate 
the influence of training interventions (see, for example, Bandura, 2000; Kanfer & Heggestadt, 
1997; Stajkovic, 2006; Stevens & Gist, 1997). 
 
Limitations and Recommendations 
 
 
In interpreting the findings of the present study, it is important to recognize the 
limitations of the design and methods. Primary among these is the cross-sectional and 
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retrospective nature of the study. As an ex post facto study, the variables of interest in this 
study did not provide an opportunity to manipulate the variables. Demonstration of causality is 
a logical and experimental, rather than statistical, problem since causality can only be 
addressed via appropriate design. Further, as data collection was cross-sectional it cannot rule 
out cohort effects. Moreover, individuals respond to measures at just one point in time and, 
given the subjective nature of some of the measures, it was possible that individuals might 
respond differently at a different time or context. These are the exact arguments Vancouver et 
al. (2001) and Vancouver et al. (2002) used to argue that an over-reliance on cross-sectional, 
correlational designs might mask the complexity of the proposed relations in the model. 
An additional limitation was the fact that 4 out of 6 of the latent variables employed two 
measured indicators. Hair et al. (1998) note in this regard that three is the preferred minimum 
number of indicators and as a practical matter five to seven indicators should represent most 
latent variables adequately. Further, given some of the communalities and that the model 
included some under-identified latent variables (fewer than 3 measured indicators) constructs, 
Hair et al. (2006) propose a minimum sample size of 300 or more to recover population 
parameters. With SEM being a large sample technique, Savalei and Bentler (2006) suggest a 
rule of thumb of at least 10 observations per measured indicator. The present researcher used 
18 measured variables and the sample was 196. Nevertheless the conclusions drawn from the 
model based on the sample may not be fully trusted.  Also, given the goal to estimate the 
plausibility of the model of relations in MDM the researcher was faced with data from a 
restricted managerial population in an attempt to estimate parameters of the unrestricted 
managerial population using a sample of managers nominated for assessment (a restricted 
sample). Consequently, findings may be due to a type of range restriction, based on a 
‗selecting-out‘ process, which was not accounted for in the present study. 
The present researcher treated the discrete negative anticipated and immediate affect as 
indicators of a higher order affective construct, that is decision-generated affect. Although the 
aggregation was psychometrically justified, it may have obscured the actual subjective 
experiences associated with the particular discrete affective reactions. Subjectively experienced 
decision-affect remains difficult to capture (see, for instance, Judge et al., 2006). The present 
researcher used a self-description of experienced affect in order to assess individuals‘ 
subjective context-specific appraisals of their competence and affective reactions. This 
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retrospective nature of measurement may have resulted in a form of self-generated validity in 
which responses to one part of the scale were reactive to earlier self-reports of personality traits 
in spite of being administered in a temporal order. Further, individuals  might have only limited 
awareness of their true decision-affect, or they might have reported affective reactions they 
believed the researcher wanted them to experience. The results of this measure may thus have 
been inflated by common sources of variance. To address this, Roseman and Evdokas (2004) 
propose supplementing self-reports with other sources of information about affective reactions, 
such as facial expression and physiological measures. A useful methodology to consider is 
experience sampling methodology (ESM). ESM is a type of repeated data collection method in 
which individuals provide in situ reports of their experiences over a period of time (Beal & 
Weiss, 2003). This enables information that assesses the influence of decision-affect at the 
point in time when it occurs. ESM combines the ecological validity of naturalistic behavioural 
observation with the precision of scaled questionnaire measures. For example, Foo et al. (2009) 
used a cell phone-based ESM in order to monitor entrepreneurs‘ positive and negative decision-
affect in real time (see also, Bono, Foldes, Vinson, & Muros, 2007; Fisher, 2000; 2002; Fisher 
& Noble, 2004).  
Finally, this study demonstrated that MDM is much more that reason-based decision 
behaviour. It offers an abundance of additional research problems in order to understand the 
largely neglected influence of the temporal order of ‗hot processes‘ for the deployment of effort 
to be comprehensive in decision making or to resort to low-effort heuristics and economize 
processing (i.e., save or conserve attentional resources). To this end, Beach and Connolly 
(2005) conclude that this abundance of problems suggests that it is a good time to be working 
in this discipline, the enterprise is exciting and fun, it is worthwhile and the future looks bright.  
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APPENDIX I 
 
 
 
Date 
 
Dear 
 
 
You are being asked to participate in a research study.  We are going to give you information 
that will help you to understand the study, and what you will be asked to do during the study, 
the risks and benefits, and your rights as a study subject.  If anything is not clear to you, please 
ask the researcher to explain. 
 
I am currently registered at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University and conducting 
research on managerial decision making.  The aim of this research is to investigate how well 
experienced managers use decisional skills they possess.  The manner in which individuals 
approach complex decision tasks may be affected by beliefs in their competence that are self-
enhancing or self-impeding and the research aims to investigate this notion. 
 
This study has been approved by the Human Ethics Committee of the Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan University.  This is a group of independent experts whose responsibility it is to 
help ensure that the rights and welfare of participants in research are protected and  that the 
study is carried out in an ethical manner.  The study cannot be conducted without the Human 
Ethics Committee‘s approval.  The Human Ethics Committee can also answer any questions 
about your rights as a research subject. 
 
Your contribution in this research study entails inventorying your views about your own 
problem solving and decision-making behaviour. Some of the measures we will use for the 
purposes of this research will be clearly marked ―for research purposes only‖ and will not be 
used at all for the purposes of the assessment you have been nominated for.   
 
Participation in the research is completely voluntary.  You are not obliged to take part in the 
research.  If you choose not to participate, your position will not be affected in any way and 
you will incur no consequence to which you may otherwise be entitled.  Your identity will 
remain confidential.  The results of this research study may be presented at scientific 
conferences or in specialist publications, but your identity will not be made known. 
 
You will be asked to give your written informed consent to participate by signing and dating a 
form putting your initials against each section to indicate that you  understand and agree to the 
conditions.  You have the right to ask questions concerning the study at any time.  You should 
also immediately report to the researcher any concerns you may have during the administration 
of these inventories.  If you agree to take part, you have the right to change your mind at any 
time during the course of the assessment.  You are free to withdraw this consent and 
discontinue participation at any time.  However, if you do withdraw from the study, you should 
inform the administrator so that the data collection may be stopped in an orderly manner. 
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The telephone numbers of the researcher are provided on this letter head.  Call this number if 
you have any questions or concerns about the study. 
 
This informed consent has been prepared in compliance with the Professional Board  for 
Psychology. 
 
Yours sincerely 
Wim Myburgh 
 
Industrial Psychologist 
Health Professions Council of South Africa 
Registration no.: PS0015873 
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APPENDIX II 
 
INFORMATION AND INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
TITLE OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT: 
 
AN EXPLORATION OF MANAGERIAL DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES AND 
AFFECTIVE OUTCOMES AS A FUNCTION OF INDIVIDUAL VARIABLE FACTORS 
AND SELF-EFFICACY BELIEFS 
 
NELSON MANDELA METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY 
 
PRINCIPLE INVESTIGATOR:  Wim Myburgh 
 
Supervisor: Prof. M. B. Watson 
 
  Co-Supervisor: Prof. C. D. Foxcroft 
 
ADDRESS:  46 Barnet Street, Gardens 8001, CAPE TOWN 
 
CONTACT TELEPHONE NO.: 021 462 4883 
 
DECLARATION BY OR ON BEHALF OF PARTICIPANT INITIA
L 
I, THE UNDERSIGNED, 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………
… 
                                                       (name) 
 
In my capacity as participant in the managerial assessment process, of  
 
………………………………………………………………………………………
…. 
 
………………………………………………………………….. (address) 
 
                                HEREBY CONFIRM AS FOLLOWS:  
I was invited to participate in the abovementioned research project which is  
being undertaken by Wim Myburgh of Psymetric in conjunction with the 
Faculty of Health Sciences of the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan  University. 
 
The following aspects have been explained to me. 
AIM: The investigator is studying how well experienced managers use their 
decision skills in complex decision tasks.  The information will be used for the  
Requirements for the degree of Doctor Philosophiae. 
 
Procedures:  I understand that I will be asked to disclose my decision making 
behaviour and preferences through a series of inventories, exercises and an 
interview. 
 
Possible benefits:  As a result of my participation in this study I may gain an  
310 
 
understanding of the influence of my own self-competence beliefs more fully 
which may help to improve my managerial decision making performance.  The 
findings, if disclosed to me during feedback, may suggest how to achieve this. 
Confidentiality:  My identity will not be revealed in any discussion, description 
or scientific publications by the investigator. 
 
 
Access to findings:    Any new information / or benefit that develop during the 
course of the study will be made available to me should I request this. 
 
My participation is voluntary:  My decision whether or not to participate will in 
no way affect my employment. 
 
 
1. The information above was explained to  by …………………………….. 
 
(name of relevant person) in Afrikaans / English / Xhosa / other 
………… 
 
and I am in command of this language / it was satisfactorily translated 
to me 
 
 by ………………………………… (name of translator). 
 
I was given the opportunity to ask questions and all these questions 
were 
answered satisfactorily. 
 
 
 
2. No pressure was exerted on me to consent to participation and I 
understand that I may withdraw at any stage without consequences to 
me. 
 
 
 
3. Participation in this study will not result in any additional cost to 
myself. 
 
 
 
I HEREBY CONSENT VOLUNTARILY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE 
ABOVEMENTIONED PROJECT. 
 
Signed / confirmed at …………………………………………………………….. 
 
On ………………………………… 200…… 
 
…………………………………………………….(place) 
………………………….                                       …………………………….. 
Signature of participant                                          Signature of witness 
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IMPORTANT MESSAGE TO PARTICIPANT 
 
 
Dear Participant 
 
Thank you for your participation in this study.  Should you at any time during the study, 
 
  experience a concern as a result of the research, or 
 
  you require any further information with regard to the study 
 
   ……………………………………………………………………………….. 
   ……………………………………………………………………………….. 
(indicate any circumstances which should be reported to the investigator) kindly contact 
Wim Myburgh at telephone number 021-4624883 or at email wim@psymetric.co.za 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
